IR 05000312/1980029
| ML19345D212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1980 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B, Obrien J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345D215 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-80-29, NUDOCS 8012120253 | |
| Download: ML19345D212 (11) | |
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i U. S. :1UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO.1 0FFICE OF It{SPECTIO:1 A:10 EilFORCEMEllT REGIO 1 V Report ilo.
50-312/80-29
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OPR-54 Docket ilo.
50-312 License ilo.
Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830
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Sacramento, California 95813 Facility ilame:
Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
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Inspectio'n conducted:
September 1-30, 1980 Inspectors: b MNd. lyt >
/b//7/&O Harvey4. Cantdr4 Senior Resident Inspector Jate' Signed
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b f uthM [4n/
/d//7'(D Jonn 038rien,lunit Resident Inspector Date Signed
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Approved by: C\\ b 4. d
/d//7/@
BJ H. Ehulke'dberpy, Chief Reactor Projects Section Date Signed
- 2, Reactor Operations and fluclear Support Branch i
Summary:
Inspection between September 1 and 30,1930 (Report flo. 50-312/80-29)
Areas Inspected:
Routine operational safety verification; monthly maintenance ooservation; monthly surveillance observation; review of plant operations; followup on regional requests; inoffice review of licensee event reports; followup on inspector identified problems; and, independent inspection effort.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or
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deviations were identified.
8012120 253 RV Fonn 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Rodriguez, Manager Nuclear Operations
- P. Cubre', Plant Superintendent
- D. Blachly, Operations Supervisor M. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor
- Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance Technician
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
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H. Heckert, Engineering Technician
- J. Jewett, Acting Quality Assurance Supervisor'
l F. Kellie, Plant Chemist
- V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer a
- R. Hiller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor
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- R. Moore SMUD Special Agent a
L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director
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- 0. Unitney, Nuclear Engineer B. Wicnert, Mecnanical Engineer The inspectors also talked sith and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations, and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on September 30, 1980.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control rocu operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control rocm operators during the month of September 1930.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified prcper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building and the turbine building were conducte to
observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview l
verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
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l The inspectcr observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions
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and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
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During the month of September 1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the engineered safety features and auxiliary feed systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed i
portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with I
radwaste shipments and barreling.
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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conforrance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and admin-istrative procedures.
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations'were identified.
3.
Monthly Itaintenance Observation
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Station maintenance activities of safety related system and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides
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and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The Silowing items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures
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and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control recoras were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
a.
"C" Diesel Generator Temperature Instrumentation
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b.
Diesel Generator Room Temperature and Vent Fan Start c.
"A" Diesel Generator Fuel System Following completion of maintenance on the "A" and "B" Diesel Generators, and Diesel Generator Rocm Ventilation System, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
l 30 items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation i
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing of the "D" Inverter, diesel generators, reactor protection and main feed systems and verified tnat testing was performed in
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accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, tha t
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i removal and restoration of the affected components was accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
l a)
1-10dC (9/13/80) Monthly RPS Channel C o)
STp-879 (9/3/80) Special Test of Inverter D
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c)
Sp 203.04B (9/18/80) Monthly Test of Reactor Trip from Gen / Turbine
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Trips and/or Loss of Main Feedwater
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d)
SP 206.03A (9/23/80) Diesel Gen. "A" Monthly Tese ilo items of noncompliance or ceviations were identified.
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Review of Plant Ooerations
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i During tne month of September 1980, the inspector reviewed the following activities:
d.
Review and Audits On September 17 and Septemoer 18, 1980, tne inspector attended a safety review committee meeting.
The inspector verified that provisions of technical specifications dealing with memoership, review process, frequency, and qualifications were ue t.
The inspector also verified that decisions made were reflected in the meeting minutes and that corrective actions proposed were taken.
i On September 15, 1930, toe inspector witnessed an audit conducted by the licensee's offsite audit team and verified conformance with technical specifications and QA procedures.
b.
Training i
Tne inspector attended two of the licensee's operator requalification i
lecture series and verified that iesson plan objectives were uet and that training was in accordance with the approved operator requalification program schedule and objectives, i
i The inspector verified by direct questioning of one new, one existing, and one temporary employee that administrative controls and procedures, radiological health and safety, industrial safety, controlled access and security procedures, i
emergency plan, and quality assurance training were provided l
as required by the licensee's tecnnical specifications; verified j
by direct questioning of one craf tsman and one technician that l
un-the-job training, formal technical training commensurate
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witn job classification, and fire fighting training were
provided.
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c.
Envircn.nental protection i
l The inspector verified the installation and operability of j
four sampling /.r.onitoring stations and associated equipaent and reviewed records for completeness and accuracy.
d.
Security i
The inspector observed that 38 individuals achieved acceptable I
scores during the conduct of weapons and physical fitness tests.
j e.
Licensee Action Concerning Identified problems i
The inspector reviewed corrective actions taken by the licensee pertaining to recurring failures and resolution of identified i
discrepancies involving safety-related components.
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do items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Followup on Regional Reuuests
During the month of September,1980, personnel from the Region V office of the URC in Walnut Creek, California requested information from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancno Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning:
locked valves in
the Reactor Contaimaent building; the fuel sipping procedure (STP-
224); procedures dealing with heat balances and Huclear Instrunent calibrations; the Performance Appraisal Branch Inspection, Reactor Containment entry requirements; and Solid / Radioactive Waste storage.
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do items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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The Senior Resident Inspector conducted an initial screening, i
examination and followup on the following licensee avent reports.
This inspection activity was conducted in part to determine whether tne repcrting requirements have been met, the reports are adequate j
to assess the event, the cause appears accurate and is supported by report details, corrective actions appear appropriate for correcting i
tae cause, generic aspects of the events have been considered, and the LER forms are complete.
The following LER's are CLOSED:
(1) 79-16 Snubber Rework
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(2) 79-18 Grinnell Snubber Modification
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(3) 79-19 Pinhole Leck in Socket Weld
(4) 79-E0 Pinnole Leak in Socket Weld
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(S)
79-21 Early tlithdrawal of APSR's (6)
79-22 Reactor Building Purge Valve Operability (7)
79-23 Improper Valve Lineup
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(3)
79-44 Improper Valve Lineup
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(9) 30-02 Seismic Support Modifications
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(10) d0-03 Improper Valve Line0p (11) 30-04 RCS Leakage - Excessive I
(12) 00-07 Bergen - Patterson Snubber Failures
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Items 7, 8, and 10 were subjects of a Civil Penalty issued to $1100
in April, 1930.
ido other items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
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8.
Followup on Inspector Identified Problems The purpose of this effort is to ascertain whether items identified by the insue-tors during previous inspections are resolved satisfactorily
and consistent with Regulatory requirements.
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Accordingly, the following items are discussed:
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a.
(UPLl)
Item 79-25-02, Revised Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
Traini a erocram
Tne couaitment given in IE Report 79-25 by a licensee representative was that tne Instrument and Control (I&C) Apprentice Training Program will be revisco and a consistent program establisned by duly 1, 1980.
Due to uanpower limitations, plant operations j
since that couaitment was made, and PAB findings, the licensee has not been able to meet the July 1,1980 date.
A committee i
of I&C and Maintenance personnel is currently performing a
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feasibility study on this issue.
The scope of the study has been expanded from the original concern with the lac department i
to include the maintenance department in the final outcome.
I In other words, the outcome of this study will be a formal l
administrative program that will define the Apprentice Training program for both I&C and Maintenance Department.
The plan is i
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expected to be completed by December 31, 1980 and fully implemented
by December 31, 1981.
I Tnerefore, this item will remain open pending the inspector's examination of the comoleted program.
b.
(CLOSED) Itcm 80-06-06 Bergen-Patterson Failures
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ilRR approved the repair and test program for the dergen-l Patterson snubbers.
This item and the LER 80-07 review of l
this item are closed.
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(CLOSED)
Item 80-10-02 PLS-036 The inspector verified that PLS-036, a manual valve in parallel
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with the letdown orifice and the air operated bypass valve, i
HV 24011, was removed from the plant using appropriate administrative
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controls.
The work was done under Work Request 45835.
Engineering Change ilotice A-4913. Rev.1, was generated for this work.
The 10 CFR 50.69b analysis was examined (Log #181) as was the
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!!aintenance Inspection Data Report 187-R2.
This document included verification of the hydro-tests done to the nigii
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pressure and low pussure caps which are in place for PLS-036 at present.
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The inspector verified that the licensee is planning to replace
PLS-036 and portions of the bypass line which PLS-036 is actached to during a 1981 refueling outage.
(The valve was removed rather than replaced to limit radiation exposure on personnel and preclude time constraints associated with plant startup following the 1980 refueling outage).
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This item is closed.
i d.
(CLOSED) Item 80-17-02 iiuisance Alams
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The Instrument and Control Department has responded to tne inspectors' concerns about alarms which exist in the Control Rocm for extended periods of time and therefore could cause
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the operators to become complacent and neglect to respond to real problems.
Discussions with the Operations Supervisor, also, have indicated a willingness to eliminate tnese alarms.
i A new empnasis on writing work requests will be undertaken by l
the operations department, the I&C department will respond to attempt to eliminate the nuisance alarms.
The alarms mentioned in item 80-17-02 have been eliminated.
This item is closed.
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e.
(OPE:1) Item 60-23-02 Environuental and Seismic Qualification or Pur/ and SV Indications Contrary to tne commitment given in the May 1,1980 letter
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i referenced in IE Report fiO-312/80-23, the licensee has not documented the qualification of the PORV and SV's.
The contract to perfom said qualifications was let on May 7,1980
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(#7675) as proposal number P-80-05.
The date given to the
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licensee for the completion of qualifications is December 1,1980.
The tests are being perfomed to verify functional perfomance, enerual aging characteristics, radiation environment capabilities.
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seismic response characteristics, and transient response
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cnarac terisi tics.
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decause the qualification work is not complete, this item will
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remain open until the results can be examined by the inspector.
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(CLOSED)
Item 80-23-04 HGS-Oli in A-52 A.52, ilydrogen Purge System, will most likely be revised as
the new purge systems are installed pursuant to "TMI2" required cnanges.
Tne changes may require dual vert fication.
In the
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i interim, the licensee sees no reason to perform dual verifications
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following maintenance on manual valves in' this system which j
are not containment isolation valves.
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Tne inspector verified that procedure A.52 incorrectly stated a valve number as HGS-Oli vice liGS-010.
The procedure has
been cnanged to correct this and other errors.
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This item is closed.
9.
Indeoendent Inspection Ef fort Discussions were held between tne Resident Inspectors and operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems tney may nave wnich are related to nuclear safety.
These
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discussions will continue as a standard practice.
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j On numerous occasions, during the montn of September, the Resident Inspectors attended operations sta tus meetings.
These meetings are held by tne Operations Supervisor to provide all disciplines onsite with an update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
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In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed
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on the following items:
i a.
Operations Supervisor Qualifications
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b.
Itawaoth Lakes Earthquakes c.
Witnessing of plant startup (9/2 to 9/3/80)
d.
Communication problems between Security and Operations l
departments
e.
Coments on IEC 80-21 i
l The following comments concern some of the above items:
i d.
Ocarations Supervisor Qualifications
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The Inspector has reviewed the qualifications requrements for b
the new Operations Supervisor.
His qualifications were balanced against the requirements of Section 12.4.1 of the FSAR and ANSI Standard Hla.1-1971.
For example, ANSI Standard Hid.1-1971 states in part that this position requires, "A minimum of
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eight years of responsible power plant experience of which a minitcum of three years shall be nuclear power plant experience.
A maximum of tuo years of the remaining five years of power
plant experience may be fulfilled by satisfactory completion
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of academic or related technical training on a one-for-one time basis.
At the time of initial core loading or appointment
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to the active position the operations manager shall hold a Senit
.cactor Operator's License." The training and personnel records show that all the requirements have been met as outlined below:
1.
Candidate has 6 years 10 months nuclear power plant expericace, (October 1973 to August 1930)
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Candidate has 3 years related technical training.
(BSME, California State University, June 1971)
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3.
Candidate holds a current valid Senior Reactor Operator's License (originated August 19,1976)
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b.
Marwoth Lakes Earthquakes:
a A series of earthquakes occurred in the Maniaotn Lakes area of California between llay 25 and May 27, 1980.
The three largest quakes ranged from 6.0 to 6.3 in magnitude.
Due to queries by the NRC on the effects of the earthquakes on Rancno Seco, the licensee contacted the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) office in llenlo Park, California regarding any infonnation they had developed from Ene seismic events.
The following information is quoted from a SMUD memorandum frcm an engineer to the Resident Inspector and others dated August 1, 1980:
"The USGS informed us that their nearest seismic instrument was located in Hawthorne, llevada 70
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miles from the !!aranoth Lakes region.
They stated that this instrument, set to trigger at 0.019 horizontcl
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ground acceleration, did not activate during any of the seismic events.
The USGS office surmised that
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since Rancho Seco was so far away it was unlikely l
that the USGS instrument at the meteorological tower had any activity also.
I mentioned that SMUD had checked the counter on the accelerometer and it was still on zero (no activity).
However, I received information that the U.S. Corps. of Engineers (USCE)
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dnd the California Ulvision of Mines and Geology (CDMG) had facilities in the area which were instrumented l
and had some data from the events.
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"During the following days, the CDMG and USCE offices in Sacramento were contacted for additional information.
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"The USCE's nearest facility was the Pine Flat Dam near Fresno, about 60 miles from the !!ammoth Lakes i,
area.
The activity recorded at that location indicated
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peak norizontal ground acceleration of 0.129 Other
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sites with instruments included the New Hogan Dam near Valley Springs and San Andreas and the Isabella Dam east of Bakersfield.
At these locations, ground
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accelerations were about 0.02 to 0.039, respectively.
"The CD:!G was able to provide p'reliminary infonnation i
regarding data they had collected.
In addition,
they will have reports on the events by late September or early October which will be available to S!!UD.
Preliminary strong motion data in report fona may be
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available earlier and was requested from the CDMG.
During the teleanone conversation, we were informed
that the epicenter of tne seismic events was located r
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in the Hammotn LaPes region with CDMG seismographs
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recording three ear inquakes of magnitude 6.0 to 6.3
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within a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period.
The maximum recorded acceleration at Convict Lake was determined to be 0.469 peak horizontal and 0.439 peak vertical.
There were subsequent smaller earthquakes and aftershocks.
"The initial event (6.0 magnitude) occurred at 9:33 a.m. on May 25, 1980.
Horizontal ground acceleration at the Mammoth High Scnool gymnasium sileasured 0.339 At Paradise Camp, which is located between Tom's
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Place and Bishop, the second and largest of the
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seismic events measured 6.3 magnitude.
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"At the Rancho Seco site, there was indication that some motion was felt by personnel during tnese events (see memo, Oubre' to Raasch, dated June 26,1980).
However, neither the recently installed and calibrated instruments nor the USGS instrument at the Met Tower indicated activity of the 0.01g sensitivity level i
I necessary to trigger the accelerometers."
c.
Witnessing the Septe_mber Startuo/Heatup The Inspectors witnessed portions of the preparations for the
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reactor coolant system heatup, the actual reactor coolant
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systeia heatup, the heatup to hot shutdown with reactor coolant pumps, the approach to criticality, and zero to 15 percent opera tions.
The controlling peccedure for these evolutions is il.2, Plant Heatup and Startup.
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l Various initial conditions were verified as complete.
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inspectors also witnessed the resetting of the power range i
channels overpower trips to 105.5% and the raising of reactor coolant system pressure above the low pressure trip of 1900 psig.
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During the approach to criticality,' reed switch problems were j
noted with rod 12 in group 4 and rod 11 in group 7.
The in-limit lights cleared on the Diamond Control Panel, but the 0%
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i lights did not extinguish.
This problem was not a safety
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problem in that it was obvious what the actual rod locations i
were. After latching and driving the rods in and out a few i
times, the reed switches cleared and the absolute position indications operated normally thereaf ter.'
The estimated critical position (ECP) was calculated to occur at between 45% on group 6 and 32% on group 7 (nominal 92% on group 6).
Criticality was not achieved withf1 + 0.5% A k/k above the ECP, however. At this point the licensee recalculated the ECp using actual temperatures, baron concentrations, and
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times.
A better ECP ensued and the startup was continued.
At the time of this event and later at the exit interview on September 30, 1980, the inspector stated that it would be a better practice if the operators calculated the ECP with the latest information just prior to the approach to criticality
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j rather than days before, using expected plant conditions.
The
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licensee representatives acknowledged this coment and stated
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they would consider this technique for future startups.
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i l;o items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The Resident Inspectors met with the licensee representatives
denoted in Paragraph 1 on September 30, 1980.
During this meeting,
the inspectors summarized their findings for the September,1980 inspection effort.
I ilo items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l A licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's observation that containment isolation valves SFV53503, 53604, and 53610 are, in effect, gagged closed.
The air operators are vented such that spring pressure will keep these valves shut, even with the loss of
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d.c. power to the operator solenoids.
The design of these valves were the subject of an item of noncompliance (80-26-03) issued in
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IE Report 50-312/80-26, Paragraph 7.
A licensee representative
added that the " clearance system" is used to vent the air and be assured that it takes the Plant Superintendent's permission to
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override the closure.
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Finally, the Senior Resident Inspector inforecd the licensee of a Special Team Inspection to be performed between October 28, 1980 and Hovember 7, 1980.
The team will consist of Senior Region V Inspectors and an NRC Headquarters representative.
The team will
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followup on the licensee's responses to. items of noncompliance and deviations issued in the PAT report 50-312/80-15.
The team will also followup on items identified as " poor" in the referenced report.
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