IR 05000277/1987014

Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Repts 50-277/87-14 & 50-278/87-12 on 870420-23 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Security Plan,Security Organization,Mgt Effectiveness & Security Program Audit

ML20236F059
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	06/02/1987
From:	Bailey R, Keimig R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236F046	List: IR 05000277/1987014 ML20236F043
References
50-277-87-14, 50-278-87-12, NUDOCS 8708030201
Download: ML20236F059 (5)

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

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Report'N /87-14 '

50-278/87-12 i Docket N ~

License No. OPR-44 GPR-56 Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301, Market Street  !

f Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3 Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania

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Inspectior, Conducted: April 20-23, 1987

. Type-of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security

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Date of,Last Physical Security Inspection: August 25-28, 1986 inspector: Ib/, A y Inspector N'U R. J. Bailf,'Physicar/Secu date/ -

Approved by: [ #

guards Section

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g R.'Keimig, Q f, S date DRSS Inspection Summary: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on April 20-23, 1987 (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-277/87-14 and 50-278/87-12).

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Areas' Inspected: Security Plan; Security Organization; Management Effective-l ness; Security Program Audit; Security Contingency (Response Drills); Physical '

Barriers (Vital Areas); and Followup on Inspector Identified Items (IFIs).

Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements in

tne areas examine r 8700030201 870616 PDR ADDCK 0500g7 G - _

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DETAILS 1.0 _ Key Persons Contacted R. S. Fleischmann, Plant Manager R. J. Weindorfer, Director, Nuclear Plant Security J. C. Oddo, Nuclear Security Specialist P. P.. Supplee, Technical Analyst, Nuclear Security H. R. Abendroth, Senior Engineer, Atlantic Electric Company M. A. Phillips, Senior Engineer, Public Service Electric and Gas Company B. L. Clark, Administrative Engineer R. L. Sweeny, Security Manager, Electric Production S. Tharpe, Chief, Security Coordinator M. D'Angelo, District Manager, Burns International, In T. Johnson, NRC Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel and members of the Burns International (BURNS) security forc .0 Followup on Inspector Identified Items (IFIs)

(Closed) IFI 50-277/84-06-02 and 50-278/84-06-02: The inspector had observed problems with the assessment aids located in the Secondary Alarm Station. The inspector determined, through a review of maintenance records, that on March 12 and 13, 1984 and on April 9, 1984, maintenance technicians had performed maintenance on the system. During this and other inspections subsequent to April 1984, the inspector observed that the problems had not recurre (Closed) IFI 50-277/85-02-03 and 50-278/85-02-03: The licensee committed to a review and revision, if necessary, of the operating procedure for the Central and Secondary Alarm Station (CAS/SAS) operator The licensee advised the inspector that, after careful consideration, the existing CAS/SAS operating procedure (Plant Procedure-#31), dated February 17, i 1981, was deemed to be adequate. However, several administrative duties, '

previously assigned to these operators, but not identified in PP#31, were reassigned to other staff positions. The inspector observed that CAS/SAS operators do not appear to have any administrative activities that would interfere with the execution of their alarm response function .

i (Closed) IFI 50-277/86-17-02 and 50-278/86-18-02: Conduct additional :

Quality Assurance audits on contractor background screening program l The inspector found that quality assurance had conducted an audit on I the screening programs of the five contractors identified in NRC Combined !

Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/86-17 and 50-278/86-18. The inspector l

reviewed these audits and found that the auditors had identified defi- '

ciencies in four of the five ccreening programs and required each con-tractor to take immediate corrective action. Unescorted Occess to I protected and vital areas at Peach Bottom was immediately withdrawn for three of the four contractors with deficient screening program The l-( _ - _ _ _ -________- - - - - _ - - -

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denial of access remained in effect until corrective action was taken by the contractor and verified by the auditors. The inspector also found that the auditors had conducted 56 audits of contractor screening programs by the end of 1986 and 43 to date in 1987. The inspector determined that the licensee has developed a permanent audit / inspection program to evaluate each contractor background screening program coincidental with the awarding of the contract, and periodically thereafte .0 Physical Security Plan (PSP)

The inspector determined that the licensee is adequately implementing the NRC-approved PS The following observations were made:

Observation 1: The licensee's contract with the security contractor (Burns International, Inc. BURNS) does not clearly impose require-ments for the contractor to implement a Safeguards Contingency Plan I (10 CFR 73.55, Appendix C). The Director, Nuclear Security acknowledged this omission and stated that a correction would be included in the next contract. The contractor in practice, however, was implementing the contingency pla Observation 2: The inspector observed that the licensee had con-structec several new buildings within the protected area since the initial NRC-approval of the PSP in 1978. The irspector questioned

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whether tr.e overall physical security program performance statement, l

relative to the security threat in Chapter 11, may have changed with these additions. The Director, Nuclear Security stated that it had not been specifically reviewed, however, one would be conducted and corrective action would be taken, if appropriat Observation 3: The inspector observed that there are several administrative corrections required in Chapters 13 and 14 because of the licensee's recent reorganization and security management changes. The Director, Nuclear Security stated that the corrections would be included in the next change to the PS .0 Management Effectiveness The inspector inquired into the licensee's action regarding a potential tampering incident involving the Standby Liquid Control system that was reported to the NRC on October 17, 1986. The incident is discussed in NRC Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/86-19 and 50-278/86-20. The Director, Nuclear Security stated that the investigation was concluded and, that by May 7, 1987, an assessment of the incident would be made and documented by the license The inspector inquired into the security contractor's method of verifying the validity of the Defense Department DD Form 214 (Report of Separation From Active Duty) submitted by individuals who have had prior military

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service. A contractor's representative stated .that since February 1986,

.the authenticity of the 00 Form 214 was verified through the National Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. The contractor's representative stated that no problen had been encountered to cause the verification of those submitted ' prior to February,198 ;

5.0 Security Organiza' tion f

The inspector was provided a copy of a new PEco security organization chart. The chart depicts the licensee's security management staff for Peach Bottom, under the corporate Manager, Nuclear Support Departmen The new organization reflects those changes and commitments made to NRC

- Region I in the past to provide additional licensee oversight of the

- security contracto The inspector verified that the licensee established at Peach Bottom, the security staff identified on the organization chart,'with the exception that only three of eight Shift Security Assistants (SSA's) have been hired to date. The Director, Nuclear Security stated that he will attempt to accelerate hiring of the other five. The inspector noted that SSA's can require up to 6 months of specialized training before being assigned full-time duties. The SSA's are under the direct supervision of the Nuclear Security Specialist and will receive training from the security force training section and other outside source In addition to the security organization reporting to the corporate Manager, Nuclear Support Department, a security manager will be assigned ;

to the corporate Manager, Electric Production. He will be responsible for conducting annual audits of the onsite security organization. This position has been filled and th'e incumbent is currently undergoing trainin .0 Security Program Audit The inspector reviewed the licensee's in-house security program audits conducted since September 1986 by quality assurance auditors with special-ized security training. The inspector observed that the results of these audits indicate a very critical assessment of the overall performance of the security force. The inspector verified that feed-back on critical observations made by auditors and supervisors were reviewed, corrective actions were taken, and training lesson plans and security procedures were revised, when appropriat .0 Physical Barriers (Vital Areas)

THIS PARAr,m"'"NT49S SAFEGlJARDS INF0V'" '

iS OT F011 PUBlic DISCLOM,il G !NIEMIDNALLY LEFI BLANK.

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., ? : P THIS PARAliRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMt,T'O'i "!D IS l'01 FDil PUBUC

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DISCLOSur,E,II15 INTEN110NALLY LEFT BLAN l

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8.0 Security Contingency plan (Response Drills)

o The inspector reviewed the contingency response drills conducted by the security. force and'found that the operations staff was not exercising its role in these drills. The Nuclear Security Specialist stated that, on several occasions, supervisors of the operations staff declined when asked to participate in the contingency response drills. The Director, Nuclear

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Security and the plant Manager acknowledged this and stated that future !

contingency drills would include exercising the roles of members of the (

plant operatiors staf #

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9.0 Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives listed in paragraph 1

.on April 23, 1987,- and discussed the' scope and results of the inspectio No written material. was provided to the licensee by the inspector during the inspectio i

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