IR 05000317/1992012
| ML20198D475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1992 |
| From: | Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198D441 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-92-12, 50-318-92-12, NUDOCS 9205210046 | |
| Download: ML20198D475 (15) | |
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a U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COhthilSSION
REGION I
Report Nor -
50-317/92-12; 50-318/92-12 License Nos.:
DPR-53/DPR 69 Licensee:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Post Office Box 1475 Baltimore, hiaryland 21203 Facility:
Calvert Cliffs Nuc%ar Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Lusby, hiaryland Inspection conducted:
Afarch 29,1992, through April 25,1992
Inspectors:
Peter R. Wilson, Senior Resident inspector Allen G. Howe, Resident inspector Carl F Lyon, eside
{ns tor Approved by:
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Urry Nicholson, Chief
'DaHf Reae Projects Section No. I A Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary:
This inspection report documents resident inspector core, regional initiative, and reactive inspections performed during day and backshift hours of station activities including: plant operations; radiological protection; surveillance and maintenance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification.
Remits:
See Executive Summary.
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9205210046 920513 PDR ADDCK 05000317 G
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EXECUTIYEjiUMMARY Calvert Cliffs Nudtar Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/92-12 and 50-318/9hl2 Plant OoeIlt110ns: (Operational Sciety inspection hiodule 71707, Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors hiodule 93702) Overall, the facility was operated in a safe manner. There were no noteworthy operational events during the period. General plant housekeeping was adequate; however, the cleanliness of the service water pump rooms was weak.
Radioloelcal Protection: (hiodule 71707) The inspector concluded, based on selected reviews, that the radiological controls program and implementation was acceptable. The inspectors identified two workers who were not attentive in a radiologically controlled area. BG&E corrective actions were found to be prompt and thorough.
Maintenance and Surveillance:
(hiaintenance Observations hiodule 62703, Surveillance Observations biodule 61726) An acceptable level of performance was observed during the observation of several.naintenance activities and sarveillance tests. A significant number of welding performance concerns was identified by BG&E. This issue remained unresolved pending further NRC review. Corrective actions taken in respmse to previous NRC concerns with the calibration of installed process instrumentation were adequate.
Securitv: (hiodule 71707) The inspectors determined that security program implementation was acceptable. A site security drill with participation from the hiaryland State Police was canducted on April 7,1992 and observed by NRC security specialists.
Encineerine and Technical Support: (hiodule 71707) The inspectors found that BG&E was taking appropriate actions in response to an error identified in the criticality analyris for the spent fuel storage racks.
Safety Assessment /Out.lity Verification: (hiodules 71707, 30703) Previous NRC concerns with the lack of procedural guidance on the operation of the containment emergency air locks were adequately corrected.
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llEIAILS 1.0 SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES
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Unit 1 be '.an the period in cold shutdown (mode 5) for the cycle 10 refueling outage. The unit
' eling (mode 6) on April 10 and completed defueling on April 22. The unit remained entered i
defueled at the end of the period.
Unit 2 began the period shutdown in mode 5 while accomplishing modifications to the engineered safety features actuation system. Following completion of the modifications, the unit returned to power on April 3. The uni' operated at full power for the remainder of the period.
2.0 PLANT OPERATIONS 2.1 Ooerational Safety Verification The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the facility was )perated safely and in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requitements. Regular tours were conducted
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of the following plant areas:
-- control room
-- security access point
-- primary auxiliary building
-- protected area fence
-- radiological control point
--intake structure
-- electrical switchgear rooms
-- diesel generator rooms
-- auxiliary feedwater pump rooms -- turbine building Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with technical specification (TS) requirements. Operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources was verified. The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and confirmed tl at operator response was in accorc e a with plant operating procedures. Routine operations surveillance testing was also observed. Compliance with TS and implementation of appropriate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected. Plant radiation monitoring system indications and plant stack traces were reviewed for unexpected changes, Logs and records were reviewed to determhie if entries were accurate and Mentified equipment status or deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags, and the temporary modifications log. Plant housekeeping controls were monitored, including control and storage of flammable material and other pctential safety hazards. The inspector also examined the condition of various fire protection, meteorological, and seismic monitoring systems.
Control room and shift
. manning were compared to regulatory requirements and portions of shift turnovers were observed. The inspectors found that control room access was properly controlled and that a profassional atmosphere was maintained.
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In addition to normal utility working hours, the review of plant operations was routinely conducted during portions backshifts (evening shifts) and deep backshifts (weekend and midnight shifts). Extended coverage was provided for $7 hours during backshifts and 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> during deep backshifts. Operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigue.
Except where noted below, the inspectors obsened an acceptable level of performance during the inspection tours detailed above.
Overall plant housekeeping was adequate; however, the cleanliness of the service water pump
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rooms was weak. Although some improvements were observed, the inspectors continued to find excessive dirt and debris on horizor.al surfaces. The inspectors noted that efforts to upgrade the material condition of the emergency diesel generator rooms was initiated during the period.
2.2 EdQwup of Events Occurring During Inspection Period There were no noteworthy operational events during the period.
3.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS During tours of the accessible plant areas, the inspectors observed the implementation of selected ponions of the licensee's Radiological Controls Program. The utilization and compliance with special work permits (SWPs) were reviewed to ensure detailed descriptions of radiological conditions were provided and that personnel adhered to SWP requirements. The i~spectors observed that controls of access to various radiologically controlled areas and use of prsonnel monitors and frisking methods upon exit from these areas were adequate. Posting aid control of radiation areas, contaminated areas and hot spots, and labelling and control of catainers holding radioactive materials were verified to be in accordance with licensec procedures.
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Health Physics technician control and monitoring of these activities were determined to be adequate. Overall, an acceptable level of performance was obsuved.
3.1 Lqaltentive Workers in a Radiologically Controlled Aiea During a Unit I containment tour, the inspectors observed two worke s lying on the floor in a potentially contaminated area who appeared to be sleeping (cyes clo:,ed). The workers were wearing anti-contamination clothing. The area that the workers were kcated was a designated j
low dose area. After ensuring the individuals were alen, BG&E management was informed of the observation.
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BG&E promptly conducted an investigation which determined that the individuals elected to lay down after waiting for approximately three hours for the health physics technician coverage for their asrigned work. The workers claimed they were not asleep. The radiation dose reccin:d
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_by the_ workers was minimal and none were contaminated. BG&E counseled the workers
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concerning BG&Us policy prohibiting laying or sitting in potentially contaminated areas, in
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addition, the workers were reminded of BG&E's policy to contact outage management whenever a job was delayed by more than 30 minutes.
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The inspectors found BG&E's response to the finding was appropriate. BG&E's investigation j
was prompt and thorough. The inspectors did not observe any other instances of inattentivene. -
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or loitering in the containment and therefore concluded that the above occurrence was an isolated
event.
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4.0 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE 4.1
.hiaintenance Obsen'alinr1 The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that:
the activity did not violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation and
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that redundant components were operable;
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required approvals and releases had been obtained prior nmencitig work;
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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the trade;
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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
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where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and
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implemented; QC hold points were established where required and observed; and
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equipment was properly tested and returned to service.
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hiaintenance activities reviewed inclLded:
-h10 19106697 Inspect / lubricate containment purge air supply valve 1-CV-i411 hiO 29103323 Upgrade SRWHX room supply fan VU-19A to SR power supply per FCR
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88-123. Also remove Thi 2-88+66
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MO 19201765 Remove No.13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump MO 19107362 Replace Low Pressure Safety injection Pump Pressure Switch for FCR 91-206 MO 09200810 investigate trip of No.11 Control Room HVAC Compressor MO 19107285 Repair / replace rubber lining for Nos,11-15 condensate demineralizer vessels
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MO 19200597 Replace existint 'ndicator assemblics with new dim / bright indicators, add new dim / bright indicators, and modify associated control board wiring in
IC03, IC05, IC47, IC48, ICl44A, and ICl44B
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MO 19108105 Modify AFAS start actuation logic MO 19105934 Removal of reactor vessel upper guide structure There were no notable observations.
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Surveillance Observation
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The.aspectors v.dtnessed/ reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, Technical Specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned. The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:
STP O 73A-2 Salt Water Pump Performance Test STP M-562-1 Containment High Radiation Monitor Alignment Source Checks
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STP M-152-0 Reserve Battery Weekly Check STP M 190-0 Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly Check STP O-59-1 Refueling Machine Load Test STP O-73L-1 LPSI Pump Large Flow Test
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There were no notable observations except as described below.
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Refueling Machine Load Test Testing per this procedure was stopped prior to completion due to problems in performing the hoist overload limit portion of the test. Investigation by BG&E revealed that the friction between the hoist and the refueling mast affected the calibration of the load weighing system.
This friction was not factored into the calibratic, procedure.
'Ihe calStation method used the expected weight of the hoist assembly as one of the points in the calibration of the lo::.d weighing sys'em. Friction between the refueling mast and the hoist
" masked" the actualload placed on the hoist cable where the load weighing systerr was installed.
Decause the actual weight of the hoist was not loacle. onto the hoist cable, the difference between actual load and expected load introduced error into the calibration.
The calibration procedure was revised to use the " dummy" fuel bundle, the load weighh.g system was recalibrated, and the test was subsequently reperformed. The inspectors reviewed the issues and discussed them with BG&E personnel The actions taken were appropriate to resolve the test problems, b.
LPSI Pum_p Large Flow Test This surveillance test indicated a failure due to high measured vibrations on the No.12 low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump. The vibrations were above the allowable limbs in the Surveillance Test Proceduie (STP) bat below the action range criteria in the ASME section XI requirements.
BG&E revised e STP acceptance criteria to be consistent with the ASME section XI requirements rather than the more restrictive values in the existing procedure and declared the pump operable. Aftr tuimer investigation, BG&E determined that the data had been taken from a location other than de (..erere location. Additional vibration data taken at the reference lucation showed that vi0 rations were consistent with those expected.
A recent quality assurance audit recommended that sketches showing the proper location for taking the vibration data be included in STP's that record equipment vibration. The surveillance test coordinator was considering this recommendation as the period closed. Tne inspectors observed performance of the STP, reviewed the results, and discussed the issue with cognizant
personnel. Appropriate actions were taken by BG&E to investigate this issue, i
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4.3 Welding Concerns During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed several issue reports (irs) related to welding and welding processes. The inspectors expressed concern to BG&E maintenance management regarding the number and nature of the irs.
The controls for the welding program were described in Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP) 6, Revisi:m 21, " Welding." BG&E Program 6, " Welding Program", contained specific welding program implementation procedures. A Weld Authorization Traveller (WAT) provided the weld process and material specincations, non-destructive examination (NDE) requirements, and approval criteria for each weld performed. The WAT was the key document that controlled the field weld processes and provided the documentation to plant history for completed welds.
Some of the irs documented welding activities that were not performed in accordance with the WAT. Specifically, the more significant irs were:
IRO4)08-450 The craft improperly fitted and weld'ed a 2 inch half-coupling on an auxiliary feedwater modification. This incorrect installation violated the requirements of Program 6 and had to be removed and reworked.
- 008-442 The craft 6tted and tack welded two sets of pipe and valve assemblies on the No.
I1 and 12 blowdown piping using a welding process not specified by the WAT.'
Additionally, the NDE inspector later documented examination of the welds without questioning the process used.
' % -006-460 Welders began welding on the No.12A condenser screened disc inlet valves using a weld process not specified in the WAT. A new WAT was prepared reflecting the process actually used and the data transferred.
IRO4)06-930 NDE was not performed after machining on the No. 21 feed pump discharge check valve. The WAT was also not properly filled out.
IRO-007-218 An ANSI B31.1 code requirement regarding the amount of weld material that must be depodted before interruption was not followed. The welders involved apparently did not receive training given in response to a similar error that occurred in Novemi.er 1991.
IRO-003-2f4 An NDE inspector accepted three weld finals without examining the inside diameter. The welds were later found to be unacceptable.
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IRO-008-443 WAT issued to field work package was not properly filled out in that pipe and flange material were not specified. This WAT had been approved by the Code Inspector and Principal Metallurgist.
IRO-004-276 Welders failed to have visual examination performed on root pass of weld as required by the WAT.
In addition, approximately ten other irs were reviewed by the inspectors that document WAT problems such as missing information, niissing signatures, improper post weld documentation, and other similar errors.
Approximately concurrent with the inspectors' observation, the Issues Assessment Unit an.
Independent Safety Evaluation Unit (ISEU) noted a potential trend with welding concerns. As the inspection penod closed the ISEU had raised the issue to a trend status. When the ISEU developed a trend, the trend was turned over to the responsible line organization for action.
In response to the inspectors concerns, BG&E maintenance management had conducted an analysis of the various irs and determined that the errors were due to one or more of the following causes: inattention-to-detail, missed training, procedure unfamiliarity, and poor workmanship.
BG&E maintenance management assessed that the multiple quality checks designed into the weld program were sufficient to ensure that completed welds were adequate.
During discussions, the inspectors ascertained that welder qualifications were ve.i6ed pnor to welding on plant equipment.
However, all welders were not trained on site specific administrative controls and the WAT Reliance was placed on the welding supervision to ensure WAT requirements were met. Based on the nature and number of performance errors identified in tne irs, the inspectors concluded that supervision did not adequately ensure that al.1 WAT requirements were met.
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In response to the prcblems identified, BG&E maintenance management planned corrective actione to provide training on WAT familiarity, specific ASME Code issues, and to develop initial WAT familiarization training for welders when they arrive on. site. As the inspection period closed, the training had not been performed, but was scheduled for weld coordinators, plaaners, and supervisors by May 1,1992.
The inspectors independently reviewed the irs and BG&E's analysis of the causes and concluded
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ofissue reports that indicated potential welding implementation problems. QAP 6 specified that l
the welding supervisors were responsible for ensuring that welding was performed within the (-
requirements of the QAP and in accoruance with properly issued WATS.
Welders were esponsible for complying with the requirements of the WAT.
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The BG&E analysis of the causes and the pending corrective actions appeared to address the program implementation concerns. However, additional inspection was warranted to review the concerns and corrective' actions. This issue is unresolved pending the completion of this inspection (50-317 and 318/92-12-01).
4.4-Calibration of Permanently Installed Plant Instrumentation The inspectors reviewed the status of the program to calibate permanently installed safety related plant instrumentation used to monitor system performance. The overall requirements were defined in Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP) 17, "Contml and Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment."
Program concerns were identified during the NRC Special Team Inspection as unresolved item 50-317 and 318/89-200-13. The concerns were characterized in two general areas. First, there were program inconsistencies that did not permit a readily accessible mechanism to ensure that safety related process instrumentation was scheduled and periodically calibrated. Second, there was not a process to evaluate the effect on equipment operability of instrumentation found out of calibration.
BG&E developed a matrix to cross reference instrumentation to the specific surveillance test procedures (STPs). The instrumentation was also verified against the preventative maintenance (PM) and STP programs to verify that the instrumentation was contained in the calibration program. The matrix for operations STPs was previously reviewed by the NRC, found acceptable, and documented in Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/90-05. In addition, the inspectors performed walkdowns of selected safety related equipment and verified that the
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equipment was currently calibrated and appropriately scheduled for periodic calibration.
During the walkdowns, the inspectors noted that a few instruments did not have calibration stickers attached although they were in the calibration program. The inspectors verified that these instruments were within their required calibration frequencies.
The inspectors expressed cor.cern with the inconsistent use of calibration stickers. The General Supervisor - Electrical and Controls (GS-E&C) agreed that this was a problem and stated that he would reemphasize the requirements for the use of stickers to the technicians. The GS-E&C indicated that a computer program to track calibration status has been implemented. This new system provided a method to track calibiblion status and therefore the GS-E&C was comfortable that the calibration program was working. Also, the program to use stickers was under review.
.The current plan is to revise the QAP to delete trie use of stickers by 1993. The inspector.c assessed that the inconsistent use of stickers was of minor safety significance given that tk processes to ensure calibration were implemented. Tne actions planned by the GS-E&C wm appropriate.
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The inspectors reviewed concerns with the use of installed process instrumentation for Engineering Test Procedures.
Calvert Cliffs Instruction (CCI) 132 " Requirements for Implementation, Use and Record Keeping of Engineering Test Procedures (ETPs)" contained requirements for the te:;t coordinator of an ETP to verify that instruments that were used to collect data were calibrated. Via discussions, the inspectors ascertained that this provision was t
implemented by incorporating a prerequisite step for verification in ETPs.
The inspectors reviewed the process to evaluate the impact of out of calibration instrumentation.
To track changes to process instrumentation used for surveillance testing, CCI-104 " Surveillance Test Program" required notification to the surveillance test group of these changes to support updating the cross reference matrix. Also, CCI-iO4 prohibited the use of out of calibration instrumentation such as an instrument with an outstanding maintenance request. For process instrumentation found out of tolerance during calibration, the calibration data sheets were required to be compared vith the cross reference matrix. If the instrument was in the matrix, an issue report requiring evaluation of operability was generated. The inspectors verified via interviews and the review of selected issue reports that this process was properly implemented.
In summary, previous NRC concerns with installed safety related instrumentation calibration have been resolved. The processes in place to control and calibrate instrumentation were effectively implemented with the exception of the inconsistent u:,e of calibration stickers.
Actions planned and taken by BG&E appropriately address this issue. The inspectors had no further questions.
5.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS The insoectors toured the onsite emergency response facilities to verify that taese facilities were in an adequate state of readiness for event response.
The inspectors dNussed program implementation with the applicable personnel. The resident inspectors had no noteworthy findings in this area.
6.0 SECURITY During routine inspection tours, the inspectors observed implementation of portions of the
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security plan. Areas observed included access point search equipment operation, condition of physical barriers, site access control, security force staffing, and response to system alarms and degraded conditions. These areas of program implementation were determined to be adequate.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
A site security drill was conducted on April 7 to exercise the Calvert Cliffs security forces in coordination with the Maryland State Police. The scenario included a terrorist penetration of the protected area and a hostage situation. The drill was observed by Mr. R. Keimig, Chief, Region 1 Safeguards Section, and Mr. R. Albert of his staff.
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7.0 ENGINEERING AND TECIINICAL SUPPORT The inspector reviewed selected design changes and modifications made to the facility which the licensee determined were not unreviewed safety questions and did not require prior NRC approval as described by 10 CFR 50.59. Particular attention was given to safety evaluations, Plant Operations Review Committee approval, procedural controls, post-modification testing, procedure changes resulting from this modification, operator training, and UFSAR and drawing revisions. The following activity was reviewed:
7.1 Error in Soent Fuel Storage Criticality Analysis On March 17, 1992, BG&E was notified by ABB Combustion Engineering (CE) of an error which adversely impacted an analysis that provided the basis for a license amendment to increase the allowable enrichment of fuel in the spent fuel storage racks from 4.1 to 5.0 weight percent U-235. As a re: ult of this error, in combination with other errors described in NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-21, the analysis could not support the 4.2 weight percent fuel planned for the current Unit 1 Cycle 11 reload. As a result, BG&E delayed the placement of Cycle 11 new fuel into the spent fuel pool pending further evaluation, The inspectors conducted a review of the above concern to assess BG&E's response and to determine the safety significance of the error. The inspection consisted of personnel interviews and the review of applicable documentation.
In order to accommodate longer fuel cycles, BG&E had requested and was granted technical specification amendments (Unit 1 No.136 and Unit 2-No,117) on March 7,1989, to raise the Unit I and Unit 2 fuel enrichment for spent fuel storage to 5.0 weight percent U-235. The basis for the amendment was an analysis performed by CE which demonstrated that the fuel placed in the spent fuel pool would remain subcritical under all conditions (Keff s 0.95). The error that was subsequently identified concerned the affects of postulated gaps in the spent fuel storage rack Boraflex absorber sheets.
The Unit 2 spent fuel storage racks were fabricated with Borallex poison sheets (neutron absorber). Because of prior industry experience with tears and subsequent formation of gaps in Boraflex sheets, the analysis calculated a reactivity penalty to account for the loss of neutron absorption in postulated worse case gap configurations (gaps aligned in an infinite array). The CE analysis indicated the penalty associated with the postulated gaps was very small. This penalty was also applied to the Unit I storage racks (fabricated with a different material) to allow for uniform licensing of the pools.
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Subsequently in March 1992, CE discovered an error in the gap calculation that was unique to
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the analysis performed for BG&E. The neutron population assumed at the postulated gap locations was under estimated. When a more realistic neutron population was utilized, the reactivity penalty was signincant (0.4 weight percent U-235). With the above error, combined with the reactivity errors previously identi6ed (IN 92-21), the CE criticality analysis would not support fuel enrichments of greater than 4.15 weight percent U-235 in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
The inspectors were informed that in 1989, the Unit 2 Cycle 9 new fuel with a fuel enrichment of 4.3 weight percent U-235 was temporarily stored in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool prior to core
- load. The inspectors concluded that the temporary storage of the Cycle 9 new fuel in the spent fuel pool was of minor safety signincance. The calculations used to determine spent fuel storage criticality assumed no boric acid in the spent fuel pool. During the period that Unit 2 Cycle 9 fuel was stored in the spent fuel pool, the boric acid concentration was always greater than 1700
_ ppm. In addition, the probability that gaps in the Boraflex sheets were aligned in an infmite array was extremely small. At the end of the period BG&E was performing an evaluation to determine if the temporary storage of the Cycle 9 fuel in the spent fuel pool was reportable.
The enrichment of the fuel scheduled for the Unit 1 Cycle 11 fuel load was 4.2 weight percent U-235. As described above, BG&E prohibited the storage of any Cycle 11 new fuel into the
- spent fuel pool pending further evaluation. At the end of the period, BG&E's evaluation was incomplete.
During the period, _BG&E held discussions with NRR staff concerning potential license
- amendments to correct the current fuel enrichment TS. The inspectors were informed that BC&E was expediting amendment submittals to correct the affected technical specifications.
The inspectors found that BG&E was taking appropriate actions in response to the above issue.
BG&E's initial iesponse and corrective actions were prompt and thorough.
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8.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION 8.1 Plant Operations and Safety Review Commince The inspector attended several Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee (POSRC)
meetings. TS 6.5 requirements for required member attendance were verined. The meeting agendas included procedural changes, proposed changes to the TS, Facility Change Requests, and minutes from previous meetings. Items for which adequate review time was not available L
were postponed to allow committee members time for further review and comment. Overall, the level of review and member participation was good in fulGiling the POSRC responsibilities.
No unacceptable conditions were identined.
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8.2 Emergency Air Lock Interlock Failurc Inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by BG&E in response to a notice of violation for lack of operating procedures for the containment air locks (NV4 50-317 and 50-318/42-02-01). The lack of operating procedures contributed to improper operation of the Unit i emergency air lock (EAL) which resulted in a breach of containment integrity when the mechanical interlock failed. NRC review of this issue is documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-317 and 50-318/91-30 and 92-02.
Inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken by BG&E documented in the above inspection reports and in Licensee Event Report 91-007.
Permanent signs have been placed at the containment air lock door operating mechanisms that include a caution to personnel to wait for pressure to equalize before opening the doors and directing appropriate action should pressure not equalize after a specified period. Training on this event has been conducted with appropriate personnel and the special work permits governing initial entry into containment has been modified to increase awareness of the consequences of improper operation of the doors. The inspectors concluded that BG&E response to this issue was appropriate and that no further NRC review is required.
9.0 FOLLOWUP OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS Licensee actions taken in response to open items and findings from previous inspections were reviewed. The inspectors determined if corrective actions were appropriate and thorough and previous concerns were resolved. Items were closed where the inspector determined that corrective actions would prevent recurrence. Those items for which additional licensee action was warranted remained open. The following items were revicwed.
9,1 LClosed) Violation (50-317 and 50-318/92-02-Olk Emergency Air Lock Interlock Failure This violation involved a lack of operating procedures for the contunment air locks which contributed to improper operation of the Unit i emergency air lock and resulted in a breach of containment integrity. The issue was inspected as documented in section 8.2.
9.2 (Closed) Unresolved (50-317 and 318/89-200-13): Calibration of Permanently Installed Plant Instrumentation This issue involved concerns identified during the NRC Special Team Inspection and identified as unresolved item 50-317 and 318/89-200-13 regarding program inconsistencies that did not permit a readily accessible mechanism to ensure that safety related process instrumentation was scheduled and periodically calibrated and the lack of a process to evaluate the effect on equipment operability of instrumentation found out of calibration. This issue was inspected and closed as documented in section 4.4.
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10.0 MANAGEMENT h1EETING During this inspection, periodic meetings were held with station management to discuss inspection observations and findings. At the close of the inspection period, an exit meeting was held to summarize the conclusions of the inspection. No written material was given to the licensee and no proprietary information related to this inspection was identified.
On April 21-22, Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Regional Administrator, visited the site for informational tours and meetings with the resident staff and plant management. The visit included a tour of the independent spent fuel storage facility and meetings with Mr. G. Creel, Vice President for Nuclear Energy, and Mr. R. Denton, Plant General Manager.
10.1 Preliminary Inspect:on Findings One unresolved item (50-31" and 50-318/92-12-01) was identified regarding a large number of welding deficiencies.
10.2 Attendance at Management Meetings Conducted by Region Based Inspectors Inspection Reporting Dalg Subiect Report Na Inspector 4/3/1992 EDSFI 50-317/92-80 R. Mathew 50-318/92-80 4/17/1992 Outage 50-317/92-13 J. Furia Radeon 50-318/92-13 i