IR 05000293/1990015
| ML20028G884 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1990 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028G883 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-90-15, NUDOCS 9009050337 | |
| Download: ML20028G884 (93) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:. . . . . . . l t U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATnRY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket No.: 50-293 Report No.: 50-293/90-15 Licensee: Boston Edison Company
800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Location: Plymouth, Massachusetts Dates: June 12 - July 23, 1990 Inspectors: J. Macdonald, Senior Resident Inspector C, Carpenter, Resident Inspector W. 0.lsen, Resident Inspector
Approved by: M'
() . Rogge, Chief, ReactYr" Projects Section 3A /Date Insretion Summary: 56;pection on June 12 - July 23,1990 (Report No.
Ins 293/90-15Q Areas Inspected: Roi:*ine safety inspection of plant operations, security, . maintenance and surveillance, engineering and technical support, radiological controls, and safety assessment / quality verifica' ion.
Results: Inspection results are summarized in the attached Executive Summary.
No vic'ations or unresolved items were identified during this inspection period.
. 9009050337 900823
PDR ADOCK 0500
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. . % . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PILGRIM INSPECTION REPORT 50-293/90-15 JUNE 12 - JULY 23, 1990 Plant Operations: Operators displayed good awareness of plant conditions and procedural requirements during the recirculation pump motor generator set trip, the subsequent plant shutdown and following a t.hutdown cooling system isolation (Sections 2.7 and 2.8).
In contrast, during final drywell inspection prior to plant startup, general drywell housekeeping was noted to be inadequate and not in a condition to support startup (Section 2.9).
Radiological Controls: The digital alarming dosimeter and exposure control program is ar, example of the licensee's commitment to ALARA and occupational dose reductions (Section 3.3).
The ef fort to identify and address liquid and gaseous rel' ease pathways from the station is a noteworthy licensee initiative indicative of the licensee commitment to continual improvement in the radiological area (Section 3.2).
Maintenance / Surveillance: The HPCI/RCIC steam leak maintenance and supportive administrative activities were well controlled and completed in a quality manner (Section 4.1).
Independent review by the Compliance Division of the mispositioned breaker for valve MD-1001-28B was a good licensee initiative (Section 4.3).
Emergency Preparedness: The licensee properly implemented the Emergency Plan during the July 3 Ur, usual Event. Advance notice to local town officials well within plan requirements was a positive initiative.
Security: A security inspection was conducted June 25-29.
The results will be documented in Inspection Report 50-293/90-16.
Engineering / Technical Support: Licensee troubleshooting of the tripping of the Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator set was appropriate, well controlled and deliberate.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification: Licensed operator overtime was properly managed (Section 7.2).
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- + . . % % TABLE OF CO.NTENTS PAGE 1.0 Summary of Facility Activities......................................
2.0 Plant Operations (IP 71707,93702,92702,90712,62703,61726)*......
2.1 Plant Operations Review.........................................
2.2 Safety Systems Review...........................................
. 2.3 Review of Tagging Operations....................................
2.4 Operational Safety Findings....................................
2.5 Inoperable Equipment............................................
2.6 Malfunction of the Reactor B;ilding Airlock Door Interlock......
2.7 " A" Rec i rcul a ti on Pump M-G S et T ri p.............................
2.8 Shutdown Cooling System Iso'ation...............................
2.9 D rywel l C l o s ecu t I n s pec ti on.....................................
3.0 Radiological Controls (IP 71707)....................,.......
........ 3.1 Previously Identified Item......................................
3.2 Identification of Liquid Release Pathway........................
3.3 Electronic Dosimetry System......................................
4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance (IP 37828, 61726, 62703, 93702).............
4.1 HPCI/RCIC Drain Line Repair.....................................
4.2 Temporary Modifications.........................................
4.3 Loss of Valve Indication........................................
4.4 Inoperable Main Steam Drain Isolation Va1ve.....................
5.0 S e c u r i ty ( I P 717 0 7 )..................................................
5.1 Obse rva ti on s o f Phy si c a l Sec uri ty...............................
5.2 Safeguards Event Report (SER 90-501-00).........................
6.0 Engineering / Technical Support (IP 37282).............................
6.1 Summary of the "A" Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Set Trips,
- The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedure (IP) that was used as inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report section, i
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. iTable of Contents' l - .. - o e , s , i 1" ' -} . > > . ! PAGE.
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, . ! !- ' .7.. : Safety Assessment / Quality' Verification (IP 35502, 71707, 40500, f - - 92700,92702,92709)...............................................
! 7.1' Licensee-Event Reports...........................................
- LER 90-08............................l................. 7.1.1 L E R. 9 0 - 0 9..................................
'7.1.2
,. If f . 7.2' Review of Overtime. Records.......................................
7.3 Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reports.................. 15-71707'.....................................-
8.0l Emergency Preparedness:(IP )
t - 18.1:; Review-of Emergency Action Level Classification.................
< l 9.0 Review of Periodic and Special Reports (IP 90712 90713).............
- 10.0 Management Meetings (IP 30703,40500)=...............s...............'..
16; ATTACHMENTS Attachment I:. Persons Contacted Attachment II: Licensee handout from June 22 -1990 Management Meeting
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% i s ! DETAILS
. Summary of Facility Activities
1.0 { Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) (Pilgrim, the licensee, or the plant) was at 100*' power at the start of this report period.
On-June 21 the licensee conducted an. annual partial participation emergency preparedness exercise.
, ' On July 2 at 5:11 a.m. the "A" recirculation motor generator (M-G) set [ . tripped.
Reactor power automatically ran back and stabilized at 65'i power as designed.
Following several unsuccessful attempts to restart the M-G.- - set,;the licensee determined it would be necessary to shutdown in order to . facilitate appropriate corrective actions. On July 3 at 4:19 a.m. an
Unusual Event was declared in accordance with station emeroency action i level procedures upon initiation of a technical specification (TS) required ' - shutdown.
Reactor power was reduced to 30% and a reactor scram was initiated by placing the reactor mode select switch (RMSS) in ' shutdown at 5:00 a.m.
- The Unusual Event was terminated at 5:03 a.m.
Upon plant shutdown, the
- licensee commenced a seven day unscheduled short notice maintenance outage.
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On July 3 the licensee notified the Nhc Operations Center via the Emergency
Notification System (ENS) when a false sensed high pressure signal resulted ! in the isolation of the two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System shutdown cooling suction valves and subsequent tripping of the "A" RHR pump (section , 3.3).
This notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
On July 10 at 8:25 p.m. the reactor was made critical following completion
of repairs to the "A" Recirculation M-G set and other maintenance activities.
. The turbine generator was synchronized to the grid on July 11 at 4:55 a.m.
l During the-power ascension, the licensee individually tripped each M-G set and successfully performed hot starts.
The plant was at essentially full - power at the conclusion of this inspection period.
. On June 20-21, an NRC manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) was onsite to meet with the NRC resident inspectors.
On July 3 , Mr. Phil Johnson, Temporary Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3A was onsite.
.. , The following NkC Region I specialist inspections were conducted during
this report per,iod: . ' a.
Emergency preparedness, June 20-22, 1990 (Inspection Report 50-293/ 90-14) b.
Security, June 25-29,1990 (Inspection Report 50-293/90-16) c.
Primary and secondary chemistry, June 25-29,1990 (Inspection Report t 50-293/90-17) d.
Inservice Inspection and Water Chemistry, July 9-13,1990 (Inspection Report 50-293/90-18) . _ _ _.. - -
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b , Recs ntly, Mrs., Cynthia Carpenter, NRC Resident Inspector (RI) at PNPS, .acceited a promotion to an Operations Engineer position in the Performance and Ouality Evaluation Branch (POEB) of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Mrs. Carpenter's promotion and relocation to NRR will be effective on or about September 2.
On July 1, Mr. William T. Olsen was ~ selected to succeed Mrs. Carpenter. Mr. Olsen was previously a Reactor Engineer in Region I and was currently on temporary assignment to the PNPS Resident Inspector. staff at the time of his selection.- 2.0 plant Operation 2.1 Plant Operations Review The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift hours of the following areas: Control Room fence Line (Protected Area) Reactor Building Intake Structure Diesel Generator Building Turbine Building; Switchgear Rooms J ' Control room instruments were observed for correlation between channels, proper functioning and conformance with Technical Specifications.
Alarms received in the control room were reviewed and discussed with the operators. Operator awareness and response to these conditions were reviewed, Operators were found cognizant of board and plant conditions.
Control room and shift manning were compared with Technical Specification requirements.
Posting and control of radiation, contaminated and high radiation areas were inspected.
Use of and compliance with radiation work permits and use of required _ personnel monitoring devices were checked.
Plant housekeeping controls, including control of flammable and other hazardous materials, were observed.
During' plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to ensure compliance with station procedures, to determir.e if entries were correctly made and to verify correct communicatien of equipment status. These records included various operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and lif ted lead and jumper logs._ Inspections were performed on backshifts including June 11-14, 16, 19-21, 23, 26-30 and July 2, 3, 7, 11-12, 14, 19.
" Deep backshift" inspections were conducted as follows: Time Date 10:00 p.m. - 1:00 a.m.
6/14-15/90 10:15 p.m. - 11:45 p.m.
6/16/90 Pre-evolution briefings were noted to be thorough with appropriate questions and answers.
The operators appeared to have good knowledge of plant conditions. No unauthorized reading material was observed.
Food, beverages and hard hats were kept away from control panels.
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' 2.2 Safety System Review { , Portions of the emergency diesel generators (EDG),' reactor core isolation i - cooling (RCIC), core spray-(CS), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), . residual heat removal (RHR) and safety related electrical systems were reviewed to verify proper alignment and operational status in - the standby mode.
The review included verification that (i) accessible- ? major flow path valves were correctly positioned, (ii) power supplies ' were energized (iii) lubrication and component cooling was proper,- ! 'and (iv) components were operable based on a visual inspection of
. equipment for leakage and general conditions. No violations or safety ' concerns were identified.
, 2.3 Review of Tagging Operations The following tagouts were reviewed with no discrepancies noted: { ' Tagout' Description 90-4-21 Steam Jet Air Ejector Monitors l , 90-19-7 "A" Fuel pool Cooling Pump-90-20-82 Basket Strainer "A" Condensate Demineralizer ' . 2.4 Operational Safety Findings Licensee administrative control of off-normal system configurations , by the use of temporary modifications and tagging procedures was in . compliance with procedural instructions and was consistent with plant - safety. Backshift inspections found operators to be alert and attentive.
Overall plant cleanliness and material condition continued to be good . (with the exception of the drywell as noted in Section 2.9 below).
' 2.5 Inoperable Equipment Actions taken by plant personnel during periods when equipment was ' -inoperable were reviewed to verify that: technical specification limits were met; alternate surveillance testing was completed satisfactorily; and, equipment was properly returned to service upon completion of repairs.
This review % s completed for the following items: , Date Out Date In System 6/21 6/22 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System . 6/5 7/10 Main Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation Valve (MO-220-1) ' g 7/21 7/23 Augmented Offgas System Radiation Monitor
7/17 ' 7/17 "A" Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set
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, i 2.6 Malfunction of the Reactor Butiding Airlock Door Interlock On' June 15 the licensee identified that a malfunction of the reactor
building airlock door interlock occurred which allowed both the inner and outer doors to be opened simultaneously for approximately two seconds.
Security guards were immediately posted to ensure secondary ! containment integrity was maintained and Failure and Malfunction Report
(F&MR) 90-185 was generated to document this event.
l Licensee investigation revealed that the door electromagnet required ! cleaning and tightening. The work was completed in accordance with new station _ procedure $1-CM.1000, " Mechanical Inspection and Preventive Maintenance for Facility Doors and Louvers." This procedure was . recently issued to provide scheduled mechanical inspec on and preventive maintenance of' security, fire and high radiation access ders and louvers in the. Process Buildings to ensure proper operation.
The reactor building airlock doors will be inspected weedy and minor , > maintenance (e.g., tightening of loose screws) performed pe. Ue , procedure. The licensee interim corrective action was approprim.
- The effectiveness of the new procedure to improve performance of the ' airlock doors will be monitored by the inspector.
2.7 "A" Recirculation Pump M-G' Set Trip , On July 2 at 5:11 a.m. the "A" recirculation pump motor-generator ' (M-G) set tripped as a result of a drive motor breaker trip and a generator lockout. The "A" M-G set had been operating at 92% steady-state speed.
No flags or alarms were indicated following the
M-G set trip.
The reactor, which was operating at 100% power prior to the M-G set trip, automatically ran back and stabilized at 65% power as designed.
The PNpS operating license (condition 3E) permits continued plant operation for up to twenty-four hours with one recirculation loop inoperable.
If the Inoperable recirculation loop cannot be returned to service within twenty-four hours, the license
requires that the plant be placed in hot shutdown.
Following the M-G set trip, the licensee conducted a technical review of available plant computer data and conducted a physical insptction of the M-G set.
Ultimately the licensee determined the M-G set tripped as a result of instability in the voltage regulation circuitry. At 3:50 p.m. on July 2, the licensee completed necessary prerequisites and attempted to restart the M-G set, The M-G set failed to restart due to a Delta P permissive incomplete startup sequence logic trip.
The M-G sets are provided with various interlocks which increase equipment protection. One such protective interlock is the recirculation l pump differential pressure (Delta P) permissive.
The Delta P permissive requires, to complete the M-G set start sequence, that the differential l-pressure across the recirculation pump be greater than 8.0 psid (nominal) for a minimum of 4.5 seconds during the initial 20 second M-G set startup sequence.
Upon failure of the M-G set to restart the ! .
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., d licensee performed calibrations,of the Delta P pressure transmitter . and of the fluid drive scoop tube positioner which indicated the components were in proper tolerances. At 9:49 p.m. the licensee attempted a second restart of the M-G set. The restart was again unsuccessful due to-a Delta P permissive incomplete startup sequence logic trip.
Continuing _ licensee review of the unsuccessful M-G set .; starts' focused on the lack of recirculation pump speed being developed ' due to rapid rate of change of the fluid drive scoop tube positioner which resulted in minimal torque translation to the recirculatich , i pump.
Early on July 3, the licensee implemented a temporary modification . (TM 90-20) to decrease the scoop tube positioner rate of change and ' thereby increase torque to the recirculation pump. At 4:06 a.m. the . licensee attempted the third restart of the M-G set. This restart was also unsuccessful due.to a Delta P permissive incomplete startup sequence logic. trip.
' At 4:19 a.m., with less than an hour available to return the M-G set to service and with obvious short term corrective measures already tried, the licensee determined it would be nece,ssary to shutdown.
An Unusual Event was declared at 4:19 a.m. as required by station emergency .'
action levels and the Technical Specification (TS) required shutdown i
was initiated.
Reactor power which had been maneuvered to approximately - 35'o to support M-G set restart was reduced to 30% by control rod '
insertion and a reactor scram was initiated by placing the reactor
mode select switch to shutdown at 5:00 a.m.
The Unusual Event was
terminated at 5:03 a.m.
(See Section 8.1 for more detail).
i Licensee response to the "A" M-G set trip and subsequent unsuccessful , restart attempts was appropriate.
Correct procedures were utilized and complete operator anrenes; of plant parameters was maintained.
Notwithstanding strong, ' "ance during this shutdown event, the < inspector expressed coned s licensee management regarding the time that elapsed prior to init h ag the plant shutdown (23 plus hours).
" The licensee responded there was a very high confidence level following the second unsuccessful restart attempt that the problem had been identified and that the temporary modification to the scoop tube ^ positioner rate of change circuitry would result in a successful restart, and therefore management deemed it appropriate tp pursue M-G set restart.
Additionally, because reactor power had previously been maneuvered to , 35's to support M-G set restart, the licensee concluded an orderly ' shutdown in accordance with procedures could be accomplished within the required time limitations.
Upon review of all licensee activities the inspector concluded the licensee actions to support the third
restart. attempt were acceptable and the inspector had no further
questions.
- l 2.8 Shutdown Cooling System Isolation On July 3 at 1:32 p.m., while attempting to initiate the shutdown
' cooling systerr (SDC), an instantaneous high pressure signal was , L received and a Group 3 PCIS (primary containment isolation system) l l 1; >
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'. actuation occurred closing the SDC discharge valves MD-1001-47 and 50 and tripping the running "A" RHR pump.
The control room operators immediately started the main condenser vacuum pump to maintain the main condenser heat sink for decay heat removal.
Systems and operations personnel conducted a visual inspection of all accessible portions of the SDC system and found no evidence of structural damage. Additionally, after the drywell was de-inerted a visual inspection of SDC system inside primary containment was conducted in which no damage was identified.
An event critique was conducted on July 3 to determine the cause for the event. The licensee concluded the isolation resulted from a hyc rodynrnic transient in which a pocket of unvented air, most probably 4 a beetzontal run of SDC, was pressurized upon opening of the SDC sy, tem discharge valve. The resulting pressure transient was of sufficient magnitude (greater than 90 psig) to actuate PCIS Group 3 pressure switches PS-261-23A and PS-261-23B. At 4:26 p.m. following the licensea investigation, the PCIS signal was reset and the affected valves were reopened. At 6:40 p.m. the "A" RHR pump was restarted and SDC was placed in operation without complication.
This is the second recent SDC automatic isolation during system initiation due to pressurization of entrapped air. On December 9, 1989, an SDC isolation and RHR pump trip occurred upor, system initiation (following a reactor scram the preceding day). The cause - of this event was determined to be unvented air in the SDC discharge piping. However, it was the consensus of the event critique board that the isolation was a one time event resultant from air entrained in the system from previous work on a system valve.
The event critique board convened to analyze the July 3 isolation identified the length of pipe between valves M0-1001-47 and M0-1001-50 as the probable volume in which a pocket of air would most probably accumulate. The board recommended procedural revisions to vent between MO-1001-47 and MO-1001-50 prior to initiating SDC and to close MO-1001-43 A, C (or B, D) prior to closure of M0-1001-47 and M0-1001-50 while securing SDC.
The procedural revisions were implemented prior to the conclusion of the unscheduled outage.
Additionally, the board recommended an existing plant design change to enhance SDC venting be pursued and completed during the next refueling outage (RF0 8). The design change was scheduled to be implemented during the 1990 surveillance outage but was postponed due to higher priority issues until RF0 8.
Licensee response to this event was appropriate. Operators quickly ensured the availability of a heat sink for decay heat removal, the RHR system was inspected to ensure structural integrity, and the event was comprehensively critiqued prior to the re-initiation of SDC. The <
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expeditiously implemented. The inspector will review the offectiveness - of the procedural revisions, as well as the schedular status of the - design change to enhance SDC system venting during routine inspections.
, ! 2.9 Orywell closeout Inspection ' -On July.7, the inspector accompanied the Operations Section Manager on the final drywell inspection prior to closecut and plant startup.
General drywell housekeeping was inadequate and..not in a condition to i support startup.
Several hand tools and drainage funnels with attendant-l rigging were observed in the MSIV area. A face shield and hcnd tools were observed in the reactor vessel sump area.
Loose dirt and-miscellaneous refuse from work activities were observed in most of p the drywell downcomers as well as below the deck grating (atop ' ventilation ductwork).
Additionally, the protective mesh of a ventilation exhaust duct was observed to be extensively damaged.
The licensee subsequently assembled a supervised work force which required several hours to correct the deficiencies detailed above.
Reactor startup was delayed as a result of the additional drywell cleanup.
Hcwever, more significant'ty, unnecessary radiological exposure was consumed to perform the remedial cleanup and to conduct followup inspections.
The licensee has lacked a formal quality controlled process to ensure effective integrated drywell closeout and turnover from outage' management to the operations department'. As a result of the deficiencies'noted during the initial closecut inspection, the licensee is developing a drywell housekeeping and turnover process.
The effectiveness of this process will be reviewed during future outages.
3.0 Radiological Controls
3.1 Previously Identified Item (Closed) Violation (89-10-01), Recurring Locked High Radiation Door Violations. During inspection 50-293/90-12, the inspector noted that-licensee corrective actions relative to control of locked high. radiation doors was complete as described in the licensee reply to the notice . of violation, with the exception of the issuc ce of a preventive maintenance procedure to address continuing attention to door performance.
! On June 8,1990, the licensee promulgated station procedure SI-CM.1000,
" Mechanical Inspection and Preventive Maintenance for Facility Doors and Louvers." This completes the remaining action for violation 89-10-01.
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. 3, i ' 3.2 Identification of Liquid Release pathway-The licensee radiological section has been involved in an initiative-to identify the liquid and gaseous, release paths from the station.
' On June 27 during~a flow test to determine whether or not liquid from the recirculation system motor generator (M-G) set floor drains could be released to an unmonitored pathway, an unmonitored release occurred.
One pathway believed to be a potentially unmonitored release path was from the M-G set room floor drain to the M-G set oil; separator tank L to the plant storm drain system to the discharge canal.
The flow . path shown on licensee drawings indicated that the water from the M-G set floor drains and oil separator _ tank flows to the sewage ejector tank and into the sanitary sewage system, which is sampled prior to release from the site..However, licensee. field walk down indicated that the flow path appeared to be from the oil separator to the storm drain system to the discharge canal.
The licensee determined by flow indication following filling of the oil separation tank that the actual discharge path was from the oil > separator tank to the storm drain to the discharge canal. On completion ' of the test, radiological surveys of the tank indicated contamination in the tank-(a survey performed prior to the test indicated the oil separator tank was radiologically clean).
Sampling of the tank water with rust deposits found in the tank confirmed contamination.
, L The licensee determined the root cause of this event to be that the personnel involved assumed that the system was clean and therefore did not require or perform a more thorough radiological-survey, l Contributing factors included: (1) prior (years past) contamination of a system (oil separator tank) that was designed to be clean; and
(2) lack of accurate drawings which led to the necessity for a flow
test to verify actual piping runs.
Immediate corrective actions by the licensee included: (1) stopping the flow of water and removal of the hose to prevent pot,sible additional water entering the tank; (2) initiation of a Level 1 Radiological Occurrence Report; (3) sampling c the tank water wM.h rust deposits; (4) covering the M-G set room flove drains to prevent further water entering through this path; and (5) commence obtaining additional samples throughout the pathway.
Sampling of gravel and sludge obtained from the storm drain system confirmed the presence of activity; however, it cannot be conclusively determined that this activity was the result of this discharge.
Further corrective actions to be performed by the licensee include: (1) verifying whether drawings showing the subject flow path are in error and correcting them, if required, including verification of all inputs to the oil separator tank; (2) decontaminate the lines from , a
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.importance of-performing more thorough surveys prior to future ! investigations of this type; (5) conduct a review to determine other potential unmonitored liquid release paths from the plant; and (6) attempt'to quantify the impact of possible.past releases from the c identified flow path.
The inspector considered the safety significance of this event minor in that the release point into the discharge canal is located within the site boundary for liquid releases.
The volume of water involved > in the release was small (about 40 gallons) compared to the dilution in the discharge canal of approximately 355,000 gpm over 40 minutes.
The licensee determined that the release did not violate 10 CFR 20 or . 10 CFR 50 limits for releases of radioactive material outside the ' site boundary nor Technical Specification limits and the event was determined not to be reportable.
Licensee investigation of this event ' was prompt and aggressive.
Corrective actions.taken were appropriate , and comprehensive. Although a release occurred, it was the result of licensee aggressive efforts to identify and address potential unmonitored liquid and gaseous release paths from the station.
, 3.3 Electronic Dosimetry System On July 15, the licensee instituted the ALNOR electronic dosimetry , system. The ALNOR systen consists of a pockat size programmable ! dosimeter (RAD-85) which provides audible alarms with a digital dosimetry reader /initializer to test the dosimeter, and displays dose rate and accumulated dose.
! -The ALNOR system provides: (1) real time individual and task dose- ' , recording, including immediate information of accumulated personal ' doses at exits from controlled areas; (2) alarm levels depending on a preset dose limits and job; (3) controlled access; and (4) an immediate-
audible alarm in the controlled area when the dose limit has been - exceeded or when a high dose rate field has been entered.
} The licensee instituted the ALNOR electronic dosimetry system to: (1) automate the menual system of dose recording and tracking; .(2) increase the accuracy of dose tracking and (3) provide up-to-date information to the individuals and the licensee, immediate feedback is provided to the individual when a high dose field is present.
Installetion of the ALNOR electronic dosimetry system is an excellent licensee initiative to provide improved tracking of dose and individual awareness of dose and dose rates and to reduce personnel exposure, t ,
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4.0 Maintenance / Surveillance , 4.1' HPCI/RCIC Drain Line Repair
On June 11, the licensee identified a steam leak on a steam trap on
the common HPCI and RCIC condensate return line to the main condenser ! hotwell.
A maintenance work request was written to repair the leak and temporary modification'(TM) 90-016 was installed to allow operation
of the HPCI system while the drain line piping was being replaced.
On completion of the original scope of repairs another steam leak was . discovered during post work testing (PWT) in the same line a few feet - , upstream of the initial section.. This leak was also repaired by piping replacement and subsequently post work tested satisfactory. A review
of licensee documents to control the work indicate adequate management i review and control of all phases of the task.
The TM installed on
the HPCI system was removed and both the HPCI and RCIC systems were ! tested satisfactory and restored to original configuration.
, The licensee currently has a plant design change (PDC) to replace the . HPCI/RCIC steam traps and drain lines during the next refueling outage j to reduce steam trap maintenance and drain line eresion.
Licensee . . actions were appropriate for this situation.
4.2 Temporary Modifications During this inspection period, the. inspector reviewed outstanding temporary modifications (TMs) to ensure proper control and technical i review were' applied by the licensee. As of. July 16, there were 26 .l outstanding TMs installed in>the plant. Thirteen were extended beyond ~ the expiration date with appropriate justification for operation and independent review by the Technical Section Manager.
' . The inspector also verified that TMs extended beyond six months, were , reviewed semi-annually by the Operations Review Committee as required ' by licensee procedure.
The Master Surveillance Tracking Program is used effectively by the licensee to schedule the required review.
The licensee is making an' effort to schedule en the long term plan those temporary modifications which are planned to be made permanent.
The inspector reviewed the justification for operation for those . temporary modifications extended beyond six months.
No discrepancies were identified, , 4.3 Loss of Valve Indication On July 6 during routine operator walkdown of control room panels, t it was observed that position indication for residual heat removal (RHR) system valve MO-1001-28B, LPCI loop injection valve was lost.
Licensee investigation discovered that the circuit breaker for the valve at the motor control center was open.
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P, . ' not in the trip free position, the valve did not receive an automatic open signal.
Valve MD-1001-28B was verified to be in the normal (open) position.
, The compliance division, in conjunction with the operations department,
conducted an independent review of this event and concluded that the i breaker was inadvertntly bumped and opened.
Licensee investigation consisted of the following actions. A review 6f surveillances performed u between July 3-7 determined no surveillances involving the 28B valve breaker had been performed.
The control room tagout log was reviewed to determine what tagouts were performed during that time period.
No , tagoutt involving the 288 valve or corresponding breaker were performed.
- However, work packages involving two other breakers in the area were . performed several hours prior to the loss of indication on the valve .l . war noticed.
The licensee postulates that the 28B valve breaker may have been inadvertently bumped due to the confined space in the e environmental enclosure around the breakers, thereby mispositioning i the breaker.
Licensee corrective actions included: (1) immediate reclosure of the breaker; and (2) plant management counselling of operations and maintenance personnel on the importance of exercising caution when working in the vicinity of breakers, especially in confined spaces.
Additionally, the investigation performed by the compliance division was presented to the Operations Review Committee (ORC) on July 18; 'the ORC concurred that this was an isolated instance.
The inspector does not take ext.eption to the licensee finding that the breaker was inadvertently opened.
Independent review of this event by the compliance division was a good licensee initiative.
4.4 Inoperable Main Steam Drain Isolation Valve On June 5 during the performance of procedure 8.7.4.3, "Miscell e eous Containment Isolation Valve Quarterly Operability," valve MO-220 2, main steam line drain inboard isolation valve failed in the closed position.
In accordance with Technical Specifications, the in-series containment isolation valve MO-220-2 was deactivated in the isolated condition.
Valve M0-220-1, wat unable to open due to a failed motor.
Licensee l investigation has not, as of the end of this report period, determined ' the root cause of the motor failure.
Since a replacement in kind for this motor was not available, a motor having the same torque output rating but a lower output speed was installed in place of the existing MO-220-1 motor.
New overload relays were also installed in 480 volt Motor Control Center B20 to provide proper overload protection of the
E new motor.
Existing control and power cables were reused to minimize ' l exposure time.
The existing motor which failed was unique in that it was not used anywhere else at Pilgrim and replacement was not easily , .
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> i obtainable.
The new motor is 1.0 horse power (versus'1.9 hp for thA .old motor) with a stroke time of approximately 14 seconds (versus 7-i , seconds).
The new stroke time is within Technical Specification operability requirements of 30 seconds. The new motor is environmentally ) qualified.
Licensee actions with respect to identification of the failed motor.
and replacement in kind were prompt and conservative. Tne inspector 4 had no further questions.
5.0 Security 5.1 Observations of Physical Security
Selected aspects of plant physical security were reviewed during ' regular and backshift hours to verify that controls wert i n accordance with the security plan--and approved procedures; This review included the following security measures: security officer staffing, vital and protected _ area ba-rier integrity, maintenance of isolation zones and protected area barrier integrity, and implementation of access controls including access authorization and badge issue, searches of personnel, packages and vehicles, and escorting. No discrepancies were identified.
5.2-Safeguards Event Report > , The inspector reviewed the Safeguards Event Report (SER) listed below to determine that with respect to the general aspects of the event: (1) the report was submitted in a timely manner; (2) description =of
the event was accurate; (3) root cause analysis were performed; . (4) safety implication was considered; and (5) corrective actions' implemented or planned appear sufficient to preclude recurrence of a similar event.
, 5.2.1 SER 90-$01-00 .
SER 90-S01-00, " Unauthorized Handgun Detected at Alternate Access Point" addresses the June 12, 1990 discovery by a security officer of a handgun in a carrying bag at the alternate access point.
The licensee determined that an ' individual unintentionally placed the firearm in a carrying- ' bag, intending to return the weapon to its normal storage $ location and forgot that the weapon was in the bag.
The SER fulfilled the above reporting criteria.
The inspectors ' reviewed this event and had no additional questions, u .
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'. 6.0 Engineering / Technical Support , 6.1 Summary of the "A" Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Set Trips Since October 7,1989, the plant has experienced several trips of the "A" M-G set.
The most recent M-G set trip occurred July 2,1990, and is documented in Section 2.7 of this report.
The trips have occurred at high speed M-G set operations following speed changes, as well as during steady state operations.
The recenc "A" M-G set operational history is summarized below.
NRC Inspection Trip Date Operational Status Report October 7, 1989 78% speed, followi'g minor speed IR 89-12 changes October 12, 1909 98% speed, duri- . coop tube IR 89-12 position veritis tion December 6, 1989 High speed, while 1 creasing speed IR 89-13 March 10, 1990 98% speed, during < agnostic IR 90-07 testing July 2, 1990 92% speed, steady. tate operation IR 90-15 Causal ana ysis of each event identified discrete component failures, l however, each trip was pre:ipitated by rapid diverging voltage oscillations which resulted in drive motor breaker trips and generator lockouts.
The licensee has conducted extensive physical inspection and performance testirg of the voltage regulation circuitry since the init,al trip. An M-G set task force was formed, which has e.; listed vendor (GE) and industry expertise.
Licensee processes following each trip have ensured a controlled and deliberate approach to the resolution of the M-G set voltage regulator instability.
However, the licensee's causal analysis was an iterative procass dependent upon post trip dita acquisition and limited by restrictive post work testing methodologies.
In addition to the replacement of degraded and failed components, during the spring outage the licensee implementeJ a plant design change (PDC 90-14) which removed the speed feedback module of the M-G set speed control circuitry.
The speed feedback mod;1e has been identified throughout the industry as thE source of circuit noise which affects M-G set stability.
In addition to the removal of the speed feedback module, the design change also increased the M-G set hydraulic coupler scoop tube positioner rate of change circuitry such that the scoop tube would be withdrawn at near maximum speed.
The increased scoop tube position rate of change decreased trie translation of terlu2 f rom the M-G sets to the retirrulation pumps, thereby decrea ing cevelopment of initial pump speed.
Decreased oump speed results in decreased purup dif ferential pressure.
F,ilowing the July 2 "A" M-G set trip, restart eifort; were unsuccessful due to incomplete . --
.., ,, ..,.....
. c . d. ; 14' ., f.' start sequence trips resultant from inadequate initial pump differential pressure development (see Section 2.7).
Upon recognition of this condition, the licensee implemented a field revision notice (FRN 90-14-11) to PDC 90-14 which wired the scoop tube position rate limiter-to the downstream side of the speed limiter circuitry for each M-G set.
Following completion of the FRN the "A" M-G set started properly from cold and hot operating conditions.
, During July 12-16, the licensee performed ' additional testing and tuning of the "A" M-G set voltage regulator with analog diagnostic test oquipment.
Several additional components were replaced..The, licensee contir,or. to collect and analyze "A" M-G set control system data, cir.a1 root case analysis of the July 2 event is planned to be addressed in failure and. malfunction report (F&MR) 90-202.
Notwithstanding.
otherwise appropriate licensee. measures to resolve the "A" M-G set volt' age regulation instability, the inspector initially concluded the implementation of PDC 90-14 during the spring outage (which effectively increased the scoop tube position rate of change limiter to maximum speed) to be the primary contributing factor to the inability to restart the "A" M-G set following the July.2 M-G set trip. The inspector noted contributing factors which exacerbated the situation including indications of pump motor upper thrust bearing wear as well as what appears to be an inherently slower start sequence for the "A" M-G t.
The inspector will continue to monitor M-G set performance in addition to licensee. actions to resolve voltage regulator instability.
7,0 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification 7.1 Li_censee Event Reporting The inspector reviewed the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) listed below to determine that with respect to the general aspects of the events: (1) the reports were submitted in a timely manner; (2) descriptions of the events were accurate; (3) root cause analyses were performed; (4) safety implications were considered; and (5) corrective actions implemented or planned appear sufficient to preclude recurrence of similar events.
7.1.1 LER 90-08 LER 90-08, " Automatic Scram Resulting from Lead Rejection at Full Power" addresses the May 13, 1990 automatic reactor scram resulting from a load rejection caused by a momentary fault on the offsite 345 KV transmission system. The mcin generator's loss-of-field relay detected the fault and immediately tripped the generator without the expected 15 cycle time delay due to a 6efective relay ("X") coil.
This event was previously documented in section 6.1 of Inspection Report 50-293/90-13.
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og 7.1.2 'LER90-09? , LER 90-09, " Automatic Closing of the Outboard Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation Valves" addresses the June 6, 1990-partial Primary Containment Isolation Control System Group 6 (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuation due to a failure 'of a logic relay coil.
This event is documented in detail in section 2.6.2 of Inspection Report 50-293/90-13.
No deficiencies were identified during this review.
' . 7.2 Review of Overtime Records The inspector reviewed the records of hours worked for licensed operators . during the months of March, April and May 1990. Procedure 1.3.67, ' " Control of Overtime" and Procedure 1.3.34, " Conduct of Operations" describe the use and control of overtime to ensure compliance with NRC Generic Letter 82-12, " Nuclear Power Plant Staf f Working Hours."
The procedure requires that overtime for safety,-related work b'e limited to 16 hours in a 24 hour period,-24 hours in a 48 hour period and 72 hours in a seven day period, excluding shift turnover time.
Specific controls are established to allow an individual.to exceed these limits with prior approval of the Station Director.
This approval is documented on Attachment A to 1.3.67, Overtime Authorization and Request to Exceed NRC Guidelines.
The inspector verified the-hours worked by review of employee payroll sheets.
The inspector found that only in isolated cases had an individual exceeded the NRC overtime guidelines of 72 hours in a seven - day period, but in each of these cases, proper orior approval by the Station Director was obtained.
For the three month period of payroll sheets reviewed by the. inspector, no concerns with respect to overtime or proper approval was noted in the operations area. The licensee . maintains a' computerized tracking system with weekly printouts to 'l ' verify compliance with station requirements.
The inspector had no further questions.
7.3 Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Reports The Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) report is issued to resolve suspected or actual conditions adverse to quality identified by departments not using deficiency reports, nonconformance reports or failure and malfunction reports and.to identify actual or suspected failurer to comply with NRC rules, regulations or the facility license.
The inspector reviewed all open and closed PCAQs for 1990 to determine if NRC rules and regulations or Technical Specification compliance issues had been identified and properly and promptly dispositioned.
No discrepancies were identifie _ _ _ _. _.. , ' . . 3; e T r
, 8.0 Emergency Preparedness 8.1 Review of Emergency Action-Level Classification 'As prev'iously discussed in Section 2.7, the licensee declared an Unusual Event (NOVE) on July 3 at 4:13 a.m. in accordance with procedure EP-IP-100, revision 1, er. titled Emergency Classification, Section 6.1.1.1 of procedure EP-IP-100 requires an Unusual Event to be declared-upon the initiation of a plant shutdown required by TS. The licensee made all appropriate federal, state and local notifications and terminated the NOVE at 5:03 a.m. upon completion of the shutdown and verification of stable reactor conditions.
In addition to complying with the provisions of the facility emergency plan, the licensee informed local town emergency preparedness personnel during the= evening of July 2 of plant status and the potential to-initiate a TS-required shutdown and,therefore declare an NOVE.
These communications were a positive licensee action and effectively reduced the potential for confusion upon formal NOUE declaration early-on-July 3 The licensee d. splayed sound command of. emergency plan requirements as well as effective internal and external commurications.
9.0 Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications.
This review verified, as applicable: (1) that the reported information was valid and included the NRC-required data; (2) that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and-(3) that planned corrective actions were adequs e for resolution of the problem.
The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as .an abnormal occurrence. The following reports were reviewed: Monthly Operational Status Summaries for May and June 1990 -- Operations Review Committee and Nuclear Safety Review and Audit -- Committee Meeting Minutes Special Report dated July 2, 1990 - Alarm Function of Turbine Basement -- Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Inoperable in excess of fourteen days No deficiencies were identified.
10.0 Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss licensee activities and inspector areas of concern. On August 6, the resident inspector staff conducted an exit meeting with licensee management summarizing inspection activity and findings for this report period.
No proprietary information was identified as being included in the report. Additionally, the inspector provided the t
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.. ,, L plant manager a copy of a memorandum,from the Director of NRR -to the [. Regional Administrators, dated February 22, 1990, regarding temporary waivers ' of compliance. This memorandum is available in the public document room.
~0n~ June 22, the NRC and the licensee held a mid-cycle Systematic Assessment-of Licensee Performance (SALP) meeting at the NRC Region I office. The licensee presented a self-assessment on their performance during the current-e .SALP cycle.
Licensee handouts from the presentation are included.as Attachment 11 to.this report.
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. . . . ., 0.. ATTACHMENT 1 Persons Contacted Interviews and discussions were conducted with members of the licensee staff and management during the report period to obtain information pertinent to tie areas inspected.
Inspection findings were discussed periodically with the man-agement and supervisory personnel listed below.
- R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear K. Highfill, Vice President, Nuclear Operations and Station Director
.E. Kraft, Acting Plant Manager D. Eng, Outage and Planning Manager L. Schmeling, Acting Deputy Plant Manager R. Fairbanks, Nuclear Engineering Department * D. Long, Plant Support Department Manager L. Olivier, Operations Section Manager N. DiMascic, Radiological Section Manager J. Seery, Technical Section Manager i G. Stubbs, Maintenance Section Manager
T. Sullivan, Chief Operating Engineer J. Neal, Security Division " =.g e r P. Cafarella, Acting Syste Engineering Division. Manager B. Sullivan, Fire Protection Division Manager
- Senior licensee manager present at the exit interview
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s , ATTACHMENT 1 ' !:s L ' Persons Contacted > ' y , '" ' -Interviews and discussions were conducted with members of'the-1.icensee staff- -! Land management'during the' report period to obtain information pertinentsto the, '[ ? Lareas inspected.
Inspection findinas were= discussed periodically with the man- 'agement and supervisory--personnel;.sted below.
" ,. i , nr ,
- R.. Bird,. Senior!Vice-President - Nuclear
! . "' mi K.'Highfill, Vice President, Nuclear OperationsLand Station Director.: ' ~ ' 'E. Kraft, Acting Plant' Manager j D. Eng',~ Outage and Planning Manager t SL.'Schmeling, Acting DeputyLPlant Manager !
'Ri Fairbankst Nucleart ngineering Department. Manager E ' - lj' P.'. Long, Plant Support Department' Manager XC ' ' so-L. 011 vie'rd 0perationsfSection Manager.
, N.'DiMascio, Radiologic'al-Section Manager t - J. Seery, Technical Section' Manager-i , -
- G.LStubbs, Maintenance.Section Manager
<- - . LT. :Sullivan.. Chief Operating Engineer ', . J.-Neal,5 Security Division 1 Manager, i P. Cafarella,~ Acting Systems-Engineering Division Manager a 'B. :Sullivan, Fire Protection Division Manager ~ ' j
- Seniorc. licensee manager present at:the exit interview
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I - . PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT
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BIRD l BOSTON EDISON COMPANY-
JUNE 22, 1990 . % ,
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. . . _ . . . . AGENDA JUNE 22. 1990 - INTRODUCTION RALPH BIRD EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RALPH BIRD OPERATIONS ED KRAFT MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE ED KRAFT RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS NICK DIMASCIO SECURITY DON LONG ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT B0B FAIRBANK SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION i RALPH BIRD RALPH BIRD SU M RY . . .
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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
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MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT > ' 0PERATIONS t ' , '
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KRAFT ., ' PLANT MANAGER
. JUNE 22, 1990 j ' ,
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. _ _. _ .. - . O_ , ., _ , -..- ... :; . , _ - ' .... ' _ STAFFING IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUE - . ~ ~ SIX SHIFT ROTATION . THIRD SRO ON ALL SHIFTS . FUTURE LICENSE CANDIDATES IN TRAINING . . LOW PROJECTED LOSSES . . \\ .
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. . = - . . - STAFFING LEVELS CONTINUE-TO INCREASE 100% PASS RATE FOR LAST THREE SRO CLASSES . , LICENSE REQUALIFICATION. PROGRAM RATED SATISFACTORY . SRO CERTIFICATION FOR PLANT MANAGER AND DEPUTYS . . FULL'INPO ACCREDITATION . . \\
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OPERATOR PERFORMANCE HAS IMPROVED SINCE LAST SALP NO PLANT SCRAMS DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR' . - NO TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWNS ~ . ESF ACTUATIONS REDUCED OVER 45% . ' ' SDOCR TEST SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED- . OPERATOR RESPONSE TO PLANT TRANSIENTS .
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DEC '. NAHNE S R G O S N T I S I A G F R S N E E E I I P I F R O T E B I R I R V E R N O I V B O T T O I C C N N T A A R A U E U L L R T T P O F V D I H T E N H C F O S T I E C A H R E F W S P S O L . . . . ORTNO C .
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' .. .. - .,: : STRICT ADHERENCE TO OPERATIONS PROCEDURES IS IMPROVING . . . RECENT PERFORMANCE IS GOOD
. - . MONITORING IS INTENSIVE . NOTED AS STRENGTH IN NEW OPERATORS . f EVOLUTIONS STOP IF PROCEDURES ARE UNCLEAR . MANAGEMENT ATTENTION CONTINUES ., . .
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OPERATIONS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN UPGRADED l .: i - l ,,
, i - - . ! ' EASIER TO USE , ! ! . -! ' HUMAN FACTORS IMPROVED . .. TECHNICALLY UPGRADED
. - . 95% COMPLETE ~
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SNO . IT S A E R D _ E A P R O G P E . U VO E R R P U M D I E S C L T O L N R I E P S W M L S E O S S C R E E N T V S A N I S N O T A E C A T I F N K T L I R I E A O N S M W I R . . . E - HTO " ' ' ' - i g ' m lla m
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. -. . . . .. ~ N . O ITAR S E T S N N E E E M D G M A O H R M R S G E I O T W L R N O P P A P M L O N P E C O V C I L I A S L T N A C S E U N C N D O S I O I A R T Y P A R C R E N D E W E N P O I A O P C I E T F F L N O O B A R A C N P I I O L F I R E I T O R N E T G L A , I P, R E S M E F O P A C O S - . . . - - . . .
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. . , ,! .i i . BOSTON EDISON COMPANY a MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT l MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE ' . I \\ ! , - } l - ! i ' E.S.
KRAFT PLANT MANAGER: . JUNE 22, 1990
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M / i NEW DEPUTY SECTION MANAGER POSITIONS FILLED- .l . NEW SENIOR SUPERVISOR POSITION FILLED FOR 'I . ,, EACH DIVISION , i RATIO OF SUPERVISORS TO CRAFT IMPROVED . , . If I
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. >. CRAFT MANNING IS STABILIZED - . -
l ' MAINTENANCE DIVISIONS AT. AUTHORIZED LEVELS . LEVELS ASSESSED BY MONITORING BACKLOG .
BACKLOG LESS THAN INDUSTRY AVERAGE . - .
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' . + MAINTENANCE TRAINING PROGRAM IS-0N TRACK ,
. ., 1989 TRAINING COMPLETED ON TIME AUGMENTED TRAINING PLAN IMPLEMENTED . 1990 TRAINING PLAN ON SCHEDULE- . . SEMI-ANNUAL ASSESSMENT SCHEDULED ' . FIRST'LINE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INPO . . . I
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- l ll MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES ARE BEING UPGRADED j
. p .. ; ' . HUMAN FACTORS, NOMENCLATURE, TECHNICAL' VALIDATION . q
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AHEAD OF SCHEDULE - / . f 10 PERCENT COMPLETE- ! . !!
COMPLETION EXPECTED DECEMBER 1991
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. .. , ! ADDITIONAL PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENTS , o l
' SURVEILLANCE WALK DOWNS PRIOR TO FIRST USE . -
NOMENCLATURE VALIDATION . ! EFFECTIVE DURING MARCH / APRIL 1990.MID-CYCLE OUTAGE .
i ' RFI PROCESS INPUT . . EVENT CRITIQUE INPUT . , . k n l ! , '17 _ .- . . _.. . .
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~ . ,, .- . - _ . SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS ARE BEING STRENGTHENED IST ' PROGRAM DESIGN BASIS ~ REVIEW -COMPLETE . TECH SPEC CHANGES TO IMPROVE EQUIPMENT / PLANT ^ . RELIABILITY RE90ESTED INCREASED STA INVOLVEMENT . LCO~ TRACKING LOG PROCEDURALIZED . STARTUP. PROCEDURE HOLD POINTS ESTABLISHED . ESF ACTUATIONS REDUCED- . ' .
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__ ,- . ..w.: . . .. -- ~ . '-* '% - . WORK CONTROL PROCESS IS IMPROVING . ,.N-
FINE TUNING CONTINUES . INPO ASSIST VISIT REQUESTED AT PILGRIM . .' SHORT TERM UPGRADES COMPLETE .. ENHANCED ORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION . .
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, . .. . e g - ' ' s . , _ ,t% l ~ - e . WORK CONTROL PROCESS - ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS- . / WORK' CONTROL PROCESS STUDY . PROCESS EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS . . INSTALLATION OF KUCLEIS PROGRAM . l I -
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PLANT-MATERIAL CONDITION CONTINUES T0-BE VERY GOOD - . - SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL. ISSUES MONITORED DAILY . MAINTENANCE BACKLOG BELOW INDUSTRY AVERAGE . ANI, NEIL FEEDBACK . l . \\
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. . SUM 4ARY _ CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON PROGRAMMATIC IMPROVEi4ENT . .: - . PROCEDURES UPGRADE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE . SURVEXI. LANCE PROCEDURES, IST/ISI PROGRAM . IMPROVEMENTS . WORK CONTROL PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS . . e
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l BOSTON EDISON COMPANY , MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT ' ! ! RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS l
, I l ' > I NICK DIMASCIO { t RADIOLOGICAL SECTION l MANAGER l ' ' JUNE 22, 1990 l
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- . , ] ! . . t - ALARA IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUE - .
i i 1989' EXPOSURE 4TH LOWEST FOR BWRS l .
! - \\ RADCON INTEGRATED THROUGHOUT ORGANIZATION ! s .
! ALARA' PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM LESSONS LEARNED
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~- .. . -. ... - . _k ' N S - . FIELD RADCON CONTINUES TO IMPROVE THIS PERIOD - BEST INPO QUARTILE, 1989 CONTAMINATIONS . . PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION CONTROL IS EXCELLENT . NO ACTUAL OVEREXPOSURES . . NO POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURES . . e \\
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OTHER RADIOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS ! - l !
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i SOURCE TERM REDUCTION
! ! CONTROL BLADE MANAGEMENT f . , , t
COBALT CONTRIBUTORS BEING IDENTIFIED f . , ! l l
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' LOCAL DOSE RATES REDUCED .
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I RADWASTE IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS ! ! . RADWASTE TRUCK LOCK IMPROVEMENTS COMPLETE . RADWASTE MAINTENANCE BACKLOG REDUCED . PLANT HEATING SYSTEM' UPGRADE (SUMMER / FALL) f . ! RESIN DRYING SYSTEM (3RD OUARTER 1990) ] . i MIXED BED DEMINERALIZER (3RD OUARTER 1990) i . , ' , RADWASTE INFLUENT MONITORING SYSTEM- -i . (IST GUARTER 1991) ! SPENT RESIN STORAGE TANK REPLACEMENT t . (4TH QUARTER (1990) i ! !
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. STAFFING AND ORGANIZATION CONTINUE TO BE A STRENGTH l , ,
i REORGANIZATION OF RADWASTE FUNCTIONS IS EFFECTIVE ' . l
TECHNICAL DEPTH INCREASED . ..
, RADIOLOGICAL SECTION ORGANIZATION MANUAL UPDATED f . FULLY STAFFED . i . ! . j t - !
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l IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS (CGhTINUED1 i
! i . i THE 1990 LIQUID DISCHARGE GOAL REDUCED . BY 40% FROM 1989
- . ' ! NEW EXPOSURE POLICY / LOWER ADMIN LIMITS.
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' f ' TIGHTER ACCESS CONTROL OF THE MAIN . RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA j ! i i ? , ,
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, . i ) SUMARY ! , ! l PREVIOUS IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE . i } l PROGRAMS ARE IN PLACE TO RESOLVE f . IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES ! N ,; STAFFING AND ORGANIZATION ARE FULLY EFFECTIVE l . ,.
[ i i CONTINUE TO SET CHALLENGING GOALS l . i
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, i BOSTON EDISON COMPANY i ! MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT .
SECURITY ! i . ! l ' ! - I I ' ! ! . i i D.J.
LONG
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i , s ! i HIGHLY OUALIFIED MANAGEMENT- ' . ! .
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, . ! OVERTIME CONTROLS EFFECTIVE ! . . ! - ' . ! LIMITED USE OF CONSULTANT PERSONNEL . . CONTINUOUS OVERSIGHT OF GUARD FORCE
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! ATTRITION LESS THAN 10 PERCENT l ' .
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i t 't } l t QUALITY PROCEDURES ARE A PROGRAM STRENGTH ! i . l ! -
i ' l NO VIOLATIONS-
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c IMPROVED SECURITY AWARENESS BY PLANT STAFF l . . TRAINING EMPHASIZES ADHERENCE } . ! . I f I
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i l i l WORK PRIORITIZATION TEAM .
I ! ! PLAN OF THE DAY MEETINGS i . - . - ) !
I MAINTENANCE PLANNING l . ! !
! ! OUTAGE PLANNING ! .
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, SIGNIFICART ACCOMPLISHMENTS NADE THIS PERIOD LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY PLAN . EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TRAINING > . PURCHASED ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT . RANGE TIME FOR PROFICIENCY FIRING . EXPANDED WEAPONS TRAINING . IDENTIFIED VITAL AREA BOUNDARIES ON DRAWINGS . PARTICIPATED ON OUALITY ASSURANCE AUDIT TEAM . TACTICAL RESPDNSE TRAINING . PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADE PROGRAMS . s
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! EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONTINGENCY EXERCISE l ! . - l ! CONVERT KEY CONTRACTOR POSITIONS TO BECO - .
l CONTINUE WEAPONS UPGRADE . i ! ! i
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. , _ - . . - [ I f . I CONTINUING SELF ASSESSMENT IS A KEY STRENGTH j i
i f QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITS . PEER EVALUATIONS . MANAGEMENT SURVEILLANCE TOURS ! . ~ MANAGE!1ENT SELF ASSESSMENTS i , .
-
CORPORATE SECURITY AUDITS . ' i l GUARD CONTRACTOR AUDITS .
INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY AUDITS . i i i l I Y , ! , ! ! i i l 41 i . - - - - . -- ....--.
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> I i AGGRESSIVE CHALLENGE TO SECURITY ' . . I i i r > i BEYOND~ SIMPLE COMPLIANCE .
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. STRONG PROGRAM ! . l i l EXPERIENCED / QUALIFIED PERSONNEL i . ,
. i MODERN TECHNOLOGY i . ! '!
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! ! ! I ' k BOSTON EDISON COMPANY l MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT , f ! ENGINEERING & TECHNICAL SUPPORT ~ ! , f i ! i
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! R.V.
FAIRBANK !
MANAGER-NUCLEAR ENGINEERING ! ( JUNE 22, 1990 .
.
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q . ! ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT CONTINUES TO BE \\ ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH I i - , ! i - EXPERIENCED STAFF REMAINS HIGHLY MOTIVATED . . i STAFF TRAINING IN OPERATIONS IS VALUED . i STAFF WORKS TOGETHER TO RESOLVE ISSUES ! .
t ' RESULT IS QUALITY TECHNICAL RESOLUTION OF . STATION ISSUES !
CIRCUIT BREAKERS j .
ISOPHASE BUS DISCONNECT f . ! SALT SERVICE WATER PUMPS .s l .
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_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _.
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. ' SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 15 A VALUABLE RESOURCE
! FOR OPERATIONS l ~ ! ' ' I ! - INTEGRATES ORGANIcATIONAL ACTIVITIES
. ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS i
I . EVALUATES SYSTEM PERFORMANCE- .
- .
~ IDENTIFIES ROOT CAUSES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS-l i l . i ASSISTS OPERATIONS IN. ADDRESSING PLANT ISSUES j i . ( - i , l ' h i I
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. _. . _. - . ~:: ,.,e .. , , f , l . - L i ' l . -r ! ENGINEERING HAS MAINTAINED ITS RECOGNIZED STRENGTHS > i ! ! ! i ENGINEERING CONTROLS DESIGN AND PLANT MODIFICATIONS j . STAFF PREPARES HIGH QUALITY SAFETY EVALUATIONS'- . ! i DESIGN REVIEW BOARD THOROUGHLY REVIEWS ENGINEERING . PRODUCTS AND ISSUES ! ! ! ! ONSITE STAFF PROVIDES PROMPT SUSP W ! . i ?
( I k l " i f I l -' . , l 47
. - - . . . - - - - - - -
__ . - - . - . ..
. . STAFF SUPPORT TO PLANNED OUTAGES WAS BETTER THAN EVER PROVIDED TWO-SHIFT, FULL DISCIPLINE COVERAGE . MAINTAINED REPRESENTAT'IVE ON-SITE 24 HOURS / DAY . 7 DAYS / WEEK ESTABLISHED OFF-SITE OUTAGE ISSUE CENTER . AND MANAGER IMPROVED OUTAGE SUPPORT BY IMPLEMENTING PAST OUTAGE . CRITIQUE RECOPW4ENDATIONS , . 9-AA ____ -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - ,
- .. .. . _ ~ .
. ! . . i l TECHNICAL STAFF PROVIDED ESSENTIAL SUPPORT l ! TO SPRING OUTAGE ! i
l , i COMPLETED 300 ACTION ITEMS INCLUDING 2 PLANT l . DESIGN CHANGES i , , MANAGED IN-SERVICE TESTS
.
! CONDUCTED COMPLETE LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST ' i . PROGRAM i l l
PERFORMED MULTIDISCIPLI$1ED ANALYSIS OF 4 VALVES l , l
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l UTILIZED:SELF ASSESSMENTS, OA AUDITS AND-THIRD . PARTY EVALUATIONS , . CHANGED DRAWING UPDATE POLICY.
. ~ INCREASED INVOLVEMENT IN DAY-TO-DAY PLANT . ACTIVITIES , PROHIBITED-CONDITIONAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS '
. INITIATED IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS . ' , s ,
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! ! ' i-DESIGN BASIS RECONSTITUTION . , WORK CONTROL AND PRIORITIZATION
. , ' .~ EPIC COMPUTER l CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW [ .
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, STAFF HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD COMPLETING - g THE _CaffTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROJEfiI - -
I N'C ACCEPTED PROGRAM PLAN ] . i
PLAN INCLUDES PHASED IMPLEMENTATION RECOGNIZING . SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTROL-PANEL CHANGES - , a OPERATIONS IS A: KEY MEMBER OF-PROJECT TEAM j . PROJECT IS ON SCHEDULE TO SUBMIT FINAL SUlW4ARY . IN NOVEMBER ' PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED . ! > l co *- g~'- 1' t g-e;., , _,___-__. _ _ ______ _ ___._ _ _ _ _. _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -gu._ m.mu ,
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- . 1TAFF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS HAVE ENHANCED CONTROL INFORMATION AND OPERATIR!i COMPLETED SPDS . PROVIDED PROCESS COMPUTER TRANSIENT ANALYSIS CAPABILITY . ~ ~ INSTALLED LABELS, MIMICS AND DEMARCATION ON THE . AUGMENTED OFF GAS CONTROL PANEL INSTALLED LABELS AND MIMICS ON FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE, . AND TURBINE CONTROL PANELS INSTALLED NEW SWITCH ESCUTCHEONS ON THE FEEDWATER . HEATER CONTROL PANEL - REPLACED-SCALES ON 25 METERS REWIRED THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SPEED AND . VOLTAGE CONTROL SWITCHES REMOVED ABANDONED IN PLACE EQUIPMENT FROM 3 CONTROL- ; PANELS -
. en = ~ - ,; ., , - ~ -s.
,. . - ..
N:s x s .. THE STAFF CONTIN.UES TO STRIVE FOR RISING STANDARDS 0F EXCELLENCE IN ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT.
_ . ) FOCUS IS ON SAFETY . EMPHASIS IS ON CONTINUED IMPROYT'ENT IN OUALITY . AND TIMELINESS IMPROVEMENT NOTED IN SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS AND . MAINTENANCE SELF ASSESSMENTS AND EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS WILL BE ' ' USED TO IDENTIFY.FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS Ed ._ _- _
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_ 33 __ , - .;.. _ . BOSTON EDISON COMPANY . MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT- " SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION
. R.G.
BIRD SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR' aukE 22, 1990 l (( . . -
._ . . - . .. .. . . ,- - _ - - - - , . -- . -. s.
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l ! i ~ MANAGEMENT'S APPROACH TO P'_ ANT 0PERATIONS AND TESTI_KG ~ .
EXHIBITS SAFETY AWARENESS q
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POWER ASCENSION TESTING COMPLETE j . j r SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM TEST
.
- i . - 50.59 REVIEWS A STRENGTH l , .
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- - - . - . . . _
- .
.- .;. .
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- - . . + d-. . CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT ASSURES QUALITY- . ,* i RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT / INVESTIGATION (RFI) PROCESS l . l CRITIQUE PROCESS . ' ., HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM (HPES)
~ ' . -
SY$TEMS ENGINEER CONCEPT j , . ' ~ ' LER QUALITY ! . i . \\ ,
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. . ,; ^ , . . THE QA/QC AUDIT AND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS CONTINUE !
TO BE ACTIVE AND SOUND j ! !
!
t AUDITS ARE THOROUGH, COVER OBJECTIVES ' .
i FINDINGS AND..RECOMMENDAT' ONS ARE EXCELLENT i . , TECHNICAL DEPTH IS NOTEWORTHY . , v>
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__ - [.: . 1< ' ~ . , . .. ' -: . .. , PLANNING IS FARSIGHTED AND PR0 ACTIVE FIVE YEAR OPERATING PLAN . MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION PROGAM . MANAGEMENT SRO-CERTIFICATION PROGRAM . . TECH-STAFF AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM .
. % _. _. _ _ _
- -- -- _ _ 2 . -{'~ ' .. ... ~ _ .- .: _ ACHIEVABLE GOALS ESTABLISHED FOR MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES FALL MAINTENANCE OUTAGE . '90 MID-CYCLE OUTAGE . SSW PUMP REPAIR / MODIFICATION , .
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i - - . ' k I ! ' l ! } l - I ! PROCEDURAL-QUALITY-UPGRADES ON TARGET i ,
l OPS PROCEDURES 95% COMPLETE d .
l t l I MAINTENANCE PROCEt>UREs 10% COMPLETE . , ! l
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-61 ,; . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - . . .. ._ ~,. _.- . ,, .
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i L $ - t TREND IN RIGHT DIRECTION ., , , l . r I ' INTENSIVE MONITORING- .
' ' ~. CONCEPT CLEARLY EXPRESSED . i
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.. .. .: i ..C0lWIITTEES .i , . MANAGEMENT. OVERSIGHT AND ASSESSMENT TEAM (MOAT) - . NUCLEAR MANAGERS--COMMITTEE (NMC)
. , ! LONG TERi1 PLAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW COIW41TTEE (LTP/MRC) j . , DESIGN REVIEW BOARD-(DRB) !
. t . t 'k ALARA COMMITTEE j , .
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--- _ - --- - - _. _ . _ y - ... s..
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. ! ' PROGRAMS / INDIVIDUALS
! ! MANAGEMENT WATCH TOUR PROGRAM ! . .] PEER' EVALUATOR PROGRAM
- i
. l l PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PROGRAM . . l -
' i .! INDEPENDENT RADIOLOGICAL-ASSESSOR ! . t f
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- 64
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, AUDITS ' - .; l SURVEILLANCES - ! ENGINEERING (OED) ! - , EXCHANGE PROGRAM-(YANKEE 3
.
CORP.
SECURITY AUDITS .
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L I N '!'I c65
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. '. , . 4. - s .n AUDITS > ouAury DR, NCR, MCAR ,, OUALITY CONTROL QUAUTY B7E " QA MGR'S ASSESSMENT y y D O.A. SURVEILLANCE ASSURANCE y ,,ogy .:: i
! ! 5_
C CH MGR'S Nuclear 3-ASSESSMENT-CLEARINGHOUSE ASSESSMENT ' . Manners NA N E ACDONS > DATABASE- ' r i RFI "> ( Commt!!"O -ASSESSMENT-A lesTORY PEER EVALUATOR PROGRAM-R APPRTRIATE { MANAGEMENTWATCH PROG."
I CoR" CoRRECHVE . N c --pACDoN Sv5TEMS j HPES (raMR. MR, PCN) . > G
> H .p]NWE REVIEW l INPO . . SCOPE CRITIQUES V MENT Management Lonn y IMPROVEMENT n U ACDON JUSTIFICATION ' , Review - > Term ACTIONS " AUTHORIZATIOff( Oommittee DATABASE Plan E issTORY \\ - .
i <
! i Assign to the appropriate NH->l NWE HEVIEw hk SYSTEMS Deoartment for action ERP ra m RP > ENGINEERING > DATABASE kar Training Departenent. DIVISION instony Configuration Management-66 x - . ..~. . . . ... _ .. _ _
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BOSTON EDISON : COMPANY - . MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT ! i EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS , ! . . , ~ . ! R.G.
BIRD: .{ SENIOR VICE i , ~ PRESIDENT. NUCLEAR l - JUNE 22, 1990 ~ ' , . , , t ! I s
-t
- . ! -. _ .. . . .
.. _ _ _ _ _ _- __ _ ,
i < ,* ;,
- .
. . .. ~ t . _.. _ -- ,- " . ' PROGRESS IN OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS '
PILGRIM PERFORMED WELL IN 10/89 NRC/ FEMA EXCERCISE .
! ! . COMMONWEALTH DEFICIENCIES ESSENTIALLY RESOLVED i j . .; l [ '
OFFSITE PROCEDURES ARE OF HIGH OUALITY . l l ! 3 LARGE SCALE DRILLS CONDUCTED IN 1990 -
. 2 OTHERS~ PLANNED I l . i ! _- t , .
-. . _.
. -. - - -
,.m - . . ., . ., - ., . , .*?' $ ^ _ f _ ;o.~ '
' _ .:'; . - BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
- MID-CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT
~ CONCLUSION . . R.
G.
BIRD - SENIOR VICI PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR JUNE.22, 1990 .
g..
- .. . -
._ - _
- _ ;~
_
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- - ' . 'g - A, . .; . -. . MID CYCLE SALP ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIQMS IMPROVEMENT-IN EACH SALP AREA . 45% REDUCTION IN ESF'ACTUATIONS . NO PERSONNEL ERRORS CAUSING PLANT SCRAM , . 4TH LOWEST EXPOSURE OF U.S. BWR'S IN 1989 . HIGH LEVEL OF PLANT MATERIAL CONDITION . EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE DURING-TWO COMPLEX OUTAGES- . DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO OPERATE THE PLANT SAFELY l' . l DEDICATION TO'A RISING STANDARp OF EXCELLENCE . m s . ' i . f
.. }}