IR 05000309/1978023

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IE Insp Rept 50-309/78-23 on 781218-21.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Properly Control safety-related Jumpers/Bypasses
ML19282B297
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 01/18/1979
From: Lazarus W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19282B295 List:
References
50-309-78-23, NUDOCS 7903120516
Download: ML19282B297 (11)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-309/78-23 Docket No. 50-309 License No. DPR-36 Priority

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Category C

Licensee:

Maine Yaakee Atomic Power Company 20 Turnpike Road Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Facility Name:

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Inspection at:

Wiscasset, Maine Inspection conducted: December 18-21, 1978 Inspectors:

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9 W. M zarus d factor Inspector

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Approved by:

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/R. R. Keid, Chiep[ Reactor Projects Section date signed No.1, R0 & NS Eranch Inspection Summary:

Inspection on December 18-21, 1978 (Report No. 50-309/78-23)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of plant operations including shift logs and operating records and a tour of accessible areas; licensee actions regarding selected: IE Bulletins and Circulars and previous inspection findings; and followup on selected Licensee Event Reports.

The inspection involved 28 inspector-hours on site by one regional based NRC inspector.

Resul ts: Of the four areas inspected, one apparent item of noncompliance was identified (Infraction - failure to properly control safety related jumpers / bypasses).

Region I Form 12 7 90312 0 SM, (Rev. April 77)

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • P. Anderson, Staff Assistant to the Plant Manager R. Arsenault, Assistant Operations Department Head
  • C. Frizzle, Assistant Plant Manager W. Paine, Operations Department Head R. Painter, Maintenance Foreman R. Prouty, Maintenance Department Head D. Stevenson, Plant Shift Superintendent D. Sturniolo, Chemistry and HP Department Head
  • E. Wood, Plant Manager R. Wyckoff, Assistant Engineer The inspector also interviewed several licensed operations personnel and members of the licensees technical and administrative staffs.
  • denotes those present at the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (309/78-06-01): Failure to maintain file of changes to operating procedures. The inspector verified that this noncompliance had been reviewed by:the PORC (meeting 78-13) and that corrective action, spedifisd in WMY letter 78-53 of June 1,1978 to NRC:RI, had been completed.

(Procedure 0-06-2 has been revised and files of procedure changes are being maintained).

(Closed) Non:ompliance (309/78-06-02): Failure to adhere to admini-strative controls. This noncompliance was reviewed by PORC in meeting 78-13. The inspector verified that each of the examples listed in this noncompliance had been corrected by the licensee, as specified in letter WMY 78-53 of June 1, 1978 to NRC:RI.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/78-13-03): Revise safety injection procedure.

The inspector verified that procedure RH-3-1 had been revised to include operator action for the situation in which safety injection would be initiated if not lined up for automatic actuatio '

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(Closed) Noncompliance (309/78-13-04): Operation in accordance with an obsolete PDIL Curve.

The inspector reviewed the revised Control Room Technical Data Book which contains the Core IV parameters including the correct Power Dependent Insertion Limits (PDIL)

graph.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/78-16-01): Procedure 3.1.14 has been revised to reflect the proper VCT suction valve numbers for SIAS trains A and B.

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3.

Shift Logs and Operating Records a.

The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established administrative requirements in this area in preparation for review of various logs and records.

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0-06-1, " Procedure Preparation, Classification, and Format."

0-06-2, " Procedure Review, Approval, and Distribution."

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0-09-1, " Reporting Requirements."

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0-09-2, " Reportable Occurrence Reports."

0-10-3, " Maintenance of Operations Department Logs."

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SP-3.1.1, " Routine Instrumentation Surveillance."

16.1, " Maine Yankee Operation Safeguard, Yellow Tag -

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Control Log."

b.

Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to. verify that:

Control Room log entries involving abnormal conditions

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provide sufficient detail to communicat61 equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration; Log Book reviews are being conducted by the staff;

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Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specifi-

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cations requirements; Jumper (Bypass) log does not contain bypassing discrepancies

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with Technical Specification requirements;

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" Problem Identification Reports" confirm there are no

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violations of Technical Specification reporting or LC0 requirements; and,

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Logs and records were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures in 3.a above.

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c.

The review included discussions with licensee personnel and the following plant shift logs and operating records.

Control Room Operators' Log, November 1 - December 20,

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1978.

PORC Minutes 78-30 through 78-35.

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Yellow Tag Control Log Request Forms 78-15 through 78-30.

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Tag Out Log " Local Control Rules" Nos. 2018-2217.

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PIR Nos. 84-86.

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Control Room Log Sheets I and II and Primary Side Log:

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November 1 - December 20, 1978.

Except as noted below, no items of noncompliance were identi-fied.

d.

Control of RPS Channel Trip /Byoass Keys In the review of the Control Room Operators' Log and the Yellow Tag Control Log, the inspector identified three occasicas in November and December 1978, on which individual channels in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) were bypassed using bypass keys.

This action is permitted by Technical Specifications.

These occurrences were logged in the Control Room Operators'

Log but were not documented in the Yellow Tag Control Log in accordance with procedure 16-1 " Maine Yankee Operation Safeguard Yellow Tag Control Log."

In addition, during an inspection in the Control Room on December 20, 1978, the inspector observed that RPS Channel D - Thermal Margin / Low Pressure, Variable Overpower, and Symmetric Offset Trips were bypassed, again, without the completion of a Jumper Control Request form in the Yellow Tag Control Log.

The inspector was informed that the channels had been bypassed becaut

' spurious signals from a temperature detector (RTD) which supplies the channel.

The licensee removed the keys and stated that control of the bypass keys would be in accordance with procedure 16-1, " Maine Yankee Operation Safeguard, Yellow Tag - Control Log."

Failure to control bypassing of safety functions in accordance with this procedure represents an infraction level item of noncompliance (309/78-23-01).

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4.

Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant including the Primary Auxiliary Building, Ventilation Equipment Room, Containment Spray Pump area, Auxiliary Feed Pump area, Tur-bine Building, Switchgear Rooms, Containment, HP Control Point, and the Control Room.

Details are noted below.

a.

Monitoring Instrumentation and Annunciators Control Board annunciators were checked for alarms, abnormal foi plant conditions, on several occasions during the inspection.

None were identified. The following monitoring instrumentation was checked to verify that required instrumentation was operable and that, where applicable, values indicated were in accordance with Technical Specifications.

RMS Process and Area Monitors.

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CEA Position Indication.

Core Power Distribution (Symmetric Offset, azimuthal

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tilt, peaking factors).

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Nuclear Instrument Power Level.

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RPS Trip Logic Trains.

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Containment Pressure.

RWST and SI Tank Levels.

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No items of noncompliance were identified.

b.

Radiation Controls Radiation controls established by the licensee, including posting of radiation areas, the condition of step off pads, and the disposal of protective clothing werenobserved for conformance with the Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Manual.

MYAPC Radiation Work Permits issued for the inspection of the Primary Auxiliary Building and Reactor Containment were reviewed for proper documentation and compliance.

No items of noncompliance were identifie.

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c.

Plant Housekeeping Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness and storage of material to prevent fire hazards, were observed in all areas toured for conformance with the Maine Yankee Plant Safety Manual. The inspector noted that general plant housekeeping conditions were good.

d.

Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations Systems and equipment insall areas toured were observed for the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibrations.

None were identified.

e.

Control Room Manning Control Room manning was reviewed for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and Technical Specifications.

The inspector observed that appropriate licensed operators were on shift as specified by the posted shift schedule on several occasions during the inspection, ahd manning requirements were met at all times.

5.

In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

The inspector reviewed LER's received in RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.

The inspector also determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted on site followup.

The following LER's were reviewed.

  • -- 78-012, RPS Channel D Erratic AT Power Indication 78-013, Omission of Data from Environmental Report

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78-014, Containment Isolation Valve Leakage

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-- 78-015, Failure to Perform Penetration Leak Test 78-016, Non-conservative Setpoint Drift, RCS Pressure

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-- 78-017, Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoint High 78-018, Fuel Handling Incident

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  • -- 78-019, Loop Isolation Valves not Disabled during Operation

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.78-020, Loss of Fire Pump Diesel Oil Sample

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78-021, Missed Surveillance on BAST Boron Concentration

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  • -- 78-025, SIAS Channel D Relay Setpoint Drift Except as noted below for those LER's identified by (*). the inspector had no further questions in this area.

6.

On Site Licensee Event Followup For those LER's selected for on site followup, the inspector verified that reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits. The review included discussions with licensee personnel, review of PORC meeting minutes, Plant Information Reports (in-house reports), and applicable logs.

The following LER's were reviewed on site.78-012, RPS Channel D Erratic AT Power Indication

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The problem was corrected during the refueling outage by cleaning the penetration electrical connector associated with detail 3.c) question, but has recently begun to recur (see the RTD in The licensee's diagnosis / corrective action for

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this malfunction will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (309/78-23-02).-- 78-019, Loop Isolat:on Valves not Disabled During Plant Operation The licensee determined that this violation of Technical Specifications (3.19) was primarily due to inadequate procedural guidance for operators.

Procedure 1-2, " Reactor Startup," has been revised to include a precaution for operators to verify that loop isolation valve thermal overload links are removed prior to criticalit.78-022, RWST Boron Concentration Low

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The licensee attributed this violation of Technical Specifi-cations 3.6. A.3 and 3.7 to the dilution effects of draining a RCS loop at a lower boron concentration to the RWST in addition to nonnal system letdown.

A review of the Control Room Log by the inspector indicated that the loop was drained to the Waste Disposal System in accordance with procedure 1-10-6, " Reactor Coolant Loop Draining," and, therefore, could not have caused the dilution indicated.

Further investigation by the licensee and the inspector indicated that the dilution of the RWST was caused by two operations of draining the pressurizer to draw a bubble necessitated by two sequential RCS leak tests in a short period.

The licensee has agreed to change procedure 1-13-2, "RHR System Shutdown," to require the addition of con-centrated boric acid to the RWST when the concentration falls below 1750 ppm (as specified in other procedures) to prevent a recurrence of this incident. This item is unresolved pending review of the revised procedure (309/78-23-03).78-023, Diesel Graerator 1B Inoperable

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The cause for diesel generator inoperability was air in the fuel lines which occurred when the fuel filters were replaced earlier in the day of the test.

The inspector reviewed the revised preventive maintenance procedures which now require purging the air from the fuel lines following filter replace-ment.78-024, Missed Surveillance for RCS Iodine

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Operations personnel failed to alert the chemistry department to take an RCS iodine sample following a load reduction of greater than 15 percent in one hour as required by T.S. 4.2-1.1.

The operators were unaware of this recent addition to Technical Specifications, but have since been briefed on the requirement.

The licensee agreed to add information on this requirement to procedure 1-4, " Operations at Power," to lessen chances of recurrence of this event.

This item is unresolved pending review of the revised procedure (309/78-23-04).

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7.

IE Bulletins and Circulars Licensee action concerning the following IE Bulletins and Circulars was reviewed by the inspector to verify that:

The Bulletin or Circular was forwarded to appropriate onsite

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management; A review for applicability was performed; and,

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Information in the Licensee's response (when required) con-cerning applicability and corrective action was accurate.

IEB 78-05 GE CR105X Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism.

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The inspector checked several circuit breakers in the 480V switchgear and concurred with the licensee's findings that this type of circuit breaker is not in use in any safety related systems as stated in WMY letter 78-50 of May 23,1978 to NRC:RI.

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IEB 78-06, Defective Cutler Hammer Type M Relays with DC Coils During a tour of the switchgear room and the Control Room, the inspector checked the relays installed for emergency power system switching and load sequencing and verified that these relays (all GE) were not of the type in question.

No discre-pancies were identified.

IEC 78-02, Lube Oil for Terry Turbines

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of this Circular which determined that the oil in use in the auxiliary feed pump turbine did not contain a corrosion inhibitor.

Action is being taken to procure the reconmended oil.

Until it is received, the oil in use is inspected frequently for evidence of water (none has been noted).

Completion of correc-tive action will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.

IEC 78-06, Conmon Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment

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An engineering evaluation of plant's potential to suffer loss of ECCS equipment from common mode flooding had been partially completed. The completed evaluation will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

IEC 78-09, GE NEMA Size 2 Contactor Failures

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of this Cir-cular documented in a memo dated October 16,1978, which stated that a review of plant motor control centers disclosed none with this type of contactor.

IEC 78-13, Inoperability of Multiple Service Water Pumps

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the pro-blems identified in this circular (Memo Arsenault to Paine, August 18, 1978) which concluded that their trash / ice boom was adequate to prevent this problem.

IEC 78-15, Tilting Disc Check Valves

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A review by the licensee documented in a memo dated October 23, 1978 concludes that based on a review of plant systems, no valves of this type are installed in a vertical position which could result in a malfunction.

IEC 78-16, Limitorque Valve Actuators

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The circular has been reviewed by plant personnel, (memo dated October 25, 1978) and although no problems of a similar type have been experienced, warnings to cycle the valve through a full stroke have been stenciled on applicable valves to prevent possibility of similar valve malfunctions.

Except as noted above, the licensee's evaluation / corrective actions for these Bulletins and Circulars was appropriate.

8.

Review of Periodic Reports The inspector reviewed the Monthly Operating Reports for September -

November,1978 in the Region I office to verify that reporting requirements were met.

No items of noncompliance were identifie.

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9.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items for which more information is required to determine if they are acceptable, items of noncompliance, or deviations.

Unresolved items identified during this report are discussed in paragraph 6.

10.

ExjtInterview The inspector met with licensee representatives (see detail 1 for attendees) at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection as detailed in this report.

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