IR 05000280/1993011
| ML18153D358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1993 |
| From: | Belisle G, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153D357 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-93-11, 50-281-93-11, NUDOCS 9306160156 | |
| Download: ML18153D358 (15) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/93-11 and 50-281/93-11 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry land 2 Inspection Conducted: April 4 through May 1, 199 Inspectors: /f. ~ng%r Resident Inspector 4:~z>v S. G. Tin sTcfent Inspector Accompanying NRC Inspector:
A. Ruff Approved by:
G. A.C!zB.1sl~%ief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
s:~
Date Signed 5;4(&3 D7ate,gned This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the area of plant status, operational safety verification, maintenance inspections, safety assessment and quality verification, service water system and circulation water system walkdowns, station blackout meeting, licensee event review, and action on previous inspection items. During the performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee's backshifts, holiday or weekend operations on April 4, 9, 14, 17, 22, 23, and 2 Results:
In the operations area, the following item was noted:
A document for operations daily schedule is frequently updated and is an excellent tool for keeping operations management aware of outage activities. This was identified as a strength (paragraph 3.c).
9306160156 930524 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
In the maintenance/surveillance functional area, the following items were noted:
The 'licensee's policy to use furmanite to affect temporary repairs during plant operations and then make permanent repairs during the next RFO was identified as a strength (paragraph 4.a).
Electricians lifted the wrong lead and caused a valve to close which isolated component cooling flow to a Unit 2 residual heat removal heat exchange Non-cited Violation 50-281/93-11-01 was identified for this discrepancy (paragraph 3.b).
During the removal of the Unit 2 Blow head safety injection pump, two examples of failure to follow procedures were identified as examples one and two of Non-cited Violation 50-280,281/92-11-02 (paragraph 4.b).
This maintenance was well planned and progressed smoothl A significant amount of maintenance was performed on the Unit 2 containment personnel hatch during the refueling outage (paragraph 4.c).
The Unit 2 refueling outage was well organized and was completed satisfactorily in a safe manner (paragraph 4.d).
In the safety assessment/quality verification area, the following items were noted:
Failure to process Temporary Modification Sl-93-04 in accordance with Virginia Power Administrative Procedure 1403 was identified as example three of Non-Cited Violation 50-280,281/93-11-02 (paragraph 5.a).
The licensee's Startup Assessment Program continued to be a strength Paragraph 5.b).
A licensee quality assurance assessment identified enhancements that would aid in the prevention and identification of loss of main control room indicators (paragraph 5.c}.
The licensee's At Power Critical Parameters, Seven Day Look Ahead and Cold Shutdown/Refueling Shutdown Critical Parameters Programs were identified as strengths (paragraph 5.d).
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. Allen, Supervisor, Operations
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- M. Biron, Radiation Protection Engineer
- H. Blake, Superintendent of Site Services M. Bowling, Manager, Corporate Nuclear Licensing
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Engineering
- R. Campbell, Foreman, Electrical Department D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager;.
- R. Cramer, Nuclear Site Services
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection
- A. Friedman, Supervisor, Nuclear Training
- M. Haduck, Supervisor, Electrical Department
- F. Horn, Electrician
- R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance L. Hartz, Manager-Nuclear, Quality Assurance
- A. Keagy, Supervisor, Nuclear Materials
- M. Kansler, Station Manager C. Luffman, Superintendent, Security A. Meekins, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- W. McKiney, Electrician
- J. O'Hanlon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager NRC Personnel
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
- Plant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operatio The unit was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 80 of continuous operation Unit 2 began the reporting period in a refueling outag The unit was at hot shutdown at the end of the inspection period, day 57 of the refueling outag.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 42700)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours 1-of the control room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved procedures.* The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify. operations safety and compliance with TSs and to maintain awareness of the overall operation of the facilit Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and housekeepin Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns were properly addressed and reported. Operator Response to Loss of Unit 1 Radiation Monitor Panel 1-2 On February 20, 1993, the radiation monitor cabinet 1-2 power supply failed rendering the following Unit 1 radiation monitors inoperable:
l-SV-RM-102, condenser_air ejector l-CH-RM-118/119, latdown hi/lo range l-SW-RM-120, SW discharge tunnel l-SW-RM:114, A RSHX SW discharge l-SW-RM-115, B RSHX SW discharge l-SW-RM-116, C RSHX SW discharge l-SW-RM-117, D RSHX SW discharge Operators responded to this event in accordance with annunciator response procedures O-RM-L4, Radiation Monitor Loss of Power, Revision O; I-RM-MS, Discharge Tunnel-Hi, Revision O; and 1-RM-M7, Condenser Air Ejector-Hi, Revision The inspectors reviewed these annunciator response procedures and concluded that operators responded to this event in accordance with the annunciator response procedure *
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The inspectors also reviewed JCO C-92-002, Non Fail-Safe Function of the Radiation Monitors, Revision The UFSAR lists the radiation monitoring system as a fail-safe designed system; however, the present system is not fail-saf The JCO explained why it is acceptable to operate without a fail-safe radiation monitoring system and stated that a fail-safe radiation monitoring system would be installed in the futur A fail-safe radiation monitoring system would stop or reroute a radioactive release on loss of power to the affected monitors and the annunciator response prn.c.edures would direct operators to take the appropriate actions. The inspectors reviewed annunciator response procedures O-RM-L4, 1-RM:.:Ms, and l-RM-M7, which were used by bperators to *respond to the event that occurred on February 20, and concluded that these procedures did not direct operators to invnediately stop or reroute releases on loss of power to radiation monitors. These procedures required that the discharge be sampled and if the sample results indicated abnormal activity, the discharge be secured or reroute The inspectors reviewed the HP's and Chemistry Department's sample logs dated February 20, and verified that the appropriate samples were obtained and analyzed, and did not contain any abnormal activity. The inspectors also reviewed VPAP-2103, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 4, and verified that sampling was the required action for loss of the radiation monitor Normally JCOs require compensatory actions of some typ The inspectors concluded that JCO C-92-002 did not contain any compensatory actions and were unable to determine the intent of the JC The licensee stated that the intent of the JCO was to establish that it was acceptable to operate without radiation monitors being fail-safe as specified in the UFSA At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was revising JCO C-92-002 to clarify the inten Loss of Component Cooling Water to the RHR Heat Exchanger On April 20, CC flow was lost to the Unit 2-A RHR HX for approximately one minut The unit was in day 46 of the refueling outage. This event occurred when electricians were lifting leads on Vital Bus 1 Circuit 16 and the power to valve TV-CC-209A was lost. The valve closed and isolated flow to the A-RHR H The low CC flow alarm annunciated and the electricians were told by an SRO to reland the leads. Once the leads were relanded (approximately one minute) TV-CC-209A was reopened and flow was returned to the A-RHR H The RHR flow to the core was not interrupte The temperature of the RCS was 101 degrees F and did not rise during the one minute that CC flow was isolated from the A RHR H Since the other RHR pump and HX were operable and available, the licensee did not lose the ability to remove residual hea *
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This condition did violate the station TS Section 3.1.A. requires that when the reactor coolant loop temperature is less than or equal to 350 degrees F, at least one RHR loop shall be in operatio By TS definition (Section 1.0} a system shall be operable or have operability when it is capable of performing its functio Implicit in this definition is the assumption that all attendant requirements such as cooling water are capable of performing their support functions. This violation of TSs is identified as NCV 50-281/93-11-01, Violation of Technical Specifications in Operation of the Residual Heat Removal Syste This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in SeGtion VII.B of the Enforcement Polic.:-
The inspectors reviewed the root cause evaluation for this event and conducted discussions with maintenance personne The root cause was that tagout instructions supplied by the electrical department to operations were inadequate. Specifically, the information included wire and terminal numbers, but did not identify the cable numbers and did not specify that the field side cables should be lifted. A typographical error in the tagout instructions and a mislabeled lead also contributed to this even The inspectors reviewed the immediate and proposed corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the problem and they were considered satisfactor Use of Operations Department Daily Schedules During an outage, the operations department uses an operations department daily schedule document for the outage unit as a guid This schedule lists operational events by suggested times and priorities. Other events that could impact operations are also listed, e.g., the maintenance activities plan of the da This schedule is constructed from the outage scheduling report, the periodic tests that are on the normal operations schedule, and a special list of periodic tests that are performed during an outage and cold shutdown conditions. This schedule is modified several times a day by reviewing changes in the outage schedule, reviewing the operations logs to determine what has been accomplished, and reviewing results of daily operations meetings. These schedules developed as a result of the current inputs are an excellent tool to give operations management an indepth picture of day to day outage activities. This was identified as a strengt Notice of Enforcement Discretion On April 30, the NRC granted a one-time use Enforcement Discretion to TS 3.1.A.3.a. for Unit 2 onl Prior to startup following the RFO, an RCS ASME Section XI hydrostatic test was required to be performed at a pressure of 2280 psi When approaching hydrostatic test pressure, the A and/or C pressurizer safety valve
began to simme Primary plant pressure was reduced and the A safety valve continued to periodically simme The licensee proposed to mechanically secure the A and C pressurizer safety valves in order to (1) reestablish loop seals which would possibly prevent the valves from simmering and (2) accomplish the RCS system hydrostatic test. TS 3.1.A.3.a requires that all three pressurizer safety valves be operable when the head is on the reactor vessel and the RCS temperature is above 350 Granting of this allowed only one pressurizer safety valve to be operable for a period not to exceed 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> with the RCS above 350 F and the head installed on the reactor vesse In granting this Enforcement Oiscrection, the following administrative controls were required to be invoked when the A and C safety valves were mechanically secured: The reactor remain subcritical with all rods fully inserted and RCS boron concentration maintained greater than 2100 pp.
One PORV operable with the associated block valve open and the other PORV available for manual operatio.
One or more reactor coolant pumps in operation with the loop stop valves open. No HHS! pump surveillance testing would be performe The Unit 2 A and C pressurizer safety valves were mechanically secured at 9:55 p.m., on April 30, and the valves were returned to service at 4:19 a.m., on May Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703} (42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure Repair of Furmanited Valve During the previous operating cycle, valve 2-MS-FCV-204D developed a body to bonnet leak, and as temporary corrective action, the leaking mechanical joint was injected with furmanit On April 15 through 22, the inspectors witnessed the permanent repair of this valv It was repaired in accordance with WO 136147 and procedure O-MCM-0401-01, Valves and Traps in General, Revision The purpose of this maintenance was to return the valve to original conditio Although 2-MS-FCV-204D is a non-safety related valve, this illustrates the licensee's policy to furmanite components to stop
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leakage while the plant is operating and then return components to original condition during the next RF This same program also applies to safety-related valve The policy to use furmanite to affect temporary repairs during operation and then make permanent repairs during the RFO is identified as a strengt Unit 2 B LHSI Pump Seal Replacement On April 16 through 23 the inspectors witnessed activities associated with replacing the Unit 2 B-LHSI pump mechanical seal This maintenance was accomplished by the electrical and mechanical department The electrical department removed and reinstalled the pump motor in accordance with WO 133433 and procedure O-ECM-1413-01, LHSI Pump Motor Disconnict, Rework, and Connect, dated January 7, 199 The Mechanical Department replaced the mechanical seals in accordance with WO 131190 and procedure O-MCM-0110-01, LHSI Pump Overhaul, dated November 19, 199 The inspectors noted several examples where electricians failed to follow procedures during the removal of the moto Step 6.2. of O-ECM-1413-01 required that the motor field leads be wrapped after being disconnecte The inspectors noted that the leads were not wrappe The purpose of wrapping the motor field leads was to protect personnel in case the field leads were inadvertently energize The PMT data sheet pre-maintenance action item required verification that all VPAP-0305 EQ requirements were me The inspectors noted that this item was not signed or waive Step 6.3.2 of VPAP-2003, Post Test Maintenance Program, dated May 1, 1992, requires that all PMT premaintenance items be completed or dispositioned before the start of maintenanc These examples of failure to follow procedures were identified as examples 1 and 2 of NCV 50-280/92-11-02. This NRC identified violation is not being cited because criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied. The personnel involved were counseled on the need to follow procedure No other discrepancies were identifie Unit 2 Containment Hatch Repair On April 23 the inspectors witnessed maintenance on the Unit 2 containment personnel hatch inner doo The maintenance was accomplished in accordance with WO 12704 The work order contained supplemental instructions that were prepared by maintenance engineering and approved by SNSO A maintenance engineer and personnel hatch technical representative were also present at the job site. The purpose of the maintenance was to repair the door's *hinge In addition to witnessing the maintenance, the inspectors reviewed the completed work package and PMT requirement No discrepancies were identified. This maintenance was well planned and progressed smoothly.
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prepared, reviewed and approved by SNSOC prior to implementatio Failure to process TM Sl-93-04 in accordance with VPAP-1403 was identified as example 3 of NCV so-2a*o,2a1/93-ll-0 For corrective action the licensee was evaluating procedural changes to recognize events where a TM is needed in an expeditious manne The inspectors discussed this issue with the SNSOC chairperson who stated that a TM and supporting safety evaluation could not be prepared, reviewed and approved in six hours on a weeken Therefore, SNSOC decided to install the temporary power supply, exit the six hour clock and complete the paperwork as soon as possible afterwards. Prior to installing the temporary power supply, a SNSOC meeting was held per telecon and this plan was approve The inspectors concluded that this issue had minor safety significance in that the TM and safety evaluation found the condition acceptable. After further review of this event, the licensee concluded that it was not required to enter the six hour clock upon failure of radiation monitor cabinet 1-2. This was based on an analysis that concluded operability of the containment recirculation spray system was not dependent on the operability of the RSHX SW radiation monitor Unit 2 RFO Startup Assessment On April 16, the inspectors attended the Unit 2 Startup Assessement meetin Items reviewed during the meeting were status of temporary modifications, special order tags, valve lineups, startup procedures, plant walkdowns, plant status log, post maintenance testing, reactor operator training, outstanding DRs and commitments, periodic tests, ISI inspections, reactivity issues, JCOs, deferred WOs and PMs, DCPs, scaffolding, insulation, shielding, chemistry, radiological contaminated area, and station housekeepin Many of these items were previously disposition by the MR The inspectors reviewed the Startup Assessment package and did not identify any discrepancies. The licensee's Startup Assessment Program was previously identified as a strength and continues to be a strengt QA Assessment of Loss of Annunciator Power The licensee has recently implemented procedures, training, and design changes to alert and provide instructions to operators on the loss of power to control room annunciators. The inspectors reviewed a recent QA assessment of this are The assessement concluded that operations personnel were aware of and sensitive to a potential for loss of control room annunciator capability but identified a number of enhancement Some of the enhancements included periodic monitoring of annunciator internal power supply status lamps, periodic calibrating the annunciator system ground fault detector, and providing additional training to craft
- * During the previous SALP assessment period, containment personnel hatch malfunctions were identified as an area needing additional management attention. Also during the Unit 2 outage, hinges o the containment personnel hatch outer door were replaced, the escape hatch was replaced, and the equalizing valve was replace Similar repairs are planned for the Unit 1 containment personnel hatch during the next Unit 1 RF Unit 2 Outage Overview The inspectors monitored the day-to-day activities associated with the Unit 2 RFO and concluded that the outage, which was well organized, was completed satisfactorily in a safe manne The inspectors considered that the odtage scope was well defined and noted an improvement in the area of planning outage in that efficiency for maintenance items and safe plant operation were emphasize Also noted was that minimal station management involvement was required in the accomplishment of daily activities. During the outage, the licensee replaced a cold leg SI check valve when the fuel was removed from the vessel to prevent entry into an RCS reduced inventory condition. This further shows the licensee's emphasis on plant safet Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identified.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500) Temporary Modification for Installation of Temporary Power Supply On February 20, 1993, the power supply to Unit 1 radiation monitor cabinet 1-2 failed resulting in the loss of power to the radiation instruments that monitor the SW discharge from the containment RSH The licensee considered that the effected radiation monitors, l-SW-R-114, 115, 116, and 117, were containment recirculation spray subsystems and declared both trains of containment recjrculation spray inoperable. A six hour LCO to hot shutdown was *entered in accordance with TS 3.0.1. After the radiation monitor cabinet 1-2 was powered from a temporary power supply in accordance with TM Sl-93-04, Temporary Power Supply for Radiation Monitor Cabinet 1-2, dated February 21, 1993, the six hour LCO was exite During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed TM Sl-93-04 and concluded that the TM and supporting safety evaluation, SE 93-30, Hook Up a Temporary Power Supply to Radiation Monitor Cabinet 1-2 from Radiation Monitor Cabinet 1-1 Power Supply, dated February 21, 1993, were completed the day after the temporary power supply was installed and the six hour LCO exited. The inspectors also reviewed VPAP-1403, Temporary Modifications, dated June 15, 199 The inspectors concluded that VPAP-1403 requires that the TMs and supporting safety evaluations were required to be
- * personnel on industry experience with the loss of control room annunciator capability due to untaped lifted lead At Power and CSD/RSD Critical Parameters During the previous SALP assessement period, the licensee's At Power Critical Parameters and Seven Day Look Ahead programs were identified as strengths and continued to be strengths thoroughout the current assessment period. These programs summarize the specific safety parameter status to ensure safe operation of a unit at powe At the start of the current]~it 2 RFO the licensee implemented the CSD/RSD Critical Parameters Ptogram. This program summarizes the'~pecific safety parameter status to ensure adequate core cooling during planned and unplanned outages and also incorporates a seven day look ahea The seven day look ahead assessement evaluates the effect of planned maintenance on core cooling parameter The inspectors ~eviewed STA-OI-22, Surry Power Station CSD/RSD Critical Parameters, dated February 4, 1992; daily Unit 2 CSD/RSD critical parameter assessments; and seven day look ahead schedules, and concluded that this new program was effective in increasing plant safety. The implementation of the CSD/RSD Critical Parameters Program is considered a strength.
Operating Experience Review Briefing On April 15, the inspectors were briefed on the licensee's Operating Experience Program implementation. This program evaluates and acts upon Surry, North Anna, and industry events to prevent their recurrence or to mitigate their effects. This group looks at industry, NRC, INPO, vendor, in-house LERs, in-house root cause results and evaluates each of these for safety issues that could affect the nuclear station No programmatic concerns were eviden Within the areas inspected, one example of a NCV was identifie Service Water System and Circulating Water System Walkdowns (71710 and 71500)
Procedure no. OP-49.1.8, Service Water System-CR Chillers and Supply Strainers Valve Alignment, dated April 1, 1993, and procedure no. 2-0P-49.lA, Service Water System Alignment, dated April 22, 1993, were used to walkdown valve alignments for portions of the SW syste The first procedure references valve alignment for the SW to the control room chillers which is a part of the system shared by both units. Using this valve alignment, the inspectors verified that fourteen valves were properly aligne Using the second procedure the inspectors verified that seven valves on Unit 2 were in their proper position for the
anticipated start up of the unit. These seven valves were located in the turbine building and in the safeguards are There were no gross packing leaks, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling noted on any of the valves. The inspectors found that housekeeping was acceptable with the appropriate levels of cleanliness being maintained for both unit In addition, no prohibited ignition sources or flammable materials were present in the vicinity of the SW syste Certain portions of the SW and CW systems that were related to the IPE potential flooding issues were walked down at the same time the SW valves and piping were examine The inspectors discussed the status of some of these issues with the system engineer and licensing personne One issue involved several high level intake canal* isolation ideas and the licensee decided to make an addition of rollers to the existing seal plates. The licensee plans to implement this modification during 199 A second enhancement would be the modification of eight (four per unit)
96 inch diameter CW inlet valves so that the valves would be waterproofed to the degree that they could be operated after being submerged for one hour. This modification project should start some time after the Unit 2 outag A third enhancement would be installing a watertight door at the entrance to MER 3. This door would delay flood water from entering the ESGR from a ruptured SW pipe brea The licensees's plans to have this new door installed during 1993 have not changed. These items are currently being evaluated by the NR Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
SBO Meeting On April 21, an inspector attended a meeting where Virginia Power proposed an alternative SBO design to the NRC staff. The original Surry SBO design was approved by the NRC on May 1992 and required that two DGs be installed and be capable of powering equipment required to place both units in cold shutdow The new proposed design requires that one non-safety-related additional DG with a larger capacity be installed and be capable of placing both units in hot shutdow Along with the present EDGs, the new proposed design also includes a higher DG reliability facto In the meeting, Virginia Electric and Power Company representatives stated that this proposal would be submitted to the staff by May 7, 1993, and requested a response by June 4, 199 The SBO project is currently scheduled to be completed in 199 Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
11 Licensee Event Review (92700) The inspectors reviewed the LER listed below and evaluated the adequacy of the corrective action. The inspector's review also included followup of the licensee's corrective action implementatio (Closed) LER 280/91-019, Loss of Containment Integrity Due to a Crack in Component Cooling Water Pipin On August 28, 1991, a portion of the Unit 1 RCS loop B instrumentation began to operate erratically. The affected instruments were declared inoperable and were placed in a tripped conditio Investigation into the erratic operation of the instruments revealed a leak in a welded section of a tee in the CC 3-inch supply piping to the B reactor coolant pump shroud coole Water from this leak was spraying on in~trumentation and caused the erratic instrument reading The defective component was isolated and repairs were scheduled for the next outag Corrective action for this event included the following: during the outage in 1992 the faulty tee was replaced, and other components in the system were inspected and repaired/replaced as necessary. A CDE, N, was performed on the failed tee and it was determined that mechanical vibration in the CC line caused the crack in the welded tee section. Pipe vibration in the CC pipe was the result of loose fan blade strikes in the reactor shroud cooler and excessive distortion from imbalance when blades were knocked loose. This condition was also corrected during the 1992 outag Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Action on Previous Inspection Items (92701,92702)
(Closed) S0-280,281/P2191-0S, Limitorque Corporation 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of SMB 00 Torque Switch Roll Pin Failure On December 11, 1990, Limitorque Corporation made a notification that the torque switch shaft roll pins had failed on SMB 00 actuators with heavy spring pack In response to this notification, the licensee issued EWR 91-015, MI Valves Torque Switch Roll Pins, dated February 4, 199 The inspectors reviewed this EWR and verified that the torque switches were replaced on safety-related actuators with heavy spring packs in both unit (Closed) VIO S0-280,281/91-18-0l, Failure to Follow or Provide Adequate Procedures with Three Example In a letter dated September 6, 1991, the licensee responded to this violation. The response stated that operations department management reviewed this issues with shift personnel and discussed the need to achieve strict compliance with procedures. Since these examples were identified, the inspectors have periodically monitored the operations department personnel adherence to procedures and consider that procedures have been followe The inspectors concluded that corrective actions were adequately implemented.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie *
1 Exit Interview The results were summarized on May 5, 1993, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in Paragraph The following summary of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exit:
Item Number NCV 50-281/93-11-0l Status Closed Description (Paragraph No.)
Failure to Maintain RHR Operable in accordance with TS f. 3.1.A.d.2 (paragraph 3.b}.
NCV 50-280,281/93-11-02 Closed LER 280/91-019 50-280,281/P2191-05 Part 21 Closed Closed VIO 50-280,281/91-18-0l Closed Three Examples of Failure to Follow Procedure (paragraphs 4.b and 5.a}.
Loss of Containment Integrity Due to a Crack in Component Cooling Water Piping (paragraph 8}.
Limitorque Corporation 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of SMB 00 Torque Switch Roll Pin Failures (paraQraph 9}.
Failure to Follow or Provide Adequate Procedures with Three Examples (paragraph 9}.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms ASME
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cc CDE CFR CSD cw DCP DG DR ECCS
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HHS!
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AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS COMPONENT COOLING CAUSE DETERMINATION EVALUATION CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS COLD SHUTDOWN CIRCULATION WATER DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE DIESEL GENERATOR DEVIATION REPORT EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST FAHRENHEIT HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
I
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HEALTH PHYSICS HEAT EXCHANGER INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS INDIVIDUAL PLANT EVALUATION INSERVICE INSPECTION JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM MAINTENANCE REVIEW BOARD NON-CITED VIOLATION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE POST MAINTENANCE TEST POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GUAGE QUALITY ASSURANCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM REFUELING OUTAGE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REFUELING SHUTDOWN RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER REFUELING OUTAGE SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE STATION BLACKOUT SAFETY INJECTION SURRY NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR SERVICE WATER TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS VIOLATION WORK ORDER