IR 05000271/2005003

IR 05000271-05-003 on 04/01/05 - 06/30/05 for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station; Routine Integrated Report

ML052020003
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	07/20/2005
From:	Anderson C NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Thayer J Vermont Yankee
References
IR-05-003
Download: ML052020003 (21)

Text

July 20, 2005

SUBJECT:

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000271/2005003

Dear Mr. Thayer:

On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY). The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 11, 2005, with members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Clifford J. Anderson, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000271/2005003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

Mr. Jay

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000271/2005003; 04/01/05 - 06/30/05; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station; Routine

Integrated Report.

This report covered a 13-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional senior health physicist. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649,

"Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B.

Licensee-Identified Findings None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station began the inspection period operating at or near full power. On April 25, 2005, operators reduced reactor power to approximately 80% at the request of the electrical grid operator. Power was restored to approximately 100% later that day and, with the exception of power reductions for control rod pattern adjustments and turbine valve testing, continued at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

1. Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

On June 6, the inspectors reviewed actions taken by Entergy in response to a tornado watch for the area. The inspectors reviewed Vermont Yankee Operating Procedure (OP) 3127, Natural Phenomena, and emergency action levels (EALs) to ensure any applicable actions were taken. The inspectors also discussed the weather situation and status of safety related equipment with the operations shift manager to ensure he was aware of the potential for severe weather and equipment was available, if needed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

1. Complete Equipment Alignment (71111.04S)

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment walkdown of accessible portions of the reactor building closed cooling water system, with a focus on the portions of the system that would be required for alternate cooling. The inspectors compared the actual equipment alignment to approved piping and instrumentation drawings, operating procedures, and the system description in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The inspectors observed valve positions, the availability of power supplies, and the general condition of the system to verify any deficiencies were identified and did not affect the operability of the system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Partial Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

(three samples)

The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns of risk-significant systems to verify system alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could impact system operability. Observed plant conditions were compared to the standby alignment of equipment specified in Entergys system operating procedures. The inspectors also observed valve positions, the availability of power supplies, and the general condition of selected components to verify there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the alignment of the following systems:

• The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during planned high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) maintenance on May 24, 2005;

• The HPCI, main feedwater, control rod drive, and automatic depressurization systems during RCIC system valve packing replacement on June 3; and

• The A train of the standby liquid control (SLC) system during planned maintenance on the B train of SLC on June 21.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

(twelve samples)

The inspectors identified twelve fire areas and zones important to plant risk based on a review of Entergys Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis for Vermont Yankee and the Individual Plant Examination External Events (IPEEE). The inspectors toured these plant areas in order to verify the suitability of Entergys control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, and to evaluate the material condition and operational status of fire protection systems, equipment, and barriers. In addition, the inspectors discussed attributes of several of the areas with the fire protection engineer. The following fire areas (FAs), fire zones (FZs) and combustion free zones (CFZs) were inspected:

• Torus room, 213 foot elevation, North (FZ RB1);

• Torus room, 213 foot elevation, South (FZ RB2);

• Reactor building, 252 foot elevation, North (FZ RB3);

• Reactor building, 252 foot elevation, South (FZ RB4);

• Reactor building, 252 foot elevation - S1 cable trays (CFZ-3/4);

• Reactor building, 252 foot elevation - S2 cable trays (CFZ-3/4);

• Reactor building, 280 foot elevation, North (FZ RB5);

• Reactor building, 280 foot elevation, South (FZ RB7);

• Reactor building, 280 foot elevation, recirc motor generator area (SZ RB-MG)

• Reactor building, 303 foot elevation (FZ RB7);

• Turbine building, all areas (FA TB); and

• Relay house - 345 KV (No fire designation).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors reviewed Entergys established flood protection barriers and procedures for coping with external flooding events. The inspectors reviewed external flooding information contained in Entergys IPEEE and compared it to required flooding actions delineated in OP 3127, Natural Phenomena. The inspectors performed walkdowns of flood-vulnerable areas and ensured equipment needed to mitigate an external flooding event (e.g., sump pumps, floor drain plugs, sand bags, etc.) was available and in working order. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of problems identified in Entergys corrective action program to verify that Entergy identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors observed a simulator examination for one operating crew to assess the performance of the licensed operators and the ability of Entergys Training and Operations Department staff to evaluate licensed operator performance. Crew performance was evaluated during simulated events involving an anticipated transient without a scram and a loss of all high pressure injection to the reactor vessel.

The inspectors evaluated the crews performance in the areas of:

• Clarity and formality of communications;

• Ability to take timely actions;

• Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;

• Procedure use;

• Control board manipulations;

• Oversight and direction from supervisors; and

• Group dynamics.

Crew performance in these areas was compared to Entergy management expectations and guidelines as presented in the following documents:

• Vermont Yankee Administrative Procedure (AP) 0151, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operations Department Personnel;

• AP 0153, Operations Department Communication and Log Maintenance; and

• Vermont Yankee Department Procedure (DP) 0166, Operations Department Standards.

The inspectors evaluated whether the crew completed the critical tasks identified in the simulator evaluation guide. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control board configurations. For any weaknesses identified, the inspectors observed Entergy evaluators to verify that they also noted the issues to be discussed with the crew.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

(two samples)

The inspectors performed one issue/problem-oriented inspection of actions taken by Entergy in response to B SLC pump packing leakage. The inspectors also performed one system/function performance history-oriented inspection of the containment continuous air monitor (CAM) system. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, system design basis documents, operating procedures, system maintenance rule scoping documents, list of historical condition reports written for the CAM and SLC systems, applicable maintenance rule functional failure determinations, and corrective actions taken in response to the equipment problems in accordance with station procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

(six samples)

The inspectors evaluated on-line risk management for five planned maintenance activities and one emergent condition. The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, work schedules, recent corrective actions, and control room logs to verify that other concurrent or emergent maintenance activities did not significantly increase plant risk. The inspectors compared reviewed items and activities to requirements listed in procedures AP 0125, "Plant Equipment," and AP 0172, "Work Schedule Risk Management - Online." The inspectors reviewed the following on-line work activities:

(Emergent) Trip of the Scobie 345 kilovolt (KV) offsite power line coincident with the Coolidge line being in a degraded condition during inclement weather;

• Planned limiting condition for operation (LCO) maintenance on the B service water pump;

• Planned LCO maintenance on cooling tower CT 2-1;

• Planned LCO maintenance on the HPCI system;

• Replacement of the five volt power supply for the rod position indicating system (RPIS); and

• Planned work, designated as high risk, in the 115 KV switchyard.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

(two samples)

The inspectors assessed the control room and in-plant operators performance during an April 25, 2005, power reduction to approximately 80% that was requested by the electrical grid operator and a June 28 power reduction to approximately 65% to support a planned control rod sequence exchange and turbine valve testing. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of personnel performance, procedure compliance, and use of the corrective action process against the requirements and expectations contained in the following station procedures:

C AP 0091, Risk Assessment Procedure - Temporary Configuration Changes; C

AP 0151, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operations Department Personnel; C

AP 0153, Operations Department Communication and Log Maintenance; and C

DP 0166, Operations Department Standards.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

(seven samples)

The inspectors reviewed seven operability determinations prepared by Entergy. The inspectors evaluated operability determinations against the requirements and guidance contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions, as well as Entergy procedure ENN-OP-104, Operability Determinations.

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the following evaluations of degraded or non-conforming conditions:

• Electrical grounds identified while running the cooling fan for the West cooling tower cell 2-1 (This cooling tower cell supports the alternate cooling system.);

• Low residual heat removal service water system pump motor bearing cooling water flow;

• Damage to alternate cooling deep basin cement wall;

• Potential for certain safety related breakers to fail to close electrically;

• RCIC steam line pressure switch root valve packing leak;

• Two broken bolts on control side vertical drive inspection cover of B emergency diesel generator (EDG); and

• Licensee identified that reactor protection system testing was not being performed as required by the Technical Specifications (TS).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

(seven samples)

The inspectors reviewed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities on risk-significant systems. The inspectors either directly observed or reviewed completed PMT documentation to verify that the test data met the required acceptance criteria contained in the TS, UFSAR, and in-service testing program. Where testing was directly observed, the inspectors evaluated whether installed test equipment was appropriate and controlled and that the test was performed in accordance with applicable station procedures. The inspectors also evaluated whether the test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability following maintenance; that systems were properly restored following testing; and that any discrepancies were appropriately documented in the corrective actions program. The inspectors reviewed the PMTs performed after the following maintenance activities were completed:

• Cooling tower fan CT 2-1 cable re-routing;

• Replacement of control side sections of the B EDG fuel oil injector camshaft;

• HPCI planned LCO maintenance;

• Planned maintenance on the A train of the standby gas treatment system;

• Replacement of the diesel driven fire pump;

• Replacement of the five volt power supply for the RPIS system; and

• Troubleshooting and repair of the feedwater master level controller.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

(seven samples)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing to evaluate whether each test was performed in accordance with the written procedure, the acceptance criteria specified for each test was consistent with the requirements of the TS and UFSAR, test data was complete and met procedural requirements, and the system was properly returned to service following the completion of testing. The inspectors observed selected pre-job briefings supporting testing. The inspectors also evaluated whether discrepancies identified were entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors evaluated whether testing in accordance with the following procedures met the above requirements:

OP 4105 Fire Protection Systems Surveillance; Section D, Eighteen Month Fire Pump Operational Performance, Capacity Check and Diesel Fire Pump Alarm/Shutdown Test OP 4114 Standby Liquid Control System Surveillance; Section B, Pump Operability and Comprehensive Tests and Discharge Check Valve Test OP 4116 Secondary Containment Surveillance; Section A, Secondary Containment Capability Test OP 4121 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Surveillance; Section C, RCIC Pump Operability and Full Flow and Comprehensive Test OP 4126 Diesel Generator Surveillance; Section B, Monthly [B] Diesel Generator Slow Start Operability Test OP 4152 Equipment and Floor Drain Sump and Totalizer Surveillance, and OP 4400 Calibration of the Average Power Range Monitoring System to Core Thermal Power

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors reviewed temporary modification (TM) 2005-004, Installation of Structural Steel Splices in Cooling Tower CT 2-1, and calculation VYC-2404, Design of Structural Member Splices on Cooling Tower CT-2 for TM 2005-004, and discussed the modification with the responsible engineer to ensure that the modification did not adversely affect the availability or functional capability of the cooling tower. The inspectors also walked down the accessible portions of CT 2-1 to verify the TM was properly maintained and there were no obvious deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors observed an operating crew evaluate a simulator-based event using the station EALs during licensed operator requalification training activities. The inspectors discussed the performance expectations and results with the lead instructor. The inspectors focused on the ability of licensed operators to perform event classification and make proper notifications in accordance with the following station procedures and industry guidance:

• AP 0153, Operations Department Communications and Log Maintenance;

• AP 0156, Notification of Significant Events;

• AP 3125, Emergency Plan Classification and Action Level Scheme;

• DP 0093, Emergency Planning Data Management;

• OP 3540, Control Room Actions During an Emergency; and

• Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS1 Gaseous and Liquid Effluents (71122.01)

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors performed an in-office review of the following documents to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs.

In addition, telephone interviews were conducted with Entergy chemistry staff and their contractors. The criteria for this review were the requirements for radioactive effluent controls as specified in the TS and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

Changes to the ODCM, Revision 29, Section 6.11, concerning direct dose calculation methodology were reviewed. This included a review of bases documents including:

Summary Report, In Situ Measurements Performed at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, published February 13, 2002, by Duke Engineering & Services Environmental Laboratory; ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1991, Neutron and Gamma-Ray Fluence-to-Dose Factors; and NISTIR 5632, Tables of X-Ray Mass Attenuation Coefficients and Mass Energy-Absorption Coefficients.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

1. Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being entered into Entergys corrective action system at an appropriate threshold and that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions. Additionally, in order to identify repetitive equipment failures and/or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Entergys corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing selected hard copies of condition reports (a listing of CRs reviewed is included in the Attachment to this report) and/or by attending daily screening meetings.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Annual Sample Review - Risk Assessment Program Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

(one sample)

The inspectors selected Entergys implementation of the risk assessment program for review based on several NRC and licensee-identified issues in the past year. The issues occurred both online and during the refueling outage and included both incorrect outage risk determinations and failures to hang a portion of critical plant equipment signs when maintenance was performed on safety-related equipment. A listing of reviewed CRs is included in the Attachment to this report. The CRs were reviewed to ensure the issues were identified accurately, appropriate evaluations were performed, and adequate corrective actions were specified and properly prioritized.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. However, the inspectors identified one corrective action, a procedure change, that was closed in the corrective action program but was not completed. The licensee subsequently wrote CR 2005-1763 to identify this issue and track the procedure change to completion. Entergys failure to complete the procedure change before closing the item in the corrective action program is a violation of Entergy procedure AP 0009, Condition Reports. The procedure violation is of minor significance because the procedure change was an improvement item which related to risk reviews performed during outages. Entergy did not have an outage in the time between the due date for the corrective action and the time the error was discovered. In addition, the issue was entered into the corrective action program. Therefore, the finding is not subject to enforcement in accordance with Section VI of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

3. Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a semi-annual trend review to identify trends, either Entergy or NRC identified, that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue.

Included within the scope of this review were:

• CRs generated from January through June 2005;

• Corrective maintenance backlog listings from January through June 2005;

• The corrective action program 4th Quarter 2004 and 1st Quarter 2005 trend reports; and

• Daily review of main control room operating logs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

1. Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/163: Operational Readiness of Offsite Power

The inspectors reviewed Entergy procedures and supporting information pertaining to offsite power availability and operability. The inspectors evaluated these procedures against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants; 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power; 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 17, Electric Power Systems; and TS. The results of this inspection were forwarded to NRR for further review. Entergy procedures and supporting information reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment to this report.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Resident Exit On July 11, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Messrs. William Maguire and John Dreyfuss and members of their staff. The inspectors asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Entergy Personnel

J. Callaghan, Design Engineering Manager

P. Corbett, Maintenance Manager

J. Dreyfuss, Director of Engineering

J. Devincentis, Licensing Manager

M. Gosekamp, Superintendent of Operations Training

M. Hamer, Licensing

M. Metell, Engineering

W. Maguire, General Plant Manager

J. Thayer, Site Vice President

C. Wamser, Operations Manager

R. Wanczyk, Director of Nuclear Safety

S. Wender, Chemistry Superintendent

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None.