IR 05000320/1987005
| ML20238A051 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1987 |
| From: | Bell J, Dan Collins, Moslak T, Travers W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238A038 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-87-05, 50-320-87-5, NUDOCS 8709090112 | |
| Download: ML20238A051 (10) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Report No.
50-320/87-05 Docket No. 50-320 License No. DPR-73 Priority Category C -- Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile-Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection Co i.ed: JWie 23, 1987 m July 31, 1987 \\ q /O<,t R7 i Inspectors: I T. Moslak, Res'ident Inspector (TMI-2) date sYgndd db* 8!1/!d2 - 11, Senior Radiatioil Specialist d6te tigrfed - ~L Yb. D a o~ slu/n ' %g llins, Rad' ion Specialist qtte/sigrfed Approved By: k k Shd99 W. OTrers, Director, TMI-2 Cleanup Project date s'igned UTrectorato Inspection Summary: Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection by site inspectors of plant operations, defueling operations, housekeeping conditions within the Reactor l Building, shipments of radioactive materials, radioactive sludge processir.g, l ' radioactive resin spill, and the implementation of radiological controls.
Results: No violations were identified.
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- , -_-. - [[b - ' <,. ' _ DETAILS a.c 1.0 Routine Plant Operations InspectionsLof the facility were. conducted'to assess compliance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications ano Recovery Operations Plan Lin the following areas: licensee review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; piant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, including plant cleanliness; control of switching and tagging; fire protection; licensee control of routine and special evolutions, including control. room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of , documents,-including log keeping-practices; radiological controls; and security plan implementation.
' Inspections of. the control room were performed during regular and .L backshift hours. The Shift. Foreman's Log and selected portions of the Control Room Operator's. Log were reviewed for the period June 23, 1987 through July 31, 1987. Other -logs reviewed during the inspection period included theLSubmerged Deminerali~er System Operations Log,-Radiological Controls Foreman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log Sheets.
, Operability of :imponents in systems required to be available for . response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform .their intended functions.
The inspector attended selected licensee planning meetings.
Shift staffing for licensed and non-licensed personnel was' determined to be adequate.
No violations were identified.
2.0 ' Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings .'(Closed) Unresolved Item (320/87-03-02): Dose assessment for moustache contamination.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's dose assessment and established that an acceptable method was used in determining the dose resulting from the personnel contamination.
The assessment in conjunction with other dosimetry records established that NRC dose limits were not exceeded. A related Inspector Follow Item concerning additional considerations with respect to the licensee's written procedures for dose assessment remains ( open.
. 3.0 Defueling Operations During this reporting period, defueling operators continued the removal of fuel assembly stubs from the reactor vessel. The work was primarily , performed with the core debris digger and the fuel assembly puller tool.
" To date, a total of 60 (out of 177) fuel assemblies have been loaded into l canisters.
Canisters, containing partial fuel assemblies, that were L considered to be lightly loaded were topped off with loose rods picked from core grid locations previously occupied by fuel stubs.
Prior to loading, the rods were sized using the heavy duty hydraulic shears.
Using the fuel assembly puller tool, workers attempted to engage the b - -- - - - __-- ___ _ ____ ___ _
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.. inner ring of the reactor vessel " donut".
The donut consists of a solid mass of agglomerated core-debris that resulted from past core boring (swiss cheesing) operations.
Following several unsuccessful attempts to engage the donut, the task was stopped and the lessons learned are being evaluated to further refine the technine for handling the donut.
Operational tests were conducted on the lower head vacuuming system.
The i preliminary findings suggest that the system worked as designed but the immediate loss of underwater visibility was apparently caused by the relatively large volume of fines which were too small for retention by the system knockout canister. As a possible corrective action, the licensee is evaluating the integration of a filter canister into the system.
4.0 Reactor Building Entries The inspector monitored the licensee's conduct of reactor building (RB) work during the inspaction period.
The following were reviewed on a sampling basis: l planning and coordination of the various aspects of the work, -- including ALARA reviews and equipment preparation.
planning and implementation of radiological safety measures,
-- including locked high radiation area authorizations, specific work instructions, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), alarming self-reading , dosimetry, and breathing zone air sampling.
I l personnel training in emergency procedures and the use of specially -- developed procedures and mockups for unique tasks.
On June 25, the inspector entered the Reactor Building (RB) to evaluate the radiological and housekeeping conditions.
The Deputy Manager of Radiological Field Operations, the Industrial Safety / Radiological Assessor, and the Radiological Controls Director for IMI-2 accompanied the inspector.
Housekeeping conditions were evaluated for the radwaste storage areas, general work areas, and equipment staging / repair areas, on the 305' elevation and 347' elevation.
The inspector expressed several concerns to licensee representatives regarding the following conditions: floor areas and stairways were strewn with paper and pieces of tape.
-- the area surrounding the Coagulant / Filter-Aid pump skids was covered -- with dry diatomaceous earth.
radwaste storage areas were heavily congested.
-- combustible material, e.g. cardboard boxes and tubes, was stored in -- l open waste receptacles.
dipment and materials that are not routinely used were -- a nstricting walkways.
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c: .. Laccess to a fire hose reel appeared to be restricted by material -- stored in the.immediate area.
As a result of. these concerns, the inspector met with licensee managers ,. on July 14, 1987 to discuss programmatic changes that were being made to.
- f improve housekeeping in the RB. On July 16, 1987,. the inspector
. performed another examination of conditions in the'RB.
From'the re-inspection, the inspector observed improvements in overall l housekeeping and-determined that the previously identified concerns were.
. satisfactorily resolved.- No violations were identified.
' S.0 Health Physics and Environmental Review p-a.
Plant Tours The NRC site _ Radiation Specialists performed-inspection tours of the plant, including all radiological control' points and selected radiologically controlled areas. Among the areas inspected were the reactor building, the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings, EPICOR-II, the' Radiochemistry Laboratories, the Laundry and- -Respirator Maintenance Facility, the Waste Handling and Packaging ' Facility, the Interim Solid Waste Storage Facility, and the l-.. Radiological Controls' Instrument Facility.
! -Among the items inspected were: Access control to radiologically controlled areas -- Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements -- Proper use, storage, cleaning, maintenance, and repair of L -- respiratory protection devices and associated equipment l' , Maintenance and storage of emergency respiratory equipment -- Use of radiological instrumentation.
-- Use of survey meters and other radiological instruments.
--- l ! The inspectors reviewed the implementation of radiological controls L during day shifts, on backshifts, and on weekends. Log books
maintained by Radiological Controls Field 0perations to record activities in the reactor building and the balance of the plant were , reviewed for completeness and accuracy. All of the log books contained appropriate entries.
The inspectors conducted off-sh'ft and weekend inspections on June 24 and 27, and July 10, 26, and 28, 1987.
No violations were identified.
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. b.
Radioactive Material Shipments , The inspectors reviewed preparations and conduct of radioactive materials shipments on July 23 and 26, 1987, including observation of the preparation and dispatch of two railcar-mounted cask shipments of THI-2 core debris to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The inspector's reviews of shipments covered: ' Verification that the recipient is properly licensed -- Verification of compliance with 10 CFR Part 61 radioactive --- waste disposal regulations Verification of compliance with approved packaging and shipping -- procedures Proper preparation of shipping papers -- Package labeling and vehicle placarding -- Instructions to vehicle operators -- Verification of compliance with regulatory limits for -- radioactive contamination and radiation dose rates.
The inspector's review consisted of observations of shipping canister loading, performance of radiation and contamination surveys, and examination of shipping papers, procedures, and vehicles.
No violations were identified.
c.
Records Review The inspector reviewed selected licensee records related to occupational radiation exposure with respect to their accuracy and completeness, including Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), Dosimetry Investigative Reports, incident / Event Reports, Radiological Awareness Reports, Dosinetry Exception Reports, Bioassay Reports, Respiratory Protection Device Fit Tests, and medical examinations.
The inspector also reviewed other licensee records and periodic reports concerning the radiological controls program, including current data and trends in such areas as person-rem per RWP nour, decontamination status, skin contaminations, environmental monitoring, progress toward achieving goals and objectives, storage tank radioactivity content, airborne radioactivity, effluent releases (including sump releases and sources of sump contamination), and the cumulative dose to plant personnel.
No violations were identified.
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Personnel Contamination Control ~ The' inspector. reviewed the licensee's progress in implementing certain portions ~of its planned' program (See Report 320/87-03) to improve control of personnel _ contaminations, define the extent of~ the " hot particle" problem, and clarify skin dose assessment' methods and procedures.
The inspector' reviewed various written Radiological Controls documents ' describing the " hot particle program", specific actions to be taken by certain departments, training provided and to be-provided specific to hot particles, special " frisking" requirements and other hot particle detection and evaluation methods, the designation of !' hot. particle areas" within the plant, and the . performance of additional personnel contamination surveys specific to the hot particle problem.
In addition, the inspector observed special general employee and health physics technician training sessions on hot particles.
It I was also noted that the' licensee has improved its detection and assessment capabilities for hot particles, and surface contamination in general, through the use of modified detection and measuring ' instruments and the installation of a more sensitive portal monitor at the Unit 2 processing center exit from the protected area.
Further, the inspector reviewed the results of a plant-wide " tacky paper" survey for hot particles and noted that modifications to the protective ~ clothing'(PC) post-laundering radiation survey and laundering processes have been instituted in order to further reduce skin contaminations from " clean" PCs.
The inspector will continue-to follow the licensee's implementation of its planned program to improve personnel contamination control.
e.
Radioactive Sludge Solidification The inspector reviewed the progress made in efforts to solidify and dispose of the sludge that was pumped with the use of a robot from the reactor building basement to the "A" spent resin storage tank - (SRST).
The characteristics of the reactor building sludge is such that stabilization is required by 10 CFR Part 61 prior to disposal. The licensee has chosen a contractor-provided methodology (cement solidification) for stabilization of the sludge.
In a letter dated November 30, 1983, the contractor submitted to the NRC a topical report describing a method for demonstrating compliance with waste structural stability requirements (Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. Mobile Cement Solidification System Topical Report CNSI-2 (4314-01354-01P-A)). The process control program for demonstrating that the waste to be stabilized is compatible with the approved procedures and chemicals indicated in the topical report has been initiated and observed by . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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i . the inspector.
The contractor performed test solidification in accordance with the licensee's approved procedure 4231-0PS-3233.03, " Process Control Plan for CNSI Cement Solidification System", Revision'0-00, dated January 20, 1987.
As of the end of this ) reporting period, the process had not been concluded,'and a specific formulation had not been selected.
The licensee's plan.; also include solidification of spent resin l beads'from the cleanup and the makeup and purification demineralizers using cement solidification.
No violations were identified.
The inspector will continue to follow these evolutions, g.
Resin Spill The inspector reviewed TMI-2 Event Report 87-065 concerning a spill of radioactively contaminated ion exchange resin on July 24, 1987.
The spill occurred in the Auxiliary Building during a resin transfer j operation.
No personnel overexposure occurred and the area that I was contaminated was readily isolated.
The cleanup demineralizers are part of the liquid radwaste system designed to accept reactor coolant from the reactor coolant bleed tanks (RCBT), remove contaminants from the coolant and return the water to the RCBT, or route it to the reactor coolant evaporator.
There are nitrogen inlet connections in the tops of the demineralizers to provide a cover gas or pressure for sluicing resins from the demineralizers. Waste gas vents in the tops of the demineralizers allow overpressure ga:. to be vented into the waste gas system.
On July 23, 1987, the "A" demineralized resin was sluiced to the "B" spent resin storage tank (SRST) without incident.
This provided experience for the transfer of the "B" demineralized resins to the "B" SRST. On July 24, 1987, prior to the sluicing, service air was provided to the "B" demineralized to " fluff" the resins.
Fluffing ' of the resins was done to break up any small agglomerations of resin beads and to make it easier to sluice the resins.
(The "A" demineralized resins had not been fluffed on the previous day).
After fluffing the resin, the operators sluiced the resin into the "B" SRST.
A decontamination operation was in process concurrently inside the "B" and "C" RCBT room on the other side of a concrete wall separating the demineralized area from the RCBT area. Workers were spraying decontamination water on top of the tanks and on the overheads and wall surfaces of the room. While in the room, the workers noticed a foam, then water, then a silt-like material come l up through a floor drain in the RCBT room.
The workers noted that l the cumulative dose readings on their digital dosimeters began l increasing at a more rapid rate than had teen previously noted.
[ Workers are trained that an unexpected chaage in radiological conditions is cause for stopping work, seeking radiological l [ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
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. assistance and determining the hazard associated with the unexpected condition prior to resuming work. Consequently, the workers exited the room and reported the event to the Radiological Controls Technician covering the resin transfer.
The transfer was secured and an investigation conducted which identified a. water drain trap connection to the waste gas vent header as the source of the material that emerged from the floor drain. The low point water trap in the vent gas system feeds into the Auxiliary Building floor drain system in the "B&C" RCBT room.
It was determined that a water / air / resin mixture was forced into the waste gas vent header when service air was used to fluff the resin in the "B" demineralized.
The areas affected were surveyed: the "A" cleanup demineralized had been 100 mR/hr, and was now 124 R/hr; "B&C" RCBT room had been 100 mR/hr and was now 1 - 2 R/hr with beta 0.5-1 Rad /hr; contact readings on the material'on the floor of the RCBT room were as high as 12.5 R/hr and 30 Rad /hr beta. Appropriate actions were taken to evaluate and cleanup the spill which covered about 25 square feet of the floor of the RCBT room.
Other immediate corrective actions included: designation of the tank room as a " red tag key area", because -- of the high beta dose rates, and thereby imposing a requirement for management approval for access to the area assessment of the dose received by the two workers in the RCBT -- room Long term corrective actions include the following: decontamination of the "B&C" RCBT room -- determination of the root causes of the event, including the -- status of valve internals and resin retention elements review of system operation for this and future resin transfers -- incorporation of lessons learned into planning for other -- transfers of makeup and purification demineralized resins.
No violations were identified.
The inspector will follow progress in the cleanup and evaluation of this incident.
6.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to ascertain whether they are violations, deviations, or acceptable. An unresolved item is addressed in paragraph 2.0.
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. 7.0 Exit Interview The inspectors met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss inspection findings.
On June 26, 1987, the site inspectors summarized the inspection findings in a meeting with the following personnel: J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing D. Langan, 00A Monitor W.-Marshall, Site Operations D. Turner, Director, Radiological Controls TMI-2 At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the TMICPD staff except for procedure reviews pursuant to Technical Specification 6.8.2.
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