IR 05000313/1974012
| ML19309D865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1974 |
| From: | Kidd M, Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309D850 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-74-12, NUDOCS 8004110710 | |
| Download: ML19309D865 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
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REGloM ll = $UIT E 818 Tatsenews: 14046826 490s T,
230 PE ACHT REE ST RECT, NORT HWEST
AT L. ANT A. GEORGI A 30 333
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RO Inspection Report No. 50-313/74-12 Licensee:
Arkansas Power and Light Company Sixth and Pine Streets Pine Bluff, Arkansas 71601 Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 Docket No.:
50-313 License No.:
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Category:
B2 Location: Russellville, Arkansas
,, Type of License: B&W, PWR, 2568 Mwt Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced Dates of Inspection: August 21-23, 1974
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Dates of Previous Inspection: June 25-27, July 30 -
August 6,1974 Pri'ncipal Inspector:
M. S. Kidd, Reactor Inspector Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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Accompanying Inspector:
H. A. Wilber, Reactor Inspector
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Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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Principal Inspector:
M. S. KidM4 Reactor In4pector Date Facilities Section Facil,ities Test and Startup Branch Reviewed by:
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f[///79 R. Ce Lewis, Senior Inspector Date Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch l
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RO Inspection Report No.
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50-313/74-12-2-
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Action A.
Violations
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None B.
Safety Items
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None II.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters A.
Violations 1.
Conduct of Test Without an Approved Procedure (R0 Report
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No. 50-313/74-9, I.A)
A licensee response has been received, but it did not state
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when preventive measures would be or had been taken to pre-vent recurrence nor did it specify actions taken to achieve compliance with the requirement for use of an approved pro-cedure.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 2.a)
2.
Review of Procedure 1701.01 (R0 Report No. 50-313/74-10,_
I. A.l.al A licensee response has been received en this matter which
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discusses corrective and preventive measures.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 2.b)
3.
Entries in the Station Log (R0 Report No. 50-313/74-10, I.A.1.c)
The licensee response on this item discusses preventive and corrective actions.
This item in considered closed.
(Details I, paragraph 2.c)
4.
Documentation of Flushing Results (R0 Report No.
50-313/74-10. I.A.2.b)
l The licensee response on this item did not indicate what corrective actions would be or had been taken.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 2.d)
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RO Inspection Report No.
50-313/74-12-3-
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B.
Safety Items Not applicable.
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III. New Unresolved Items
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None IV.
Status of Previously Identified U resolved Items n
74-11/1 Control Room Ventilation System Preparations' are being made to retest these systems to demonstrate that they meet the FSAR design basis. This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
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74-11/2 Hydrogen Purge System
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A qualified replacement filter has been installed in the
"B" train discharge. This item is considered resolved.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
V.
Unusual Occurrences
.A.
Reactor High Flux Trip On August 11, 1974, during the conduct of a psuedo rod ejection test during zero power physics testing, the reactor tripped on a
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high flux of 0.25% power (Abnounal Occurrence Report No.
50-313/74-6).
B.
Reactor Protective System Power / Imbalance / Flow Trip Setpoint on August 12, 1974, the licensee reported that the RPS power /
imbalance / flow trip setpoint had been set at a value less conservative than required by Table 2.3-1 (item 2) of the Technical Specifications (Abnormal Occurrence Report No.
50-313/74-7).
C.
Source Range Neutron Detector On July 14, 1974, source range (SR) detector NI-1 failed due to excessive heating of the cable between the detector and preamplifier (Unusual Event Report No. 50-313/74-1).
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RO Inspection Report No.
50-313/74-12-4-
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D.
Damage to Auxiliary Building Waste Gas Exhaust Flute During a power reduction to conduct a turbine overspeed trip test, main steam relief valves relieved, causing damage to the auxiliary building waste gas exhaust flute overhead. Further damage resulted when certain valves relieved during a subsequent remote shutdown test.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
VI.
Other Significant Findings A.
Remote Shutdown Test The inspectors witnessed the remote shutdown test from 15 percent power to hot shutdown conditions,.using controls located outside
the control room.
(Details I, paragraph 5, and Details II, Para-graphs 2-5)
B.
Regulatory Operations Bulletin (ROB) 74-8 A licensee response to R0B 74-8, dated August 27, 1974, states
_s that none of the ITE breakers are used in ANO,1.
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C.
Regulatory Operations Bulletin 74-9
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A licensee response to R0B 74-9, dated August 27, 1974, states that no GE circuit breakers of the type discussed are installed at ANO,1.
The response also indicates that a program to determine the tightness of bolts in auxiliary switch assemblies had been
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initiated and that a report on that matter would be submitted by October 1, 1974.
VII.. Management Interview
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A management interview was conducted August 23, 1974, to discuss l
findings of the inspection.
The following licensee personnel attended:
Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)
G. H. Miller - Assistant Plant Superintendent B. A. Terwilliger - Operations Supervisor T. H. Cogburn - Nuclear Engineer L. W. Humphrey - Quality Assurance Engineer Cl The status of previously identified enforcement matters in Section II was discussed.
(Details I, paragraphs 2.a - 2.d)
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'l RO Inspection Report No.
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50-313/74-12-5-
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The status of previously identified unresolved items in Section IV was discussed.
(Details I, paragraphs 3 and 4)
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Findings of the inspectors observations of the remote shutdown test
were discussed.
(Details I, paragraph 5 and Details II, paragraphs 2-4)
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12 I-1
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Prepared By:
[-d-DETAILS I
M. S. Kidd,' Reactor Inspector Date i
Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch Dates of Inspection: August 21-23, 1974
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Reviewed By:
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R. C. Lewis () Senior Inspectog Date Facilities Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
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In addition to those listed in the Management Interview section, the following individuals were contacted during the inspection:
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Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L)
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J. W. Anderson - Plant Superintendent
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R. R. Culp - Test Administrator M. H. Shanbhag - QC Inspector Two Shift Supervisors Two Plant Operators Two Auxiliary Plant Operators One Waste Control Operator 2.
Status of Previously Identified Enforcement Matters a.
Conduct of Test Without an Approved Procedure This matter, originally discussed in RO Report No. 50-313/74-9, Details I, paragraph 26.d, involved testing of the control room
"Halon" fire control system.
This system was tested by the subcontractor without prior review and approval of the test procedure by AP&L. The licensee response on the matter, dated August 5, 1974,
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l did not discuss corrective measures taken to achieve compliance l
with FSAR review requirements, nor did it discuss preventive
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measures taken to preclude future occurrence of this type problem.
This subject was discussed during the current inspection and the l
inspector was informed by telephone August 26, 1974, that a supple-mental response detailing the information requested would be submitted by September 3, 1974.
This item remains open.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12 I-2
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b.
Review of Procedure 1701.01 This item was originally discussed in RO Report No. 50-313/74-10, Details I, paragraph 3.b, and involved a lack of review of a special procedure by the Technical Support Engineer and Quality Control Engineer as required by Station Procedure 1004.07, " Control of
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Special Processes." A licensee response, dated August 14, 1974, states that the procedure had been subsequently reviewed as required
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and that steps had been taken to prevent recurrence.
This action,
was verified during the current inspection. The inspector stated that this matter was considered closed.
c.
Entries in the Station Log This matter was originally discussed in RO Report No. 50-313/74-10,
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Details II, paragraph 3, and involved the lack of entry of certain significant operating actions and occurrences.
Corrective and preventive
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measures taken were discussed in the licensee response dated August 14, j
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1974. These were verified by the inspector during the current inspection. The inspector informed licensee personnel that this matter was considered resolved.
i d.
Documentation of Flushing Results
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This matter was originally discussed in RO Report No. 50-313/74-10, Details I, paragraph 3.c.
It involved the failure to document findinga of inspections of cuttings flushed from incore guide tubes after reaming
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operations to allow passage of incore detectors.
The licensee response dated August 14, 1974, did not address actions taken to gain compliance
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with the documentation requirements. This was discussed during the
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inspection and the inspector was informed by telephone August 26, 1974,
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that additional information on the matter would be submitted in a written response by September 3, 1973. This item remains open.
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Control Room Ventilation System
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This unresolved item was initially discussed in RO Report No. 50-313/74-11, Details I, paragraph.9.i.(10). Preoperational test results did not
indicate whether the ventilation systems perform in accordance with i
the design bases discussed in Section 9.7 of the FSAR. During the current inspection, licensee personnel stated that Bechtel was preparing a test procedure to be used to demonstrate the ability of the systemo to maintain the temperature and humidity conditions discusced in the
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FSAR. This item remains open.
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.R0 Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12 I-3
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Hydroten Purge System i
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This unresolved item was discussed in RO Report No. 50-313/74-11,
Details I, paragraph 9.1.(11).
The exhaust filter bank for hydrogen purge train "B" was inadvertently flooded with water after efficiency
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testing, disqualifying it for operation with regard to Technical i
Specification efficiency requirements.
During the inspection, the inspector reviewed Job Orders (J0) which covered the installation and testing of a new set of filters. New
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l filters were installed under JO N. 594 on August 17, 1974, and o
j efficiency tested under JO No. 608 on August 19, 1974. Preliminary
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test data analysis indicated efficiencies in removing "DOP" and " FREON"
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.to be greater than r.equired by Technical Specification 4.4.3.2.
The inspector informed licenras personnel that this item was considered
resolved.
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5.
Remote Shutdown Test
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A shutdown using controls located outside the control room was conducted l
August 21, 1974, and was witnessed by the inspectors.
The test was started with the plant at 15 percent power with normal system lineups for that power level and with the turbine-generator loaded as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.68.
The test was conducted to verify that the plant could be brought to a hot shutdown condition and
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maintained in that condition using remote controls and to verify
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.the adequacy of Emergency Procedure 1202.33, " Remote Shutdown." It
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was anticipated that if all plant systems functioned automatically, i
steam generator levels would stabilize at approximately 30 inches, pressurizer level at approximately 180 inches, RCS pressure at approxi-
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mately 2155 psig and RCS temperature at approximately 555 degrees F.
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During the conduct of the test, which was started at 2022 hours0.0234 days <br />0.562 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.69371e-4 months <br />, the RCS
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temperature and pressure, pressurizer level, and steam header pressure dropped considerably more than anticipated. The operating crew correctly l
concluded that a steam relief valve must have relieved and stuck open.
An atmospheric relief valve had stuck open and was isolated after discovery. High pressure injection via a makeup pump was necessary
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to maintain pressurizer level and RCS pressure, which dropped to minimum
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values of approximately 22 inches and 1850 psig respectively.
RCS temperature was stabilized at 526 degrees F.
Control of the pressurizer i
heaters was regained at 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />, at which time system parameters began
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to return to normal for hot shutdown conditions. Hot shutdown was maintained until 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br /> as specified by the test procedure. During
the plant cooldown after completion of the test, it was discovered that
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a code relief valve had stuck open on the other steam header.
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J R0 Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12 I-4
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During the test, the inspector observed the following:
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a.
The latest procedure revision was availa'ule and used, I
b.
Minimum staffing requirements of the Technical Specification and the test were met, The test was performed according to procedure by the operator c.
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observed (Plant Operator),
d.
Crew actions appeared to be correct, timely, and well cocrdinated.
Communications were maintained with the Plant Operator who directed the activities, Plant response sould have been essentially as predicted had the steam e.
reliefs not stuck open, and f.
Most data was assembled for final analysis.
Equipment problems prevented complete delogging of reactimeter data, but this was to
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be completed as soon as possible.
Recorder charts and computer logs had been assembled and identified.
On August 22, 1974, the inspectors were informed that the procedure for the Vaste Control Operator (WCO), sheet 1 of OP 1202.33, had been changed prior to the test by rearranging the sequence of steps involved.
Licensee personnel stated that the procedure was being changed permanently, but that it was not officially changed before the test began because of a lapse of memory on the part of the test coordinator.
The more desirable sequence of steps was discussed by the coordinator,
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shift supervisor, and operators prior to the test. The inspector
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noted that the personnel involved were qualified to make the change, but that the change should have been made officially and documented according to station quality control procedures. This change was completed on August 23, 1974. The inspector stated that he had no further questions, in that the intent of Technical Specification 6.7.3, involving procedure changes, had been met.
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6.
Damage to Auxiliary Building Waste Gas Exhaust Flutq On August 17, 1974, during a power reduction to conduct a turbine over-speed trip, condenser vacuum was lost, causing the main steam relief valves (MSRV) to lift when the turbine bypass valves to the condenser
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closed.
Exhaust steam from the MSRV's impinged upon the auxiliary building waste gas flute, causing damage to it.
The flute runs up the east side of the containment building from the top of the turbine building and overhead the exhausts for the MSRV's.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12 I-5
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f Several* sections of sheet metal were torn from the flute frame. When the i
l two valves relieved during the remote shutdown test on August 21, 1974, as discussed in paragraph 5, further damage resulted.
The inspector asked what measures were being taken to monitor releases from the shortened flute and what would be done to repair it and prevent future damage. Licensee personnel related that at present the only source of radioactive gases going to this flute were from the weste gas decay tanks (FSAR Figures 9-13 and 11-3).
Calculations based on concentrations of three Xenon isotopes in the tanks as of August 21, 1974, showed that concentrations at the release point and-at the site boundary would be several times less than maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) given in Appendix B of 10 CFR 20.
Analysis resulta j
indicated no other radioactive isotopes present at the time. Licensee personnel stated that releases from the waste gas decay tanks are made only after processing of a release permit, including sampling.
A method of repair and redesign of the MSRV's exhausts to prevent further damage had not been deteenined as of August 23, 1974.
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II-l RO Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12
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. DETAILS II Prepared By: Yd<&tA /
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1. A. Wilber, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Engineering Section Facilities Test and Startup Branch Dates of Inspection: Augu t 21-23, 1974
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Reviewed By:
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R. C. 'Lewiq / Senior Inspectgr Facilities ection Facilities Test and Startup Branch i
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Persons Contacted j
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Arkansas Power and Light Company B. A. Terwilliger - Operations Supervisor R. T. Elder - Instrument Technician
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Three Operators I
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Pretest Review On Wednesday afternoon, August 21, 1974, the reac'timeter calibration The date of the approved calibration was data sheets were reviewed.
Since all the required transient data were recorded August 21, 1974.
on a single tape on the reactimeter, a common time base was inherent
in the method of recording.
An operator guided the inspectors through the stations that would be
covered by the Plant Operator and the Assistant Plant Operator (Duty Sheets 2 and 4 of Procedure OP 1202.33 " Remote-Shutdown")
Observations During Conduct of Test Procedure TP 402.01 3.
During the conduct of TP 402.01, the /;ngettor observed the actions of the Assistant Plant Operator as a < upleted the operations called
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He completed each step orrectly for on Duty Sheet No. 2 of OP J20%
3, P6 swer south electrical petetration and promptly and, when he rearco at the Dasey Panel. By the room, he reported to the Plant 1Scraccs time the Assistant Plant Operator and ths ipspector reached the electrical penetration room the Auxil'.iar Opef ator was already there l.
performing the actions called for on outy. Sheet No, 3 of OP 1202.33.
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i The Auxiliary Operator opened the HPI valves at the request of the Dasey This request was correct as per Step L 2 of OP 1202.33.
Panel Operator.
The operation of the HPI valves was necessary because of e.uipmentThe co
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Operator and the Auxiliary Operator was correct in all steps observed.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-313/74-12 II-2
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-While the inspector was in the electrical penetration room, he observed coils of electrical cables lying across cable trays ECI-07 and ECI-08.
This was reviewed with Mr. Terwilliger and he stated that the cables were part of the material required for the work in progress on the installation of the Steam Line Break Detection System and the cables will be put in the cable trays as part of the work required.
4.
Post-Test Observations On August 22, 1974, the information available on the test was reviewed.
It was noted that the person who had verified the patching of the reactimeter was not identified on Enclosure 2 of TP 402.01. This was considered a deviation in form since the failure to identify the person
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was an isolated instance.
Two of the duty stations were inspected to see if the Duty Lists were available at the first action location as specified in the General e
Instructions of OP 1202.33. Duty Sheet No. 4 was available at the Dasey panel; however, Duty Sheet No. 2 had not been replaced at the switchgear panels. Mr. Terwilliger said that these sheets will be in
\\s, place before the next start-up.
The cumplete set of data from the reactimeter was not available for review because of a malfunccion in the printout process.
5.
Summary of Observation
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The acceptance criterion was that the plant could be controlled in a safe manner and would be maintained in hot shutdown mode per OP 1202.33.
i This criterion was satisfied by maintaining the unit in hot shutdown for 30 minutes. The effect of the equipment failure (stuck atmospheric relief valve and stuck safety valve) was to create a pressurizer level lower than expected and a minimum average coolant temperature lower than
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expected.
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Arkansas Power and Light Company ANO-1 SEP 13 '6/4
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.RO Inspection Report No. 50-313/74-12
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cc w/encla H. D. Thornburg, RO
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Directorate of Licensing (13)
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cc enc 1. only:
- PDR
- Local PDR
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- State
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- To be dispatched at a later date
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