IR 05000317/1990003
| ML20006E059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1990 |
| From: | Della Ratta A, Keimig R, Lancaster W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006E056 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-90-03, 50-318-90-03, NUDOCS 9002160178 | |
| Download: ML20006E059 (12) | |
Text
~ "
._
_.
_ -
- - - -
-
.,
_
!
~ f;n1@ @itL!"; 4
.;
joyi$$ h 6 6Qnd.l__Qt>)f)g
,
'
' r{p;;c).
p s;./.ms).
a
.
..
.
d me n,
_g..
yo
.
,
.
_-
W
$w.
L pp m:
..).
y n
,
i k
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
L
- REGION I
,
y,
,
I
'
50-317/90-03
. Report Nos,.50-318/90-03-
'
>
50-317 l
Docket'Nos.
50-318
t
DPR-53 License Nos. OPR-69 Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
' Facility'Name: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2
J.nspection At:L j.3@, Maryland
-
,
' Inspection Conducted: January 8-12, 1990
- Type of Inspection:> Routine, Unannounced Physical Security
.
P k
N-/-70
~
A Inspectors:.
A~. Della Ratta,- Ph)Sical Security Inspector date i
u.
l-L
.N,\\
6[4 Z.= l= 90
.
W. K. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector date
'
y
.
Approved by:-
& /- fo
.
'
jR. R. Keimig, V iefh, Safeguards Section date
,
,
Division of Radiatf6n. Safety and Safeguards L
-
!.
Inspection ' Sun mary:
Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/90-03 and 50-318/90-03)
?
'
'
<
- Areas Inspected:
Licensee actions on findings of the NRC's Regulatory i
Effectiveness Review (RER); Management Effectiveness; Management Support, Program Plans, and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, o
!
=
_
+
w
,
-
-
-
______.________ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _.......
__
.
-
.
,
.
Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Power Supply; Testing, Maintenance' and Compensatory Measures; Training and Qualifi-
,
cations; Locks, Keys, and Combinations; Lighting; Records and Reports; and Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure Verification.
Results: A licensee-identified violation in the area of Vital Area Detection Aids was reviewed by the inspectors. Additionally, the licensee was found in ncncompliance with the NRC-approved Guard Training and Qualification Plan in that security force members were not being tested for either field of vision or glaucoma. A potential weakness was alta identified in the area of Protected Area Detection Aids.
4
.
.
.
_
l
'
..
-
'
J
.
l
-!
%.
]
DETAILS J
1.
Key Personriel Contacted
Licensee Personnel
- R. Dernoga, Manager, Facilities Management
' V Bradly, Director, Security Services
- L. Gibbs, General Supervisor, Calvert Cliffs Security Operations
'
- G. Brosan, General Supervisor,~ Loss Prevention
'J. Alvey, Assistant General Supervisor, Nuclear Security
- G. Gwiazdowski, Supervisor, Security Training tad Education Unit
- J.:Ross, Security Licensing Analyst
- W. Moffat, Nuclear Security Supervisor
- W. Flanagin, Nuclear Security Supervisor R. Leonard, Supervisor Security Screening Unit
>
- M. Cox, Security Training Specialist J. Flinn, Supervisor, Security Support Unit D. Harshbarger, Physician Assistant-Certified, Medical Department U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- J. Beali, Senior Resident Inspector
- Indicates those present at the Exit Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Findings from the NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER)-
The NRC's RER was conducted on October 7-11, 1985 and identified two potential inadequacies and six weaknesses'in the licensee's security program. NRC Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/89-13 and 50-318/89-13, docurented the satisfactory resolution of all but one item identified in the RER report.
During this inspection, the remaining item (RER Report paragraph 2.2.2) was reviewed.
IIIIS MEAM C0 mas SArgun,s IEf0EATMl ED IS liDT TSR pmg
,
DIS 010SUFI,IIIS INTETiomly
'
LEFTBLAK The NRC considers this RER item (2.2.2) to be resolved.
. -
-
-
-
.
-
.
-
._
-
-
.
.4
.
.
.
4; j
t
3.
Management Effectiveness - Security Pronram
.
The inspectors determined that management attention to the Calvert Cliffs security program remains. strong and aggressive.
The_following actions have been taken by the licensee since the last NRC
physical security inspection to enhance the existing security program:
- The licensee used consultants to conduct training and to provide technical expertise in evaluating various areas during the annual security program audit.
'
-
.
- The licensee upgraded the X-ray search capabilities at the main access control center.-
- The licensee initiated an engineering study to upgrade the protected i"
area-(PA): security barrier, intrusion detection system (IDS)
assessment aids and the main access control center. These upgrades
are scheduled for completion in 1993.
- The licensee has upgraded PA lighting,
,
- The licensee has upgraded PA assessment equipment.
- The licensee has upgraded alarm station capabilities.
l
- The license purchased four new portable guard booths.
- The licensee is continuing to upgrade the on-site firearms training range,
.
'1 TIll$ PAP.AGRAPli CNABS SmSUta liUORMATID!! ISD IS HDI FOR fi2LIC DISCLOSilRE, li IS IENIl0NALLY LEFTBLAK
In summary, the licensee continues to maintain an effective and high L
quality program. Management (both corporate and plant) attention to and interest in the program was evident.
In addition, the security program is actively' supported by other plant groups and effectiveicommunication L
channels exist among security and other plant groups.
4.
Management Support, Security Program Plans and' Audits a.
Management Support - Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be active and effective by the
.
inspectors. This'determinatio.n was based upon the inspector's review
,
h
..
.
.
.
,,
'
,
.
,
of various aspects of the licensee's program as documented in this report.-
j
,
?;
The inspectors considered the types of upgrades' discussed in Section 3 of.this inspection report to be indicative of a high quality.
i
-
'
effective and performance-based security program.
>
The inspecters noted that Security Force Members (SFMs) are, in general, very knowledgeable of their post duties, contents of
,
i procedures and their other responsibilities, and exhibit a very professional demeanor. The morale of the security force appeared
-
good. Plant security management and supervisors appeared to be effectively implementing a quality program and corporate support is i
highly evident. Minor potential spcurity-weaknesses identified by
,
the inspectors during the inspection were discussed with security
.:
management.and prompt corrective actions were taken. The-inspectors j
noted an increase in the security force attrition rate, which is
'
normally very low.
This increase appears to be related to salary.
Licensee management is aware of this problem and is currently t
evaluating the security positions and salaries, b.
Security program plans - The inspectors verified that changes to the licensee's Security, Contingency, and Guard Training and Qualification Plans (the Plan), as implemented, did not decrease the
'
effectiveness of the respective plans, and had been submitted in accordance with NRC requirements.
No discrepancies were noted, c.
Audits - The 1989 annual security program audit report was reviewed during Combined Inspection Nos. 50-317/89-13 and 50-318/89-13. As a result of several potential weaknesses identified during that.
inspection, the licensee conducted another security program audit-which was completed on November 30, 1989.
For that audit, the licensee. enlisted the services of several nuclear security consultants to thoroughly review the security program.- The audit report had not been issued at the time of this inspection and, therefore, the inspectors did not review the audit findings or the responses by the security organization to the audit findings. This will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
5.
Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids a.
Protected Area (PA) Barriers - The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the PA barriers on January 9,1990. The inspectors determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan.
No discrepancies were noted.
'
b.
Protected Area Detection Aids - The inspectors observed the PA perimeter detection aids on January 9,1990 and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.
- -
-
-,. _ _
',
.
.
..
,
.
The inspectors identified several areas where-the PA 10$ was potentially weak.
The licensee took appropriate compensatory security measures when these areas were identified.
Igl$ pff,19?J?'d COMiliS SINEE3 ER3Hil0!! f39 IS I!DI M EllE InScl0SEE,liISl E O N '
LEil SLE.
This is an Inspector Follow-up Item.(IFI 50-317/90-03-01 and 50-318/90-03-01).
-
During a previous inspection (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-317/89-13-and 50-318/89-13), the inspectors also identified an area that was weak.
This area had been corrected. As a long-term corrective action, the licensee intends to upgrade the PA 105. The inspectors verified that funding had been budgeted for this project, which is scheduled for completion by 1993.
c.
Isolation Zones - The inspectors verified that isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides'of the PA barrier. No deficiencies were noted, d.
Protected Area an'd Isolation' Zone Lichtina - The inspectors conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on January 9,1990.
The inspectors determined, by observation, that lighting in the isolation zones was adequate.
No deficiencies were noted.
e.
Assessment Aids - The inspectors observed the.PA perimeter assessment system and determined that it was installed, maintained, and operated as committed-to in the' Plan. During a previous inspection (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-317/89-13 and 50-318/89-13), the inspectors identified several areas where the assessment system was only marginally effective.
Several of the marginal areas identified by the inspectors during the previous inspection-had been corrected.
<
<
.
- - _ _ - _ _ _
___
.
_ _ _
_ _ _.
__,.
.
.
.-
.-
.
,
,
-
.
During 1989, the licensee replaced several components of the system as a short-ters corrective action. The licensee intends to upgrade; the system and the inspectors verified that funding had been budgeted for. the project, which is scheduled for completion by 1993. The inspectors recommended that the upgrades to the assessment aids be accomplished as soon as possible to avoid excessive maintenance and the need for compensatory measures, f.
Vital Area Barriers - The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of several VA barriers on January 11 and 12 -1990. The inspectors determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in.the plan. No discrepancies were noted.
g.
. Vital Area Detection Aids - The inspectors observed the VA detection aids and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted.
The inspectors also reviewed a security event that was reported to the NRC under the requirements of -10 CFR 73.71. At 6:52 a.m., on December 29, 1989, a contract watchperson was found inattentive while on post by.a proprietary SFM.
TIR$ PARAttAPH C0gADiS SMEMSDS WORIAAllDN AND IS HDI TUR Mllfi DISCl0$RE,if 13 E!Hil5 ALLY LETT BLAM.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to comply with the.above requirements in the NRC-approved Calvert Cliffs Physical Security Plan, in that the licensee determined that a Nuclear Security Force Member-was inattentive to duty while posted as a compensatory measure for a degraded. vital area barrier represents an apparent Violation (VIO 50-317/90-03-02 and 50-318/90-03-02). This 1s a. Severity level IV Violation, however, a Notice of Violation will not be issued for this event because this violation satisfies all of the conditions as set forth in Section V.A. of 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.
,
The following conditions were met by the licensee:
- This event was identified by the licensee.
,
- This event fits-in. Severity Level IV.
- This event was reported as required.
.,
Z^
-
B l
"
-
>
?
-
.
...
,,
3
'
.
t
- This event was corrected in a reasonable time frame, including _
measures to prevent recurrence.
- This event was not a violation that could reasonably have been exploited.
.
Acceptable corrective actions taken by the licensee to prevent
recurrence included increased awareness and sensitivity to human
performance factors by supervision and the procurement of new,
portable guard booths for security force members use.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, this event will'
,
be classified as a noncited violation and no response from the licensee is required, c
6.
Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles
-
a.
Personnel Access Control - The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs.. This determination was based on the following:
(1) The inspectors verified that personnel are properly identified and authorization is checked prior to issuance of badges and key-cards.
No discrepancies were noted.
L (2) The inspectors verified that the licensee has a program to
<
confirm the trustworthiness and reliability of employees and contractor personnel.
No discrepancies were noted.
(3) The inspectors verified that the licensee has a fitness-for-duty
'
program in place. The licensee fully implemented the requirements of 10'CFR 26 on January 3,1990.
Random drug-and alchol-testing of all personnel began on June 1,1989.
Additionally, the licensee is continuing periodic searches of
,
the owner-controlled area and the PA with drug detection dogs.
No discrepancies were noted.
L (4) The inspectors verified that the licensee takes precautions to
,
L, ensure that an unauthorized name cannot be added to the access
,
list by having a member of management review the list every 31
!
days.
No discrepancies were noted.
(5) The inspectors verified that the licensee has a search program, as committed to in the Plan, for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials. The inspectors observed personnel access processing during shift
'
changes, visitor access processing, and interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff about personnel access procedures. No discrepancies were noted.
i
.
.
.
-
_-
.
-
-..
._ -.
-
..
.
-
[
.'
'
--
ri
$.
f
'
,
- q 9=
-
y
I 7'
During a previous inspection'(Combined Inspection Nos.
'
_50-317/89-13 and 50-318/89-13) the-inspectors identified a J
problem with the X-ray equipment at the main access control point. The licensee has' replaced that equipment with new,
"
state-of-the-art units that are very effective.-
i
'
'(6). The inspectors reviewed the security lock and key procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan..The inspectors also reviewed the protected and vital area key inventory logs,.and discussed lock and key procedures with members of the security force and the licensee's security staff. No discrepancies were noted.
(7) The. inspectors determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs display their access badges as required.
No discrepancies were noted.
(8) The inspectors verified that the licensee has escort procedures for visitors in the PA and VAs. No discrepancies were noted.
(9) The inspectors verified that the licensee has a mechanism for
,
expediting access to vital equipment during emergencies and that the mechanism is adequate for its purpose.
No discrepancies were noted.
(10) The inspectors verified that unescorted access to VAs is limited to authorized individuals.
The access list is revalidated at least once every 31 days as committed to in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted, b. - ' Package and Material Access Control - The inspectors determined that the -licensee was exercising positive control over packages. and-ma^.erial that are brought into the-PA at the main-access portal. The inspectors reviewed the package and material control procedures and found thatLthey were consistent with commitments in the' Plan. The inspectors also observed package and material processing and
-
interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff:about package and material control procedures. No discrepancies were noted.
During a previous inspection (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-317/89-13
,
and 50-318/89-13) the inspectors identified a problem with-searches of " factory sealed" boxes.
During this inspection, the inspectors observed very thorough package and material searches being conducted by SFMs. The inspectors noted that SFMs had been sensitized to
" factory sealed" packages, and determined that an improved search program has been implemented.
.
.
--
_
_
__-
__ -
_
._
_
_
h.-..
-
,
,
.c.
Vehicle Access Control - The inspectors determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within-the PA. The inspectors verified that vehicles are properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA.
Identification is verified by the SFM at the vehicle access portal. --This procedure.is consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspectors observed vehicle processing and search, inspected vehicle logs, and interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures. -The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments
,
-in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted.
During a previous inspection (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-317/89-13 and 50-318/89-13) the inspectors identified several weaknesses with the licensee's control of vehicles and drivers within the main-vehicle search area. The licensee corrected these weaknesses by installing a new vehicle trap / inspection area (which is totally enclosed by security fencing) and instituted new procedures that'are very effective..
7.
Alarm Station and Communications The inspectors observed the operation of the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations (CAS & SAS) and determined they were maintained and operated'as
, committed to in the Plan 'CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspectors and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors verified that the CAS and SAS did not contain any. operational activities that would interfere w'th the assessment and response functions. No discrepancies were noted.
During a previous inspection (Combined-Inspection Nos. 50-317/89-13 and 50-318/89-13), the inspectors identified a potential weakness in the operation of the SAS. This weakness _will be corrected with an upgrade project which is scheduled for completion in 1993. Until that time, the licensee has effected. appropriate compensating actions.
The inspector also observed test.s of communications capabilities in the alarm stations and reviewed the testing records. All were found to be as committed to in the Plan.
No discrepancies were noted.
8.
Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures The inspectors reviewed the testing and maintenance records and confirmed that the records committed to in the Plan were on file and readily available for licensee and NRC review. The station provides dedicated instrumentation and controls (I&C) technicians to conduct preventive and corrective maintenance on security equipment. A check of repair records indicated that repairs, replacements and testing is being accomplished in a timely manner. No discrepancies were noted.
.... _..
.
.
..
_
- _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
,P
..
.
,
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's use of compensatory measures and determined them to be as committed to in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted except as discussed in Section.5.g. of this inspection report.
9.
Security Training and Qualification
.The inspectors randomly selected and reviewed the training and qualification records for six SFMs. The physical and firearms qualification records for those SFMs were also inspected. The SFMs selected were armed guards and supervisory personnel.
On January 11, 1990, the-inspectors determined, by reviewing individual SFM training records and by interviewing security and medical personnel that SFMs were not being tested for either glaucoma or field of vision during their routine physical examinations.
After a review of the inspectors' findings, the licensee agreed and stated that the cause was apparently an administrative oversight on the part of the licensee's medical department.- The licensee initiated prompt action to correct this problem.
The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Guard Training and Qualification Plan, dated March 13, 1989, Revision 4, Section 2.2.1, states, in part, that all members of the nuclear security force are required to pass a physical examination that includes a vision check for both field of-vision and glaucoma.
The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to comply with the above requirements in the NRC-approved Calvert Cliffs Guard Training and Qualification Plan represent an apparent violation of NRC requirements (VIO 50-317/90-03-03 and 50-318/90-03-03). Due to the nature of this violation, the inspectors questioned the depth and thoroughness of the
- licensee's QA audit program, since it should have identified these discrepancies.
Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possess the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that they were knowledgeable of their job requirements.
No discrepancies were noted.
'The-licensee continues to administer the training program with eight professionals (1 supervisor, 3 instructors /on-site, 2 instructors /
off-site,_I clerk and 1 part-time firearms instructor). Newly hired SFMs receive a minimum of eleven weeks of basic training (including 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of firearms training). The licensee's nuclear security training program had been recently accredited as a college level program by the American Council on Education ( ACE). The licensee is increasing the firearms requalification program to include quarterly assessments for all armed SFMs.
Fake weapons and explosives have also been incorporated into the licensee's program as training aids.
SFMs continue on a five week
_.. _. _....
... __________.___.
.
.
- p
,
..
_,..
12-
.
I routine training schedule, i.e., every fif th week they receive one week of-training. Training schedules continue to be prepared one year in advance.
At the time of the inspection,-the licensee's station security organiza-tion consisted of 138 personnel (42 SfMs,10 security system operators,10 supervisory personnel, 31 contract watchmen full-time, 31 contract watchmen part-time (hired as outage support), 6 administrative / managers, and 8 screening personnel). The inspectors verified that the armed response force meets the commitments in the Plan and that there is always one full-time member of the security organization on-site who~ has the authority to direct security activities.
10.
Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure. The licensee's procedure details short-term actions that could be taken to protect against attempted radiological sabotage involving a land vehicle bomb if such a threat were to materialize. The procedure appeared adequate for its intended purpose.
No discrepancies were noted.
11. Exit Interview The inspectors met.with the licensee representatives indicated in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on January 12, 1990. At that time, the purpose and scope for the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented. The licensee's commitments, as documented in this report, were reviewed and confirmed with the licensee.
_ _.
_