IR 05000271/1990017

Insp Rept 50-271/90-17 on 901105-09.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp Activities to Ascertain Whether Licensee Activities Conducted in Compliance W/ Applicable ASME Code & Regulatory Requirements

ML20058K358
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	11/23/1990
From:	Gray E, Mcbrearty R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058K356	List: IR 05000271/1990017 ML20058K353
References
50-271-90-17, NUDOCS 9012170179
Download: ML20058K358 (5)

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U.'S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY < COMMISSION REGION ~I i

Report N .50-271/90-17 .

Docket N '

i License N DPR-28 l= r

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Lice..see: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation FD 5, Box 169 2 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont -05301

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Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co boration-Inspection At: Vernon, Vermont inspection Conducted: November 5-9, 1990-Inspector: W $h' W _

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R. A. McBrearty, React @' Engineer, Materials d~a tel and Processes Section, EB, DRS l

Approved by: mi rials and Processes'

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date l H. Gray, Section, Chief, @ Branch,- DRS Engineerin Inspection Summary: Inspection on November 5-9,1990 (Report No. 50-271/90-17).

Areas Inspected: A routine announced inspection was conducted of inservice inspection activities to ascertain whether'the-licensee's activities were '

conducted in compliance with applicable ASME~ Code and regulatory requirement [

The results of the water chemistry program.and licensee' actions regarding '

selection and control of component materials to minimize personnel exposure to radiation were reviewed. 'In addition, the. licensee's actions regarding the e feedwater. check valve cracking problem were reviewed. .

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t Results: The~ 1nspector concluded that the licensee's activities complied with .

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applicable requirements, and that the licenss e fulfilled its commitments regarding the feedwater check valve proble .

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DETAILS

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1.0 Persons Contacted 1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation'

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D. Girroir Inservice Inspection Coordinator-

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• R. Grippardi, Quality-Assurance Site Supervisor

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• S. Jefferson, Assistant to Plant Manager _ -

• D. Phillips, Engineering Support Supervisor-D. Reid,!P1 ant _ Manager

• S. Skibniowsky, Chemistry Supervisor ' t D._ Weyman, Senior Environmental Program Manager U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• F. Hiltz, Resident Inspector

• w notes those present at the exit meeting on November 9, 1990.

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2.0 Inservice Inspection Activities- (73753)

The Vermont Yankee facility _is in-the. third period of the-second tert year inspection interva The 1990 refueling outage was the 1st; outage of the period. The 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI governs the_ examinations which are required to be completed during the ten year interva .

j Refueling outage ISI plans and schedules, examination data, and NDE q personnel qualification / certification records were selected for'

inspection to ascertain that required examinations were scheduled, the examination results.were properly documented,-evaluated an ,

dispositioned, and that the' examinations were performed by' qualified.and certified examiner The " Final ISI Inspection Plan - 1990 Outage'.' listed the components which were required to be examined during the outage; For cases where,.due to ,

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interferences, the originally scheduled weld could not be completely  !

examined, an alternate weld was identified and included in the program as !

permitted by Section XI. Augmented examinations were-identified as were components selected'as part of an expanded _. sample when mandated by code requirements based on examination results of the original sampl Several examinations which were only partially ' completed were identified-and rescheduled for examination during the next scheduled refueling outage in 1992. Additionally, components'were identified for inclusion '

in the ten year-ISI Program which resulted.from~ plant modifications and required a baseline examination prior.to;being placed in servic ~

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f All pertinent and required information was documented.regarding  ;

examination results. The licensee ~has developed'an " Inservice Discrepancy Report"~.-(IDR)- to provide a timely response to in,ervice inspection findings identified 'during the implementation'of the ISI program. An example of the use of the report is. IDR #90-020 dated 10/8/90 which documented the use of, an incorrect calibration block for the ultrasonic examination of 20" diameter weld RH8-5234 in the RHRa ' l system. The' correct cal.ibration block was identified and the ultrasonic !

response from.each block was compared which resulted in an accept-as-is .j dispositio Based on the documented results of' the comparison,' the ,

inspector agreed with the licensee's disposition. EThe.ISI-ten year program is scheduled for revision'and the correct-calibration block wil1 :)

be identified by the revised' program; The qualification / certification records-of EBASCO nonJostructive: 1 examination: personnel confirmed that the; appl.icable requirements of .j SNT TC-1A were> complied with. The records furth.t confirmed that~those- 1 EBASCO personnel.Who m e responsible for;the uie:. sonic' examination'of

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austenitic stainless s 1-piping systems were trained and certified for- -

the detection of IGSCC .c the:EPRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina,. I in accordance with the provisionsuof N_UREG-0313, Revision 2, and Generic Letter 88-01. That was additionally confirmed byythe latest. edition of-the EPRI " Registry of Qualified Personnel for;UT of IGSCC" dated  ;

October 1, 199 i Conclusion i The licensee-has a system for documenting and tracking.ISI findings and j for maintaining the status 'of the ten year program. Code required and i augmented examinations were performed by qualifiedLtechnicians,.and the-examination results were properly documented. Planning 3for the outage j o activities included the information necessary to implementLthe ISI '

program,

.l 3.0 Occupational Exposure (83750)

The' licensee's program for minimizing personnel exposure to radiationL -

includes the scheduled,-periodic replacement of control blade pins and'

rollers with non-stellite materials and the electropolishing of reactor cleanup system and-recirculation system replacement piping. -The feedwater regulat'or valves, which'were a large contributor of cobalt-into the. system, were' replaced in approximately 1980. Maintenance

personnel who are responsible for valve maintenance are, trained and.made 3 l aware of precautions which should be observed when working.on stellite j bearing valve components. Additionally, the licensee' attempts to maintain good water chemistry to reduce. corrosion in piping systems and ] -

the spread of corrosion products throughout the plant, q

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i Conclusion

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The-licensee has an ongoing program to. control and reduce personne1~

exposure to. radiation including the use of non-stellite bearing _ val:!e .

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material when~possible, training of maintenance personnel, and the-effort-to maintain good plant water chemistr _

4.0 Water Chemistry (84750)

. Water chemistry data were reviewed as part of this inspection. The-methods of: collecting and verifying the accuracy of.these data were not-included in the scope of this inspection; The inspector. reviewed the primary water" chemistry data for the period of'

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April 1989 through August-1990 and discussed these_ data with= responsible-individuals in the'licen'see's chemistry departmen l; The average conductivity per month of the primary' water during'the period-reviewed ranged from 0.072 umho/cm to 0.093 umho/cm which was within the

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licensee's goal of 0,20 pmho/cm and the Technical Specification limit of 5 umho/cm. Chlorides were reported-as ranging from 1.0 to 20 parts per billion (ppb) 'thich is less than the level which will: initiate Action-Level 1 actions and is within the: Technical Specification'11mit of 0.1-part per million (ppm). '

Conclusion The licensee has maintained the plant primary water chemistry'within 1 Technical Specification limits and EPRI/BWR Owners. Group Guidelines during the last operating cycl .0 Feedwater Check Valves (57080]

By letters to the NRC dated March 28,.1989 and March 16, 1990Lthe licensee-provided.an evaluation of cracks in? Vermont Yankee feedwater check valves. The submittals contain fracture mechanics analysi.s and '

commitments to replace feedwater check valve-V28B at the next refueling outag During the 1990 refueling outage, valves V28A and V28B were; replaced and'

ultrasonic examination of the two-remaining-. lift check valves.(27B and-96B) was performed. Flaws were' identified in each of the valves and flaw u sizing techniques identified that the flaw' in valve 27B exceeds ASME code acceptance criteria, but.is within-the bounds of the flaw in' valve 28 which was analyzed in 1989. Based on the 1989 ana' lysis the. licensee, ;

with NRC concurrence,.ju'dged valve 28B to be acceptable for one cycle'o continued operation, ,

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l The. licensee reported to the NRC its plan'to operate valve 278 for one !

additional cycle, 'and has committed- to either repair or replace. the. valve -

at the end of the cycle. Additionally, the licensee committed-to insta leak monitoring tape on valve ~27 I The inspector reviewed the ultrasonic examination data representing the -l examinations performed in .1990 and: determined that '.he flaw depth was, ;

arrived at by using the sizing technique taught at the EPRI NDE Center at Charlotte, North Carolina. Additionally, the rinspector' found that leak -

monitoring. tape has been installed on valve =27B.-

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The monitoring system i is capable of detecting leakage.at the ' rate ^ of 0.1 gpm or greater and is-

'provided with an clarm in the control roo Conclusion '

' Ultrasonic sizing of.the flaw in valve 278 was performed by qualified examiners using the11atest sizing techniques taught at the EPRI ND Center at Charlotte, North Carolina. The licensee. fulfilled its l

commitment to replace lif t check valve 28B and'also.has replaced I valve 28A 'with swing check valves ~ during the 1990 refueling outage. . An !

additional commitment to install leak monitoring tape on valve 27B was completed during the 1990 outag l i

6.0 Exit Meeting'

The inspector met with licensee representatives, denoted-in paragraph 1, at the end of.the inspection on November 9, 1990._ The inspector- 1 summarized-the scope'and findings of the inspectio !

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At no time during the inspection was written material'provided by the .;

inspector'to the licensee, The~ licensee did not indicate that i proprietary information was involved within.the scope of this inspectio ;

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