IR 05000312/1980026
| ML20002C345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1980 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B, Obrien J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002C336 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-80-26, NUDOCS 8101100103 | |
| Download: ML20002C345 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUL\\ TORY C010ilSSION
OFFICE OF INSPEC !ON AND ENFORCEMF.NT
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REGION V
50-312/80-26 Report No.
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50-312 DPR-54 Docket No.
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Safeguards Group Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Sox 15830
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Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Unit 1 Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection at:
Inspection conducted:
August 1-29, 1980 Inspectors:
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r arvey iT t,anter, Lenior ge_uce,nc inweu cur Date Signed
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S '1 m \\. ~ fyYn JAo 96a-/10
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Jonn O'9tien, Unit riesident-utipector Date Signed
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Approved By: /0 3l.' MMbb cff'/f o 5. H. F3ulkenaerry, t,111eytor FroJects bection Date Signed
- 2, Reactor Operations and fluclear Support Branch
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Su=ary :
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Inscection between August 1 and 29, 1980 (Report No. 50-312/80-26)
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v?? + - Areas Inspected:
i Routine operations safety verification; monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance observation; LER followup, followup on regional request; followup on Headquarters recuests; and, independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 117 inspector-hours by two resident inspectors.
Resul ts:
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Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in five areas; two items of nonccmpliance were identified in one area (Repeat failure to follow shutdown Procedure B.4) gh flux trip to 5%; infraction -and, one infraction Infraction - failure to reset overpower hi in another area (containment isolation valve aesign not in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A requirements).
RV Form 219 (2)
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8101 100103
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DETAILS 1.
persons Contacted
- P. Cubre', Plant Superintendent
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- 0. Coleman, Assistant Cuality Assurance Engineer
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Colceto, Technical Assistant
- G. Coward, "aintenance Supervisor
- R. Hollingsworth, Engineering Technician
- J. Jewett, Acting Quality Assurance Sucervisor F. Kellie, Plant Chemist J. King, Shift Sucervisor R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor L. Schwieger, Cuality Assurance Director
- T. Tucker, Acting Goerations Suoervisor W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant The inscecters also talked with and interviewed several other licensee emoloyees, i".luding memoers of the engineering, maintenance, operations, and cuality assurance (0A) organizations.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interviews on August 29, 1980.
2.
Ocerational Safety Verification The inspector ooserved control rocm operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of August,1980. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected comoonents. Tours of both the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equicment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, anc excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inscector observed plant hcusekeeping/ cleanliness conditions and verified icolementation of radiation protection controls.
During the month of August,1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the containrent spray and auxiliary feedwater systems to verify operability.
The inscector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews ind observations were conducted to verify that facility operaticns were in conformance with the reouirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
I t'o items of noncomoliance or deivations were identified.
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3.
Monthly aintenance Cbservation, Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed belcw were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with acproved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The followirg items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for oceration were met while cccconents or systems were removed from service; accrovals were obtained crior to initiating the work; activities were accomclished using apcroved procedures and were inscected as acclicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning ccmconents or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were imolemented; and, fire orevention controls were implemented.
'! ark recuests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs
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and to assure tnat oriority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance wnien may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
a.
Diasel instrument air regulator.
b.
RPS channel
'O' flow transmitter.
c.
Auxilary feed pump gages.
d.
Main turbine thrust bearing work.
Following comcletion of maintenance on the RPS channel
'D' ficw transmitter and diesel instrument air system, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Monthly Surveillance Cbservation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the NSC'.1 pumps, isolation values, reactor protection and reactor building spray systems and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adeouate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected cceponents were accomplished, that test results confor~ed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were croperly reviewed and resolved by appropriate mamagement personne _;.
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The inscector also witnessed cortions of the following test activities:
a.
SP203.07C (3/3-8/a/30) 1SC'.l pumo test-loco A.
b.
SP205.07A, 3 (3/a/80) isolation valve survey.
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SP208.0aA (8/7/30) monthly test of reactor trio from generator turbine trics and/or loss of main feed water.
d.
SP204.03A (3/8/80) quarterly RBS-A 1000 surveillance (P-291 A).
5.
Licensee Event Recorts Followuo Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event report was reviewed to determine that the immediate recortability recuirements were fulfilled and that immediate corrective action was accomolisned:
LER 80-39 (Coen): Failure to Reset Overcower Trio On August 20, 1980, members of the Instrument and Control (I&C) department discovered the nuclear power trip setting at 105.5% of rated maximum. As soon as tne snift supervisor was infomed of this fact, the shift supervisor ordered the I&C technicians to reset the four trips to 55 as per the technical specificaticn taole 2.3-1 requirement.
The reset was logged as being complete at 0840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br /> on August 20, 1980. This item was reported to the Senior Resident Inspector witnin two hours of its discovery.
The inscector's record review and personnel interviews indicated that on August 13, 1920, the plant was placed in the Shutdown Bypass Mode; that the licensed operator 1pparently informed the senior licensed operator (Shift Supervisor) that the plant was in shutdown bypass but that the nich flux trip had not been reset; that the senior control
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operator (a licensed reactor operator) inadvertently initialed the shutdown procedure S.4, Step 5.15 as being complete even though the flux trip was not reset; and, that due to an unintentional error, neither the shift sucervisor nor the operators took action to reset the high flux trip at that time.
Because of the above stated facts, the requirements as specified in Table 2.3-1 of the Technical Specifications were apparently violated in that the administratively controlled reduction of the nuclear power trip setting to 55 of rated maximum was not perfomed during reactor shutdown.
This is an accarent repeat infraction.
In IE Report 50-312/79-25 dated January 4,1920, tne inspector issued a Notice of Violation covering this same issue.
(50-26-01)
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As stated above, on August 13, 1980, a senior control operator initialed Steo 5.16 of Station Procedure B. A indicating that the action had been completed and that the four high flux trips had been reset to 55 of rated maxinum. However, on August 20, 1980, it was determined that Step 5.16 of Station procedure B.a had not been implemented. This failure to imolement Procedure B.4 is in violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 which states in part that written procedures shall be established, imolemented, and maintained covering tne activities referenced in the applicable procedures recomrended in Appendix
"A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Novemoer 1972.
This is an accarent item of noncompliance at the level of an infraction.
(80-26-02)
It is imoortant to note that the citations mentioned above are felt to be administrative in nature because the purpose of resetting the nuclear oower trio to SS of rated maximun is to prevent any significant reactor oower from being croduced when performing physics tests. Hao low per physics tests been performed, anotner Technical Specification (3.1.8) would have been operative ano would have alerteo the licensee again to reset the overpower trip.
No low power physics tests were in progress at the time the piant was shutdown nor were any low power physics test run during the period between August 13, 1980 and August 20, 1980.
The review of LER 80-39 will not be completed until the fourteen day follow up report is received and examined by the inspector. This item remains open.
6.
Followuo on Reoional Reouests During the month of August, 1980, personnel from the Region V office of the MRC in '.lalnut Creek, California, recuested information from the Resident Inspectors regarding the operation and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the Region V office concerning diesel generator time delay relays, a security drill, turbine maintenance, a ccuponent cooling water motor bearing failure, a component cooling water pump seal failure, maintenance performed on the
"D" and "J" inverters, and the loss of CC control power to outside containment isolation valves.
No items of nonccmpliance or deviations were discovered.
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Folicwuo on Feadcuaters Recuests During the month of August,1980, personnel from the NRC Headquarters in Bethseda, Maryland requested information from the Resident Inspectors about the operation, design and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.
Information was obtained and transmitted to the NRC Headquarters on diesel generator time delay relays, the diesel generator " Engine Control Panels,"
the diesel generator " Generator Control Panels", and the loss of DC control power to specific outside containment isolation valves.
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The first item is the subject of a folicwup item (30-17-01) mentioned in IE Report 50-312/30-17.
Further information has been gathered which corrects statements in item 30-17-01 dealing with Agastat relays in the Engine Control Panels. All the Agastat's in the Engine Control Panels are the 7CCO series Agastats, including TD-1 and TD-9 in each panel which are 7012 PC agastat's. The other TD-1, 2412PM Agastat removed earlier this year was taken from the "A" Diesel Generator Control Panel (GCP) not the Engine Control Panels. The range of this Acastat is.2-180 seconds.
TD-1 in the "3" GCP is a 2all PC Agastat with a range of.8-15 seconds. This Agastat was accarently cart of. the original GCP because it corresponds to the carts list number for TD-1.
The parts list also states that the 241aPC Agastat has a range of 0-180 sec. This does not correspond to the range stamped on the 2414 PC in place in the "B" GCP. Since the relay is set to time out at about 2 seconds an Agastat with a smaller range should be more accurate for this application. Since 2414 PC Agastats are not purchased as replacements at Rancho Seco, but 7012 PC Agastats are, and because the 7012 PC Agastat's range is 1.15-15 seconds, there accears to be no oroblem nere. Also, even though there is no documentation to snow that receipt insoections were performed on the 7012 PC Agastat, the Engineering Review Board (ERB) accepted the disccstion of the 7012 PC for the 2412 PM on Acril 22. 1980. The ERB consists of the Manager of Generation Engineering, a senior memoer of the SMUD 0.A. Decartment ano the Plant Superintencent. By oispositioning a nonconformance report as
" Accept As Is" the ERS indicates that the nonconformance does not substantually affect safety, intercnangeability, service life, or performance, and the tne material can be used for its intended purpose.
Therefore, all actions taken by the licensee relating to this matter were in ccmoliance with pertinant HRC requirements.
'iith the above facts, the inspector has determined this item to be closed.
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(30-17-01).
' lith respect to the last item the inspection determined that the
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outside isolation valve on the reactor building purge inlet line (SFV 53503), the reactor building purge outline line (SFV 53604), and the reactor building pressure equalizing line (SFV 53610) will apcarently fail open on loss of pcwer to the DC solenoids which control actuating air flow to the valves.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 23 states that the protection system shall be designed to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on scme other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy (i.e., electric pcreer, instrument air), or postulated adverse envircnments (e.g., extreme heat or cold, fire, pressure, steam, water, and radiation) are experienced.
It accears that the design and operation of the three containrent isolation values identified above do not confom to the requirements specified in Criterion 23. This is an accarent item of noncompliance at the level of an infraction.
(80-26-03). This item was originally identified as number 80-23-03 which is now close.
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Indeoendent Insoection Effort Discussions were held between the Resident Insoectors and operations, security and maintenance cersonnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions will continue as a standard cractice.
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On numerous occasions, during the month of August 1980, the Resident Inscectors attended ocerations status meetings. These meetings are held by the Coerations Supervisor to orovide all disciplines onsite with an update on the clant status and ongoing maintenance work.
In addition to the above, indeoendent inspection effort was cerformed on the following items:
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Witnessed security drill and critique.
2)
Witnessed a training health pnysics lecture.
3)
Surveyed dry waste sniements.
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Provided information to the media.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview The insoectors met with licensee representatives throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection (denoted in Paragraoh 1) on August 29, 1930. The scope and findings of the inspection activities were summari:ed.
During the discussions on the items of noncompliance the inspector stated that the corrective actions planned to preclude reoccurrance appear acprocriate. However, thcught should be given to requiring a member of the operating staff to check the settings of the high flux trip bistables after the step in the procedure which requires the reset.
Also, procedures B.1, B.2, and 3.0 need thorough review. There are sections of these startup and shutdcwn procedures which may not be clear to all licensed operators.
The licensee acknowledged these statements.
The licensee was asked for information on the dates of the next Joint Utility Audit. The response was that the Joint Utility Audit team will be on site between October 20-25, 1980. They will be asked to concentrate on a prior IE Performance Appraisal Team audit of Rancho Seco.
Finally, the insoector informed the licensee that the plans to shut down between "ay 1,1981 and June 15, 1984 for refueling only and then again about Octocer 15, 1981 to complete turbine inspections and TMI category
"B" items may not coincide with NRC Headquarters opinion of the licensee's recuirements and committments which have to be completed earlier. NRR has been informed of the licensee's schedul ;.
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During the August 29, 1980 exit the insoector informed the licensee that a deviaticn would be issued on the loss of de control power to the valve solencids. On Sectember 19, 1980, the inspector informed the licensee that instead of a deviation an infraction would be issued.
(See llotice of Violation Item C and paragraoh 7 of this report)
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