IR 05000277/1987019

Insp Repts 50-277/87-19 & 50-278/87-19 on 870601-05.Major Areas Inspected:Containment Integrity & Tours of Facility

ML20235G870
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	07/02/1987
From:	Anderson C, Chung J, Joe Golla NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235G864	List: IR 05000277/1987019 ML20235G860
References
50-277-87-19, 50-278-87-19, NUDOCS 8707140407
Download: ML20235G870 (11)

Text

,_ _-__ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

REGION I

l Report No /87-19 '

50-278/87-19 Docket No License Nos. DPR-44 DPR-56 Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Penr qlvania 19101

!

Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2 and 3 Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania '

Inspection Conducted: June 1-5, 1987 Inspectors: _ _ [/d 7-2-77 W. Ghung, Lead Reactor Engj#j ' r date

, N seph A o b

@ _ k,fReactdr Eligineer ~

7' 2-Y7 d te '

Approved by: 7 1 PL Cli(ford J. Anderson, Chief date Plant Systems Section, EB, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 1-5, 1987 (Combined Inspection Report i No. 50-277/87-19, 50-278/87-19)  !

Areas Inspected: Special unannounced inspection of containment integrity and tours of the facilit Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

l 8707140407 870702 j PDR ADDCK 05000277 G PDR

1

--- -- -----

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

Il Details 1.0 Persons Contacted J. Dawson, Supervisory Engineer, Maintenance

• A. Donell, QA Site Supervisor

• A. Fulvio, Technical Engineer

• J. Jordan, Supervisor-Performance Engineer J. Oddo, Nuclear Security Specialist M. Rashid, Maintenance T. Rock, Technical Assistant l J. Rogenmuser, Preventive Maintenance Activities Coordinator  :

D. Shaulis, Performance Engineer

• D. Smith, Plant Manager

• D. Smith, Superintendent - Operations D. Thomas, Maintenance USNRC

• T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector The inspectors also held discussions with other licensee employees during the inspection, including operations, technical supports and administrative personne * Denotes those present at the exit meeting held on June 5, 198 .0 Scope of Inspection 2.1 Objective The objective was to verify that containment integrity was maintained over the previous operating periods and that appropriate systems were available and adequate procedures were implemented to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

2.2 Inspection Items The containment systems and components designed to mitigate the offsite release of fission prodacts were inspected for compliance with regulatory requirements. Hardware availability was evaluated to ensure that containment integrity would be maintained in the event of a severe accident. The post-LOCA mitigation systems reviewed included the following:

Containment Atmosphere Dillution (CAD) System Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Containment Spray

Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Core Spray I i

_-

,

.

,

An "As Found" and "As Built" verification walkdown inspection was conducted for selected isolation valves & containment penetrations. The objective was to verify current system lineup and valve positions, and to look for obvious indication of leakage or abnormalitie Hardware availability was evaluated based on the licensee's programs and implementation of their programs as. supported by the records, procedures, in progress activities, initiatives, and "As Found" condition The following criteria were employed to assess hardware availability:

Preventive measures to reduce equipment failure (preventive maintenance).

Prompt detection of deficiencies (surveillance and operations).

i'

Effective corrective measures and measures to prevent the recurrence of deficiencies or failures (corrective maintenance

& trendings)

Licensee's programs to verify equipment operability after maintenance, surveillance, and testing (post-maintenance testing and implementation per Generic Letter 83-28).

"As Built" and "As Found" walkdown inspection The operational readiness of the post-LOCA mitigating systems was evalurted based on the adequacy of the procedures, surveillance, and "As Found" condition. The capability of direct or indirect surveillance of the containment integrity in combination with a high degree of equipment availability improves assurance of containment integrit Technical specification surveillance testing records of post-LOCA mitigating systems were reviewed as well as station administrative procedure .3 Conduct of Inspection The inspection methodology was based on the premise that the unavailability of important plant equipment, due to either its failure to function or improper alignment, will serve as an accident contributor or the inability to sufficiently mitigate the consequences of an acciden The logic used for developing the inspection plan is presented below:

The licensee's programs must address the means to:

--

Prevent equipment deficiencies or failures;

--

Detect Deficiencies or failures promptly;

--

Correct them effectively;

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

.

.

'3

.s

--

Prevent recurrences; and

--~

Verify the equipment operability after. maintenance, surveillance, and testin .4 Findings Summary

'

The inspection findings indicated that the plant programs and the containment systems to mitigate fission product release in the event of a LOCA are in a high. state of. availability,- and that tha  ;

plant is caoable of monitoring continuously the containment l atmosphere and containment integrit '

Good indication of equipment availability and the demonstration of

. containment integrity is indicative of the licensee's effectiv program Surveillance and maintenance programs were adequat l Their implementation and records were consistent with the station procedure The licensee has initiated an ir.novative " predictive maintenance" program. The program, recently instituted at Peach Bottom with .the l

assistance _of a technical corsulting company, utilizes spectrum '

frequency analysis to track rnd predict component failures in safety related and other systems, and provides a feedback to preventive maintenance activities. The program which was initiated 4 months prior to the inspection has thus far analyzed 70 of 240 pumps / motors rated over 50 horsepower. Also analyzed was the HPCI system. Time series analysis was performed separately on the unit 2 and unit 3 i HPCI systems for the following equipment groups: l l

Motor operated valves i Air operated valves i

Other HPCI system valves j Fittings Each of these equipment groups were further subdivided and analyzed 3 at the component failure mode / failure cause level. The program has i resulted in a table of specific scheduled maintenance tasks for each HPCI system (units 2 and 3) based on the time series analysis results. A similar study will be conducted for other system The j goal of the maintenance department is to eventually have a guideline document that utilizes feedoack to adjust the frequency and scope of preventive maintenance activitie While conducting "as-built" verification walkdowns of unit 3  !

containment penetrations the inspectors noted and brought to the 1 licensees attention the following editorial deficiency in the lice.nsees locked open valve check off list (col):

__- _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ -

e

.

...

'4

Hand valve'(HV 3-16A) for backup N2 to ADSLlocated in the south isolation valve room was locked open. COL Appendix A-8B did not reflect the locked-open status. The licensee has initiated a proposed revision to the above document to add 4 backup N2 valves as locked-open statu No evidence of breach of containment or unavailability'of LOCA mitigating systems were found within the scope of this inspectio .0 Primary Containment Integrity-The inspectors' reviewed drawings and procedures relating to containment penetrations and post-LOCA mitigating systems. Penetration walkdowns were conducted to compare "as-built" conditions with station drawing Procedures were reviewed for technical content and the proper extent of'

administrative control of activities and record keeping. Surveillance y test. records of tests performed in accordance with plant technical

. specifications on containment related and post-LOCA mitigating systems were reviewed to ascertain system availability statu .1. Walkdown Inspection of Containment Penetrations '

A Walkdown visual inspection of the "as-built" configuration of unit 3 containment penetrations and isolation valves was conducted for both the inside and outside of the containment. This included the

'following: j Px 195'

l Penetration N-26 drywell vent to SGTS A0 3596, A0-3507, A03509, i

A0-3510, 02 analyzer SV-3671G, SV-3978G, N2 Compressor suction A0-5235  !

South Isolation Valve Room

Penetration N-16B "A" core spray MO-12A l

Penetration N-ISB "A" RHR LPCI M0-25A Penetration N-47 backup N2 to ADS HV-16A Penetration N-23 RBCCW to D/W MO-2373 Penetration N-24 RBCCW to D/W MO-2374 Penetration N-398 "A" Containment spray M0-26A, MO-31A North Isolation Valve Room Penetration N-11 HPCI Steam Supply MD-15, MO-16

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _

,__- . _ _ . _ _ _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

-

l

.

Penetration. N-12 Shutdown Cooling MD-17 Penetration F-39A "B" Containment spray MO-268, MO-31B Rx 135" l

Penetration N-53 D/W chilled water MO-3201B

Penetration N ,4 D/W chilled water M0-32008 i l

Penetration N-55 D/W chilled water MO-320CA Penetration N-56 D/W chilled water M0-3201A Penetration N-6 CRD Hatch Penetration N-3A Equipment Hatch Penetration N 1028 Backup N2 to ADS SV-9130A The inspection objectives were to observe any obvious leakage or incorrect valve lineups and to compare "as-built" configurations with station drawings. No unacceptable conditions were identifie l 3.2 Surveillance on Por,t-LOCA Mitigation Systems The performance of the T.S. required surveillance over the period ,

September 1985 through March 1987 demonstrated the operability of the following post-LOCA mitigation system System Surveillance (s)

Containment 4.7.A. ST 9.16 l inerting Containment gross leak rate Containment 4 7.A. detection Atmosphere ST 1.13 Dillution CAD system funct. test (CAD) ST 1.16 CAD sample system flow CAD 4.7.A.6 b funct. test

'

ST Liq. N2 Quanity report-cad CAD 4.7.A tank ,

ST9.19  !

CAC 02 and H2 SGTS 4.7.B. Analyzer Calibration 4.7.B. ST 13.7A SGTS filter differential & i Heater capacity

, - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __- - - .__ _

- _ - . - _ - . - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ - _ _

.

-6-

-SGTS' 4.7.8. ST 1.3-2 PCIS Logic sy func. test U/2 ST 1.3-3 PCIS Logic Sys. Func. Test U/3 LPCI 4.5.A.3b ST Subsystem 4.5.A.3c RHR "A" pump, valve, flow'&

4.5.A.3d unit cooler functional i 4. .ST 6.9 RHR "B" pump, valve, l flow, and unit cooler functional These surveillance satisfied the requirements to adequately demonstrate the operability of these systems. . Additionally, the

~

inspector verified.that surveillance tests were performed:at the proper frequencies. No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Maintenance l Maintenance records associated with preventive and corrective maintenance l

on MSIV's and containment airlocks were reviewed for the past operating periods for units 2 and 3. The review objectives were to verify that the l MSIV's and containment airlocks were reliable and that failures or l deficiencies.were.promptly. corrected. The maintenance program and its l implementation were reviewed including the programmatic controls of

. post-maintenance testing per generic letter 83-28. It was found that in all cases reviewed the post maintenance testing was completed in a timely manner and that maintenance procedures and maintenance request. forms (MRF's) were properly administered .(signatures, tagouts, work descriptions completed). No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Administrative Control The adequacy of the licensees administrative control over activities related to containment integrity was assessed by the inspector Administrative procedures or "A" procedures were reviewed with. respect to the overall " programmatic". approach to ensuring the proper activities are

, performed which constitute containment integrity. These activities include preventive and corrective maintenance,. surveillance, hardware availability, and the proper administration and dissemination of related records, procedures, and drawings. Also, the programmatic aspects were evaluated based of the review of other inspection items. The following

. "A" procedures were reviewed by the inspectors:

A-7 Shift operations A-25 Preventive maintenance program i t

A-2 Instrument preventive maintenance program A-26 Procedure for corrective maintenance l l

_ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

_. __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__

l

.

i A-26A Procedure for corrective and preventive maintenance using CHAMPS A-26A AP List of Personnel authorized to sign mrfs A-43 Surveillance testing system A-47 ?rocedure for the generation of surveillance tests GP-16 Check list prior to secondary containment breach The above procedures were found to be comprehensive and instructive in nature, describing such things as the purpose and scope of-the procedure, prerequisites if any, and duties, responsibilities, and instruction Also reviewed by the inspectors was the plant performance monitoring program recently instituted at PBAP The Plant Performance Monitoring Program (PPMP) is designed to ensure I that equipment that could have a significant effect on plant performance is adequately monitored and timely corrective action is taken to maintain reliable operatio The PPMP is implemented at a system and plant level. The PPMP takes full advantage of existing programs and functions which monitor plant performance. The PPMP utilizes existing data collection activites (e.g., surveillance test data, in-service inspection data, and preventive maintenance data). The PPMP supplements these activities with data from those areas not currently monitored which have a significant impact on plant power output and equipment reliabilit A monthly management report is prepared and issued by the PPMP Coordinator. This report summarizes the overall performance of Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, including a discussion of major incidents of degraded unit performance. A central file of the individual system PPMP data is also maintained by.the PPMP Coordinato Based on the comprehensive review of PBAPS "A" procedures, the plant performance monitoring program and other records, activities and procedures, it is concluded that administrative control of a programmatic nature is established and maintained at a level sufficient to significantly contribute to overall containment integrity and plant  !

safet No unacceptable conditior,s were identifie .0 Systerr_ Avail ability The irspectors assesed the operational readiness of the containment barrier and post-LOCA mitigating systems based on a comprehensive appraisal of all activities and documents inspected. No abnormal i

_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _

, - _ - - - _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ __

-

-

!. ,

.,

occurrences.were noted regarding excessive system / hardware downtime or repetitive-_ component-failures. Based on this review it is~ concluded that no breach of containment was evidenced or unavail' ability of post-LOCA mitigating systems for the previous operating periods of units 2 and No unacceptable conditions regarding system availability were identified within the scope of this inspectio .0 Plant Tours 9 The inspectors made several tours of the plant facilities, ' including the

~

,

primary containment and reactor building, turbine- building, penetration i rooms, control room and plant exterior in order to monitor outage activities and housekeeping. The following findings were identified during the facility tours-i The interior of the-unit 3 primary containment was clean and general housekeeping was goo l The housekeeping in the unit 3 north and south isolation valve. rooms needed improvement. Oebris' of various kinds were found throughout ,

the penetration rooms. The licensee stated that the areas would be '

i cleane j No unacceptable conditions were observe l 8.0 Quality Assurance and Quality Controls The onsite QA/QC activities were discussed with the_ operational.QA/QC i personnel on programmatic aspects of_ QA/QC implementation. QA audit ]

reports and QC monitoring reports were reviewed for the activities j related to the plant systems which are important to post-LOCA pressure j reduction.. The following documents were reviewed: 1

'

i 1). Audit Reports j

,

.AP 86-13 ST, 2/28/86

.AP 86-28 ST, 7/30/86

.AP 86-88 S0, 10/31/86

.AP 85-08 ST, 6/28/85 2). Monitoring Reports

L .Startup Monitoring, Unit 3, 3/23/87 i

.Startup Monitoring, Units 2/3, 9/23/86 ,

.FTC-87-0004, 1/16/87 l

.FTC-87-0018, 1/14/87

.FTC-87-0024, 1/19/87

.FTC-87-0067, 2/16/87 l

.PMR-87-0096, 3/5/87

.PMR-87-0111, 3/14/87

l

_ _______ .-___ _ ____ _ _ _________ _______;

_ _ _ _ _ __ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

1.- .;

i

_,

9  !

.PMR-87-0132, 3/23/87

.PMR-87-0148,'3/30/87

.PMR-87-0181, 4/20/87

.PMR-87-0202, 5/4/87

> .PMR-87-0235, 5/27/8 The inspector determined, based on the above review, that the onsite QA/QC activities on systems and components related to post-LOCA pressure reduction and containment integrity were acceptabl !

'The inspector.was also' informed that one QA/QC inspect or was a licensed reactor operator and is in the license training program. The inspector

' discussed training and improvement programs of the QA/QC staff. No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Security Inspection On the-. morning of June 5, 1987 while reporting for duty at PBAPS the inspectors.were privy to a' surprise security exercise by the' PBAPS nuclear security specialist. The surprise excercise was designed to test the ability of the guards on' duty to detect and respond to an attempt by

' unauthorized persons'to bring contraband onsite. The. guards were observed by the_ inspectors to respond.quickly and confidently to the situatio The inspectors discussed the performance of the guards with the nuclear security specialist. The nuclear security specialist indicated the guards carried out actions that were appropriate for the given situation. No deficiencies in the guards performance were note !

10'.0 Exit Meeting i Licensee management was informed of the purpose and scope of the inspection at the entrance intervie The findings of the inspection ,

were periodically discussed and were summarized at the exit meeting on i June 5, 198 ]

Attendees at the exit meeting are listed in section 1.0 of this repor At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the i licensee by the inspector I i

d

)

l I

l l

l

___________-_ m

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

,

Inspection Summary Report

.o Date 6 - 0- 7

' General Plant Report #

[d- 4 [3 Date Inspection Completed 4 - 5~- 97 77' /9

-

Lead Inspector d. C au w ;'

Accompi. Inspectors V. 6o//A ' Inspecticn Sco Module s4,/7/ 5/pe/so(%C) (%C) (%C) (%C) (%C)

Areas Inspectkd verificaried of cournianewr rwre ne i r y . Inspection Results Violations pjo a f Unresolved Items Ncar

.

Status of Open Items Reviewed v6ar Problem / Controversy Areas Miscellaneous Overall SALP Rating & Basis 1 t /crowe uns c om o .;5n en car . rm;og.;

fr m e- /hrico e w c-a s: acer us-reo /nac> Osoeven ) caanim w~en., /co,pu~w.~s3 er Tnuts: ,bfgc,gm l Independent Meas./ Calc. & Innovation

]

I QA Area Review (operating plant) da # #6; c At< ~ <r m ~ x hur-5 d l ov%eu- [j a urcoirivwwere wn's ps <w o -re i?r> n rarnnw. ' 1 Documentation:

l 4 Cover Letter ! [ 766 li 01 Forms l T DRP Copy ,

l ,,V SALP l

r;c:

W. Johnston L. Bettenhausen DRS Branch Chiefs INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT 04/27/87 I

l

- . - _ _ _ - .

J