IR 05000289/1987018

Insp Rept 50-289/87-18 on 870914-17 & 21-23.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previously Identified Items & Calibr of Foxboro Transmitters

ML20236X608
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	12/02/1987
From:	Chaudhary S, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236X604	List: IR 05000289/1987018 ML20236X600
References
50-289-87-18, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, IEIN-85-100, NUDOCS 8712090317
Download: ML20236X608 (4)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-18 l

Docket N License N DPR-50 Priority -

Category C License.e: GPU Nuclear Corporation L O. Box 480

Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island, Unit 1 i

Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania )

Inspection Conducted: September 14-17, and 21-23, 1987

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Inspectors: 4.u4 a)2cf it/7/8 7 S. K. Chaucfrary, Sgnior Reactor Engineer date Approved by: ,JY R. 5trosnider, Chief, MPS, EB, DRS

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[J Inspection Summary: Routine Unannounced Inspection on September 14-17, and 21-23, 1987 (Report No. 50-289/87-18)

Are_as Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection of the licensee's actions on previously identified items and calibration of foxburo transmitters was conducte Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000289 0 PDR

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t Details Persons Contacted GPU Nuclear Corporation

• P. E. Dojka, I&C Engineer

• C.-E. Hartman, Manager, Plar.t Engineering

• E. G. Lawrence, Preventive Maintenance Engineer

• C. W.' Smyth, TMI-1 Licensing Manager

• V. P. Orlandi Lead I&C Engineer US Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. J. Conti, Senior Resident-Inspector, TMI-1 The inspector also held discussions with other licensee personnel during the course of.the inspectio * Denotes those present during the exit meeting on September 23, 1987. Follow-up Actions On Previously Identified Item (Closed)- Violation 87-06-04: This violation was related to ambiguity in procedure SP-1302-5-10, Rev.14 regarding calibration of instrument loops. The licensee has revised the procedure clarifying that an instru-mentation loop may be calibrated in segments, if necessary, and approved by the responsible engineer and the supervisor. This item is close (0 pen) Unresolved Item 87-09-06: This item pertains to zero point shift in foxboro transmitters. The inspector reviewea the licensee's corrective actions to ascertain the effectiveness of the new calibration procedure in eliminating the zero point shift. The original problem in this area appeared to have been the result of several contributing factors, i .e.1) the failure to perform a zero static alignment, 2) air .

apparatus failure to fully account for the zero shift due to cover  !

reinstallation, and 3) a last minute setpoint change that was not well i understoo .

i The inspector reviewed the licensee's new calibration procedure to I determine if the procedure was technically adequate to address the above apparent problems, and was sufficiently detailed to procedurally assure effective implementation and the repeatability of calibratio ..

Based on the above review and discussions with cognizant licensee

. personnel, this inspection determined that the procedure was sufficiently detailed to assure effective implementation. However, the repeatability of the calibration by the new procedure had not been established, in that i

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y-ithefcurrent practice of channel cross-check verification' was not adequate 4

'to' provide qu'antitative: data ~for evaluating the magnitude of zero point

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shi f t'. The determination of zero point shift is still a qualitativ . determination which may or may not be accurate without a quantitative

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assessment of the magnitude ~of zero point' shift. Thus, the effectiveness of the;new calibration procedure-and its ability to satisfy Regulator Guide :1.97!cannot be ascertaine This item, therefore.. remains open

- pending further evaluation of data to determine.the acceptabi.lity of the new' calibration procedur <

- (Closed) IE.Information' Notice 85-100: This notice contains information

, regarding the zero point shift in'Rosemount' transmitters.: The problem of. the zero. point: shif t in ~ Rosemount transmitters 'were similar in nature

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as discussed above.for.foxboro transmitters. However, the' licensee's actions.to corrsct this problem were found adequate to resolve'thi Lissue. The licensee' initiated two licensing actions (86-9029 and 86-9122) providing adjustment in the use and applicability'of these Transformers. -The' calibration procedure and surveillance requirements'

were'also; adjusted to. assure accuracy of the_ transmitter signals. These

actions appeared to be adequate to-solve the. problem. This item'is

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cl o's ed.-

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3; Concrete' Anchor Bolts

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'During the course'of.an in-service. examination of the Contro11 Room Chilled Water System,'the' licensee identified. improper installation of concrete' ,

anchor bolts in support base plates. Two of the support plates (CHE-20 and CHE-54) in the system' had one of the four bolts welded at the back of the support plate giving the appearance of proper installation. In an

.other case,:it-was found that the shell of the anchor bolt'was cut'short w to avoid interference'.with reinforcin'g bars and to provide ease in instal-

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lation. 'The licensee initiated a material nonconformance-report (NMCR-123-87).to evaluate-the safety of the' system, and an engineerin investigation to ascertain the root cause and the extent of this proble The inspector. reviewed the licensee's follow-up actions to assess the validity of the technical approach, and the adequacy of any corrective action that may have been necessar The two support plates discussed above are part of a. pipe support at i elevation 322-0 in'the chilled Water system that consists of a structural l frame' and two base plates mark number CHE-20-(east plate) and CHE-54 (west

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-plate)., The supports in the' Chilled Water system were included in the  !

inspection and testing program in response to IE Bulletin 79-02. The

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j Llicensee's program included pull. testing of one anchor per base plate 1 which confor:ned to the sampling method ~ described in the Appendix A of the

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' bulletin. From the--licensee investigation of this problem, it appears that' the two specific anchors (deceit bolts) were not in the random sample J

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of one bolt per plate tha' as tested. During a modification (NM-31) of CHE-20 involving washer ~ pi +- installation and addition of longer bolts no

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further pull tests were per ..med as no additional bolts were installe However, a review of document package NM-31 disclosed that a welder identi-fied as No.65-065 was the installer'of the' welded washer on the base plate. Further review of the specific welder as:,ignments disclosed that nine additional supports were worked on in various-degrees by the same

, individual. .A one hundred percent inspection of these nine supports, all on the Chilled Water system, with the use of ultrasonic techniques to determine the length of embedded bolts disclosed no additional deceit bolting. On the basis of this determination, the licensee concluded that t the incident of deceit boltings were isolated cases, and'were.probably originated during the construction phase of the plant; because, the anchor bolt for on CHE-54 was never instal kd, and on CHE-20 an. attempted instal-lation was evidenced by a hole at-this locatio The modification draw-ings-.for ECM-116-280 had required only welded washer plates and bolt rep?acement and no work on.the shell itsel The engineering evaluation of this as found condition, as documented in GPN Calculation C1101-104-5321-020 determined that the base plates with deceit. bolts still provided a factor of safety of greater than two; which

.was mandated by bulletin 79-02 for continued operability of the plant (short term factor of safety). A repair was, however, required to bring the. factor of safety of the shell type anchors to a minimum of greater ,

than fou i It appears that the occurrence of this deficiency is not wide spread or representative of shell type anchors at TMI-1. Also, it appears that the validity of the IEB79-02-inspection and testing program and the resulting modifications.are not affected. The overall statistical results and the confidence level of the bulletin sampling program is still vali No deviation or violation was identifie . Exit Meeting At the conclusion of this inspection, the inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted * in paragraph 1) on September 23, 1987 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspectio At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector; also, the licensee did not indicate that any proprietary information was contained within the scope of this inspectio _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _a