IR 05000272/1995021
| ML18101B211 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1996 |
| From: | Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101B210 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-95-21, 50-311-95-21, NUDOCS 9602120008 | |
| Download: ML18101B211 (13) | |
Text
Report No License No Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved:
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-272/95-21 50-311/95-21 DPR-70 DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station November 19, 1995 - January 13, 1996 C. S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector J. G. Schoppy, Resident Inspector T. H. Fish, Resident Inspector
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Inspection Summary:
This inspection report documents inspections to assure public health and safety during day and back shift hours of station activities, including:
operations, radiological controls, maintenance, surveillances, security, engineering, technical support, safety assessment and quality verificatio The Executive Summary delineates the inspection findings and conclusions.
9602120008 960201 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Salem Inspection Reports 50-272/95-2I; 50-3II/95-2I November I9, I995 - January I3, I996 OPERATIONS (Module 71707) Salem operators demonstrated proper safety perspective in responding to a phase current imbalance on IA ED In resolving the issue, shift management also demonstrated appropriate sensitivity to a possible generic concern that potentially affected all EDG Operators inappropriately based operability of the I8 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on surveillance results. Operations management discovered the inappropriate conclusion, and made an appropriate operability determination based on an assessment of the impact of the frequency oscillations on EDG performanc *
MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE (Modules 61726, 62703) Operators exceeded the maximum design speed of no. IA emergency diesel generator (EDG) during a surveillance. Maintenance performed an in-depth EDG failure analysis and inspectio The EDG overspeed had minimal safety significance due to the plant condition (defueled with offsite power, no. I8 and no. IC EDGs available) and no resultant damage to the no. IA diesel engine or generato Operations.management did not determine the root cause analysis in a timely manne The EDG overspeed is an inspection followup item pending NRC review of root cause analysi ENGINEERING (Module 37551) In response to a defective General Electric S8M switch associated with a vital 4I60V circuit breaker, engineering personnel demonstrated effective teamwork, proper safety focus, and. good technical assessmen Engineers identified potential generic concerns, reviewed equipment history and operating experience, and initiated inspection of related equipment in a timely manne The inspectors concluded that the improved engineering response to the degraded condition resulted from better performance standards implemented by the current engineering managemen During the inspection *period, river debris, icing and silt buildup challenged Unit I and Unit 2 service water (SW) on three occasions. There had also been recent challenges to service water and the non-safety related and seismic class III construction of the instruments and controls associated with the SW traveling screen As a result, the inspectors questioned the ability of the SW system to provide an adequate supply of cooling water to the reactor safeguard and auxiliary equipment under all credible seismic, flood, drought, and storm conditions *as stated in UFSAR section 9.2.I.I. This issue remains open pending NRC review of corrective action stemming from the Salem Condition Report associated with this issue.
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Based on a review of engineering backlog performance indicators (Pis), the inspector concluded that the current system allows engineering st&ff and management to effectively monitor trends in the engineering backlog, including wo~k completion, and to a~sess the impact of the enginrering backlog on plant safet PLANT SUPPORT (Module 71750) Radiological Controls staff responded quickly and appropriately to notification that the cover had blown off a radiological waste shipment enroute to a disposal site. The shipment contained used tools
- with low-level contamination that Salem staff had individually wrappe No contamination of the shipping container or the environment occurred as a result of the individual wrapping of the part In response to several instances of radiation workers forgetting their radiation monitoring devices (Alnors) when entering the radiologically controlled area, radiological controls (RC) staff initiated a Condition Report and implemented several corrective action Because of the duplication of dosimetry, no unmonitored exposure occurred. After RC staff implemented the corrective actions, a worker again entered the RCA without an Alno The effectiveness of the corrective actions will remain open pending NRC review of licensee response to the additional occurrence SELF ASSESSMENT and QUALITY VERIFICATION (Module 71707) The Significant Event Response Team (SERT) 95-02 report, the Addendum to the report, and the associated Licensee Event Report identified a number of significant discrete performance and equipment deficiencies associated with the June 1995 Salem Unit 2 shutdown. The Addendum, and the LER also identified a number of long-standing programmatic weaknesse The Corrective Action Review Board. (CARB),
however, made the observations of the underlying causes of the programmatic weaknesses contained in the Addendum and the LER contained. Similarly, the SERT 95-03 report, concerning the October 1995 Salem unit 1 loss of overhead annunciators, identified unacceptable performance, but did not address underlying cause The CARB review again identified the fundamental underlying weaknesse The SERTs demonstrated that the Salem staff (prior to October 1995) had been unable to identify and correct unacceptable performanc The CARB, on the other hand, clearly demonstrated the ability to recognize the causes for unacceptable performanc The inspectors concluded that SERTs did not result in effective self-assessment, but (as demonstrated by CARB) the new management demonstrated the ability to perform critical self assessment and hold the Salem staff to high standards of performanc In addition, the Salem Restart Plan contains actions intended to insure effective self-assessment and high standards for performance in all levels of Salem staff.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 OPERATIONS......... Summary of Operations............ Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Current Phase Imbalance........ Operability Determination MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
. Maintenance.... Surveillance...
...... IA Emergency Diesel Generator Overspeed ENGINEERING............. Defective SBM Switch..... Service Water Degradation........ Engineering Backlog Performance Indicators PLANT SUPPORT............ Radiological Controls..... Radiological Waste Shipment.. SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION REVIEW OF REPORTS AND OPEN ITEMS EXIT INTERVIEWS/MEETINGS.... Resident Exit Meeting... Licensee Management Changes..
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DETAILS 1. 0 OPERATIONS The inspectors verified that Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) operated the facilities safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors evaluated PSE&G's management control by direct observation of activities, tours of the facilities, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Technical Specification compliance, and review of facility records. The inspectors performed normal and back-shift inspections, including I2 hours of deep back-shift inspection.1 Su11111ary of Operations Unit I remained defueled for the duration of the inspection period. *
Unit 2 began the report period in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).
On December I6, I995, Operations commenced core off-load activities and completed the evolution on December I The unit remained defueled for the remainder of the inspection perio.2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Current Phase Imbalance Salem operators demonstrated improved safety perspective in responding to a phase current imbalance on IA EO In resolving the issue, shift management also demonstrated appropriate sensitivity to a possible generic concern that potentially affected all Eu~ On November 28, during testing on IA EOG, an equipment operator reported that the load on Phase 2 was approximately 80 amperes less than Phase Because the imbalance appeared to be an anomaly, the senior nuclear shift supervisor (SNSS) contacted system engineers for technical suppor The engineers'
initial assessment was that line imbalances could damage generator insulation or cause rotor cage cracking. Subsequently, the SNSS declared all EDGs (Unit I and 2) inoperable, and requested that system engineers evaluate the effects of operating EDGs with phase loading imbalances and conduct internal inspections of the generator The SNSS issued a voluntary 4-hour report to the NRC, and appropriately established containment integrity for Unit 2 per Technical Specification 3.8.2.2. Action statement. Senior management notified Hope Creek management of the issue and the possible effect it could have on their diesel On November 29, operators measured phase current on all four station vital power transformers to determine if the current imbalance existed on the 4KV vital power system, or if it originated in the EO Operators concluded the imbalance existed on the electrical gri On December 2, operators suspended EOG inspections after I) the inspections performed on IA and 2C EDGs did not produce indications of rotor overheating or generator damage, and 2) system engineers completed calculations that indicated the generators could accept up
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to 180 ampere phase current imbalance. Shift management subsequently returned the EDGs to operable status. Engineers later revised the imbalance limit to 240 ampere Inspectors noted the operator that initially identified the current imbalance displayed a good questioning attitud The SNSS correctly recognized the potential effect on IA EDG operability and the possible generic implications of the issue. Senior plant management also demonstrated sensitivity to generic implication The inspectors concluded Salem operators responded well to the issu.3 Operability Determination Operators inappropriately based operability of the lB emergency diesel generator (EOG} on survei 11 ance results. Operations management di sc*overed the inappropriate conclusion, and made an appropriate operability determination based on an assessment of the impact of the frequency oscillations on EDG performanc During a surveillance on the no. lB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG},
operators observed small frequency oscillations. The operators completed the surveillance, and concluded that the EDG remained operable based on meeting the acceptance criteri An Operations assistant manager reviewed the test results and determined that operators had incorrectly concluded that successful completion of the surveillance adequately addressed the effect of the frequency oscillations on EDG operabilit The manager appropriately concluded that the oscillations did not affect operability since they remained within acceptable limit.0 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE Maintenance The inspectors observed portions of the following safety-related maintenance to learn if the licensee conducted the activities in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrial codes and standard The inspector observed portions of the following activities:
Salem 1 Salem 1 Work Order(WO} or Design Change Package (DCP)
WO 950916153 WO 950905138 Description lC 230V Motor Control Center Bus Bolt Replacement lC 230V Diesel Generator Vital Motor Control Center Inspection
Salem 1 WO 951212329 Salem 1 WO 961108008 Salem 1 WO 950216081 Salem 1 WO 950913288 Salem 1 WO 950830356 Salem 1 DCP lEC-3322 Salem 1 DCP lEC-3323
No. 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor Removal No. 12 Safety Injection Pump Bearing Inspection No. 12 Component Cooling Pump Discharge Header Crossover MOV Overload Heater Replacement Service Water Bay No. 1 Piping Replacement No. 1 safety injection boron injection tank outlet MOV VOTES testing Service Water Pipe Replacement For No. 11 CCHX Room Install New Cross-tie Piping in Service Water Bay No. 1 The inspectors observed that the plant staff performed the maint~nance effectively within the requirements of the station maintenance program. Surveillance The inspectors performed detailed technical procedure reviews, observed surveillances, and reviewed completed surveillance packages. The inspectors verified that plant staff did the surveillance tests in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications and NRC regulation The inspector reviewed the following surveillances:
Unit Procedure N Test Salem I Sl.OP-ST.DG-0001 IA Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Salem 1 Sl.OP-ST.DG-0002 IB Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Salem 2 S2.0P-ST.DG-0003 2C Diesel Generator Surveillance Test The inspectors observed that plant staff did the surveillances safely, effectively proving operability of the associated systems.
.,........... IA Emergency Diesel Generator Overspeed As a result of a malfunction, the no. IA emergency diesel generator (EOG)
maximum design speed was exceeded during an overspeed surveillanc Maintenance performed an in-depth EDG failure analysis and inspectio The EOG overspeed had minimal safety significance due to the plant condition (defueled with offsite power, and no. IB and no. IC EDGs available) and no resultant damage to the no. IA diesel engine or generato The EDG overspeed is an inspection followup item pending NRC review of root cause analysi (IFI 50-272&311/95-21-01)
On November IS, I995, operators performed SI.OP-ST.DG-OOI6, IA Diesel Generator Overspeed Trip Tes Moments after test initiation, the IA EDG failed to shut down on overspeed as expecte The Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS), realizing the EOG failed*to trip as designed, directed the th~ottle linkage operator to release the throttle lever. The throttle linkage operator released the lever, the throttle linkage returned to the minimum fuel position, and the EDG shut dow The highest speed recorded during the test was 125I rpm, exceeding the maximum design speed of II25 rp Engineering personnel identified misalignment and wear of the fuel pump control shaft collar and overspeed trip device reset shaft collar. They also determined that this condition allowed the throttle linkage operator to override the trip device and overspeed the ED Maintenance personnel, in concurrence with the system manager and EOG vendor, performed an in-depth inspection of EOG components susceptible to overspeed damag This inspection verified that the overspeed condition did.not cause any EOG damag Maintenance personnel repaired the overspeed clutch assembl The Operations Department satisfactorily conducted the IA EOG overspeed trip device surveillanc *
The inspector noted the lack of timeliness (> 60 days) of the root cause analysi In addition, the maintenance department scneduled overspeed clutch assembly inspections of the remaining Unit I and Unit 2 EDGs in future EDG outage windows and planned to complete the inspection prior to further overspeed testing and prior to restart. However, delay in inspecting other EDGs for potential common cause degradation did not affect plant safety due to plant conditions (both units defueled). ENGINEERING Defective SBM Switch In response to a defective General Electric SBM switch associated with a vital 4I60V circuit breaker. engineering personnel demonstrated effective teamwork, proper safety focus, and good technical assessmen Engineers identtfied potential generic concerns, reviewed equipment history and operating experience, and initiated inspection of related equipment in a timely manne The inspectors concluded that the improved engineering response to the degraded condition resulted from better performance standards implemented by the current engineering management.
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On November 2, during a scheduled lA vital bus outage, project engineers discovered that a General Electric Type SBM switch on one of "-t,~ vital 4 KV feeder breakers had a broken cam follower on an unused contac The contact was one of six within the switc None of the other contacts had broken cam follower Project engineers issued a Condition Report against the defective component that resulted in system engineers performing follow up inspections of the switch. Subsequently, system engineers concluded there was a possible generic failure concern (cracking of the cam follower) that could potentially affect breaker operation. The engineers noted that a broken cam follower would prevent its respective breaker from closing or openin System engineers contacted industry sources, reviewed switch maintenance history, and performed an operating experience feedback search for information concerning the failur Based upon the information they gathered, engineers concluded there was not a failure history with the switch at Salem; however, they identified similar failures at other sites. Subsequently, engineering personnel immediately identified systems where SBM switches had critical application Inspection of these systems uncovered no defective switche Engineers will complete a comprehensive system review of nonessential applications by mid February. Maintenance Department personnel will replace all SBM switches prior to restarting the unit The inspector noted the continuity from initial problem identification to inspection of the switch demonstrated good teamwork between project engineers and system engineers. System engineers then showed appropriate sensitivity to indications of a possible generic concern with switch operatio In addition, system engineers appropriately considered the switch's design purpose in determining what effect the degraded component could have on the plant._. This analysis contrasted with previous engineering performance that accepted use of degraded component.2 Service Water Degradation During the inspection period, river debris, icing and silt buildup challenged Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water (SW) on three occasions. There had also been recent challenges to service water and the non-safety related and seismic class III construction of the instruments and controls associated with the SW traveling screen As a result, the inspectors questioned the ability of the SW system to provide an adequate supply of cooling water to the reactor safeguard and auxiliary equipment under all credible seismic, flood, drought, and storm conditions perform as stated in UFSAR section 9.2.1.1. This issue remains open pending NRC review of corrective action stemming from the Salem Condition Report associated with this issue. (IFI 50-272&311/95-21-02)
On December 28, 1995, a large mass of river grass caused Unit 1 control room screen wash trouble (high traveling screen differential pressure) and strainer (high differential pressure) alarms. Operators noted that SW header pressure dropped to 60 psig before the automatic start of another SW pump restored header pressur On January 7, 1996, buildup of grass and ice caused a high differential pressure (d/p) across the traveling screen of the operating Unit 1 SW pum The SW screen would not operate in auto or test due to the buildup
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of ice and grass. Operators started another SW pum Again, the related SW screen ~J:*1~ not run in auto or test. Service water ~ead~r pressure decreased rapidly from 90 psig to 27 psig. Operators started a third SW pump and observed header pressure increase to 100 psi Licensee Event Report (LER) 78-13/0lT documented a significant degradation in the Salem Unit 1 service water system on January 11, 197 Engineers*
identified two possible causes of the event: (1) random chance simultaneous failure of four shear pins or (2) ingestion of river ice and subsequent binding of the strainer backwash ar The LER stated:
"It is concluded that there is a reasonable chance that a failure mechanism exists which could prevent the service water system from fulfilling its design basis safety function. This mechanism is the ingestion of fine floating ice from the river due to the weir effects of siltation buildup. This mechanism can be effectively eliminated through siltation level control. A siltation inspection program is being implemented to prevent silt depths from exceeding three feet in any pump bay" During a January 13, 1996, Salem Unit 2 silt inspection, engineers found a 10 foot buildup of silt, corresponding to 80 feet above the PSE&G datu The lowest credible water level for service water is 76 feet above datu Engineers concluded that, had the postulated low tide occurred, a four foot tall dam of silt would have blocked service water from entering the ba They also noted that plant staff inspects service water bays for silt buildup every 92 days, typically finding about a three foot buildup of silt if the inspection is conducted regularly. Prior to the January 13, 1996 inspection, plant staff had not previously performed the inspection since September 29, 1995. They documented the silt buildup in a Condition Report (CR).
Engineers concluded that the silt buildup did not impose an immediate safety concern because both units were defuele The Salem UFSAR, Section 9.2.1.1, states that the service water system is designed to supply an adequate supply of cooling water to the reactor safeguard and auxiliary equipment under all credible seismic, flood, drought, and storm condition In addition, UFSAR Section 9.2.1.2 states that the service water system is designed for class I (seismic) conditions except for the turbine area service water piping outside of the service water intake structure. The traveling screen motors and low pressure permissive switches are not safety related and are seismic class III. Given the recent challenges to service water from grass, debris, silt, and ice, and the non-iafety related and seismic class III construction of the instruments and controls associated with the SW traveling screens, the inspectors questioned the ability of the SW system to perform its design function under worst case condition In addition, the Salem Individual Plant Examination (IPE) stated that the loss of service water event tree sequences were assumed to lead to core damage if the service water system is not recovered within one hou The loss of service water system initiator contributes 2.7% to the total core damage frequency for Salem Unit 1 (2.2% for Salem Unit 2). The inspector noted that in performing this analysis engineering staff based the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
on Salem experience during the years 1982 - 198 No loss of service water
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(partial or temporary) events occurred during this tim Based on recent plant experience the risk 3.ssociated with a loss of set vice water may be even higher than initially assume.3 Engineering Backlog Performance Indicators Based on a review of engineering backlog performance indicators (Pis), the inspector concluded that the current system allows engineeri~g staff and management to effectively monitor trends in the engineering backlog, including work completion, and to assess the impact of the engineering backlog on plant safet.0 PLANT SUPPORT Radiological Controls In response to several instances of radiation workers forgetting their radiation monitoring devices (Alnors) when entering the radiologically controlled area, radiological controls staff initiated a Condition Report and implemented several corrective actions. Because of the duplication of dosimetry, no unmonitored exposure occurred. After RC staff implemented the corrective actions, a worker again entered the RCA without an Alno The effectiveness of the corrective actions remain unresolved pending NRC review of licensee response to the additional occurrences. (UNR 50-272&311/95-21-03)
~ Radiological *waste Shipment
Radiological Controls staff responded quickly and appropriately to notification that the cover blew off a radiological waste shipment enroute to a disposal site. The shipment contained used tools with low-level contamination that Salem staff had wrapped individuall No contamination of the shipping container or the environment occurred as a result of the individual wrapping of the part.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION The Significant Event Response Team (SERT) 95-02 report, the Addendum to the report, and the associated Licensee Event Report identified a number of significant discrete performance and equipment deficiencies associated with the June 1995 Salem Unit 2 shutdown. The Addendum, and the LER also identified a number of long-standing programmatic weaknesse The Corrective Action Review Board (CARB), however, made the observations of the underlying causes of the programmatic weaknesses contained in the Addendum and the LER containe For example.the SERT 95-02 Addendum contained the question, posed by the CARB: "Why did the operators have a minimum operating philosophy stating - 'the RH29 valves are not required in this mode.'" The answer, given by the SERT supplied the statements given by the operators for considering the RH29 valves operabl The SERT did not provide the cause for the minimum operating philosophy - low operator standards established by correspondingly low management expectations. Clearly, CARB understood the root cause of the poor operator performance, and the SERT did no In the addendum, SERT
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concluded that Salem demonstrated acceptance for degraded equipment conditions and ineffective corrective action "because management established an environment in which the resolution of equipment issues and personnel accountability to follow up and correct these issues was diminished." The SERT reached this conclusion at the prompting of the CAR The inspectors concluded that the environment that tolerated low standards existed because the senior management had low standards for accepting degraded conditions and inappropriately accepted ineffective corrective action The SERT, the Addendum, and the LER discuss inadequate management oversight, yet they did not recommend corrective action for managemen Similarly, the SERT 95-03 report, concerning the October 1995 Salem unit 1 loss of overhead annunciators, identified unacceptable performance, but did not address underlying cause For example, the SERT did not identify the cause of the inappropriate operator conclusion that Salem did not ne*ed additional public attention drawn to the facility by declaring an ALERT, or the root cause of inadequate management oversight of emergency preparedness and the corrective action proces The CARB review again identified the fundamental underlying weaknesse For example, the SERT team incorrectly concluded that operators inappropriately declared an ALERT after the fact, since they had restored the overhead annunciator syste The CARB (and the SERT manager, a member of the new management team) concluded that the overhead annunciators remained inoperable since plant staff had not determined the cause of the failure or verified the effectiveness of the corrective actio The CARB noted that the SERT ineffectively assessed the operability of the overhead annunciators in the same way the operators had assessed i The SERT~ demonstrated that the Salem staff as it existed up to October 1995 had been unable to identify and correct unacceptable performanc The CARB, on the other hand, clearly demonstrated the ability to recognize the causes for unacceptable performanc The inspectors concluded that SERTs did not result in effective self-assessment, but (as demonstrated by CARB) the new management demonstrated the ability to perform critical self assessment and hold the Salem staff to high standards of performanc In addition, the Salem Restart Plan contains actions intended to insure that management imparts the high standards in all levels of Salem staf.0 REVIEW OF REPORTS AND OPEN ITEMS The inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to determine whether the licensee took the corrective actions stated in the report, detect if the licensee responded to the events adequately, and ascertain if regulatory requirements and commitments were appropriately addressed:
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Unit 1 Number Event Date LER 95-026 October 23, 1995 LER 95-027 December 11, 1976 LER 95-028 September 20, 1995 Description Main steam safety valves failed lift set tes Operation of positive displacement pump during a safety injectio Inadequate technical specification 6. program for primary cool ant source*s outside containmen The inspectors determined that the LERs listed above do not warrant further inspection or enforcement action and considered the LERs close.0 EXIT INTERVIEWS/MEETINGS Resident Exit Meeting The inspectors met with Mr. C. Bakken and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of the inspection report period to summarize the scope and*
findings of their inspection activitie Based on NRC Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2 restriction.2 Licensee Management Changes Senior management made the following personnel changes: on November 13, John Holden became the Station Planning Manager; on November 27, Eric Salowitz became the Director, Nuclear Business Support.