IR 05000312/1980003
| ML19309F717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1980 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry, Obrien J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309F710 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-80-03, 50-312-80-3, NUDOCS 8004300453 | |
| Download: ML19309F717 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
50-312/80-03 Report No.
50-312 DPR-54 Safeguards Group Docket No.
License No.
Licensee:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Rancho Seco Facility Name:
Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)
Inspection at:
Inspection conducted:
January 2-31, 1980 Inspectors:
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fa Farvey'T. Canter, S ior-Resi~ dent Inspector Da'te Signed wck-alulw Isal t
(AlohnP.6Brien,ResidentIpspecht Date Signed
%.bI 2fdb 80 Paul P. Narbut, Reac or Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
D-6 #,b 2/2L./fd B. H. Faulkenberry, Chief, 8eacto'rgProjects Section 2, Date Signed Reactor Operations.and Nu(lear Support Branch S m ary:
Inspection between January 2 and 31,1980 (Report No. 50-312/80-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections of plant operations; physical security; implementation of w.'ike plan; refueling preparations; LER follow-up and reporting; follow-up on inspector identified items; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 114 inspector-hours by the NRC Resident Inspectors and 24 inspector-hours by one NRC Region V based inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in six areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (LER follow-up and reporting).
RV Form 219 (2)-
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DETAILS 1.
persons Contacted
- R. Rodriguez, Manager, Nuclear Operations
+*P. Oubre, Plant Superintendent
- N. Brock, Supervisor, Nuclear Instruments
- D. Blachly, Mechanical Engineer
+*G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
+*R. Colombo, Technical Assistant
+*W. Ford, Operations Supervisor
+*H. Hechert, Engineering Technician
+R. Lawrence, Generation Engineering Department
+*J. McColligan, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor
- R. Medina, Quality Assurance Engineer
+*R. Miller, Cnemistry and Radiological Supervisor
+J. parman, Nuclear Plant Inspector, SMUD
- L. Schwieger, Manager of Quality Assurance
+*B. Stiver, Mechanical Engineer
- J. Sullivan, Quality Assurance Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor operators, auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, security personnel, plant technicians, helpers and engineers, and quality assurance personnel.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interviews on January 11 and 31,1980.
+ Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on January 25, 1980.
2.
Plant Operations a.
Facility Operating The inspectors examined the log entries contained in the control room log, the shift supervisor's log, and various other logs for facility operations performed between December 3 and 19,1979. The log entries were consistent with the requirements of facility administrative orders and were found to accurately reflect the operational status of the facility.
Station orders issued by the operations supervision were consistent with the intent of the facility technical specifications, licensee conditions, and IE Bulletin requirements. Sufficient infor-mation appeared to be contained in the control room log and shift supervisor's log to identify potential problems and to verify compliance with technical specification reporting requirements and limiting condi-tions for operation.
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Facility Tours and Observation of Operations Tours of the facility were made by the Resident Inspector in the auxiliary building, turbine building and other accessible vital areas.
During the tours, the following assessments of equipment and plant conditions were made.
(1) A number of limiting conditions for operation and limiting safety system settings were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be in compliance with the technical specification and licensee requirements.
(2) Control room observations indicated that facility manning was in accordance with regulatory requirements.
Shift turnovers were found to be in accordance with presently approved watchstanding practices. Two or more operators were noted to be in the control room at all times.
(3) System alignment and operability of various engineered safeguards systems were verified to be correct by the Resident Inspector.
(4) Piping systems which were observed, appeared to show normal vibration levels and leakage.
(5) Radiation controls appeared to be properly established.
(6)
Instrumentation for monitoring the status of the plant were in operation.
No items of noncompliancb or deviations were identified.
3.
Physical Security Based on discussions with various licensee representatives, observations and examination of facility procedures, the inspector verified that the measures employed for the physical protection of the facility were consis-tent with the requirements of the physical security plan, applicable ddministrative orders, and regulatory requirements.
Specific aspects of physical protection examined by the inspector included the following:
a.
Properly closed and locked protected area and vital area barriers.
b.
Properly conducted personnel, vehicle and package searches.
c.
Adequate security organization manning.
d.
Proper shift turnover, shift routines, and communications procedure. _ _ _ _
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Proper weapons qualifications and agility testing performed.
f.
Properly authorized, identified and badged personnel being provided access to the protected area and vital areas.
g.
Proper escorts provided for personnel and vehicles when required inside the protected area.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Implementation of Strike Plans Local 1245 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers struck the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) on Tuesday, January 15, 1980. The majority of affected employees stayed off work until Monday, January 21, 1980. They returned based on a determination that the strike was illegal. The plant was in cold shutdown, during this work action, for maintenance purposes and in preparation for a refueling outage which had been scheduled to commence on January 19, 1980.
SMUD Supervisory personnel performed all operational activities required by the technical specifications during this period.
Although there appeared to be no formal strikecontingency plan developed by SMUD management, the inspector verified by observation and discussion with various supervisory personnel that they were familiar with their newly assumed functions.
Plant staffing requirements, security require-ments, and emergency response capability were adequately covered during this period.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Refueling Preparations Rancho Seco was shut down approximately one week prior to the scheduled refueling outage due to exceeding the technical specification limit of one gallon-per-minute of unidentified reactor coolant leakage.
(See TS 3.1.6.2.)
In preparation for witnessing actual fuel movements, the inspectors examined portions of the fuel handling documents.to verify they were technically ade-quate and had received proper approval for use.
In addition to the documents listed in IE Inspection Report 50-312/79-23, Paragraph 8, the following document was reviewed.
STP-224, Load Following and Fuel Sipping Program - Cycles 3 and 4 No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
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Licensee Event Reports The Resident Inspector cor.lqcted an initial screening, examination and follow-up on the following licensee event reports. This inspection activity was conducted in part to determine whether or not the reporting requirements have been met, the reports are adequate to access the event, the cause appears accurate and is supported by report details, corrective actions are appropriate to correct the cause, generic aspects of the events have been considered, and the Licensee Event Report (LER) forms are complete.
a.
The following LERs are CLOSED.
(1)
79-10, Loss of D.C. Control Power to the "B" NSCW Pump (2) 79-11, Improper Position of a Spring Charge Disconnect Switch (3) 79-12, Pipe Support Anchor Bolt Deficiencies (4) 79-14, Missing Seismic Supports (5) 79-15, Missing Seismic Supports (6) 79-17, Starting Failure on the "A" Diesel (7) 79-25, Late Surveillance Test (8) 80-01, Seismic Support Safety Factor Less Than 2 b.
The following LERs,are OPEN.
(1) 79-13, Degraded Grid Voltage (2) 79-16, Snubber Rework (#9SW-30709-3)
(3) 79-18, Grinnel Snubbers - Lock Nut Modifications (4) 79-19 and 79-20, Socket Weld Repair:
Open pending reinstallation of SIM 579 during this refueling outage. Also open pending a determination on the cause of the socket weld failure after repair as discussed in LER 79-19.
(5) 79-21, Early Withdrawal of APSRs: Open pending (1) inspection results of the feedwater nozzles to determine if this was the cause of the apparent loss of electrical megawatts over the last 12 months; and, (2) further investigation into the applicability of figures in Technical Specification 3.5.2 related to 270 EFPD operation.-__ -
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-5-(6) 79-22, Reactor Building Purge Valves-Potential Inoperability:
By letter dated January 18, 1980, Mattimoe to Reid, the licensee commi'.ted to (1) operate the containment in a passive mode as much as possible and (2) limit purging and venting to times the reactor is at cold shutdown or refueling shutdown. This LER is Open pending that resolution.
An item of concern was noted during the initial screening of this LER. On December 17, 1979, the licensee representative received a mailgram from the purge valve vendor listing closing problems for the Rancho Seco Unit 1 reactor building purge valves follow-ing a LOCA.
The four valves are 66 inch, 60 WR Allis-Chalmers butterfly valves.
Pertinent valve information is as follows:
Valve #
Size Operator SFV-53504 66" Limitorque HMB-4T/150 with H-6-8
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SFV-53605 66" SFV-53503 66" Pneumatic Cylinder / Spring Return
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SFV-53604 66" The SMUD engineer to whom the mailgram was addressed forwarded the information to Rancho Seco from the SMUD General Office on December 18, 1979. The reporting significance of the mailgram was not apparent until the Plant Review Committee (PRC) Chairman reviewed the plant reportable occurrence report (which was gen-erated on December 18,1979) on January 7,1980. At that time, the PRC declared this potential problem to be reportable to the NRC. The Resident Inspector was informed on January 8,1980, at 2:32 p.m.
Because the problem was known by licensee personnel on December 17, 1979, communicated to the cognizant Rancho Seco personnel on December 18, 1979, but not communicated to NRC Region V until January 8,1980, this item appears to be an item of noncompliance.
Technical Specification 6.9.4.1.1 defines the appropriate require-ments which were not followed in this case.
(80-03-01)
This appears to be a repeat item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
(See IE Inspection Report 50-312/79-25, Paragraph 7.)
(7) 79-23 and 79-24, Improper Valve Lineup:
Due to the repetition of this type of event, the licensee has committed to performing two-person, separate independent valve line-up verifications on all
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-6-Safety Features Actuating System components ' disturbed due to maintenance or operating evolutions. These LERs are open pending issuance of a Standing Order (S0) on this subject and incorporation of the order into plant procedures. (80-03-02)
One item of noncompliance was identified during this LER review. See Paragraph 6.b.(6).
7.
Follow-up on Inspector Identified Items PG-PL Woodward Governors equipped with acceleration control devices have been installed by Terry Corporation on a turbine that is used to drive an auxiliary feedwater pump at Rancho Seco. The vendor informed the licensee that the turbine may trip on overspeed if it is restarted within 30 minutes after shutdown.
As soon as the licensee became aware of this potential problem, a test was run to determine if the problem exists at Rancho Seco. The test allowed for starting and stopping the turbine at 10, 20 and 30 minute intervals, but no indication of the problem was noted.
Further analysis showed an oil bleed device was in place in Rancho Seco's speed setting cylinder on their auxiliary feed pump Terry turbine which dumps hydraulic fluid after the governor is de-energized.
This device precludes the problem from occurring at Rancho Seco.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Independent Inspection Effort Discussions were held with operations, security and maintenance personnel in an atte.spt to better understand problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions will continue as a standard practice for the Resident Inspectors.
On numerous occasions, during the month of January, the Resident Inspectors attended the outage status meetings. These meetings are held by the Outage Coordinator to provide all disciplines onsite with a shift by shi.ft update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.
In addition to the above, independent inspection efforts were performed within the following identified areas:
a.
Pressurizer Code Safety Valves An inspection was performed to examine the maintenance controls on work performed on the pressurizer code safety valves PSV 21506, PSV 21507 and the in-shop spare.
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The inspector examined activities related to maintenance of the pressurizer code safety valves for conformance to the requirements of the FSAR Section 4.1.3, Appendix 1B.7, Appendix 18.9.6, ASME B&PV Code Section III 1968 Edition and Dresser Industries Manual
" Instructions for Installation and Maintenance Consolidated Closed Bonnet Maxiflow Safety Valves Type 31700," dated October 1978.
Three valves were examined.
Valve S/N BR0 9499 was installed in position PSV 21506, valve S/N BM 9684 was installed in position PSV 21507 and valve S/N BM0 9685 was the in-shop spare.
Some items of concern were observed with each valve.
(1) BR0 9499:
The bonnet vent hole was found to be plugged whereas the Dresser Industries Manual states that a check should be made to insure the bonnet vent is not sealed in any manner since this is critical to valve operation.
(Re:
Pa October 1978 Dresser Industries Manual.) ges 19 and 25 of the The body drain was found to be plugged.
The Dresser Industries Manual states that the body drain must be piped to a safe area and if left plugged corrosive condensate will accumulate inside the valve body.
(Re:
Safety Precautions, Page 5 in the October 1978 Dresser Industries Manual.)
The manual actuator housing cap was installed with five of six required studs. Of the five studs, only two had nuts installed.
Of the two nuts installed, one nut lacked two threads from full engagement.
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(2) BM 9684:
The valve was found installed without a manual actuation lever. Also, the body drain was found to be plugged.
(3) BM0 9685:
Same as BM 9684.
The inspector examined SMUD Procedure MT 003, Revision 3, Pressurizer Code Relief Set Pressure Verification. The procedure contains a space
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for initialling that all rework was completed in accordance with the vendor technical manual.
The inspector interviewed a quality control inspector who had initialed that space for valve BM0 9685 on October 29, 1979. _The QC inspector stated that the rework verification actions did not include verification of critical measurements such as spindle run-out, adjusting ring positions, disc nut to disc clearance and other maintenance items'which the October 1978 vendor's manual states are critical to satisfactory valve operation.
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-8-The inspector examined SMUD Procedure M.6, Revision 2, Pressurizer Relief Valve Removal and Replacement, and observed removal of valve S/N BM 9684.
The inspectors requested that the licensee investigate the inspectors findings.
Emphasis was placed by the inspectors on the safety valve installed in position PSV 21506 (BR0 9499) because this_ valve was found to have been in operation with the bonnet vent plug installed, contrary to the vendors precautions and recommendations, and not in accordance with good quality control practices. This is an unresolved item pending resolution of the concerns identified in this report.
(80-03-02)
b.
Surveillance Testing During Refueling
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The inspector was infomed by a licensee representative prior to the January 12 refueling outage that " systems that either cannot be tested or are not considered a contribution to nuclear safety The attached list of SPs during refueling need not be tested.
[ Surveillance Procedures] describe these systems and components.")
The licensee's position stems from Technical Specification 1.9 which does not take into account the fact that during a refueling shutdown, it may be impossible to test certain systems or com-ponents that are testable during power operation.
In the following list, the single asterisked SPs will be brought current prior to reactor startup and the double asterisked SPs will be brought current as soon as practical after startup. The licensee stated, "The Technical Specification requirements for duration, staggered and time periods will be initialized when the generator breakers are closed. This will permit Technical Speci-fication d schedule."yfinitions 1.9 thru 1.9.8 to be completed on a continuous The. inspector stated that a technical specification clarification should be submitted to NRR for approval on this issue. A licensee representative concurred.
This item is considered to be unresolved.
(80-03-03)
I Quoted from a SMUD memo: Colombo to Rodriguez and Oubre dated January 8, 1980, on the subject of Interpretation of Technical Specifications Requiring Surveillance Testing During Refueling.
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SURVEILLANCE TESTS THAT ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE TESTED DURING REFUELING OUTAGES.
SP No.
Description Assigned Group 200.05 Instr. Surv. Prior to Startup*
Oper.
202.01 Reactor Coolant Sampl. (Weekly) (Total Gas)**
Rad / Chem 202.05 Secondary Coolant (Weekly)**
Rad / Chem 207.04 Evaluate RCS Leakage (Weekly)**
Oper.
208.02 CRD Mechanism Exercise (2 Weeks)**
Oper.
209.02 Quadrant Power Tilt (2-8 Hours)**
Tech. Support 209.03 Core Power Imbalance (2 Hours)**
Tech. Support 209.04 Core Power Distribution **
Tech. Support 210.06 F.W. Piping Weld Insp. (Weekly)**
Oper.
200.04 Incore Inst. Sury.**
I&C 200.08A Monthly RPS Channel A*
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200.08B Monthly RPS Channel B*
I&C-200.08C Monthly RPS Channel C*
I&C 200.080 Monthly RPS Channel D*
I&C 200.09 Monthly SFAS Sury.*
I&C 200.12A RPS Sury. Calibration **
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202.03 Core Flooding Tanks *
Rad / Chem 202.09 Cooling Tower Blowdown **
Rad / Chem 203.02E Monthly HPI Pump Loop A P-238A Oper.
203.02H Monthly HPI Venting P-238A*
Oper.
203.02F Monthly HPI Pump Loop B P-238B Oper.
203.02I Monthly HPI Venting P-238B*
Oper.
203.02G Monthly M.U. Pump P-236*
Oper.
203.02J Monthly HPI Venting P-236 Oper.
204.03C Monthly RBS Loop 'A Pump P-291 A*
Oper.
204.03D Monthly RBS Loop B Pump P-291B*
Oper.
208.04A Monthly Test of Reactor Trip From Gen./Turb.*
Maint.
Trips &/or Loss of Main FW 209.01 Reactivity - Balance ( Anomalies)*
Tech. Support 209.05 Neutron Noise Monitoring **
I&C 209.06A RX Coolant Pump Vibration Monitor **
I&C 210.01D Monthly Turbine Driven Aux. Feed **
Oper.
Pump P-318 210.01E Monthly Motor Driven Aux. Feed **
Oper.
Pump P-319 210.03A Turbine Steam Stop Valves **
Oper.
210.08 OTSG Operational Data History **
Oper.
202.10 Spray Additive Tank *
I&C 203.02A Quarterly HPI Sys. "A" Loop (P-238A)*
Oper.
203.02B Quarterly HPI Sys. "B" Loop (P-2388)*
Oper.
203.02C Quarterly HPI Sys. "C" Loop (P-236)*
Oper..
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204.03A
' Quar. RBS-A Loop Surveillance (P-291A)-
Oper.
l 204.03B Quar. RBS-B Loop Surveillance (P-291B)*
Oper.
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204.04A RB Cooling SFAS Fans Channel "A"*
Oper.
l 204.048 RB Cooling SFAS Fans Channel "B"*
Oper.
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209.06 Loose Parts Monitoring **
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Seismic Monitoring System Inaccurate data generated on the Rancho Seco seismic monitoring equipment following recent San Francisco Bay area earthquakes has prompted interest by the NRC. SMUD has recognized that the in-stalled equipment is not reliable.
Consequently, bids are being iken this refueling outage for installation of up-to-date seismic y nitoring and/or display equipment. A licensee representative
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Technical Specification Table 4.1-1, Item 47, requires that the current strong motion accelerometer receive a battery check quarterly and a calibration each refueling. This technical specification may require revision in lieu of the installation of new instrumentation.
The progress of the changes to the present seismic monitoring system will be followed-up at a later date. This item is considered to be unresolved.
(80-03-04)
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncom-pliance or deviations. Three unresolved items disclosed during the inspec-tion are discussed in Paragraphs 8.a (80-03-02), 8.b (80-03-03), and 8.c (80-03-04).
10.
Exit Interview The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and other NRC representatives met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on January 11, 25 and 31, i
1980.
During these meetings, the inspector summarized the scope and find-ings of the January 1980 inspection effort.
The inspector also informed the licensee representatives of an upcoming,
Performance Appraisal Team (PAT) inspection. The in-depth management appraisal inspection is scheduled for the weeks of April 28, May 6, and May 19.
One item of noncompliance was discussed.
Please see Paragraph 6.b.(6).
At the exit interview on January 25, 1980, the items discussed in Paragraph 8.a of this reportwere discussed with licensee representatives and, in addition, the following items were discusse :
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Action was requested to resolve whether a plugged bonnet incapacitates a.
the pressurizer code safety valves; b.
Action was requested to determine whether the bellows on Valve BR0 9499 were sound; c.
Technical justification was requested for not performing the bellows leak test recommended by the Dresser Industries Manual on BR0 9499; d.
It was requested that the need for installing or not installing manual actuation lift handles be technically resolved and the resultant conclusion implemented consistently; e.
The valve repair procedures appeared to require revision to include quality control verification of critical work operations.
A licensee representative stated that a review of repair and installation procedures would be made with the intent of incorporating information from the October 1978 Dresser Industries Manual for the 31700 Closed Bonnet Maxi-flow Safety Valves; f.
Technical justification for performing one satisfactory lift pressure test when the Dresser Industries Manual recommends three consecutive successful lifts for assurance of accurate lifts; g.
Technical justification was requested for not having valve body drains piped to a safe area as recommended by the Dresser Industries Manual, to prevent corrosion; h.
Verification that the Dressler Industries Manual of October 1978 applied to valve BR0-9499, since BR0-9499 is a Model 31759 valve and the Dresser Industries Manual lists Model 3-31759A-1 and 6-31759A-2 as applicable model numbers.
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It appeared necessary to provide verification that blowdown adjustments-are currently proper for the valves to be re-installed for operation; j.
It appeared necessary to provide verification that critical internal dimensions, clearances and procedural steps were properly established and performed on valves to be re-installed for operation; and, k.
The inspector had a question regarding the absence of lead seals on the lockwire attached to adjusting ring locknuts.
It was subsequently discovered that the. ASME B&PV Code 1968 Edition applied.
It does not require lead seals to be installed.
The inspector had no further questions at this time.
Items a through j, above, are considered unresolved.
(80-03-02) See Paragraph 8.a.
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