IR 05000266/2010010
| ML100980367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/2010 |
| From: | Robert Daley Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Meyer L Point Beach |
| References | |
| EA-09-297 IR-10-010 | |
| Download: ML100980367 (14) | |
Text
April 7, 2010
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2010-010 AND 05000301/2010-010 CONTAINING RESULTS OF NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO 3-2009-011 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Meyer:
On February 17, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an in-office inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The purpose of the inspection was to review the facts and circumstance surrounding completion of ignition control permits. The inspection also reviewed the results of an investigation by the NRCs Office of Investigations (OI), which was completed on November 24, 2009. The enclosed report documents the inspection and investigation results, which were discussed on February 19 and 25, 2010, with Mr. J. Costedio and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The NRC reviewed selected procedures and records and interviewed your personnel.
Based on the results of the inspection and investigation by the NRCs OI, and the following consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, the NRC has determined that a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC=s Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html).
The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (NOV) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation is being cited in the Notice because it involved the willful actions of contract individuals, one of whom held a supervisory position, and the violation was NRC-identified.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In particular, the NRC is interested in any safety culture issues associated with performance of ignition control permit walkdowns. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27
Enclosures:
1.
Inspection Report 05000266/2010-010; 05000301/2010-010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-266; 50-301 License Nos:
05000266/2010-010; 05000301/2010-010 Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Two Rivers, WI Dates:
February 17, 2010 Inspector:
A. Dahbur, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by:
R. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report (IR) 05000266/2010-010, 05000301/2010-010; February 17, 2010; Point
Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; results of NRC Investigation Report No. 3-2009-011.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Severity Level IV. A Severity Level IV, Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) Completeness and Accuracy of Information, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to maintain complete and accurate information required by the Commission. Specifically, a Point Beach Nuclear Plant employee and two contract employees from Day and Zimmermann Nuclear Power Services, signed Ignition Control Permits without the authorized person inspecting the areas as required by the ignition control procedure NP 1.9.13.
The violation affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function because it involved willfulness. Therefore, it was evaluated using Traditional Enforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level IV violation was appropriate due to the willful nature of some violation examples. The NRC determined that the violation should be cited because: (1) the violation was NRC-identified; and (2) it was willful; and (3) it involved a first-line supervisor.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Review of Office of Investigation Report (EA-09-297)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspection and investigation was conducted to determine if licensee and Day and Zimmermann Nuclear Power Services (DZNPS) employees willfully signed ignition control permits (ICPs) without visiting the areas, as required by procedure.
b. Findings
Introduction:
Severity Level IV, Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.9 was identified by the NRC for the licensees failure to maintain information required by the Commission complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on several occasions, a Point Beach Nuclear Plant individual and two DZNPS contract employees failed to provide complete and accurate information during the performance of NP 1.9.13, Ignition Control Procedure, Revision 13, Step 3.0 and Step 4.2, in that, the individuals signed ICPs without the authorized person initially inspecting the areas.
Description:
Procedures Manual NP 1.9.13, provided guidance, requirements, and administrative controls to positively control welding, cutting, grinding, and open flame or spark producing operations hot work at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The followings steps provided the responsibilities of the authorized person and the order in which the ICP, Form PBF-0068, was to be completed:
a) Step 3.1.3 Responsibilities - Ignition Control Permit Authorized Person, stated that the authorized person was to visit the site initially and each shift prior to hot work commencing to ensure that flammable and combustible materials were removed or adequately protected from the hot work activities.
b) Step 4.2, Procedure Section, stated that the authorized person shall visit the work site and ensure that a list of five precautions has been completed.
c) Step 4.5, Procedure Section, indicated that the authorized person shall forward the ICP to the Work Control Center (WCC) for approval.
Based on the order of the procedure steps, the inspectors determined that the authorized person was required to visit and inspect the work site initially prior to signing the permit and forwarding it to the WCC for approval.
The NRC identified a concern with signatures on ICPs. The NRC requested information from the licensee regarding the extent of the concern. The licensee reviewed 187 ICPs, dating from September 3 through November 3, 2008. During the review, the licensee verified that, on several instances, ICPs were not completed as required per NP 1.9.13.
The licensees review included comparison of permit approval dates to records of card reader entries for the authorized person. Subsequently, the licensee initiated corrective
3 actions (CAPs) documents related to several discrepancies that were identified during the review: CAP 1139647, 1139326, 1139342, and 1139343. The licensees immediate corrective actions focused on procedural guidance and enhancements to NP 1.9.13, and ICP Form PBF-0068, clarifying that only a person who has received the Authorized Person training was authorized to sign on Section 3 of the permit and the authorized person could only sign the permit only after having made an initial visit to the work site.
The licensee also took corrective actions in regard to the personnel involved.
Based on the information provided by the licensee, the NRC initiated an investigation into the facts surrounding the issue. On November 24, 2009, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) completed its investigation. The NRC concluded that the actions of a PBNP employee, who signed an ICP on October 25, 2008, without visiting the work site, was not willful because the employee had discussed the situation with his supervisor, and another employee, who was ICP qualified, visited the site. Nevertheless, the NRC concluded that this was a violation of the procedure as written.
The NRC concluded that two contract employees from DZNPS, a supervisor and a foreman deliberately falsified ICP paperwork. Specifically, the NRC determined that a DZNPS supervisor deliberately instructed the DZNPS foreman to falsify the supervisors initials on an October 17, 2008, ICP. Following this, on October 28, 2008, the supervisor deliberately signed two additional ICPs while knowing that he was required to visit the work area and had not. Additionally, on October 20, 2008, the DZNPS foreman signed his own initials on an ICP, without ascertaining whether he was qualified to sign the ICP.
This resulted in the failure to perform an inspection of the work site by an ICP qualified person.
Analysis:
The inspectors determined that the failure to provide complete and accurate information on the ICPs was contrary to 10 CFR 50.9(a) and was a performance deficiency. Because the violation involved willfulness and potentially could impede or impact the regulatory process, the issue was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. In accordance with Section IV.A.4 of the Enforcement Policy, willful violations are of particular concern to the NRC because the NRCs regulatory program is based on licensees, and their contractors, and employees acting with integrity and communicating with candor. Therefore, a violation may be considered more significant than the underlying noncompliance if it includes indications of willfulness.
In this case, the underlying technical issue was minor, since there was little to no actual safety consequences, because, in all cases, individuals who were fire-watch-qualified completed the inspections and were present when the hot work was done.
Enforcement:
A Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) was identified and is cited in the Notice of Violation. The violation was cited because it was willful, it was not identified by the licensee and it involved licensee officials (first-line supervisory position),consistent with Sections IV and VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy (VIO 05000266/2010010-01; 05000301/2010010-01, Inaccurate Information Relating to Signatures on Ignition Control Procedures).
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting Summary
On February 19 and 25, 2010, the inspectors discussed the inspection and investigation results for the issue of failing to follow the controlling procedure for ignition control permits with Mr. J. Costedio, and other member of the licensees staff via telephone.
The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- J. Castedio, Nuclear Licensing Manager/Regulatory Affairs Manager
- F. Flentje, Regulatory Affairs Supervisor
- C. Trsziss, Engineering Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Daley, EB-3 Branch Chief
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000301/2010010-01 VIO Inaccurate Information Relating to Signatures on Ignition Control Procedures
Closed and
Discussed
None