IR 05000271/2011009
| ML111310742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2011 |
| From: | Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Michael Colomb Vermont Yankee |
| Shared Package | |
| ML111300168 | List: |
| References | |
| IR-11-009 | |
| Download: ML111310742 (28) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUGLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD KlNG OF PRUSSTA. PA 19406.1415 May 13, 2017 Mr. Michael Colomb Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station 185 Old Ferry Road P.O. Box 500 Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500 SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE - NRc TEMPORARY tNSTRUcIoN 2s1st1a3 tNSPECTlON REPORT 0500027 1 t201 1 009
Dear Mr. Colomb:
On April 22,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee), using Temporary lnstruction 25151183,."Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Dimage Event." The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on 4pri122,2011, with Mr. Wamser, General Manager, Plant Operations, Mr. Rademacher, Director, Engineering, and other members of your staff.
The objective of this inspection was to promptly assess the capabilities of Vermont Yankee to respond to extraordinary consequences similar to those that have recently occurred at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. The results from this inspection, along with the lesults from this inspection performed at other operating commercial nuclear plants in the United States will be used to evaluate the United States nuclear industry's readiness to safely respond to similar events. These results will also help the NRC to determine if additional regulatory actions are warranted.
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report. You are not required to respond to this letter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
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Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-271 License No.: DPR-28
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 0500027 112011009
REGION I Docket No.: 50-271 License No.: DPR-28 Report No.: 050002711201 1009 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Facility: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Location: Vernon, Vermont 05354-9766 Dates: April 4, 2011 through April 22,2011 lnspectors: J. Bream, Physical Security lnspector, DRS A. Ziedonis, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, DRP Approved by: Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
]R 050002711201100905000; 0410412011 - 0412212011; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station; Temporary Instruction 25151183 - Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event.
This report covers an announced Temporary Instruction (Tl) inspection. The inspection was conducted by a resident inspector and a region based inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
INSPECTION SCOPE
The intent of the Tl is to provide a broad overview of the industry's preparedness for events that may exceed the current design basis for a plant. The focus of the Tl was on
- (1) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate consequences from large fires or explosions on site,
- (2) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions,
- (3) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events accounted for by the station's design, and
- (4) assessing the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. lf necessary, a more specific followup inspection will be performed at a later date.
INSPECTION RESULTS
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this report. The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented by the NRC in a separate report.
03.01 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events, typically bounded by security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident management guidelines and as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh). Use Inspection Procedure (lP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guideline. lf lP 71111.05T was recently performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of inspection. Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel pool. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Licensee Action Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment.
Verify through test or The licensee performed walkdowns of active and passive equipment identified in the pre-inspection that established mitigating procedures for B.5.b and in severe accident management guidelines equipment is available (SAMG). The licensee performed inventories of active and passive equipment to verify that and functional. Active equipment required to implement B.5.b and SAMG procedures was available. The licensee equipment shall be reviewed preventive maintenance tasks, as applicable, to ensure tasks were up to date and the tested and passive equipment was available and functional. Active equipment such as pumps and portable equipment shall be generators were run to verify readiness. Additionally, the 8.5.b and SAMG procedures were walked down and verified current and staged in the appropriate locations.
inspected. lt is not expected that permanently installed equipment that is tested Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness (e.9., observed a test, reviewed under an existing test results, discussed actions, reviewed records, etc.).
regulatory testing program be retested.
The inspectors performed walkdowns of licensee equipment with a knowledgeable licensed senior This review should be reactor operator to assess the adequacy of installed and portable equipment staged explicitly for done for a reasonable implementation of the mitigation strategies. The inspectors also assessed the adequacy of the sample of mitigatinE equipment storage locations for survivability and to identify any potential challenges to equipment strategies/eq uipment.
material condition due to environmental conditions. The inspectors'walkdown included: the portable pump and associated suction and discharge lines; portable AC generators; portable DC power supplies; portable radios and other communication equipment; hoses and nozzles; and all associated tools. The inspector walkdown included equipment inventory verification. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed surveillance test results for applicable equipment.
Inspector identified observations and deficiencies are described below.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified enhancement opportunities associated with the mitigating equipment and procedures. The inspectors reviewed the enhancements identified by the licensee and determined there were no deficiencies in mitigating equipment or procedures.
The inspectors identified three minor performance deficiencies regarding the licensee's maintenance of equipment relied upon in the B.5.b mitigation strategies.
First, the inspectors identified that the licensee did not include the fire protection hoses relied on for 8.5.b mitigating strategies into a preventive maintenance (PM) program in accordance with the PM for hoses credited specifically in the fire protection program. Hoses stored in the equipment storage boxes for B.S.b were not included into the population for required hydrostatic testing or periodic replacement in accordance with the site PM program. Based on questions raised by the inspectors, the licensee performed hydrostatic testing on the hoses and verified functionality.
Additionally, the inspectors determined that the hoses were still within their PM periodicity for replacement had they been appropriately entered into the licensee's program. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WY-2011-01625.
Second, the inspectors identified that there was no PM for the licensee to perform winter readiness preparations on the portable pump prior to the onset of below freezing temperatures.
The inspectors determined that the licensee fully drains the pump after each use and maintains the engine block heater plugged in; however, the licensee does not perform any action to stabilize the diesel fuel tank prior to the onset of freezing temperatures or long periods of pump inactivity.
The inspectors concluded, based on the licensee's actions described above and the fact that the pump did not exhibit any performance problems during the most recent pump surveillance, that the pump remained functional. Therefore, the inspectors determined that there was no loss of availability of the mitigation strategies associated with the portable pump. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WY-2011-01140.
Finally, the inspectors identified that portable nitrogen gas bottles credited for manipulation of air operated valves were not periodically inspected to verify adequate gas pressure for implementation of B.5.b mitigation strategies. When questioned by the inspectors, the licensee performed pressure checks of all the nitrogen bottles and identified that the gas pressure in all of the bottles was below the nominal pressure rating on the equipment inventory list. However, the gas pressure in all of the bottles was above the required pressure necessary in the B.5.b implementing procedure. Therefore, the inspectors determined that there was no loss of availability of the mitigation strategies associated with the portable nitrogen bottles. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WY-2011-01648.
The inspectors determined that the above issues were three examples of minor performance deficiencies with a common theme in that the licensee did not maintain equipment in accordance with guidance provided in NEI 06-12, Specifically, that "equipment associated with B.5.b mitigation strategies will meet industry practices for procuring and maintaining commercial equipment." In all three instances above, the equipment was determined to be functional and the inspectors did not identify any adverse impact to the availability of any B.5.b mitigating strategies.
Describe the licensee's actions to verify that procedures are in place and can be executed (e.9.,
Licensee Action walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.).
Verify through Licensee personnel performed walkdowns of all 8.5.b and severe accident mitigation strategies to walkdowns or verify that procedures in place were executable. The licensee walkdowns included an demonstration that assessment of the amount and type of stored equipment to verify the 8.5.b and severe accident procedures to implement mitigation strategies were adequate.
the strategies associated with B.5.b One licensee-identified procedural weakness is described below under the discussion of general and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) results.
are in place and are executable. Licensees may choose not to connect or operate Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed. Assess whether procedures were permanently installed in place and could be used as intended.
equipment during this verification.
The inspectors selected a sample of B.5.b and severe accident mitigation strategies for walkdown This review should be with a knowledgeable licensed senior reactor operator to assess: the adequacy and completeness done for a reasonable of the procedures; familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; sample of mitigating staging and compatibility of equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by strateg ies/eq uipment.
the procedures.
One inspector identified observation is described below.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspectors identified an enhancement in the mitigating strategy for operation of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump without DC power, coincident with the operation of two Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) safety relief valves (SRV) for reactor vessel pressure control and/or depressurization to evaluate and prioritize continued reactor pressure vessel controlwhile operating RCIC in an adverse environment. The inspectors determined that no performance deficiency was associated with this observation, because the procedural actions were adequate to ensure successful operation of RCIC, and the SRVs would have operated at their designed mechanical relief set points absent of DC control power. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WY-2011-01643.
The licensee identified a vulnerability in that additional portable equipment could be needed in order to implement sections of the 8.5.b mitigation strategies than what was specified in procedures. Specifically, the licensee identified that portable hand pumps would be needed to get gasoline and diesel fuel out of onsite storage tanks during a loss of AC power. The licensee identified that there were additional sources of gasoline and diesel fuel in other locations onsite, not listed in the B.S.b mitigation strategies, which did not require the use of AC power such that there was no adverse impact to the 8.5.b mitigating strategies. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WY-2011-01225.
The inspectors determined this to be a minor issue because the licensee would have been able to obtain gasoline and diesel fuel from other onsite sources without adversely impacting strategy objectives. Therefore, the inspectors determined that there was no unrecoverable unavailability of the mitigation strategies. Based on the reviews conducted, the inspector concluded that procedures to implement the strategies associated with B.5.b and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) are in place and are executable.
Describe the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding training and qualifications of operators Licensee Action and support staff.
c. Verify the training and qualifications of The licensee conducted initial and continued B.5.b training and verified that training was operators and the completed. Additionally, the licensee verified that all required operations personnel have received support staff needed to initialand continuing SAMG training. The licensee reviewed training records and documentation implement the to ensure that the training was up to date. Personnel with incomplete or missing qualifications procedures and work were identified and training was performed or scheduled.
instructions are current for activities related to Security Order Section B.S.b and severe Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess training and qualifications of operators and support staff.
accident management guidelines as required The inspectors reviewed training records for 8.5.b and SAMG personnel training. ln addition, the by 10 cFR s0.54 (hh).
inspectors reviewed licensed and non-licensed operator initial and periodic training materials including: lesson plans, training presentations, lecture notes, and in field job performance training records. Finally, the inspectors observed one sample of licensed and non-licensed operator requalification training involving field walkdowns for implementation of B.5.b mitigating strategies.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
No deficiencies were identified by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed licensee condition reports that were generated for any licensee personnel with missing or incomplete qualification records and determined that all NRC required training was completed appropriately.
The inspector concluded that the training and qualifications of operators and the support staff needed to implement the procedures and work instructions are current for activities related to Security Order Section B.S.b and severe accident management guidelines as required by 10 CFR 50.54 (hh).
Describe the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding applicable agreements and contracts Licensee Action are in place.
d. Verify that any applicable agreements The licensee verified that agreements from municipal fire departments and other commitments for and contracts are in various pieces of support equipment required to implement the strategies were in place in place and are capable of accordance with the requirements of the station emergency plan. The licensee verified that meeting the conditions vendors and suppliers referenced in the mitigation strategies were still capable of supplying needed to mitigate the assumed services and that contact information was accurate. Additionally, the licensee identified consequences of these additional suppliers as appropriate.
events.
This review should be For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with offsite entities, done for a reasonable describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and contracts are in place and current (e.9.,
sample of mitigatinE confirm that offsite fire assistance agreement is in place and current).
strategies/eq uipment.
The inspector verified that the licensee had in place current memoranda of understanding with off-site agencies to provide assistance in mitigation strategies. The inspectors reviewed the agreements to verify that they were current, and to assess whether or not they were adequate to meet the licensee's mitigation strategies.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified that the Contingency Resource List contained in the B.5.b mitigation strategies, which identifies offsite resources that can be utilized in an emergency event, contained incorrect contact information for some of the offsite companies. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-WY-2011-01215 and promptly corrected the inaccurate information.
The inspectors reviewed the above CR to identify potential impacts to the licensee's mitigation strategies. The inspectors noted that the inaccurate information that the licensee identified related predominately to local businesses that could provide supplemental supplies and equipment and in each case the list contained other contacts that could provide the same service. No significant impacts were identified, and the inspectors determined that applicable agreements and contracts were in place and were capable of meeting the conditions needed to mitigate the consequences of these events.
Licensee Action Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems noted by the licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating strategy.
e. Review any open l l The licensee entered several issues into their corrective action program in response to issues corrective action l l identified during their review and the NRC inspection. These corrective actions are listed in the documents to assess I I attachment.
problems with mitigating strategy implementation l l The inspectors reviewed the above CRs to identify potential impacts to the licensee's mitigation identified by the l l strategies. The licensee entered identified issues into their corrective action program in licensee. Assess the l l accordance with procedures and identified corrective actions or compensatory actions as impact of the problem on l l appropriate. The inspector determined that none of the CRs identified during the inspection the mitigating capability l l significantly impacted the potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating strategy.
and the remaining capability that is not impacted.
03.02 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate SBO conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating Current Power," and station design, is functional and valid. Refer to Tl 25151120, "lnspection of lmplementation of Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action ltem A-22" as a guideline. lt is not intended that Tl 25151120 be completely reinspected. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Describe the licensee's actions to verify the adequacy of equipment needed to mitigate an SBO Licensee Action event.
a. Verify through walkdowns and The licensee conducted walkdowns and inspections to verify that all required equipment to inspection that all mitigate station blackout was properly staged, tested and maintained.
required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and maintained.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
The inspectors reviewed design and licensing basis documentation to determine the licensee's coping analysis for station blackout conditions under the station's current licensing basis. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of in plant equipment to verify proper storage locations and inventories of staged equipment for SBO mitigation. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of permanently installed equipment to verify alignments credited in the SBO procedure could be achieved. Finally, the inspectors discussed station blackout coping with staff engineers and operators, to assess the licensee's readiness for the station to cope with blackout conditions.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee verified that equipment required for mitigation of an SBO was properly staged and maintained.
The inspectors identified no concerns or observations related to this inspection area.
Licensee Action Describe the licensee's actions to verify the capability to mitigate an SBO event.
b. Demonstrate through walkdowns that The licensee identified procedures utilized in response to an SBO and performed an assessment procedures for response to verify procedural adequacy. The licensee performed walkdowns of the procedure to verify to an SBO are procedural steps were adequate and performable.
executable.
Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors assessed the licensee's capability to mitigate SBO conditions though walkdowns of in plant equipment and a review of surveillance records and system health reports for equipment required to mitigate an SBO condition including: station batteries, the Vernon Tie Line, RCIC, and onsite emergency power supplies. The walkdowns included areas of the plant where operator actions would be required to establish alternate equipment alignments.
Additionally, the inspectors conducted a tour of the Vernon Hydroelectric Station to assess the capability to black start the facility during a regional blackout to provide emergency power to Vermont Yankee. The purpose of the tour was also to confirm assumptions in the SBO design basis concerning the ability to restore power within the established coping time.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified additional areas where permanent in-plant equipment could be relied upon to supply a mitigation function in the event of an SBO, including the identification of additional power supplies.
The licensee entered the following issues into their corrective action program in response to issues identified during their review and the NRC inspection.
.
CR-WY-2011-01143; Contact phone number for National Grid in Loss of Normal Power procedure was not correct
.
CR-WY-2011-01214; Copies of current revisions of diagrams are not maintained in the Control Room
.
CR-WY-2011-01274: Procedure enhancements identified for Loss of Normal Power, Station Blackout procedure
.
CR-WY-2011-01735; Determine under what circumstances breaker at Vernon Hydro substation will open during an SBO event (NRC ldentified)
The inspectors reviewed the above CRs to identify potential impacts to the licensee's mitigation strategies. No significant impacts were identified.
03.03 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Refer to lP 71111.01, "Adverse Weather Protection," Section 02.04, "Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding" as a guideline. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through walkdowns and inspections that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged. These walkdowns and inspections shall include verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functional.
Describe the licensee's actions to verify the capability to mitigate existing design basis flooding Licensee Action events.
Verify through walkdowns and The licensee performed walkdowns and inspections to verify that all required material and inspection that all equipment to mitigate internal and externalflooding events required by the station's design basis required materials are were properly staged, adequate, and maintained. The licensee's walkdowns and inspections adequate and properly included verification that accessible doors, barriers and penetration seals were functional.
staged, tested, and maintained.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors reviewed design and licensing basis documentation to examine the licensee's design basis requirements for mitigating internal and externalflooding events. The inspectors conducted internal and external flood protection walkdowns to assess the station's capability to meet flood protection design basis requirements, and to verify that required equipment was properly staged. The inspectors also discussed station flood protection design requirements with staff engineers and operators to ensure that required equipment was properly tested and maintained.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspector concluded that all required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and maintained to respond to an internal or external flood within the plant's design basis. While no operability or significant concerns were identified, the licensee identified issues with: the testing of portable flood contingency pumps; the storage and use of sandbags as a flood barrier; and several other minor internalflooding enhancement opportunities. The licensee appropriately entered these issues into their corrective action program, as listed in the Supplemental lnformation Attachment to this report. The inspector reviewed the associated condition reports and determined that the licensee's initial responses, including their assessment and prioritization, were appropriate.
03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. Assess the licensee's development of any new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.9., entered it in to the corrective action program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns and inspections of important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures, and fire and flood response equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important function. Use lP 71111.21, "Component Design Basis lnspection," Appendix 3, "Component Walkdown Considerations," as a guideline to assess the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections.
Describe the licensee's actions to assess the potential impact of seismic events on the availability Licensee Action of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategies.
Verify through walkdowns that all The licensee performed walkdowns of equipment relied on for the mitigation of fire and flood events required materials are to identify potential equipment vulnerabilities to seismic events. Seismic vulnerabilities, including adequate and properly storage locations, were identified, and issues were entered into the licensee's corrective action staged, tested, and program to assess mitigation strategies.
maintained.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors conducted multiple walkdowns of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during the seismic event credible for the site. The inspector determined that the licensee meets the current licensing and design basis for 8.5.b, fire protection, and flooding.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Briefly summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of their reviews.
The licensee's review identified that fire protection equipment, as well as portable equipment used to mitigate a flood, were not stored in seismically qualified locations. Additionally, the licensee identified that some non-safety related batteries were not seismically supported or restrained. The licensee initiated WTVry-2O11-00159 to generate and document a mitigation strategy to compensate for non-seismic design aspects of the fire protection system.
The licensee entered the following issues into their corrective action program in response to issues identified during their review:
. CR-WY-2011-01233; Primary fire brigade equipment room not seismically protected
. CR-WY-2011-01234; Turbine building equipment storage not seismically secured
. CR-WY-2011-01340; Emergency response information system batteries are not seismically restrained
. CR-WY-2011-01474; Portable equipment used to mitigate external flooding is stored in a non-seismic building
. CR-WY-2011-1683; Condensate transfer pumps were omitted from licensee reviews of flooding events and seismic vulnerabilities (NRC identified)
The inspectors identified that the licensee's credited fire safe shutdown alternate power supply from the Vernon Hydroelectric Station, which is also the SBO power supply, was not seismically qualified. The licensee added this issue into their corrective action program under WTWY-2011-00159. The inspectors concluded the licensee meets the current design and licensing bases for Appendix R power supply and SBO. In addition, the NRC established an agency Task Force following the events in Japan to conduct a near term evaluation of the need for agency actions on various issues, including SBO.
The inspectors determined that the current seismic susceptibility of the equipment relied on to mitigate fire and flood events were beyond the current licensing and design bases for Vermont Yankee.
Meetinqs 4OAO Exit Meetino The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Wamser, Mr. Rademacher, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 22, 2011. Proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection was returned to the licensee. The inspectors verified the inspection report does not contain proprietary information.
A-1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
Robert Wanczyk, Licensing Manager
Jim Devincentis, Licensing Engineer
Patrick Ryan, Security Manager
Wayne Manning, Control Room Supervisor
Derek Jones, Assistant Operations Manager
William Pittman, Assistant Operations Manager
Jim Rogers, Design Engineering Manager
Dan Jefferies, Electrical Engineering Supervisor
Alan Robertshaw, Mechanical Design Engineer
Paul Johnson, Electrical Design Engineer
TransCanada (Vernon Hvdro Station)
George
- R. Boothby, Director - U.S. Power
Joseph Avery, Connecticut River Area Manager, NEUS Hydro
Earl Brissette, Business lmprovement Manager, Vernon Hydro Station
Nuclear Reoulatorv Commission
Wayne Schmidt, Senior Reactor Analyst
William Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst
Christopher Cahill, Senior Reactor Analyst
James Kim, Project Manager
Other