IR 05000317/1981023
| ML20039E455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1981 |
| From: | Crocker H, Kinney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039E453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-81-23, 50-318-81-22, NUDOCS 8201070309 | |
| Download: ML20039E455 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report Nos. 50;-317/81-23 50-318/81-22 Docket Nos. 50-3I7 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53 Category C
DPR-69 Priority
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Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company P. 0. Gox 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203-Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Lusby, Maryland Inspection conducted-No mber 1 -18, 1981
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Inspectors:
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W.W'. Ti 6ney,j T[amLe.. der,EPS,RI
_dat6 signed'
G.L. Snyder, Chier,~EP&PSB, RI H.W. Crocker, Chiaf, EPS,-RI-R.E. Architzel, Resident Inspector,RI N.M. Terc, Inspector, EPS, RI C.A. Sakenas, Inspector, EPS, RI R.H. Smith, Inspector, RI K. Abraham, PAO, RI D.M. Rohrer, EPLB,HQ D.B. Matthews, EPLB,HQ B.D. Pickett, Battelle PNL B.C. Thompson, Battelle PNL P.A. Bolton, Battelle HARC
/2/2//[/
Approved by:,
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H.W. Crocker,' Chief, Emergency dat'e signed'
Preparedness Section, DEP&OS SUMMARY Inspection on November 16-18, 1981 (Report Numbers 50-317/81-23, 50-
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318/81-22)
Area Inspected:
Special, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise. _The inspection
' involved 373 inspection-hours by a team of thirteen NRC Region I, NRC
~ Headquarters, and hRC contractor personnel.
Results: No items of ~ noncompliance were identified.
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PDR ADOCK 050003171
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Emergency Organization-Normal' Job Function / Title'
Job Function / Title
.A.E. Lundvall
.Vice President, Supply.
Recovery Manager C.H. Poindexter Vice President, Engineering Recovery Manager-and Construction
'J.A. Tiernan Manager, Nuclear Power Site Emergency Department Coordinator
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L.B. Russell-Plant Superintendent Plant Superintendent E.T._Reimer
. Plant Health Physicist Radiological Assessment Director N.L. Millis General Supervisor, Radiation Protection Radiation Safety Director W.S.- Gibson General Supervisor, Technical Support-Electrical and Controls Center Director G.F.-Rogers Manager, Corporate Media Communication Communications-Center Coordinator R.O..Mathews Assistant General Super-Emergency Security
- visor Nuclear Security Team Leader R.M. Douglass Manager, Quality Assurance Corporate Spokesman Department G V. Resnick Manager, Real Estate _and Administrative Office Services Services Director S.E. -Jones Training Supervisor Chief, Exercise Controller / Observer
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T.N.-Pritchett Project Manager of Nuclear
' Emergency Programs
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G.C. Creel Manager, Production Main-tenance Department R.F. Ash Chief, Nuclear Engineer G.H.~Gaertner Senior Engineer B.A. Bernaba Senior Engineer The team also observed and interviewed other licensee emergency
- response personnel as they performed their emergency response functions.
2.
Emergency Exercise The Calvert. Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant emergency exercise was conducted on November 17, 1981, from 3:30 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.
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a.
Pre-exercise Activities The NRC team of observers met with the. licensee on November 16, 1981, and reviewed the nature and scope of the exercise scenario.
During this meeting, the licensee stated that essential operational
. personnel would not participate in the evacuation portion of the exercise, since both units were operating.
The licensee coordinated the exercise scenario with the various participating offsite agencies.
The scenario included a large
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release of radioactivity to the environment under varying-meteorological conditions which required response on the part of the agencies of all'three counties within ten miles of the facility and the State of Maryland. The scenario also included a bomb threat and bomb explosions which caused the response-of law enforcement agencies concerned with such matters.
Finally,
. the scenario included the contaminated injury of an emergency repair worker which caused the response of the local volunteer rescue squad and the nearest hospital.
Based on the aoove findings, this portion of the licensee's exercise program appeared to be acceptable.
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Exercise Observation During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, thirteen NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; establishment of the emerger.cy response facilities; and actions of the emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The follow'.ng activities were observed:
(1) detection, classification, and assessment of the events making up the scenario; (2) direction and coordination of the emergency response;
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(3) notification of-licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information;.
(4) evacuation, assembly,.and accounting for licensee personnel; (5) assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions; (6) performance of offsite, onsite, and in plant radiological surveys; (7) performance of.first aid and rescue; (8) provision of in plant radiation protection;
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(9)' maintenance of site security and access control; (10) performance of technical support; (11) performance of repair and corrective actions; and (12) provision of information to the public.
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; establishment of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use'of the. facilities were generally consistent with'their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. However, the team did find areas for licensee improvement which'are discussed below..(The licensee also identified most of these areas in their critique of the exercise.)
The scope of the emergency scenario was acceptable, as discussed in section 2.a.
However, the scenario was cursory in its approach.
For instance, the in plant radiation levels were not consistent with the accident events and data provided to the offsite teams for iodine levels were given in concentration levels rather than sample. counts.
The licensee did not have a sufficient number of observers / controllers to provide an independent assessment of the. adequacy of their emergency response. For instance, there was only one observer /
controller in the Alternate Emergency Control Center. This one individual had to observe and assess the adequacy of the actions of the Recovery Manager, the_ Site Emergency Coordinator,.
the Radiological Assessment' Director and his personnel', and the Emergency Communicators. 'Also, this individual was the chief exercise controller. This task was too large for one individual.
Further, the objectivity of this individual could-have been affected by the fact that he was responsible for the exercise scenario and the training of the emergency response personnel. The lack of sufficient' observers / controllers'was further demonstrated by many of the emeroency teams performing their duties without the presence of an observer / controller.
The radiological' assessment to provide offsite radiation dose projections could be improved by better usage of the computer system, Meteorological Information and Dose Acquisition System
.(MIDAS), through provision of written instructions and training
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of personnel. The licensee should coordinate with the offsite agencies so that the same maps are used_by all offsite monitoring teams. Training of personnel in radiation units and_ consistency in-use of the units would be beneficial.
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The events and actions of personnel in the medical ~ exercise should be analyzed carefully and corrective actions taken to improve dosimeter assignments to offsite perro'nnel and radiation control practices under emergency circumstances.
Accounting for personnel over shift change was demonstrated to be a s
problem area requiring improvement.
- The audibility of announcements given on the public address; system in
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plant areas with high noise levels was demonstrated to be a problem. -
During the exercise, the Radiation Protecti.on Director (RPD) had
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minimal contact with the Site Emergency Cotddinator (SEC) even though
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the Emergency Response Plan calls for thi,s position to report to the SEC.
The organizational interfaces 4mCng the SEC, the RPD, and the
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Plant Superintendent in the Emersencs Response ~0rganization should be examined and clarified.
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Time pieces, such as stop watches, shoyld be included in kits supplied to teams collecting samples ovsr>spdcjfied times.
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_ Exercise Critique
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The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise crJtique c'n November 18, 1931, during which the key licensee exercise participants discussed their reactions to the exerctse.
The observations made by tb,eir
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thirteen observers / controllers wer'e' presented.by thq. chief,ob:erver/
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m controller. The participants highlighted areas'_for improveent.which
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included most of those mentioned in secRon 2.b.
Thedticenseadndicate'd '
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these comments would be evaluated and afpropriate correctiv4 aq. ion
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taken.
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The NRC team compared their findings vith those of the 1,ichsee' ands
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determined that neither the licensee Tior the NRC observerrhad ideritified
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items which exhibited a potential for a degraded emergency response. '
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However, areas for improvement ware i.dentified.
Discussions during
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the critique indicated that lichnsee % nagement pg 5essed sufficient understanding of these areas to. permit timely and effdctive improvements.
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Based on the findings in the above area, the NRC
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the licensee did not fully implement, the critidue.provj.; ions of theirN t;
s Emergency Response Plan Implementing Prt,cedurer(EPIIP)-NoN5.5, entitled,.- N)
Exercises, Tests, and Drills.
Sectid%;3.8 of-this'ERpIP requires that
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an appropriate number of observers to evaluate and critique the ehrcise i
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be provided. As discussed in section 2.b.,
the 'ITcensee did not;have
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a sufficient number of observers / controlle E -(his-was substantTated
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by the fact that the exercise participants.rather ;tharf the observers /
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controllers provided most of the critique of ghe' exercise:
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3.
-Exit Meeting and NRC Critique
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Follo.wingt$elicensee'sself-criticue,theNRCteammetwiththelicensee
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.repreh-rtatives clisted in section 1.
The team leader summarized the purpose
'~and ' scope of the NRC inspection.
The team leader also informed the licensee
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that their performance in the exercise demonstrated that they could implement
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is their Emergescy Respense Plan and Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures in 'a manner which wuld adequately provide for the health and
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N-safety:of the public.
However, there were areas where improvement should
, a 1:c % de, and'the improvement items previously described in section 2.b.
were discussed.
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l.'i ca n s t acknowied9ed the findin9s and indicated that evaluation
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' an%,ee mer.acemend resolution of-the identified improvement items would begin immediately.
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