IR 05000271/1990017

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Insp Rept 50-271/90-17 on 901105-09.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Activities to Ascertain Whether Licensee Activities Conducted in Compliance W/ Applicable ASME Code & Regulatory Requirements
ML20058K358
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 11/23/1990
From: Gray E, Mcbrearty R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058K356 List:
References
50-271-90-17, NUDOCS 9012170179
Download: ML20058K358 (5)


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U.'S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY < COMMISSION REGION ~I i

Report No.

.50-271/90-17

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Docket No.

50-271

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i License No.

DPR-28 l=

r Lice..see:

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

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FD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road

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Brattleboro, Vermont -05301

Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co boration-Inspection At: Vernon, Vermont inspection Conducted:

November 5-9, 1990-Inspector: W $h' W

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kW.Pl199p.

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R. A. McBrearty, React @' Engineer, Materials d~a tel and Processes Section, EB, DRS Approved by:

mi N 23/b E. H. Gray, Chief, @ Branch,- DRS l

rials and Processes'

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Section, Engineering.

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on November 5-9,1990 (Report No. 50-271/90-17).

Areas Inspected: A routine announced inspection was conducted of inservice inspection activities to ascertain whether'the-licensee's activities were

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conducted in compliance with applicable ASME~ Code and regulatory requirements.

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The results of the water chemistry program.and licensee' actions regarding

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selection and control of component materials to minimize personnel exposure to radiation were reviewed. 'In addition, the. licensee's actions regarding the e

feedwater. check valve cracking problem were reviewed..

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t Results: The~ 1nspector concluded that the licensee's activities complied with.

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applicable requirements, and that the licenss e fulfilled its commitments regarding the feedwater check valve problem.

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9012170179 901205

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{DR ADOCK 05000271 I

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DETAILS

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1.0 Persons Contacted

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation'

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D. Girroir Inservice Inspection Coordinator-

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  • R. Grippardi, Quality-Assurance Site Supervisor
  • S. Jefferson, Assistant to Plant Manager _

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  • D. Phillips, Engineering Support Supervisor-D. Reid,!P1 ant _ Manager
  • S. Skibniowsky, Chemistry Supervisor '

t D._ Weyman, Senior Environmental Program Manager U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • F. Hiltz, Resident Inspector

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2.0 Inservice Inspection Activities- (73753)

The Vermont Yankee facility _is in-the. third period of the-second tert year inspection interval.

The 1990 refueling outage was the 1st; outage of the period.

The 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI governs the_ examinations which are required to be completed during the ten year interval.

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j Refueling outage ISI plans and schedules, examination data, and NDE q

personnel qualification / certification records were selected for'

inspection to ascertain that required examinations were scheduled, the examination results.were properly documented,-evaluated and.

dispositioned, and that the' examinations were performed by' qualified.and

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certified examiners.

The " Final ISI Inspection Plan - 1990 Outage'.' listed the components which were required to be examined during the outage; For cases where,.due to

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interferences, the originally scheduled weld could not be completely

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examined, an alternate weld was identified and included in the program as

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permitted by Section XI. Augmented examinations were-identified as were components selected'as part of an expanded _. sample when mandated by code requirements based on examination results of the original sample.

Several examinations which were only partially ' completed were identified-and rescheduled for examination during the next scheduled refueling outage in 1992. Additionally, components'were identified for inclusion

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in the ten year-ISI Program which resulted.from~ plant modifications and required a baseline examination prior.to;being placed in service.

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f All pertinent and required information was documented.regarding

examination results.

The licensee ~has developed'an " Inservice Discrepancy Report"~.-(IDR)- to provide a timely response to in,ervice inspection findings identified 'during the implementation'of the ISI program. An example of the use of the report is. IDR #90-020 dated 10/8/90 which documented the use of, an incorrect calibration block for the ultrasonic examination of 20" diameter weld RH8-5234 in the RHRa '

l system. The' correct cal.ibration block was identified and the ultrasonic

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response from.each block was compared which resulted in an accept-as-is disposition.

Based on the documented results of' the comparison,' the,

. j inspector agreed with the licensee's disposition. EThe.ISI-ten year program is scheduled for revision'and the correct-calibration block wil1

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be identified by the revised' program; The qualification / certification records-of EBASCO nonJostructive:

examination: personnel confirmed that the; appl.icable requirements of

.j SNT TC-1A were> complied with.

The records furth.t confirmed that~those-

EBASCO personnel.Who m e responsible for;the uie:. sonic' examination'of

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austenitic stainless s 1-piping systems were trained and certified for-

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the detection of IGSCC.c the:EPRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina,.

I in accordance with the provisionsuof N_UREG-0313, Revision 2, and Generic Letter 88-01.

That was additionally confirmed byythe latest. edition of-the EPRI " Registry of Qualified Personnel for;UT of IGSCC" dated

October 1, 1990.

i Conclusion i

The licensee-has a system for documenting and tracking.ISI findings and j

for maintaining the status 'of the ten year program.

Code required and i

augmented examinations were performed by qualifiedLtechnicians,.and the-j examination results were properly documented.

Planning 3for the outage o

activities included the information necessary to implementLthe ISI

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program,

.l 3.0 Occupational Exposure (83750)

The' licensee's program for minimizing personnel exposure to radiationL

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includes the scheduled,-periodic replacement of control blade pins and'

rollers with non-stellite materials and the electropolishing of reactor cleanup system and-recirculation system replacement piping. -The feedwater regulat'or valves, which'were a large contributor of cobalt-into the. system, were' replaced in approximately 1980.

Maintenance

personnel who are responsible for valve maintenance are, trained and.made

l aware of precautions which should be observed when working.on stellite j

bearing valve components. Additionally, the licensee' attempts to

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maintain good water chemistry to reduce. corrosion in piping systems and

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the spread of corrosion products throughout the plant, q

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i Conclusion The-licensee has an ongoing program to. control and reduce personne1~

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exposure to. radiation including the use of non-stellite bearing _ val:!e.

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material when~possible, training of maintenance personnel, and the-effort-to maintain good plant water chemistry.

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4.0 Water Chemistry (84750)

. Water chemistry data were reviewed as part of this inspection.

The-methods of: collecting and verifying the accuracy of.these data were not-included in the scope of this inspection; The inspector. reviewed the primary water" chemistry data for the period of'

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April 1989 through August-1990 and discussed these_ data with= responsible-individuals in the'licen'see's chemistry department.

l; The average conductivity per month of the primary' water during'the period-reviewed ranged from 0.072 umho/cm to 0.093 umho/cm which was within the

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licensee's goal of 0,20 pmho/cm and the Technical Specification limit of 5 umho/cm. Chlorides were reported-as ranging from 1.0 to 20 parts per billion (ppb) 'thich is less than the level which will: initiate Action-Level 1 actions and is within the: Technical Specification'11mit of 0.1-part per million (ppm).

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Conclusion The licensee has maintained the plant primary water chemistry'within

Technical Specification limits and EPRI/BWR Owners. Group Guidelines during the last operating cycle.

5.0 Feedwater Check Valves (57080]

By letters to the NRC dated March 28,.1989 and March 16, 1990Lthe licensee-provided.an evaluation of cracks in? Vermont Yankee feedwater check valves.

The submittals contain fracture mechanics analysi.s and

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commitments to replace feedwater check valve-V28B at the next refueling outage.

During the 1990 refueling outage, valves V28A and V28B were; replaced and'

ultrasonic examination of the two-remaining-. lift check valves.(27B and-96B) was performed.

Flaws were' identified in each of the valves and flaw u

sizing techniques identified that the flaw' in valve 27B exceeds ASME code acceptance criteria, but.is within-the bounds of the flaw in' valve 288.

which was analyzed in 1989. Based on the 1989 ana' lysis the. licensee,

with NRC concurrence,.ju'dged valve 28B to be acceptable for one cycle'of.

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continued operation, j

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l The. licensee reported to the NRC its plan'to operate valve 278 for one

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additional cycle, 'and has committed-to either repair or replace. the. valve -

at the end of the cycle. Additionally, the licensee committed-to instal.1 leak monitoring tape on valve ~278.

I The inspector reviewed the ultrasonic examination data representing the-l examinations performed in.1990 and: determined that '.he flaw depth was,

arrived at by using the sizing technique taught at the EPRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina. Additionally, the rinspector' found that leak -

monitoring. tape has been installed on valve =27B.-

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is capable of detecting leakage.at the ' rate ^ of 0.1 gpm or greater and is-

'provided with an clarm in the control room.

Conclusion

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' Ultrasonic sizing of.the flaw in valve 278 was performed by qualified examiners using the11atest sizing techniques taught at the EPRI NDE.

Center at Charlotte, North Carolina.

The licensee. fulfilled its l

commitment to replace lif t check valve 28B and'also.has replaced I

valve 28A 'with swing check valves ~ during the 1990 refueling outage.

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additional commitment to install leak monitoring tape on valve 27B was l

completed during the 1990 outage.

i 6.0 Exit Meeting'

The inspector met with licensee representatives, denoted-in paragraph 1, at the end of.the inspection on November 9, 1990._ The inspector-

summarized-the scope'and findings of the inspection.

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At no time during the inspection was written material'provided by the

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inspector'to the licensee, The~ licensee did not indicate that i

proprietary information was involved within.the scope of this inspection.

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