IR 05000277/1978027
| ML19274D961 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1978 |
| From: | Ebneter S, Feil R, Jernigan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274D901 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-78-27, NUDOCS 7902270299 | |
| Download: ML19274D961 (10) | |
Text
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. _50-277/78-27 Docket No. 50-277 License No. DPR-44 Priority
-
Category C
Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Inspection at:
Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted:
September 19-22 and October 4-6, 1978 Inspectors:
h% r.,s.-
kn]/,/977
-
E. P. Jernigan/ Reactor Inspector date signed
$Ybh, n. ' n kW f24 L. ';
//- A 7?'
R. A.' Feil,Seact / Inspector date signed date signed
,
(?
% ',oA
/
a / / -
Approved by:
-,
'A
<>
S. D. Ebneter, Chief, Engineering Support date signed Section No.1, RC&ES Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 19-22-October 4-6, 1978 (Report No. 50-277/78-27)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of the licensee's inservice inspection program and activities associated with plant modifications.
The inspection involved 72 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC regional based inspectors.
Resul ts:
Of the two areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were identified in one area: (Infraction - failure to control radiographic film processing.
Infraction - failure to follow tool accountability procedure.)
~
790227oaB Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO)
- W. T. Ullrich, Plant Superintendent
- R. S. Fleischmann, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Madara, Inservice Inspection Supervisor T. Hinkle, Inservice Inspection Engineer T. Anderson, Inservice Inspection Engineer W. Tilton, Refueling Floor Supervisor J. Rupert, Quality Assurance D. Smith, Supervisor, Outage Coordinator W. McFarland, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance R. Bowen, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance Southwest Research Institute (SWRI)
W. McGaughey, Data Evaluator
'
D. Dunavant, Assistant Manager Nuclear Field Services Hartford Inspection and Insurance Comoany D. Eggleston, Regional Manager, Special Inspection Service N. Lynch, Authorized Inspector
- denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities a.
ISI Program The updated ISI program was developed by a testing contractor (Southwest Research Institute (SwRI)) and was based on the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI,1974 Edition including the Summer 1975 Addenda.
Inspections scheduled for the 1978 refueling are the first to be performed to the updated ISI program / procedures.
Further, the inspections delineated in the 1978 ISI plan are the first to be performed during the second 40-month period of the first 10-year interva.
The following documents were audited by the inspector to ascertain compliance with the above requirements.
Inservice Inspection Program for Peach Bottom Unit 2
--
SwRI, Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual (NQAPM)
--
ISI Plan for 1978 Inservice Examinations
--
SwRI Nuclear Projects Operating Procedure
--
The inspector determined that:
1) these documents contain provisions and requirements for the administration, control and execution of the nondestructive examinations (NDE's)
which are scheduled to be conducted during the 1978 refueling outage; 2) the implementing procedures had been approved by the licensee; 3) the ISI program and the contractor's QA manual delineates the administrative and organizational respon-sibilities and defines the duties of the examiners; 4) audits, including frecuency, criteria, basis for re-audit, management review and assessment, corrective action and followup and docu-mentation of results as defined; and, 5) implementing procedures are provided for activities to be performed and are reviewed, approved, controlled and accessible to examiners in implementing these procedures.
Procedures are also established for identifi-cation and correction of conditions adverse to quality.
The examinations scheduled to be accomplished during this refueling outage was audited and found to be consistent with the ISI program.
No items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identified.
b.
NDE Procedures The inspector audited selected implementing NDE procedures for technical adequacy and compliance with requirements of the applicable code.
The procedures audited included:
SwRI-NDT-600-3, Revision 46, June 1978
--
.
SwRI-NDT-800-36, Revision 18, August 1978
--
SwRI-NDT-200-1, Revision 14, June 1978
--
SwRI-NDT-300-1, Revision 14, June 1978
--
The above implementing procedures were found to be consistent with the licensee's ISI program and the aforementioned codes referenced therein with the exception of procedure SwRI-NDT-300, titled'" Dry Powder Magnetic Examination." This procedure permits the use of electromagnetic yokes with a fixed pole spacing of 9 inches.
This spacing exceeds the 6 inch maximum pole spacing permitted by Article 7 of Section V, the applicable code.
This departure from code requirements was identified by the Authorized Inspector (AI) and procedure qualification documentation was to be presented to the AI before the procedure was used.
No items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identified.
c.
Personnel Qualification Records The inspector audited qualification records of personnel performing NDE's during the current outage.
The records audited identified the discipline in which the individual had been trained and certified.
The physical examination records indicated whether or not visual aids were required when performing examinations.
No departures from SNT-TC-IA (the governing document) recommendations were identified.
No items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identified.
d.
Msterial and Equipment Certifications The inspector audited the calibration records associated with the ultrasonic testing (UT) equipment used to volumetrically examine material / piping welds.
Records of equipment identified with serial numbers 13451, 13452, 13453, 10754 and 740517 were reviewed.
The records indicated that the above equipment had been checked for amplitude linearity, sensitivity and resolution and records were signed by a certified individual.
Additionally, the inspector audited frequency spectrum and waveform analysis
records associated with transducers numbered; 637; H31826; 013719; 67; FG 5506; 650; and, 741.
Also, the inspector audited design drawings and certifications for UT calibration standards.
The records indicated that the materials of construction and design were consistent with the ISI program requirements.
Material certifications were audited for cleaner, penetrant, developer, glycerine and iron oxide powder.
This review was to verify that kspection materials did not exceed the halogen /
sulphur limits established by the ASME Code.
Batch / lot numbers identifying the above respective materials were:
78C056; 7Hil3; 788082; TB-11107-2 and M005.
The records showed that these materials met requiremets set forth in the ASME Code.
No items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identified.
e.
Observation of Work in Progress The inspector observed the performance of NDE's in progress which included:
routine visual examination of the reactor vessel internals; and, ultrasonic examination of two welds in the residual heat removal sy, tem and main recirculation system identified as 10-1 A-9,10-1 A-10 and 2AAH-3 and 2AAH-3LD respectively.
The inspector found that examinations were being performed in accordance with the requirements of the implementing procedure.
The results were being documented as specified in this procedure.
The inspector observed that reported indicatiorcs were being evaluated in accordance with the criteria delineated in Section XI of the ASME Code.
During these observations, the inspector noted that ultrasonic examinations were being performed by personnel certified as level I examiners.
However, direction and supervision for these examiners was being provided by an individual certified as a level II in the applicable examination technique.
This practice was consistent with provisions delineated in the examination contractors QA program.
No items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identifie.
f.
Data Review The inspector audited preliminary data sheets to ascertain:
1) performance of examinations by properly certified personnel; 2) equip;aent calibration performed periodically; 3) use of specified equipment; 4) recorded test data sufficient to provide basis for evaluation; and 5) evaluation and dispositioning of inspection findings.
Recorded results of visual, surface and volumetric examination were audited and included the following welds:
10-1A No. 9
--
10-1A No. 10
--
2-AHH No. 3LD
--
2-AhH No. 3
--
2.14.A No. 24R 120
--
2.14.A No. 25R 120
--
2.14.C No. 24R 240
--
2BD12
--
Examination documentation associated with a pipe to valve weld (2B012) in loop "B" of the main recirculation system identified an ultrasonic indication.
An analysis of the UT results showed the indication to be located near the root area of the weld on the inside surface of the pipe.
Investigative radiography revealed a faint circumferential line in the counterbore area of the pipe. A visual examination using fiber optics through a 1-inch hole slightly upstream from the weld revealed root irregularities and machining lines in the counterbore of the pipe. Also, a review of construction radiographs disclosed the same indications, however, this condition was not otherwise documented in preservice examination records.
Based on the above review, the indication was determined to be geometric and has been present since fabrication.
No items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were identifie.
g.
Radiography The inspector reviewed the final radiographs of four circum-ferential pipe welds in the core spray system.
These radio-graphs exhibited characteristics indicative of possible chemical contamination.
The contractors implementing radiographic procedures do not include provisions to control dark room techniques.
The inspectors discussions with licensee / contractor personnel disclosed that a specific procedure to establish dark room practices and controls, had not been developed.
The failure to provide a written procedure to control the processing of radiographs (a special process) is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX.
(277/78-27-01)
This is an infraction.
h.
Tool Control The inspector performed a visual inspection of the reactor vessel from the refueling floor.
The following was observed.
The reactor vessel head was removed and the service platform was in place to facilitate inspection of the vessel internals, which was in progress.
Several loose and unsecured tools were observed on the floor of the service platform.
Additionally, a workman was observed to be using unsecured hand tools (Allen wrenches) over the open vessel.
The inspector questioned licensee personnel regarding controls to assure that items such as tools were prevented from falling in the reactor vessel.
In addition, the inspector reviewed several maintenance procedures which address tool /part control:
Procedure M.4.8, Revision 1, " Refueling Platform Inspection"
--
requires that... "All small tools must be tied by a lanyard to a person or fixed object..."
Procedure M.4.19, Revision 1, " Service Platform Electrical
--
Inspection" requires... "that all parts be secured... "
Procedure M.4.18, Revision 0, " Service Platform Mechanical
--
Inspection" requires in part... "that all parts be secured to prevent any part from dropping into the reactor vessel..."
There was no evidence of tool control /accourtability being maintained at the entry into the reactor vessel cavity.
This is contrary to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
(50-277/78-27-02)
This is an infraction.
Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, activities on the refueling floor were reexamined.
The inspector found that tool inventory / accountability was being maintained at the entry of the reactor vessel cavity, and also, observed that all tools in use were secured, and that no loose tools were present in the area of the reactor vessel.
The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter.
3.
Facility Modification The inspector reviewed the records of the following facility modi-fications.
a.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Shutdown Cooling Control Valves Drag type wide range control valves were installed between the RHR pump and heat exchanger in loops A&D.
The valves were installed to provide capability to 1) maintain a controlled cooldown rate of the reactor pressure vessel at less than 100 F/ hour, 2) meet all flow requirements, 3) assure that no significant release of radioactivity would result from a PHR heat exchanger tube leak and 4) prevent RHR pump runout in the case of one pump flowing into a broken recirculation loop.
The globe type angle valves previously installed did not prove adequate to perform both the LPCI service and shutcown cooling service.
Severe vibration resulted in a series of valve failures.
Receipt inspection and storage records were completed.
Certifi-cates of conformance and compliance were available for materials and components.
Records attested to the personnel and equipment qualification.
Installation and testing were done in accordance with established procedure b.
Rod Sequence Control System Bypass Pressure Switch Replacement With Electronic Transmitter The modification consisted of replacing the main turbine first stage mechanical pressure switches that initiate the bypass of the rod sequence control system with more reliable and accurate electronic transmitter trip units.
Component certification, certificates of compliance and cali-bration data sheets attested to the adequacy of components and installation of the electronic transmitters.
c.
Replacement of Contact Retainers on GE CR 120 Relays Beca'ise of relay fires which were experienced in PCIS and SRM/lRM panels, the flammable contact retainers were replaced with a nonflanmable type which was functionally identical.
The contact retainers were replaced without disturbing the electrical connectors or the operability of the relay.
Receipt inspection and storage records, provided certification and installation records were completed in accordance with procedures.
Functional tests were performed to verify relay operability.
d.
Control Circuitry of the Standby Liquid Control System The modification consisted of 1) replacing the 200 VA control transformer to a 750 VA size; 2) changing fuse sizings in the control transformer and squib valve circuitry and 3) relocating the firing circuitry current monitoring relay to the neutral side of the squib valves.
The changes were done in accordance with existing facility procedures and controlled by check lists and plant reports.
Receipt inspections and conformance certificates documented component control and reliabilit.
e.
Post LOCA Environmental Qualification Type Test in Drywell Cable Splices The modification consisted of removing several selected cable splices in the irywell and resplicing in accordance with facility procedures.
Ir. addition, field inspection and documentation of the wiring methods used on safety related electrical equipment was made.
Completed Maintenance Request Forms attested to the removal and resplice of selected cables a special procedure was prepared for the process.
The modifications had been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Comittee and safety evaluation conducted.
A determina-tion was made for each modification that the proposed change did not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10 CFR 50.59(b).except for one cable splice for item e above.
The licensee stated that immediate action would be taken to have the PORC review the modification to the omitted c?ble splice.
The inspector had no further question on these matters.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on October 6,1978, a meeting was held at the Peach Bottom site with representatives of the licensee organization. Attendees at this meeting included personnel whose names are asteri.sked in Paragraph 1.
The inspector sumarized the results of the inspection as described in this report.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's findings.