IR 05000315/1978025
| ML17317A683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1978 |
| From: | Baker K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17317A681 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-78-25, 50-316-78-23, NUDOCS 7810270398 | |
| Download: ML17317A683 (10) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
, REGION III Report no.:
50-315/78-25; 50-316/78-23 Docket No.:
50-315; 50-316 License No.:
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company 2 Broadway New York, New York 10004 Facility Name:
D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and
Inspection At:
D.C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, MI Inspection Conducted:
July 10, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, August 9, 10, 14, 16, 17 and 18, 1978
,Inspector:
EzcO f K. R. Baker p-go-rg Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief Reactor Projects Section
Inspection Summar Ins ection on Jul
12
17
20
24
27 28, Au ust
10
16 17 and
1978 (Re ort No. 50-315/78-25; 50-316/78-23.
Areas Ins ected:
Observations of operation and tour of the facility, review of annual operating report, licensee's actions regarding IE Bulletins and Circulars, Licensee Event Reports, Limiting Conditions for Operation, and the August 12, 1978, unplanned release of radioactive gas, The inspection involved 126 hours0.00146 days <br />0.035 hours <br />2.083333e-4 weeks <br />4.7943e-5 months <br /> on site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in five areas.
One item of noncompliance was identified in the reviewing area.
(Infraction-Implementation of equipment control procedure; paragraph 5).
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Durin the Ins ection
- D. Shaller, Plant Manager
- B. Svensson, Assistant Plant Manager
- R. Dudding, Maintenance Supervisor
- D. Wizner, Maintenance Quality Control Coordinator V. Vanderburg, Nuclear Engineer
- E. Smarrella, Technical Supervisor R. Lease, Production Supervisor,
- R. Keith, Operations Supervisor E. Kant, Performance Supervisor D. Palmer, Health Physicist H. Chadwell, Production Supervisor
- J. Stietzel, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- T. Beilman, Quality Assurance Implementation Coordinator
- J. Rischling, Quality Assurance Implementation Coordinator R. Kroeger, AEPSC QA Manager B. Sweeney, AEPSC QA Engineer J. Feinstein, AEPSC Safety and Licensing Head J. Etzweiler, AEPSC Safety and Licensing Nuclear Engineer The inspector also contacted a number of operators, technicians and maintenance personnel during the course of the inspection.
+Denotes those present at one or more of the exit interviews.
2.
Annual 0 eratin Re ort The inspector reviewed Unit 1's Annual Operating Report for 1977.
The report appears to include the information required by NRC requirements.
3.
IE Bulletins and Circulars The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the following IE Bulletins.
Included was a review of facili,ty records and physical observations where appropriate.
(Closed), 78-05 GE breaker auxiliary contact malfunction.
Licensee's reply dated May 15, 1978.
Not used at the facility in safety related equipment.
(Closed)
78-04 Environmental qualification of stem mounted limit switches inside containment.
Licensee's reply dated April 7, 1978.
RFC - 12 2257 has been initiated.
Completed on Unit 1 and partially completed on Unit (Closed)
78'-01 Flammable contact arm retainers in GE relays.
Licensee's reply dated February 16, 1978.
Relays of this type not used at facility in safety related equipment or areas.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions regarding the following IE Circulars and determined that these actions appear to be appropriate.
(Closed)
78-04 Fire doors.
(Closed)
78-03 Packaging type A LSA material.
(Closed)
77-16 Diesel trip lock-,out features.
(Closed)
78-02 Lubricating oil for Terry turbines.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
License Event Re orts (LER's)
The inspector reviewed the following LER's submitted by the licensee to determine that the reporting requirements were met, and that actions taken appeared appropriate.
Exceptions are noted below.
Unit 1 (Closed)
78-21 Inoperable source range channels.
(Closed)
78-26 Failure to report as required by Technical Specifications.
(Closed)
78-27 Use of outdated procedures.
(Closed)
78-28 (Closed)
78-24 S.I. load sequencing out of specification.
Three circuit breakers for safety related motor operated valves found tripped.
(Closed)
78-31 R-ll and 12 Failure.
Original report was improperly coded.
Licensee corrected error by revision of the report on July 18, 1978.
(Closed)
78-19 Both ESF ventilation fans out of service.
(Closed)
78-34 Failure to review temporary change as required by Technical Specifications.
In addition to the corrective actions contained in the LER the licensee is revising PMI 2010 to better control temporary change (Open)
78-33 Portion of Containment Isolation System Failed to Function.
Licensee agreed to review the need for increased surveillance for failed fuses.
(Closed)
78-32 Surveillance required prior to core alteration was missed.
(Closed)
78-31 BIT low boron concentration.
Unit 2 (Closed)
78-06 Pressurizer level indication drift.
(Closed)
78-10 TAVG below 541 while in Mode 1.
(Closed)
78-11 Leaking Auxiliary Feedwater check valve.
(Closed)
78-15 Rod position indication drift.
(Closed)
78-16 High boron concentration in Boric Acid Storage Tank.
(Closed)
78-17 Over temperature delta temperature channel failure.
(Closed)
78-18 Feedwater flow channel failure.
(Closed)
78-19 Failure to sample accumulators as required by Technical Specifications.
Original report did not include actions taken to prevent recurrence.
Licensee amended report on 7/21/78 when this was brought to his attention.
(Closed)
78-20 Valve in midposition due to hand operator failure.
(Closed)
78-21 Late performance of ISI surveillance.
(Closed)
78-23 Failure to test steam pressure bistables as required by Technical Specifications.
Original report did not include action taken to prevent recurrence.
Licensee amended report on 7/21/78 when this was brought to his attention.
(Closed)
78-24 No flow obtained from spray additive line.
(Closed)
78-25 Failure to perform surveillance within required time interval on CD diesel.
(Closed)
78-26 Entry into Mode 4 with CTS system out of servic (Closed)
78-27 CMO 414 slow operation.
(Closed)
78-28 Certain ISI valve tests not performed within time specified by TS.
(Closed)
78-29 Turbine stop valve limit switch failure.
Original report did not contain corrective action.
Licensee provided updated report on 8/2/78 containing corrective actions.
(Closed)
78-30 Upper containment purge started before being in Mode 5.
(Closed)
78-31 Rod position indication deviations.
(Closed)
78-33 Overtemperature~
T cables reversed.
(Open)
78-34 Hydrogen recirculation fan time delay out of specification.
Report did not provide corrective action.
Licensee will provide updated report when corrective action determined.
(Closed)
78-32 Tave below 541 F during power operations".
(Closed)
78-35 RCS unidentified leakage exceeded TS.
(Closed)
78-36 Containment APD inoperable.
(Closed)
78-37 Both diesels out of service.
(Closed)
78-38 Low Specific Gravity, Cell 89, CD Battery.
(Closed)
78-39 Low Specific Gravity, Cell 35, AB Battery.
(Open)
78-40 Rod H-8 not indicating full inserted.
Licensee has not determined cause.
Licensee will provide an updated report when corrective actions required are determined.
Licensee has conflicting data as to exact problem. It has not been determined if the problem is one of indication or is an actual hang-up.
(Closed)
78-41 Rod position indication deviation.
(Closed)
78>>42
CD diesel fuel injection pump failure.
5.
Un lanned Radioactive Gas Release The facility had an unplanned gas release on August 12, 1978, from 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> until about 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br />.
The release occurred when an operator opened a valve to drain water from the gaseous vent
'4 header.
The drain was not closed and remained open for about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This provided a leakage path to the auxiliary building for gas from the waste gas decay tanks which were supplying cover gas.
The licensee's calculations indicate that about 0.59 Ci total of noble gases were released and about 0.3 x 10 Ci I-131 were released.
The release was a maximum of 0.09% of Technical Specification limits.
The inspector's re'view indicated the licensee's estimate of the release, based upon samples of gas remaining in the tanks after the release, were conservative.
A review of facility records and discussion with personnel indicated the following happened on August 12, 1978.
No.
1 gas decay tank was in service supplying cover gas.
At about 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br /> while placing the north boric acid evaporator in service an operator opened a drain valve (WD 244)
on the gaseous vent header to drain any water that had accumulated in the line.
This valve was tagged with a striped red tag, clearance No. 11812, which required permission of the Shift Operating Engineer (SOE)
to operate the valve.
No permission was obtained.
The operator forgot to close the valve.
At 1950 hours0.0226 days <br />0.542 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.41975e-4 months <br /> No.
waste 'gas decay tank was removed from service because its pressure had decreased to the minimum for supplying cover gas and No.
2 was placed in service.
At about 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br /> the cause of the loss of gas was found and isolated.
The inspector's review revealed the following:
a.
The licensee has had previous releases similar to this (see AEO 77-01, AEO 76-01, and IE Inspection Reports 30-315/76-11 and 77-08).
b.
In his June 28, 1977, reply to an item of noncompliance regarding a similar release the licensee stated the system would be modified to prevent recurrence.
The letter stated that the change would require about two months after receipt of parts which were expected to be delivered by mid-January 1979.
All parts required for the modification were received on site by October 26, 1977, but control valves DRV-237 and 238 were "lost" until after this event when they were found in the store room.
The licensee had started preliminary work on the modification on April 28, 1978, even though he did not think he had all the required parts, (gob order 47249).
c.
The clearance tags being used to prevent a recurrence, as stated in the June 28, 1977, reply, were still in use though the operator violated them.
Operation of the valves without permission of the SOE appears to be noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 which requires procedures to be implemented.
"Clearance Permit System" Rev. 0, dated February 20, 1976, requires that equipment tagged with a striped tag not be operated or status changed unless it is under the request of the person to whom the striped tag clearance was issued.
Striped tag clearance No.
11812 was issued to the SOE for the valve operated in this case.
In addition, the inspector's review of Condition Reports for calendar year 1978 show that at least five Condition Reports were initiated bec'ause of suspected problems with or violations of the Clearance Permit System (CR's78-356, 110, 109, 383, and 295)
and the review process for these reports had not been completed by the licensee.
d.
None of the facilities logs reference the event or the termination of the release.
e.
Radiation monitors did not respond significantly to the event.
Probably due to the low activity and slow release rate.
Unit 2 R26 did show a slight increase in activity during the time of the release.
The recorder for Unit 1 monitors was not inking properly on all channels making trends hard to observe.
This condition existed for a period of time before the event and still existed on August 14, 1978.
6.
Limitin Conditions for 0 erations On August 9, 10, 17, 1978, the inspector made a comprehensive comparison of operating parameters and equipment status to the limiting conditions for operations established by the Technical Specifications.
Both units were operating in Mode 1 at the time.
Checks were made of control board indications, alarms and tags.
Any abnormalities observed were compared to the Technical Specifications.
Then specific selected specifications were compared to the plant conditions that existed at the time of the inspection.
No items of noncompliance were observe.
Observation of Activities and Tours of the Facilit The inspector observed activities at the facility and toured portions of the facility on July 10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 27, 28, August 9, 10, 16, 17 and 18, 1978.
During,a portion of the tour on July 27, 1978 the inspector was accompanied by the following NRR personnel:
Operating Reactor Branch 2 Chief, A. Schwencer and D.C.
Cook 1 and 2 Project Manager, M. Mlynczak.
On July 28, 1978, a meeting was held by the Project Manager to discuss outstanding licensing items with AEPSC representatives and the inspector on site.
During a portion of the tour on August 18, 1978, the inspector was accompanied by J. Keppler, RIII Regional Director, G. Roy, Deputy Director and A. Davis, Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Chief.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Exit Interviews July 14, 1978 The previous weeks inspection results were discussed.
July 21, 1978 a.
Licensee Event Reports (LER) were discussed.
b.
Errors in the LER's and incomplete information in the reports were discussed.
The licensee agreed to revise LER's 50-316/78-19, 23, 29, 34 and 40 when the required information was available.
c.
The review of LER's by licensee was discussed.
The licensee stated the quality of the review would be improved to reduce errors and insure adequate corrective action.
d.
Reduction in the number and ways of avoiding repeat LER's was discussed.
July 28, 1978 a.
Completion of Unit 2 testing was discussed.
b.
The need to prevent items from accumulating in various panels in the plant was discussed.
The licensee stated the accumulated material would be removed.
I
August 18, 1978 a.
The licensee stated organizational changes and staffing level changes were going to be made in some departments to improve operations and that this would be completed before the impact of increased work load from such things as the new security system were felt.
b.
The need to watch the opening being made for installation of the security system from a fire protection and radiological standpoint was discussed.
The licensee appeared aware of the potential problem.
c.
The licensee stated that installation of permanent tubing for the air supply to valves CCR 460 and 462 would be pursued.
d.
The following items with respect to the unplanned gaseous release were discussed.
(1)
The item of noncompliance.
(2)
Recorders.
The licensee stated methods'o reduce the time recorders were not recording would be investigated.
(3)
The licensee stated efforts would be made to improve the information contained in logs.
(4)
The licensee acknowledged that a problem might exist in tracking parts ordered by New York for modification and stated a review would be made to see if improvement could be made.
(5)
The licensee stated additional personnel would be trained to quantify releases.