IR 05000317/1992027

Discusses Deficient Surveillance Procedure Noted in Insp Repts 50-317/92-27 & 50-318/92-27 on 921011-1021. Enforcement Conference to Discuss Procedure Held on 930107

ML20127F468
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	01/13/1993
From:	Hehl C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Denton R BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
References
EA-92-237, NUDOCS 9301200252
Download: ML20127F468 (36)

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DAN 13

Docket Nos. 50-317 License Nos. DPit-53 50-318 DPit-69 EA 92-237 Mr. llobert Vice President-Nuclear Energy 11altimore Gas and Electric Company (13G&E)

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Clavert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702

Dear Mr. Denton:

SUlUECT: NON CITED VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.

50-317/92-27 AND 50-318/92-27)

This refers to a deficient sun'elllance procedure reviewed during an inspection conducted from October 11 to November 21,1992, at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The deGeiency, discovered by llG&E, was that the common minimum Dow recirculation line for all emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray (CS) pumps was being isolated during part of a monthly surveillance test on each unit. The practice of isolating the tecirculation line during surveillance testing had been in place since the 1970s. An enforcement conference to discuss the deficient surveillance procedure was held on January 7,1993. Copies of the NRC and IlG&E visual presentation materials used at the conference are enclosed with this letter.

Closing the minimum Dow recirculation line valves placed the plant in a condition where, under certain small break loss of coolant accident conditions, some ECCS and CS pumps could have been damaged without prompt operator action. The technical safety significance of this condition was minimal because: (1) of the short period that the valves were closed (approximately ten minutes per month per unit); (2) at least one high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump and one low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump would have been available for use even if the remaining ECCS pumps had been damaged (the surveillance procedure required that one llPSI pump and one LPSI pump remain in pull-to-lock during the test); (3)

the containment air coolers are designed to maintain containment pressure within design limits without the use of the CS system; and (4) it is reasonable to assume that the operators would have acted to ensure that the emergency systems fulfilled their safety functions.

190135 OFFICIAL ltECOltD COPY n:CCENFCON.LTil

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9301200252 930113 7 PDR G

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Mr. Itobert The NitC considers the failure to promptly identify and correct the deficient surveillance procedure as a violation of 10 CFit 50, Appendix H, Criterion XVI which states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the practice of isolating the minimum flow recirculation lines for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant had existed from initial startup of the units to November 12, 1992. Due to the low safety significance, we have classified the violation at Severity Level IV. We believe that you failed to promptly identify this condition because: (1) of the narrow scope of management's focus in the 1970s and 1980s when reviewing information related to the operation of the minimum flow recirculation line (e.g., bulletins, information notices, supplements to the plant safety evaluation report, etc.);

and (2) the operators did not question the undesirable lineup because they were using a l surveillance procedure and, thus, had a mind-set that you normally assume a greater risk during testing. We also believe that the recent identilication of the prob!cm is a result of the significant improvements within your organization which have broadened management's focus on issues, and strengthened the questioning attitude of your personnel.

This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because your most recent efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section Vll.R of the Enforcement Policy. Since we are already aware of the root causes and your corrective actions for this violation, no response to this letter is necessary.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

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Charles W.11ehl, Director Division of lleactor Projects linclosures: As stated

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G. Detter, Director, Nuclear Regulatory hiatters (CCNPP)

R. hicLean, Administrator, Nuclear Evaluations J. Walter, Engineering Division, Public Sen> ice Commission of hiaryland K. Burger, Esquire, hfaryland People's Counsel -

R. Ochs, hfaryland Safe Energy Coalition K. Abraham, PAO (23) SALP Reports and (2) All inspection Reports i Public Document Room (PDR) ,

local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident inspector State of hfaryland (2)

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY a:CCENFCON.LTR e-.-r, - - - ,-

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Mr. Robert bec w/ encl:

Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)

C. Cowgill, DRP J. Yerokun, DRP l

L. Nicholson, DRP j S. Greenlee, DRP '

M. Conner, DRP (SALP Reports Only)

P. Wilson, SRI - Calvert Cliffs V. McCrec, OEDO R. Capra, NRR D. Mcdonald, NRR DRS/ Ell SALP Coordinator D. Holody, EO RI:DRP RI: P RI:DRIfj(/ -

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY a:CCENFCON.LTR

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IIAi!!'IMOllE GAS AND El,ECTitlC COAIPANY VISUAL, PitESENTATION MATEltlAI,

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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC

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SI-659 & 66C ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA JANUARY 7,1993

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ISSUE STATEMENT DISCOVERED LONG-STANDING TESTING CONDITION IN WHICH, UNDER SOME CONDITIONS, OPERATOR ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE EMERGENCY .

CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) SAFETY FUNCTION

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MORE SPECIFIC TECH SPEC AND PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED .

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e SI-659 & 660 ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA JANUARY 7,1993 AGENDA INTRODUCTION R. E. DENTON CONDITION DESCRIPTION P.G.CHABOT CONSIDERATIONS J. R. HILL G. L. DETTER ACTIONS TO ADDRESS CONCERN C.H. CRUSE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE C.H. CRUSE REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS C.H. CRUSE u

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SUPPLEMENT 5 TO UNIT 2 ORIGINAL PLANT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

. RECOGNIZED THAT A SINGLE FAILURE OF SI-659 OR 660 DURING THE INJECTION MODE COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF FLOW AND DAMAGE TO THE LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS

+ REQUIRED REMOVAL OF VALVE MOTOR-OPERATOR POWER WITH THE VALVES OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION ,

. ADDITIONALLY, REQUIRED THAT POWER BE RESTORABLE BY THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS l

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ENGINEERED SAF7 FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANiiEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED FUNCTIONAL UNIT 4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (SGIS)

NA NA R NA a. Manual SGIS (MSIV lland Switches and feed llead Isolation lland Switches) H I. 2. 3 Steam Generator Pressure - Low 5 R b.

c. Automatic Actuation Logic NA NA MUW I, 2. 3 5. CONTAINHENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)

R NA a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) NA NA b. Refueling Water Tank - Low NA R M I 2. 3 c. Automatic Actuation Logic NA NA HM I 2. 3 6. CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES ISOLATION NA R NA a. Manual (Purge Valve Control NA Switches) H 6" b. Containment Radiation - liigh Area S R Honitor TABLE NOTATION II) The logic circuits shall be tested manually at least once per 31 days.

(5) SGIS logic circuits A-1 and 8-1 are exempted from testing during operation; however, these logic circuits shall be tested at least once per 18 months daring shutdown.

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CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

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. . . THE INJECTION OF A SIMULATED SIGNAL INTO THE CHANNEL SENSOR TO VERIFY OPERABILITY INCLUDING ALARM AND/OR TRIP FUNCTIONS

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PROBLEM DISCOVERY

. SURVEILLANCE COORDINATOR WAS GATHERING VALVE-CYCLING DATA FOR SITE MOV PROJECT

. HE WAS TOLD BY THE IST COORDINATOR OF THE COLD SHUTDOWN TESTING FREQUENCY

. THE SURVEILLANCE COORDINATOR QUESTIONED THE DIFFERENCE IN FREQUENCIES

. HE ASKED THE LICENSING UNIT FOR AN OPINION

. LICENSING ADVISED THAT:

(1) SHUTTING THE VALVES WAS UNDESIRABLE (2) VALVE CLOSURE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO TEST ACTUATION LOGIC

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IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

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PLANT PERSONNEL:

. WROTE AN ISSUE REPORT

. REVISED THE SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURES TO PREVENT AT-POWER CYCLING OF SI-659 AND 660

. INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION

. POSRC REVIEWED THE CONCERN

+ MADE NIGHT ORDER BOOK AND TURNOVER LOG ENTRIES TO ALERT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS SHIFT PERSONNEL

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I OPERATOR ACTION SHUTTING SI-659 OR 660 WHILE AT POWER REQUIRES MANUAL ACTION TO REOPEN THE VALVES IN THE EVENT THE ECCS IS NEEDED DURING SMALL-BREAK LOCA. THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS COMBINE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF SUCH ACTION:

. UNAMBIGUOUS ALARMS INDICATING LOCA

. OPERATOR TRAINING

. TEST-PROCEDURE PRECAUTIONS

. COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION

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SIMPLICITY MORE SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED

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OPERATOR BACK-UPS

. RESERVE HIGH- AND LOW-PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS

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e OPERATOR RECOGNITION OF CONSEQUENCES

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. OPERATORS HAVE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAINTAINING SI-659 AND 660 OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION

. CALVERT CLIFFS'S SAFETY EQUIPMENT USUALLY REQUIRES COMPONENT ACTUATION TO COMPLETE LOGIC-FUNCTION TESTING

. OPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO OPERATE STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPECS

. THEY PERCEIVED A REQUIREMENT TO SHUT THE VALVES WHILE CONDUCTING TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE TESTING

. TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE TESTING, IN GENERAL, ASSUMES REASONABLE RISK. THIS TEST WAS NO DIFFERENT

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e INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION (IPE)

PURPOSE: AN INTEGRATED, SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF CALVERT CLIFFS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT-RISK CONTRIBUTORS THAT OTHERWISE MIGHT BE MISSED.

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. THE IPE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO DISCOVER THIS TYPE OF CONCERN IE IT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTES TO OVERALL PLANT RISK

. IPE DID NOT ORIGINALLY CONSIDER THE SHUTTING OF SI-659 AND 660 IN EQUIPMENT UNAVAILABILITY NUMBERS BECAUSE NO LOG ENTRIES WERE MADE

. THIS IPE OMISSION IS BEING ADDRESSED

. WITH CORRECT DATA, IPE WOULD NOT HAVE FOCUSED ON THIS TESTING BECAUSE ITS RISK SIGNIFICANCE IS TOO LOW

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TECHNICAL ADEQUACY REVIEW PROJECT (TARP)

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PURPOSE:

(1) ESTABLISHED EACH SURVEILLANCE

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REQUIREMENT AS BEING TESTED AND PROVIDED A CROSS REFERENCE BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (2) REVIEWED EACH SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT BASES AND INTENT, AND TECHNICALLY REVIEWED THE IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE FOR TECHNICAL ADEQUACY

. DISCOVERY OF THIS TYPE OF CONDITION WAS NOT WITHIN TARP'S INTENT

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TECHNICAL PROCEDURES UPGRADE PROJECT (PUP)

. PURPOSE: UPGRADE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES

. EXPERIENCED WRITERS:

(1) USED STANDARD FORMAT GUIDE TO ENHANCE HUMAN PERFORMANCE ASPECTS (2) MAINTAIN TECHNICAL ADEQUACY TO ACCOMPLISH PROCEDURE'S INTENDED FUNCTION

+ UNIT 1 TEST PROCEDURE UPGRADED PRIOR TO DISCOVERY (1) UPGRADE INCLUDED PRECAUTIONARY  :

STATEMENT TO STOP THE TEST AND PLACE PLANT IN STABLE CONDITION FOR UNEXPECTED PLANT RESPONSES OR TRANSIENTS (2) THIS REQUIRES BACKING OUT OF THE TEST DURING LOCA, ALLOWING RESTORATION OF MINIFLOW-

. NOT CLEARLY WITHIN PUP SCOPE

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SUPPLEMENT 5 TO UNIT 2 ORIGINAL PLANT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT

. RECOGNIZED THAT A SINGLE FAILURE OF SI-659 OR 660 DURING THE INJECTION MODE COULD RESULT IN A LOSS OF FLOW AND DAMAGE TO THE LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS

, REQUIRED REMOVAL OF VALVE MOTOR-OPERATOR POWER WITH THE VALVES OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION

. ADDITIONALLY, REQUIRED THAT POWER BE RESTORABLE BY THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS

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INFORMATION NOTICES AND BULLETINS NOTICE 85-94

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POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF MINIMUM FLOW PATHS -

LEADING TO ECCS PUMP DAMAGE DURING A LOCA

. ISSUE: CONCERNED PLANTS WITH SINGLE-FAILURE DESIGN VULNERABILITIES, AND MAINTENANCE THAT ISOLATED MINIFLOW FOR LONG PERIODS AT OPERATION

. NO REPLY REQUIRED. CALVERT CLIFFS' DESIGN SATISFACTORY BULLETIN 86-03

POTENTIAL FA: LURE OF AIR-OPERATED VALVE IN MINIMUM FLOW RFCIRCULATION LINE

. ISSUE: MORE !NS TANCES OF DESIGNS SUBJECT TO SINGLE-FAILUHE

. PLANT RESPONSE REITERATED DESIGN FEATURES FROM SER

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INFORMATION NOTICES AND '

BULLETINS (CONT.?

BULLETIN 88-04 POTENTIAL SAFETY-RELATED PUMP LOSS -

+ ISSUE: PUMP-TO-PUMP INTERACTION OR HYDRAULIC INSTABILITY

. NOT RELATED TO TESTING OR ABNORMAL LINEUPS. CALVERT CLIFFS DESIGN

's^TISFACTORY

CONCLUSION:

NOT WITHIN SCOPE OF ANY NOTICES OR BULLETINS

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SECOND TEN-YEAR IST SUBMITTAL

+ VALVES TESTED AT POWER DURING FIRST TEN-YEAR PROGRAM

. NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OF NOV.13,1987, ASKED . . .

"WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF

[Sl-659 OR 660] IN THE CLOSED POSITION DURING QUARTERLY TESTING 7 WOULD THIS RENDER AN ENTIRE SAFETY SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION 7" CONCERN WAS NOT THAT WE WERE SHUTTING THE VALVES, BUT THAT VALVES COULD Fall WHILE SHUT

+ CALVERT CLIFFS RESPONDED BY PLACING THE TEST ON THE COLD SHUTDOWN SCHEDULE

+ INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN IST AND SURVEILLANCES WAS NOT REMARKABLE

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FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS

. NOTIFIED NRC AND INDUSTRY

+ PERFORMED GENERIC SURVEILLANCE REVIEW TO LOOK FOR OTHER INSTANCES WHERE TESTING A SINGLE TRAIN MIGHT PLACE MULTI-TRAIN SYSTEMS IN A SIMILAR CONDITION -- NONE WERE FOUND

+ ISSUED TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES AND y NUCLEAR OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT LETTERS ALERTING STAFF TO THE CONCERN AND TO ENSURE THEY RECOGNIZEDTHAT RELIANCE ON OPERATORS FOR OPERABILITY DURING TESTING-WAS UNACCEPTABLE

+ PERFORMED SELF-ASSESSMENT OF SITE-PROCESSES.FOR WEAKNESS l

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE _

. NO CONSEQUENCES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC OR THE PLANT RESULTED

+ EXTREMELY LOW CONSEQUENCE POTENTIAL ,

. SHUTTING SI 659 AND 660 CONTRIBUTED ABOUT 5.0X10-8 TO CALVERT CLIFFS'S AGGREGATE CORE MELT FREQUENCY  :

, NUMARC GUIDELINES RECOMMEND TAKING COMPENSATORY ACTION FOR RISK CONTRIBUTORS GREATER THAN 1X10-6 l

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REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS

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+ SI-659 AND 660 REMAINED OPEN 99.98% OF THE TIME

+ DURING TESTING, OPERATOR ACTION REASONABLY ASSURED ECCS SAFETY-FUNCTION PROTECTION

+ VERY LOW SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

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+ DID NOT VIOLATE TECH SPECS (1) ECCS OPERABLE (2) SI-659 AND 660 VERIFIED OPEN EVERY 12 HRS

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ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

. ISSUE IS ISOLATED, NOT INDICATIVE OF MANAGEMENT-CONTROLS BREAKDOWN

. LICENSEE-IDENTIFIED SAFETY CONCERN

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. LICENSEE SUBMITTED VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT AND IDENTIFIED THE CONCERN TO INDUSTRY

. ACTIONS TAKEN WERE APPROPRIATE, THOROUGH, AND TIMELY

. NO OPPORTUNITIES TO PREVENT BY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FROM-PREVIOUS VIOLATIONS

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e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COAIAllSSION

\ ISUAI, PRESENTATION AIATERIAI,

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A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE WITH

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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ,

JANUARY 7,1993

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.{ . ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGENDA

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I. INTRODUCTION AND OPENING REMARKS Charles W. Hehl, Director Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

II. DISCUSSION OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY Daniel J. Holody Regional Enforcement Officer 111. OVERVIEW - Mr. Hehl IV. PRESENTATION OF APPARENT VIOLATION Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Reactor-Projects Branch No.1, DRP V. LICENSEE PRESENTATION

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VI. NRC FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS Vll. CONCLUSION OF CONFERENCE - Mr. Hehl Vill. PUBLIC QUESTIONS

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APPARENT VIOLATION 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, frorn initial unit startup to November 12, 1992, BG&E failed to identify and correct a deficient surveillance procedure that required closing MOV-659 and MOV-660 during power operations, creating the potential for damaging emergency core cooling and containment spray system equipment during some accident conditions.

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THE APPARENT VIOLATION DISCUSSED AT THIS.

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE

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PRIOR TO ANY RESULTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

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THE STATEMENTS OF VIEWS AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION BY NRC EMPLOYEES AT THIS ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE, OR THE LACK THEREOF, ARE NOT INTENDED TO REPRESENT FIN AL NRC

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