IR 05000275/1990022
| ML16341F892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1990 |
| From: | Good G, Pendergast K, Qualls P, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341F891 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-90-22, 50-323-90-22, NUDOCS 9012030021 | |
| Download: ML16341F892 (26) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
J Report Nos.,
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
50-275/90-22 and 50-323/90-22 50-275 and 50-323 DPR-80 and DPR-82 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
October 2-5, 1990 Inspectors:
oo ergency repare ness na yst Team Leader h( J)q-Jqo g
Team Member:
ren ergas
,
mergency repare ness Analystg.
ua s,
eactor nspector L.
K. Cohen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRC Headquarters 9c'te sgne l(
If 70 ate
>gne
'Approved by:
u as, se Reactor Radiological Protection Branch
a e
)gned SUMMARY:
I Ins ection on October 2-5 1990 Re ort Nos.
50-275/90-22 and 50-323/90-22 Areas Ins ected:
Announced inspection to follow-up on previous emergency prepare ness inspection findings and to observe the 1990 annual emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques.
Inspection procedures 92701, 82301, and 30703 were used as guidanc Results:
No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified in ttte areas inspected.
One exercise weakness and two open items were identified during this inspection.
The exercise weakness involved the inability of the Control Room staff to perform offsite dose calculations in a timely manner to support event classification.
The exercise weakness is described in Section
of this report.
Five of the findings were identified during previous NRC inspections.
The licensee demonstrated that it could adequately protect the public's health and safety; however, collectively, the findings described in this report represent a need for the licensee to improve its performance based on previously identified problem DETAILS Persons Contacted P;
Beckham, Senior Engineer M. Fujimoto, Assistant to the President P. Gangwisch, Nuclear Generation Engineer K. Herman, Supervisor, Instrument L Control S. Joiner, Emergency Planning (EP) Coordinator M. Keyworth, Supervisor, EP D. Miklush, Assistant Plant Hanager,, Operations J.
Neale, Nuclear Generation Engineer D. Oatley, Supervising Engineer R. Panero, Nuclear Generation Engineer C. Prince, Emergency Planner E. Maage, Senior Engineer, EP Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Ins ection Procedure 92701 During an inspection conducted on August 13-17, 1990, NRC inspectors identified concerns regarding the maintenance and operability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) radiation monitor(s).
Details concerning this issue can be found in Section 3.b of NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/90-21 and 50-323/90-21.
As a summary, the inspectors found that the TSC radiation monitor(s)
had been inoperable since mid-June 1990 and adequate interim measures had not been established to ensure habitability of the TSC.
In response to this concern, the licensee issued Non-Conformance Report (NCR) No. DC0-90-TI-N058, dated August 31, 1990
'he NCR documents the licensee's description of the cause of the problem and its immediate/preventive corrective actions.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the NCR and examined the TSC radiation monitor(s).
The inspector concluded that the NCR appropriately addressed the issue.
The radiation monitor(s) were observed to be operational and within calibration, except for air particulate monitor RE-66, which was tagged out-of-service on September 16, 1990.
The inoperability of RE-66 was discussed with licensee personnel.
Those discussions disclosed that RE-66 is redundant to an air particulate monitor in the TSC laboratory.
Consequently, any increase in particulate activity in the TSC would be identified on the TSC laboratory air particulate monitor.
The inspectors also found that two backup Iodine monitors had been placed in the TSC ventilation room.
The backup monitors were observed to be operational and within calibration; however, they were not secured to prevent potential damage to TSC air handling equipment during seismic events.
This is a concern because the monitors are on wheels.
.Licensee personnel stated that the two monitors were only placed in the ventilation room for calibration and that once they were'alibrated they would be secured in the hallway outside the TSC. It should be noted that this issue was identified in Section 7.g of NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/87-33 and 50-323/87-33 (see open item 50-275/87-33-02).
Open item 50-275/87-33-02 was closed in NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/88-12 and 50-323/88-11, dated May 10, 198 No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspection.
Emer enc Pre aredness Exercise Plannin Ins ection Procedure 82301)
The Senior Engineer in the EP Group of the Radiological, Environmental, Chemical Engineering segment of Nuclear Operations Support (NOS)
(corporate)
has the overall responsibility for scheduling, developing, conductinq, and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
These activities are conducted using NOS procedure NOS-4. 1.5, "Field Exercise Scenario Development."
In accordance with NOS-4. 1.5, a scenario committee, consisting of individuals with the appropriate expertise (e. g., reactor operations, health. physics, and maintenance)
was established to generate the exercise package.
Persons involved in the scenario development were not participants in the exercise.
Exercise objectives were established as part of the scenario package.
Objectives for each of the emergency response facilities (ERFs) (e. g.,
TSC, Operational Support Center (OSC),
and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) were developed.
Joint objectives for the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC) and specific objectives for San Luis Obispo (SLO) County were also developed.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Region IX, and NRC, Region V, were provided with an opportunity to comment on the exercise objectives* and scenario package.
The complete scenario package included the objectives, participant guidelines, controller and evaluator instructions, scenario narrative summary and sequence of events, messages used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, and meteorological and radiological data.
The players did not have access to the scenario package or information on scenario events.
The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario, as described in the scenario package, started with an event that was classified as an Alert and ultimately escalated to Site Area Emergency (SAE) and General Emergency (GE) classifications.
The Alert declaration was based on an unplanned release from a gas decay tank (GDT) that lasted for about one hour.
Approximately 30 minutes after the release was terminated, a primary system loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
occurred that required the initiation of safety injection (SI) and the declaration of a SAE.
Due to a series of equipment failures, all emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection was lost, resulting in fuel failure.
The scenario developers planned for the GE to be declared after calculations, based on containment radiation monitor readings, exceeded the GE threshold.
A hydrogen detonation occurred after containment hydrogen gas levels, generated as a result of the fuel damage, reached a sufficient quantity and concentration.
The hydrogen detonation caused a breach in containment and fission products were released to the environment.
The release was terminated after containment pressure reached atmospheric levels.
In response to the scenario events, exercise participants initially declared an Unusual Event (UE) after the control room (CR)/simulator
received high plant ventilation radiation alarms.
The Alert had to be prompted by controllers through the use of a contingency message.
Due to procedural inconsistencies, exercise participants declared the GE earlier than expected.
Details regarding the Alert declaration,and the procedural inconsistencies are described in Sections G.B and C of this report.
5.
Federal Evaluators Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response.
Inspectors were located in the CR/simulator, TSC, OSC, and EOF.
The NRC inspector who was assigned to the OSC accompanied various repair/monitoring teams in order to evaluate their performance.
The FEMA held a remedial drill during this exercise to evaluate a
proposed deficiency involving SLO County's ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and instructions'o the public.
This issue was identified during the 1989 biennial exercise.
Approximately six FEMA evaluators were present at various locations, including the EOF.
The results of FEMA's evaluation of the offsite response will be described in a separate report issued by FEMA.
6.
Control Room/Simulator The following aspects of CR operations were observed:
detection and classification of emergency events, mitigation, and notification.
The following items are NRC observations of the CR activities.
An exercise weakness is a finding identified as needing corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F.5.
The other observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
The CR operators did a good job in locating the source of radiation for the event involving the GDT.
B.
The CR staff did not demonstrate the ability to perform offsite dose calculations in a timely manner to support event classification.
The following problems were observed:
1)
The CR personnel did not appear to know how to convert release rate to.offsite dose using emergency plan implementing procedure (EPIP)
EP R-2,
'Release of Airborne Radioactive Procedures."
2)
Radiation monitor RE-33, which provides the required input data for the calculation, was not energized during the time it was needed for proper event classification.
The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) used the RE-33 data for the R-2 calculation without realizing it was not energized.
This resulted in an erroneous value and failure to properly classify the Alert.
3)
At 9:07 A.M., 37 minutes after the conditions first existed, controllers used a contingency message to prompt the CR staff
to declare the Alert, because the R-2 calculations did not exceed the threshold for an Alert classification.
4)
Controllers had to prompt the players to energize RE-33.
5)
Paragraph 2.2, of EP R-2 states that the procedure should only be used by CR personnel.
During the exercise, the CR personnel initially waited for radiation protection (RP) to calculate the dose rate data.
The inability to perform dose calculations in a timely manner to support event classification is an exercise weakness and will be tracked as open item 50-275/90-.22-01.
Several inconsistencies in GE class requirements were noted between Appendix Zs and EP G-l, "Accident Classification and Emergency Plan Activation."
These inconsistencies led to confusion and ultimately c'aused the GE to be declared earlier than anticipated.
Different GE class requirements and formats were identified in: 1)
EP E-l, Appendix Z, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant;" 2)
EP FR-C.2, Appendix Z, "Response to Degraded Core Cooling," and; 3)
EP G-1, Attachment 8.1, Category III, item 3.D.
Part of the confusion appeared to be associated with the use of "and/or" statements (i.e.,
human factors).
The inconsistencies between Appendix Zs and EP G-1 was a finding identified by the augmented inspection team (AIT) in April 1987.
Since these procedural inconsistencies and unclear procedures could lead to delays in event classification, this matter will be tracked as open item 50-275/90-22-02.
,l r'nformal communications appeared to delay the identification of the location of the GDT leak.
At 8:40 A.M., the Shift Foreman (SF) told the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) to direct the Auxiliary Operator (AO) to locate and attempt to stop the GDT leak, with the support of RP.
The SRO stated that he assumed-the AO was already working on the problem.
Four minutes later the AO called the CR for directions, at which time the SRO directed the above action.
The following notification problems were observed in the CR:
1)
While reading the notification form to the offsite agencies, the Control'Room Assistant (CRA) stated the release was from a
"UDT," rather than a "GDT."
The State corrected the CRA.
2)
The offsite agencies did not appear to have the same notification form.
This caused some delay in relaying information.
3)
The sheriff wanted to know the windspeed in miles per hour, but the CRA did not know how to convert from meters per -second.
The wind speed was also omitted from the new for.
Technical Su ort Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activation accident assessment and classification, protective action recommendations (PARs),
CR support, and EOF support.
The following items are NRC observations of the TSC activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
The engineering staffs ability to support the CR may have been hampered because they were not following information that was readily available.
For example, mitigating actions being taken by the CR, the CR's implementation of the functional recovery procedures, and out-of-service equipment were not being followed.
It should be noted that this issue was also identified during the 1989 exercise (see Section 7.b of Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/89-19 and 50-323/89-19).
B.
The GE notification form, generated by a member of the TSC staff and signed by the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC), did not indicate a
change in PARs from the SAE.. Independent of the notification form, a separate form is used to document the,licensee's PARs.
The PAR form was completed by the SEC and contained the proper GE PARs.
Since the responsibility to notify the State and County had already transferred to the interim EOF staff, the incorrect PARs on the notification form were not transmitted to the State and County.
The appropriate PARs were provided to the State and County via the Advisor to the County who was stationed in the Emergency Operations Center.
The notification form was eventually corrected.
This
,
matter would have been an exercise weakness if the notification form had been used to notify State and County officials.
Corrective action to prevent recurrence is recommended.
C.
Protective measures to control contamination within the TSC were not established.
A survey meter was set out, but since it was not in plain site, it was not used.
It should be noted that this issue was identified during the 1987 exercise (see Section 7.f of Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/87-33 and 50-323/87-33).
8.
0 erational Su ort Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:
activation, functional capabilities, and disposition of various inplant repair/monitoring teams.
The following items are NRC observations of the OSC activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for. improving the program.
A.
The team dispatched to the safety injection (SI) pump did not wear all of the protective clothing required by the Radiation Work Permit (RWP),
and they did not wear their badges and pocket ion chambers as prescribed by procedure (RCP-6-160).
B.
A high range teletector was not readily available at access control.
A team was delayed, because they had to wait until one could be retrieved from the calibration laborator C.
D.
E.
Individuals did not inspect protective clothing prior to use as prescribed by procedure (RCS-3).
r A proper contamination control point was not established at the location where certain teams removed their protective clothing (PC).
The PCs were not removed in a manner that would prevent the spread of contamination.
Team members then proceeded to access control to exit the radiologically controlled area (RCA).
This could have led to the portal monitors becoming contaminated, causing subsequent teams to have to use friskers, which are much slower.
Protective measures to control contamination within the OSC were not established.
Habitability and contamination surveys were not conducted.
F ~
9.
Emer Accountability was not determined or maintained in the OSC.
enc 0 erations Facilit The following EOF operations were observed:
activation, functional capabilities, notifications, PARs, interface with offsite officials, and dose assessment.
Classifications were not observed due the early classification of the GE.
The following items are NRC observations of the EOF activities.
The observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the program.
A.
B.
C.
The organizational changes made to the EOF engineering staff appeared to resolve the concerns raised during the 1989 exercise.
The interim EOF staff did a good job interfacing with the offsite officials prior to the arrival of the corporate staff.
The interim EOF staff effectively coordinated the plant evacuation with offsite traffic control authorities.
D.
E.
The long-term EOF staff implemented the TSC's request for additional RP personnel in a timely manner.
Implementation of the licensee's system for authorizing and issuing PARs resulted in some delay and confusion during the exercise.
The basis for this observation is provided below:
r 1)
Evaluation criteria 2 of planning standard II.B of NUREG-0654 states that,
"Each licensee shall designate an individual as emergency coordinator who shall be on shift at all times and who shall have the authority and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally initiate any emergency actions, including providing protective action recommendations to authorities responsible for implementing offsite emergency measures."
2)
Evaluation criteria 4 of planning standard II.B of NUREG-0654 states that,
"Each licensee shall establish the functional responsibilities assigned to the emergency coordinator and shall clearly specify which responsibilities may not be
delegated to other elements of the emergency organization.
Among the responsibilities which may not be delegated shall be the decision to notify and to recommend protective actions to authorities responsible for offsite emergency measures."
Paragraph 2. a, "Authorities and Respohsibilities,"
of EP RB-10;
"Protective Action Guidelines," states that after full,manning and activation of the EOF, "the Recovery Manager will assume responsibility for the coordination of all offsite emergency response activities.
This shall include sole authority and responsibility for the decision to notify and. recommend protective action recommemeat>one to the appropriate county and state authorities."
At ll:28 A.M. the RH asked the Radiological Manager to "touch bases" with him before the Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC) issued its PAR.
The EOF was activated with the long-term staff at ll:34 A.M.
The containment high range area monitor read 8200 R.
Containment was lost at 11:48 A.H.
The RH made a conscious decision to wait for a UDAC PAR. It should be noted that the offsite agencies had already initiated evacuations in protective action zones.1, 2, and 3 (approximately 10 miles in the downwind direction).
The UDAC was notified of the loss of containment at ll:52 A.H.
At 12:23 P.M., the UDAC dose calculations and PARs were discussed with the RM.
The dose calculations indicated a child thyroid dose of 8 R at 18 miles for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> exposure.
The Radiological Manager from UDAC (a utility representative)
stated that the UDAC PAR was to evacuate zones 6 and 7 (approximately 14 miles downwind) and to shelter zones 10 and 11 (approximately 18 miles downwind).
The UDAC PAR received the RM's concurrence.
The RM completed a
PAR form and, at 12:30 P.M., notified the Advisor to the County that the RM had concurred in the UDAC PAR to evacuate zones 6/7 and to shelter zones 10/ll.
The RM informed the SEC of the PAR at 12:32 P.H.
The UDAC PAR form that was issued at approximately 12:20 P.M.
.stated that the PAR was to evacuate all four zones (6,7,10, and ll).
The PAR for zones 10 and ll had been changed from shelter to evacuate.
This change in PARs was issued without the knowledge of the RH.
The RH stated that he concurred in the new UDAC PAR and called both the Advisor to the County and the SEC to correct the PAR that he had provided earlier.
During post-exercise discussions, the RM stated that the offsite agencies prefer to not have two separate PARs (i.e.,
a UDAC PAR based on dose calculations and a utility PAR based on plant conditions).
The RH stated that the issue had been raised during the "dress rehearsal" when the RH issued a PAR,
'ased on plant conditions, that differed from the PAR developed in UDAC.
The inspector questioned the RM about the sequence of events that occurred during this exercise.
In response, the RM
stated that he wanted to issue a
PAR based on plant conditions, but held off until UDAC could complete the dose calculations and formulate a
PAR.
The RN indicated that he was being sensitive to the concerns raised by the offsite agencies during the "dress rehearsal."
He also stated that earlier discussions had addressed the logistics of evacuating zones 6 and 7 before zones 10 and 11.
Based on the observations made during the exercise, and the discussions held after the exercise, the inspector concluded that:
(1) a PAR was modified by UDAC and bypassed the RN; (2) the licensee's system appears to allow a loss of control of information transmitted to the offsite agencies; (3) the licensee's system could cause a delay in the issuance of PARs based on plant conditions.
This issue is considered sufficiently important to be tracked as open item 50-275/90-22-03.
It should be noted that this issue was identified as an exercise weakness during the 1987 exercise (see item 9.e of Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/87-33 and 50-323/87-33).
The open item was closed in" 1988 (Inspection Report Nos.
50-275/88-24 and 50-323/88-22) after the PAR form was developed and successfully used during the 1988 exercise.
G.
The Interim Radiological Hanager was overheard to say that, by procedure, a
PAR to evacuate zone 3 could not be made unless a
release was in progress.
This statement is not correct.
The number and timeliness of press releases was above average; however, the technical content was, at times, questionable and inaccurate.
10.
Exercise Conduct As part of the exercise observation, the inspection team also observed the licensee's conduct and control of the exercise.
The following items are NRC observations of the licensee's performance in this area.
A.
During the controllers'eeting on October 2, 1990, the licensee stated that it intended to limit the use of PCs and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) during the exercise.
The licensee stated that booties, gloves, and hoods wo'uld not be used, and that masks would not be worn with the SCBAs.
This level of simulation was considered to be exces'sive, because it would detract from the training value of the exercise.
In addition, the licensee identified a problem with the timeliness of team dispatch during the 1989 exercise.
Team dispatch would be artificially expedited if the limitations on PC and SCBA use were allowed, and it would be difficult for evaluators to measure the adequacy of the corrective actions taken in response to the 1989 exercise finding.
The licensee decided to use full PCs and all SCBA gear after the NRC Team Leader expressed concerns about this matter.
The licensee was cautioned to identify all exercise limitations at the time the objectives are submitte e
B.
The following examples of pr'e-staging were observed:
2)
Prior to the start of the exercise, procedures were placed at the appropriate work spaces in the TSC.
In.addition, all of the position marker name plates and tags had been distributed.
Log sheets and pens were also set out at each work station.
These items are normally kept in an emergency locker and distributed during the activation process.
r Position name tags were set out at the appropriate work spaces in the EOF the day before the exercise.
C.
The following examples of prompting were observed:
1)
Two non-players (one controller and one observer)
were observed having inappropriate conversations with players in the EOF.
The observer prompted a player to follow-up on a question, and a
UDAC controller asked a player for the results of dose calculations, because he wanted to "make sure that they were within a couple orders of magnitude."
.
2)
An operations.staff member, stationed in the OSC, attempted to dispatch a team without following the proper procedure.
The controller stopped him from dispatching the team.
D.
Signed, controlled copies of the EPIPs were not available in the OSC the day before the exercise.
It should be noted that the OSC was recently relocated from the cold machine shop to the outage control center.
11.
~Criti ues Immediately following the exercise, critiques were held in each of the ERFs.
A formal critique involving site and corporate management personnel was conducted on October 5, 1990.
The purpose of the formal critique was to summarize the individual ERF critique session observations and present them to upper management.
The Vice President, Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager, and the Assistant to the President were present.
Many key players also attended the formal critique.
'The following items represent some of the critique findings presented during this meeting:
A.
The CR staff failed to properly classify an emergency condition, becaus'e dose calculations were not performed in a timely manner.
B.
The SAE was declared in a timely manner after the LOCA and loss of injection flow.
C.
Engineering support in the TSC was much improved over previous exercises.
The staff made good use of core damage assessment procedures and demonstrated forethought when they recommended the use of the hydrogen analyzers and recombiners.
D.
The SEC effectively utilized his staff in the TS e O
E.
The offsite agencies need a better estimate of the number of automobiles and occupants when non-essential personnel are evacuated from the site.
F.
The OSC's performance was exceptional (best ever).
G.
Teams were dispatched in a timely manner.
H.
Anti-C dressout procedures and Special Mork Permit (SMP)
instructions were not followed by all team members.
The Advisor to the County was especially effective in communicating plant conditions to the county Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
J.
Formulation of PARs based on the containment release was slow.
K.
Logs were not maintained by all key UDAC personnel.
L.
The mobile environmental monitoring laboratory needs additional
~
sampling equipment (e.g., radioactive material tape, storage boxes, and sample dilution equipment) to adequately handle the amount of samples.
12.
Exit Interview Ins ection Procedure 30703 An exit interview was held on October 5, 1990, to discuss the preliminary findings of the inspection.
The attachment to this report identifies the licensee personnel who were present at the meeting. 'he NRC was represented by the four members of the inspection team and Mr.
K.
Johnston, NRC Resident Inspector.
During the exit interview, the licensee was informed that it appeared there were no deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements identified during the inspection.
The NRC Team Leader specifically mentioned that two potential exercise weaknesses were identified.
The NRC Team Leader stated that the extent of pre-staging and prompting was more than usually observed.
Due to the number of repeat findings, the licensee was encouraged to consider the effectiveness of its corrective action program.
Subsequent to the inspection it was decided that the observations involving issuance of the PAR discussed in Section 9.E. would be classified as an area for improvement, specifically warranting inspector follow-up, rather-than a weaknes ATTACHMENT EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES S. Allen, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer T. Allen, Project Superintendent P.
Beckham, Senior Engineer M. Burgess, Manager, System Engineering M. Cherubini, equality Control Specialist L. Cossette, Senior Engineer W. Crockett, Assistant Plant Manager, Support Services S.
Freeman, Trainer S. Fridley, Manager, Operations W. Fujimoto, Assistant to the President R. Garacci, Systems Analyst, Chemistry
& Radiation Protection R. Gray, Manager, Radiation Protection H. Hansen, equality Assurance A. Hardy, equality Control J. Harris, equality Assurance Auditor J.
Hubble, Supervisor, Security Operations S. Joiner, EP Coordinator W. Keyworth, Supervisor, EP R. Kohout, Manager, Safety, Health, and Emergency Services B. LoConte, Nuclear Generation Engineer W. McLane, Manager, Outage D. Miklush, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations J.
Neale, Nuclear Generation Engineer D. Oatley, Supervising Engineer M. O'onnell, Regulatory Compliance Engineer R. Panero, Nuclear Generation Engineer H. Phillips, Manager, Electrical Maintenance C. Prince, Emergency Planner P.
Provence, Document Services D. Shelley, Senior Engineer J.
Somsel, Nuclear Engineer B. Thomas, News Media Representative R. Todaro, Manager, Security J.
Townsend, Vice President, Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager E. Waage, Senior Engineer, EP W. White, Trainer L. Womack, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support