IR 05000275/1990009
| ML16341F673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1990 |
| From: | Cillis M, Coblentz L, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341F672 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-90-09, 50-275-90-9, 50-323-90-09, 50-323-90-9, NUDOCS 9004300164 | |
| Download: ML16341F673 (18) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/90-09 and 50-323/90-09 License Nos.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, seven miles north of Avila Beach, California jo Approved by:
~Summer:
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~e Facilities Radiological Protection Section Inspection conducted March 21-23, 1990 Inspected by:.
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exposure; control of radioactive materials and contamination, surveys, and monitoring; maintaining occupational exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA); and facility tours.
Inspection procedures 30703, 83750, 83726, and 83728 were addressed.
Results:
The inspectors identified weaknesses in overall control and poetling of Radioactive Material Areas, and in general housekeeping practices within the Auxiliary Building.(Section 2.F).
Program strengths included improved dose tracking of specific outage activities and heightened ALARA awareness over that observed in previous outages (Section 2.G).
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel
"W.
G. Crockett, Assistant Plant Manager, Support Services
~S.
R. Fridley, Operations Manager
~R. Gray, Radiation Protection Manager
- D. A. Taggart, Director, Quality Support (QS)
~R.
P.
Flohaug, QS Supervisor
- R.
P. Washington, Instrumentation and Controls (I 8 C) Manager
- T. Bennett, Maintenance Manager
- M. J.
Angus, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services
"W.
D. Barkhuff, Quality Control Manager
- W. T.
Rapp, Chairman, Onsite Review Group
- T. L. Grebel, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
"J.
A. Shoulders, OPEG Project Engineer G.
S.
Boi les, Dosimetry Foreman L. T. Moretti, Radiation Protection Foreman J.
E. Knight, Radiation Protection Foreman R.
W. Rogers, Radiation Protection Foreman J.
M. Sanders, I 8 C Foreman A. J.
Newell, Training Supervisor R.
Lund, Acting Radiation Protection Supervisor D.
M. Carver, I 8 C Supervising Technician J
~
D. Buechler, I 8 C Technician B.
D. Finch, I 8 C Technician Contractor Personnel J.
Chadwick, ALARA Coordinator, Delphi Group, Inc.
NRC
"P. Narbut, Senior Resident Inspector
- K. Johnston, Resident Inspector
"M. Mendonca, Chief, Reactor Projects,Section I
- Denotes those individuals present at the exit interview conducted on March 23, 1990.
Additional discussions were held with other members of the licensee's staff and contractor personnel.
Occu ational Ex osure Contamination Control
'Radioactive Materials Contro urve s
an a>ntains n x osur es A
728)
A.
Audits and A
raisals The inspector reviewed PG8E Quality Assurance (QA) Audits 89809T, 89815T, and 89641P, which were performed in May, September, and
October 1989, respectively.
These audits addressed some areas of personnel monitoring and dosimetry, plant staff training, and radioactive material management.
Four equality Evaluation/Audit Finding Reports were generated involving administrative weaknesses in personnel monitoring and dosimetry.
No instances of regulatory or Technical Specification (TS) noncompliance were noted, and no Nonconformance Reports were i'ssued as a result of these audits.
The inspector noted that Audit 89815T, which covered aspects of radioactive material control and accountability, did not address the Radioactive Materials Area problems discussed in Section 2.F of this report.
Twelve equality Control Surveillances (gCSs)
were reviewed, which monitored radiation protection practices during decontamination and maintenance activities conducted from February 1989 to January 1990.
Although no items were listed as "significant discrepancies,"
three reports (gCSs 89-0147, 89-0150, and 89-0182, from October and November 1989) noted that airborne activity samples were not taken in the workers'reathing zone.
The inspectors mentioned this observation to the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM).
The RPM stated that airborne activity sampling had been closely monitored during the current outage in Unit 2, and that no recurring problems had been observed.
The licensee appeared to be maintaining its previous level of performance in this area, and the audit and surveillance programs appeared to be adequately accomplishing the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
~Chan es Changes in the organization, personnel, facilities, equipment, programs, and procedures were discussed with the cognizant area supervisors and managers.
Significant personnel changes included the appointment of a new RPM and the addition of a new senior engineer to the radiation protection (RP) staff.
The new RPM was interviewed with regard to planned changes in RP programs, which included:
1.
Revision of the Radioactive Materials Control Program, including improvements to storage and sorting facilities, and possible procedural changes; 2.
Use of a newly published pocket handbook, which includes points of contact, drawings, ALARA reminders, emergency procedures, man-rem goals, and schedules for the current outage in Unit 2; 3.
Designs for an extensive addition to the Hot Machine Shop, intended to expand decontamination capabilities, and to significantly improve resin processing facilities; 4.
Efforts to increase ALARA awareness at all staff levels, including continuous job-specific dose tracking, visual ALARA
reminders, management participation, and plant-wide housekeeping efforts.
The licensee appeared to be maintaining its previous level of performance in this area, and these changes appeared to be appropriately directed toward accomplishment of the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
For more comments related to this area, see Section 2.G of this report.
Trainin and
. ualifications of New Personnel This program area was examined by discussions with the training staff, inspector attendance at a General Employee Training session, viewing of a videotape used for new worker orientation, perusal of entrance examinations used to prescreen contract RP technicians, and review of resumes for all RP technicians hired for the current Unit-2 outage.
The Training Supervisor discussed selection of contract RP technicians for specific job coverage after initial training, and stated that additional formal instruct~on was given to RP technicians covering underwater and steam generator bowl tasks.
The inspectors concluded that contractor radiation protection
'echnicians who were selected for the refueling outage met the qualifications prescribed in ANSI/ANS 3. 1, "American National Standard for Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel."
Training for occupationally exposed workers appeared to.
be in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 19. 12,
"Instructions to workers."
The licensee appeared to be maintaining its previous level of performance in this area.
Hiring, based on personnel qualifications appeared to be appropriately selective, and training of new personnel appeared to be adequate toward accomplishing the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
External Ex osure Control The external exposure control program was examined by observation, discussion with responsible personnel, and review of appropriate procedures and records.
During the course of the inspection, the Auxiliary Building, the Turbine Building, the Fuel Handling Building, the Reactor Containment, and various radioactive material storage and processing areas were toured.
Radiation areas and high radiation areas appeared to be appropriately posted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203,
"Caution signs, labels, signals and controls."
Specified general area and maximum contact dose rates corresponded with readings obtained by the inspector using a model RO-2 ionization chamber, serial number 2694, calibrated on January 5, 1990, and due for calibration on April 5, 199 ~
'
During discussions with dosimetry personnel, the inspector noted that the licensee has its own NAVLAP approved dosimetry program.
Daily Dose Reports, issued for each department, provide a means of tracking individual quarterly doses by a combination of TLD and Pocket Ion Chamber, readings, and help to reinforce supervisory and management responsibility for maintaining ALARA awareness.
The inspector's review of the Daily Dose Report for March 19, 1990, indicated that no exposure limits or administrative control levels had be'en exceeded for the current'quarter.
The licensee issues a clip with two plastic loops for convenience in wearing identi ficati on badges.
Dur ing faci 1 ity tours, the inspectors noticed that personnel wearing TLDs clipped to their key control cards occasionally shielded the TLD beta window with their Protected Area access badges.
This problem was brought to the licensee's attention at the exit interview.
The licensee appeared to be maintaining its previous level of performance in this area.
The exposure control and dosimetry programs appeared to be adequate toward accomplishing the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
For more comments related to this area, see Sections 2.F and 2.G. of this report.
Internal Ex osure Control The internal exposure control program was examined by observation, discussions with dosimetry staff, and review of applicable procedures and records.
Selected Special Work Procedures (SWPs)
were reviewed for precautions related to tasks involving real or potential high airborne activity.
The Airborne Area Entry Log was examined as the licensee's method for tracking MPC-hour exposure.
Selected printouts were reviewed from the licensee's Helgeson Bed and guicky Whole Body Counters.
During a tour of the Auxiliary Building on March 21, 1990, the inspectors noticed that a tygon air sampling hose, attached to the continuous air sampler monitoring the contaminated waste box compactor, was severely crimped.
The crimped hose was immediately brought to the attention of the licensee, and the problem was corrected promptly.
With the exception of the deficiency noted in the preceding paragraph, the inspectors concluded that the licensee appeared to be maintaining its previous level of performance in this area.
The internal exposure control program appeared to be adequate in accomplishing the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identifie For more comments related to this area, see Section 2.A of this report.
F.
Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination Surve s
and on> tor>n The inspectors examined this area by observation, discussions with responsible personnel, and review of related procedures and records.
1.
Surve s and Monitorin The index of radiation and contamination surveys for 1989 was reviewed in relation to the licensee's Radiation Control Procedure (RCP) D-510, "Radiation and Contamination Survey Program."
Selected. surveys were examined for completeness, use of appropriate survey instruments, and timely management review.
Records of clothing and skin contamination were examined for thoroughness, timely decontamination, and followup action where appropriate.
During the inspectors'ours of the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Containment, portal monitors and frisking equipment appeared to be used properly.
In addition, the inspectors noted that monitoring instrumentation appeared to be in current calibration and had been performance checked.
2.
Radioactive Materials and Contamination Controls The inspectors noted that, overall, cleanliness and contamination controls in the=Reactor Containment appeared to be improved over previous outage inspections.
Tours of the Auxiliary Building, however, revealed the following deficiencies:
a.
b.
Cleanliness in radiologically controlled areas was poor.
Items lying unattended in contaminated areas included plastic and paper refuse, used rubber gloves, face shields, and tools.
Various electrical cords, air sampling hoses, and tygon tubing drain lines traversing both non-contaminated and contaminated areas were not secured in a manner to prevent contamination of the non-contaminated areas.
Drain lines used for draining contaminated liquids were not consistently identified as containing radioactive material.
C.
Several liquid effluent drain lines and vent lines, some of which were connected to polyethylene bottles, were found to be crimped.
Some of the drain and vent lines serviced contaminated systems.
Lighting was extremely poor in work areas within the
.,
Auxiliary Buildin ~
'
The above observations were immediately brought to the attention of the licensee's staff.
In addition, the inspectors mentioned that these items were similar to weaknesses identified in an earlier inspection, conducted from October
through November 2, 1989, and documented in inspection reports 50-275/89-25 and 50-323/89-25.
The inspectors reviewed Radiological Occurrence Report 88-19597, and the associated Action Request A0134903, involving contamination of an I 8 C "Sea-Train" trailer in December 1988.
The Sea-Train was posted as a Radioactive Materials Area (RMA),
but not as a Surface Contamination Area (SCA).
Due to a lack of understanding of this distinction, an I 8 C technician performed work on contaminated equipment in the Sea-Train; after contamination had been spread to the workbench and the floor, Access Control was notified.
An RP technician found'hat other items in the Sea-Train were also contaminated, to levels approaching 100,000 dpm by direct frisk.
As a result of this incident, I 8 C technicians were trained on the differences between an RMA and an SCA, and the Sea-Train was decontaminated.
The inspectors held discussions with personnel involved in the occurrence, and discovered that a similar problem had occurred in October 1989, when the same Sea-Train, posted as an RMA only, was found to have loose contamination in levels up to 20,000 dpm per 100 sq cm.
The area was again posted as an SCA, and subsequently decontaminated.
Accompanied by an RP foreman and an I 8 C supervising technician, the inspectors toured the Sea-Train in question, located in the 115'uxiliary Yard.
The Sea-Train was not posted at all at the time of the tour; however, it contained several items which were painted purple (denoting fixed contamination and/or possible internal contamination),
a vacuum pump bearing a yellow Radioactive Material tag, and a loose
pair of yellow protective clothing gloves.
Both the RP foreman and the I 8 C supervising, technician expressed surprise that the Sea-Train was being used to store these items.
The'icensee removed the items identified as radioactive material from the Sea-Train, and conducted a contamination survey.
No loose contamination was found.
The inspectors noted that, in accordance with licensee procedure RCP D-240, "Posting of Radiologically Controlled Areas," the entire Radiologically Controlled Area was posted as an RMA, and therefore the items found in the Sea-Train were, in fact, inside a posted RMA.
The inspectors concluded, however, that the recurrent problems associated with the I 8 C Sea-Train reflect poorly on licensee control of radioactive material and contamination.
The inspectors noted, further, that I L C facilities for calibration of contaminated and potentially contaminated
equipment have been moved repeatedly within the Radiologically Controlled Area.
This condition appears to have contributed to a sense of ambiguity as to which radiological controls apply to which areas, and seems to have added to the lack of adequate control of radioactive materials, At the exit interview, the licensee reiterated its intention to revise its Radioactive Materials Control Program, and agreed that better controls needed to be implemented.
In addition, the licensee stated that designs for the expansion of the Hot Shop included a permanent I 8 C calibration facility.
Licensee performance in this area appeared to be declining.
Although no violations or deviations were identified, the poor housekeeping practices in Auxiliary Building SCAs and the lack of radioactive material controls.in the I 8 C Sea-Train were considered by the inspectors to be weaknesses.
These items will be followed up in a subsequent inspection (50-275/90-09-01 and 50-275/90-09-02).
For more comments related to this area, see Sections 2.A and 2.B of this report.
G.
Maintainin Occu ational Ex osures ALARA The licensee's ALARA program was examined by observation, discussions with responsible personnel, and review of applicable records.
Workers'wareness and Involvement The inspectors noted that a high level of ALARA awareness appeared to be present among licensee supervision and management, as well as among workers interviewed during facility tours.
The inspectors noted, further, consistent statements by licensee personnel that improved planning was causing the current outage in Unit 2 (2R3) to progress more smoothly than previous outages.
Efforts of the licensee's Planning and Scheduling Office appear to have to have reduced man-rem during 2R3 by examining specific tasks and plant systems, and eliminating unnecessary work.
Efforts by the licensee's Mechanical Maintenance Group have resulted in the purchase of several remote packing extractors ("MOVATS"), which appears to have saved substantial man-hours and radiological exposur e.
In addition, the inspectors noted that the use of High Impact Teams (HIT teams) to thoroughly pre-plan critical path tasks appears to have significantly reduced problems with procurement, rework, and conflicting schedules.
The HIT teams for reactor disassembly and reassembly and Residual Heat Removal valve work appear to have made a positive impact on ALARA for those task '
l i
2.
3.
ALARA Goals and Ob 'ectives Discussions with ALARA personnel indicated that ALARA planning meetings and awareness seminars were held with all levels and disciplines of the licensee's staff prior to the start of 2R3.
These meetings were directed toward establishing ALARA goals and objectives for the outage, and increasing plant-wide ALARA awareness.
During facility tours, the inspectors'lso observed the extensive use of visual reminders, such as ALARA posters and ALARA lapel buttons.
The inspectors reviewed the ALARA Coordinator's Active Mork Permit Report, a frequently updated summary that provides an brief analysis of each active Radiation Mork Permit (RWP) or Special Mork Permit (SWP), including the man-rem goal, actual man-rem expended, and margin remaining for that RWP or SWP.
In a separate report, individual SWPs are tabulated under general job categories (e. g., "snubber activities," "cavity decontamination,"
or "thermocouple mods") for comparison to previous performances of similar tasks.
ALARA Results Review of doses received during 2R3 up to the time of the inspection indicated that the licensee was meeting its ALARA man-rem goals, which were below the actual dose received during the most recent outage in Unit 1 (1R3).
The inspectors noted, further, that the level of ALARA awareness apparent in members of licensee staff appeared to be achieving stated ALARA objectives.
The licensee appeared to be improving its level of performance in this area, and the ALARA program appeared to be adequate in accomplishing the licensee's safety objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
For more comments related to this area, see Sections 2.B and 2.F of this report.
3.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee's representatives, denoted in Section 1 of this report, at the conclusion of the inspection on March 23, 1990.
The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.
The licensee was informed that no violations or deviations had been identifie I 0