IR 05000312/1980010
| ML19318B147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1980 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318B133 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-80-10, NUDOCS 8006250066 | |
| Download: ML19318B147 (7) | |
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G-U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEhr
REGION V
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Report No.
50-312/80-10
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Docket No..
50-312 License No.
DPR-54 Safeguards Group
' Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:
Rancho Seco Inspection at:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection conducted:
liarch 3-31, 1980 Inspectors:
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,[ h O,'//#d pW H. L.Tanter, Senior esideilt Inspector Date Signed Date Signed
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Date Signed Approved By:
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B.- H. Fadtk'enberry, Chief,,Reactqr Projects Section #2, Date Signed Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Sun: mary:
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Inspection between March 3 and 31, 1980 (Report No. 50-312/80-10)
' Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of Licensee Event Report (LER) follow-up;
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follow-up on items of noncompliance; and independent inspection effort.
The inspection involved 52 inspector-hours by the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
Results: Of the. three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were found in two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction - movement of objects over the fuel transfer canal without approved procedures, Paragraph 4).
RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- P. Dubre, Plant Superintendent
- L. Schwieger,~ Quality Assurance Director
- D. Blachly, Mechanical Engineer
- Q. Coleman, Quality Engineer
- R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
- G.-Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
- W. Ford, Operations Supervisor
- H. Hechert, Engineering Technician
- J. McColligan, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor
- d. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Supervisor The inspector also talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview c., March 31, 1980.
2.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs).
The inspector conducted an initial screening, examination and follow-up on the following licensee event reports. This inspection activity was con-
- ducted in part to determine whether the reporting requirements had been met, the reperts were adequate to assess the event, the cause appeared accurate and was supported by report details, corrective actions were appro-priate to correct the cause, generic aspects of the events had been consid-ered, and the LER forms were complete and accurate.
The following LERs were reviewed; a.
(Closed) 79-21, Early Withdrawal of APSRs:
Feedwater nozzle inspections indicate that the apparent loss of electrical megawatts over the last year was due to degradation of the nozzles. The licensee plans on replacing the nozzles with stainless steel units.
In the meantime, the techniques used to calibrate feedwater flow prior to the
. refueling outage will be continued.
This item is closed.
b.
(0 pen) Anchor Valves (See IE Report 50-312/80-06, Paragraph 4.h.)
Twenty-six studs of various diameters'were sent to Anament Laboratories, Inc., in Berkeley, California, on March 24, 1980.
These are studs out of various anchor valves and with various ASTM designations which are to be tested for physical and chemical properties.
A report will be issued on these results.
The licensee stated that the NRC will have access to the report when it is issue _
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In the interim, the licensee infermed th'e Senior Resident Inspector that all Anchor Valve studs on ECCS valves,- with the designation
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ASTM A193 B6 (416), have been replaced.
This item remains open pending further review of the stud replacement program and LER 80-06.
c.
(Closed) 80-10, Improper Hand _ ling of 7-ton Cask Over Fuel Assemblies:
The Plant Review Committee eviewed this reportable occurrence on February 16, 1980, three days after the occurrence. To preclude similar occurrences, the Committee recommended the review of two procedures; M.30, Incore Monitor Handling and Replacement, and M.31, Operation of the Reactor Building Polar Crane and Fuel Transfer Canal Auxiliary Hoist.
The procedures were apparently reviewed by licensee personnel with resulting changes being made to M.30 on February 25, 1980.
The changes include added precautions on the use of the crane.
The actions addressed in LER 80-10, have been verified by the inspector.
This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) 80-la, Failure of a Wire Rope Sling Causing a 1.5-ton Calibration Block to Fall on the Reactor Vessel Seal Plate:
The actions taken by the
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licensee as delineated in LER 80-14 were verified.
The corrective actions to preclude recurrence were described appropriately in the LER.
An appar-ent item of noncompliance har been identified in this area as described in Paragraph 4.
This item is closed.
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(0 pen) 80-15, Fuel Cladding Defects-Failed Fuel Rod: On March 21, 1980, approximately two hours after discovery, the inspector was informed of abnormal degradation in the fuel cladding of fuel assembly 1C47.
The damage was found during a visual inspection in the spent fuel pool of the discharged fuel assembly. The damage was noted between intermediate i
spacer grids 5 and 6 and consisted of the exposure of about three inches of fuel in one fuel rod. The exposed fuel was not in tact. The licensee and vendor representatives estimate that the equivalent of one fuel pellet i
had been distributed throughout the primary coolant system as a result of the failure. A review of plant chemistry records by the licensee did not indicate a fuel rod failure.
The failed fuel rod occurred on the south face of 1C46 which had a burnup i
of 34716 MWD /MTU. The assembly was last located in core position K-14 and is not scheduled for further use in the core.
It consisted of batch 3, l
resintered fuel.
On March 12, 1980, the inspector reviewed the video tapes of the damaged fuel rod and verified the accuracy of the licensees statements on this issue.
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Following the discovery of the failed pin,50 fuel assemblies were sipped and 5 of them were visually inspected. A blemish was discovered on fuel assembly 1C08. The vendor is analyzing the results of all the
' sipping and visual fuel inspections performed during this refueling out-age.
The licensee expects a report to be issued, addressing the failed fuel, during the second quarter of 1980.
The inspector stated that this LER will remain open pending the inspector's review of the failed fuel report.
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With the exception of Item 2.d., as discussed in Paragraph 4, no items of
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3.
Follow-up on Items of Noncompliance The responses ~ to three prior items of noncompliance were examined to ascertain that the corrective measures were completed.
By letter dated January 28, 1980, in response to two citations in IE Report No. 50-312/79-25, the corrective actions were verified.
Items 79-25-03 and 79-25-05 on the failure to reset the high flux trip to 5% and the failure to
, promptly report respectively are closed.
By letter dated fiarch 19, 1980, in response to a citation in IE Report No. 50-312/80-03, the corrective actions were verified.
Item 80-03-01 on failure to promptly report is closad.
4.
Independent Inspection Effort i.
Discussions were held between the Senior Resident Inspector and operations, security and maintenance personnel in an attempt to better understand problems they may have_which are related to nuclear safety.
These discussions will continue as a standard practice.
On numerous occasions, during the month of March, the Senior Resident Inspector attended outage status meetings. These meetings are held by the Outage Coordinator to provide all disciplines onsite with a shift by shift update on the plant status and ongoing maitenance work.
In addition to the above,' independent inspection effort was performed on
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the.following items:
a.
Technical Specification Compliance
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The Senior Resident Inspector examined the licensee's compliance with portions of Technical. Specification 3.11, " Reactor Building Polar Crane
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and Auxiliary Hoist," Technical'Specificat' ion 6.5, " Review and Audit,"
Technical Specification 6.8, " Procedures," and Technical Specifica-tion 4.2, " Reactor Coolant System Surveillance." This review was undertaken in partial response to the technical specification related occurrences discussed in Licensee Event Reports 80-10 and 80-14.
One apparent item of noncompliance was discovered based on the following facts:
(1) Technical Specification 3.11.3 requires specific actions during the period when the reactor vessel head is removed and irradiated fuel is in the reactor building and fuel is not being moved. This was the condition the ' plant was in on February 19, 1980, for example, following the inspection and removal of the vendor's Automated Reactor Inspection System (ARIS) equipment.
The technical sp'ecification states that the Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary Hoist will be operated over the fuel transfer canal only where necessary and "in accordance with approved operating proce-dures which state the purpose of such use."
(2) Technical Specification 6.8.la requires procedures to be established for those activities referenced in Appendix "A" of Regulatory
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Guide 1.33, November 1972.
(3) Regulatory Guide 1.33, November 1972, recommends in Appendix
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Item H.2.a.20, that procedures be written for infrequent inspection of the Reactor Coolant-System pressure boundary.
(4) Technical Specificatilin 6.8.lc requires established procedures for surveillance and test activities of safety related equipment.
(5) Technical Specification 6.8.2 requires Plant Review Committee review of each procedure of Technical Specification 6.8.1.
(6) Technical Specification 6.5.1.6 requires the Plant Review Committee to review all procedures required by Specification 6.8.
(7) Technical Specification 4.2 requires inservice examinations and other surveillances of the reactor coolant system.
(8) Maintenance Procedure M.31, dated April 21,1976, " Operation of the Reactor Building Polar Crane and the Fuel Transfer Canal Auxiliary Hoist," states in Step 3.4, "This procedure does not pertain to movement into or out of the Reactor Vessel area as delineated by the red markers.
Such equipment movements are contained in separate procedures."
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Contrary to the above requirements, there did not appear to be an approved operating procedure, approved by the Plant Review Committee, that stated the purpose and use of the Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary Hoist over the fuel transfer canal during ARIS assembly, inspection and disassembly between February 18, 1980, and February 19, 1980..This appears to be an item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
(80-10-01)
A licensee representative stated that appropriate procedures will be available for the ARIS work the next time it-is performed at Rancho Seco.
b.
PLS-036 Removal PLS-036, a manual valve in parallel with the letdown orifice and the air ope' rated bypass valve HV 22011, was removed from the plant.
The line was capped. The licensee stated that the work was performed under i
This item will remain open pending review of the 10 CFR 50.59b package and the hydro-test results.
(80-10-02)
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Start-up Schedule c.
The plant has been shut down since January 12, 1980, for a scheduled refueling outage.
Due to vanious delays related to Three Mile Island modifications and the Small Break Analysis, the plant is scheduled to start up during the month of April 1980.
Prestart-up surveillance tests are currently being herformed.
d.
Fuel Spacer Grid Damage (See IE Report No. 50-312/80-06, Paragraph 3)
As a follow-up to the problem with fuel spacer grids discussed in the referenced report, the Senior Resident Inspector examined video tapes
of damaged fuel ' assemblies NJ-00EG, NJ-017R, NJ-00EW, NJ-00DJ, NJ-00DZ, and NJ-0174.
Also, various nonconformance reports which were generated as a result of the damage were examined.
The dispositioning'of the fuel spacer grid problem has been reviewed by licensee personnel. The fuel vendor has also analyzed fuel stability
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and flow blockage effects of the pieces of spacer grid material that remain in the core.
Finally, the Plant Review Committee met in meeting #178 on February 18, 1980, to discuss the damage.
Their recotiimendations have been acted upon.
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-6-Except for Item 4a, no items of noncomplianc'e of deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview The Senior Resident Inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on March 31, 1980.
During this meeting, the inspector sum-marized his findings of the March 1980 inspection effort.
The inspector supplied the licensee with an inspection plan for the Performance Appraisal Team (PAT) inspection scheduled for the weeks of April 14, April 21, and May 5, 1980. The licensee was informed on April 2, 1980, that the Performance Appraisal Branch (PAB) Management inspection will not include inspection activitiy in the areas of radiation protection, radioactive waste management, environmental monitoring and emergency plan-ning as previously scheduled for this PAT inspection.
These items will be inspected by other inspectors at a later date.
Finally, during the discussion on the apparent item of noncompliance mentioned in Paragraph 4a, the inspector asked for the reason that Inser-Vice Inspection implementing procedures such as ISI 93, Rev. 3, dated January 17, 1979, were not reviewed by the Plant Review Committee to use.
ISI 93 is entitled " Assembly and Disassembly Procedure for ARIS-II." The
~ licensee's responsewas that the procedures in the ISI manual were approved by the cognizant Mechanical Engineer and the Quality Assurance Engineer on January 15, 1980. This was the only approval felt necessary, since the vendor's Quality Assurance prograa has been audited and shown to parellel the licensee's quality assurance plan. The audit was performed in June 1978 to evaluate the vendor's ability to perform the ISI at Rancho Seco.
The inspector stated that this fact could be addressed in their response to the item of noncompliance.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were discussed, l
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