IR 05000269/2025004

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Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2025004 and 05000270/2025004 and 05000287/2025004
ML26030A031
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  
Issue date: 02/04/2026
From: Robert Williams
NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB1
To: Snider S
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2025004
Download: ML26030A031 (0)


Text

SUBJECT:

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2025004 AND 05000270/2025004 AND 05000287/2025004

Dear Steven Snider:

On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station. On January 14, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.

February 4, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Robert E. Williams, Jr., Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287 License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000269, 05000270 and 05000287

License Numbers:

DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55

Report Numbers:

05000269/2025004, 05000270/2025004 and 05000287/2025004

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2025-004-0024

Licensee:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility:

Oconee Nuclear Station

Location:

Seneca, South Carolina

Inspection Dates:

October 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025

Inspectors:

N. Smalley, Senior Resident Inspector

D. Dang, Resident Inspector

E. Robinson, Resident Inspector

M. Bradfield, Senior Reactor Technology Instructor

D. Strickland, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

Robert E. Williams, Jr., Chief

Projects Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Implement Plant Status Control Procedure Resulted in Momentary Partial Loss of Shutdown Unit's AC Power Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000270/2025004-01 Open/Closed

[H.4] -

Teamwork 71111.20 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, was identified when the licensee failed to implement procedure AD-OP-ALL-0204, Rev. 009, Plant Status Control, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations), Revision 2,

Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to control the status of the CT-2 bus potential drawer, resulting in a breaker trip and momentary loss of power to the Unit 2 main feeder bus.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 98.5 percent RTP and continued end of cycle power coastdown in preparation for scheduled refueling outage O2R32, which began October 27, 2025. The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on November 27, 2025. The unit operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1 low pressure service water (LPSW) system concurrent with Unit 2 component cooling water system dewatering and LPSW valve replacement project during Unit 2 refueling outage on November 6, 2025
(2) Unit 3 turbine driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump with the 3A motor driven EFW pump unavailable due to maintenance on December 1, 2025

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 low pressure injection (LPI) system on November 13, 2025.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire zone 95: Unit 1 electrical equipment room on October 2, 2025
(2) Fire zone 77: Unit 3 auxiliary building 200 level hallway on October 15, 2025

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the turbine building basement during the condenser circulating water crossover valve replacement project from November 2-4, 2025

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations and biennial written examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered on March 28, 2025, and the biennial written exam completed on March 28, 2025.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated refueling activities and pre-job brief for the emergency power switching logic functional test on November 18, 2025.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed just in time training for activities planned for the Unit 2 refueling outage on October 24, 2025.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Nuclear condition report (NCR) 2494408, 2LPSW-1054 low pressure service water valve failure
(2) NCR 2573453, Unit 2 purification demineralizer maintenance issues

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1)2C LPI pump motor replacement and refurbishment, work order (WO) 20295961

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1 elevated green risk due to protected service water maintenance concurrent with 1B high pressure injection pump maintenance, on October 13, 2025
(2) Unit 2 yellow risk due to reduced inventory operations for the refueling outage during the week of October 27, 2025
(3) Units 1, 2, and 3 plant risk and condenser circulating water crossover valve replacement project risk plan from November 2-14, 2025

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) NCR 2570689, premature closing of condensate system valve 2C-903 affecting an EFW flowpath
(2) NCR 2573510, excessive leakage past containment isolation valve 1LWD-2
(3) NCR 2572022, battery SY-1 cells 16 and 29 found below the minimum acceptable specific gravity
(4) NCR 2576182, increased Unit 1 reactor building normal sump rate
(5) NCR 02575718, Unit 2 LPSW piping wall thickness approaching limit during ultrasonic testing
(6) NCR 2577381, missing mirror insulation on 2B hot leg

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering change (EC) 424583, Unit 2 LPI valve replacements

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage O2R32 activities from October 27, 2025, to November 24, 2025.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

(1) PT/3/A/0261/010, "Essential Siphon Vacuum System Test," following maintenance on valve 3ESV-1, on October 9, 2025
(2) PT/1/A/0202/11, "High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump Test," following preventive maintenance on the 1A HPI pump, on October 14, 2025
(3) IP/0/A/3001/001, "Limitorque Preventive Maintenance," following maintenance on valve 1LP-15, on October 14, 2025
(4) PT/2/A/0251/069, LPI Cooler Test, following mode change during the Unit 2 refueling outage, on October 28, 2025.
(5) TT/2/A/EC419099/002, "Post Modification Testing for Unit 1/2 Low Pressure Service Water Pumps," following implementation of EC419099, on November 12, 2025
(6) PT/2/A/0203/006 A, flow test for valve 2LP-9 following maintenance to resolve rejected weld, on November 20, 2025
(7) PT/2/A/0230/015, High Pressure Injection Motor Cooler Performance Test, following EC 426266, on November 21, 2025

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) PT/0/A/0620/018, "Keowee Hydro System (KHS) Out of Tolerance Test," on September 30, 2025
(2) PT/2/A/0610/001 J, "Emergency Power Switching Logic Functional Test," on November 18, 2025
(3) PT/0/A/0711/001, Zero Power Physics Test, during Unit 2 startup on November 25, 2025

Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Low pressure service water valve, 2LPSW-1054 (PEN 63), after valve maintenance complete, on November 10, 2025

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program for potential adverse trends in the area of human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the human performance errors during a demineralizer sluice evolution and subsequent excessive reactor coolant system leakage outside containment on Unit 1 and the licensee's performance on October 23, 2025.
(2) The inspectors evaluated the excessive reactor coolant system leakage outside containment on Unit 2 and the licensees performance on October 28, 2025.
(3) The inspectors evaluated the loss of power to Units 1 and 2 loads, subsequent Keowee Hydro Unit emergency start, and the licensees performance on November 15, 2025.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Implement Plant Status Control Procedure Resulted in Momentary Partial Loss of Shutdown Unit's AC Power Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000270/2025004-01 Open/Closed

[H.4] -

Teamwork 71111.20 A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, was identified when the licensee failed to implement procedure AD-OP-ALL-0204, Rev. 009, Plant Status Control, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations), Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to control the status of the CT-2 bus potential drawer, resulting in a breaker trip and momentary loss of power to the Unit 2 main feeder bus.

Description:

On November 14, 2025, Unit 2 was shut down and defueled for a refueling outage. In preparation for electrical maintenance, licensee operators were tasked to verify a clearance on the potential transformer drawer for the Unit 2 main feeder buses (MFBs) that had been completed on the prior shift. At 22:54, operators proceeded to verify tags were removed from the CT-2 bus potential drawer. However, they were unaware power had been transferred from CT-5 to CT-2 at 22:51. The operators opened the powered CT-2 potential bus drawer. This resulted in two fuses disconnecting, per design, triggering the opening of the E21 and E22 breakers and a subsequent loss of power to the Unit 2 MFBs due to an undervoltage condition. Opening of the drawer was not required to verify the clearance and was not in accordance with procedure AD-OP-ALL-0204, Rev. 009, Plant Status Control.

The Keowee Hydro Units 1 and 2 automatically started as designed due to a main feeder bus undervoltage signal, and Unit 2 load shed channel 'B' initiated. This event resulted in a momentary loss of power to various equipment including the Unit 2 'C' LPSW pump and 'C' spent fuel cooling pump. At 22:55, the E22 breaker was closed, and power was restored to the Unit 2 MFBs before the Keowee Hydro Units completed their emergency startup. The 'C' LPSW Pump was restored when power was restored, and other affected equipment was restored to their proper configuration. The licensee notified the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the emergency AC power system (event notification 58041).

Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated causal investigation and performance analysis checklists to determine the cause of the event.

Corrective Action References: Action Request (AR) 02576181

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to control the status of the MFBs in accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0204, Rev. 009, Plant Status Control, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a temporary loss of power to several safety-related SSCs.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 1, User Guidance for Appendix G Phase 1: Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance, Green, because the Unit 2 reactor was defueled at the time, and the event did not result in a loss of margin to spent fuel pool boiling.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, individuals did not effectively communicate and coordinate the tagout verification activity. Supervision failed to communicate the work activity did not require opening the subject drawer. Additionally, operators did not verify plant status to discern the drawer was energized and that opening the drawer constituted an operation of plant equipment.

Enforcement:

Violation: TS 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 1.c of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires procedures associated with Equipment Control (e.g.,

locking and tagging). The licensee established procedure AD-OP-ALL-0204, Rev. 009, Plant Status Control, for the purpose of controlling equipment status. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to implement procedure AD-OP-ALL-0204, during a tagout verification.

Specifically, operators failed to recognize that the opening of the CT2 drawer constituted an operation of plant equipment prohibited by procedure AD-OP-ALL-0204, which resulted in a loss of power to the Unit 2 MFBs.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On January 14, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Steven Snider and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed the Nuclear Safety Review Board report that was issued July 2025.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

O FD-102A-02-01

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Borated

Water Supply and LPI Pump Suction)

065

O FD-102A-02-02

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (LPI)

Pump Discharge

055

O FD-102A-02-03

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Core

Flood)

25

Drawings

O FD-121D-03-01

Flow Diagram of Emergency Feedwater System

048

71111.04

Miscellaneous

OSS-0254.00-00-1000

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Emergency

Feedwater System

061

CSD-ONS-PFP-1AB-

0796

Pre-Fire Plan for U1 Auxiliary Building Elevation 796

2

Fire Plans

CSD-ONS-PFP-3AB-

0783

Pre-Fire Plan for U3 Auxiliary Building Elevation 783

001

O-0310-FZ-008

Auxiliary Building - Unit 3 Fire Protection Plan Fire Area &

Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 783+9

O-0310-FZ-009

Auxiliary Building - Unit 1 Fire Protection Plan Fire Area &

Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 796+6 & 797+6

O-0310-K-006

Fire Protect Aux BLDG Unit 3 EL 783+9

013

71111.05

Miscellaneous

O-0310-K-007

Fire Protect Aux BLDG Unit 1 EL 796+6

017

OFD-124A-1.1

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System

Turbine Building (Low Pressure Service Water Pumps)

056

OFD-124A-3.1

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System

Turbine Building (Low Pressure Service Water Pumps)

040

OFD-133A-1.1

Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System

(CCW Intake Pumps Discharge)

038

OFD-133A-2.1

Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System

(CCW Intake Pumps Discharge)

2

Drawings

OFD-133A-3.1

Flow Diagram of Condenser Circulating Water System

(CCW Intake Pumps Discharge)

048

AD-OP-ALL-1000

Conduct of Operations

27

AP/2/A/1700/010

Turbine Building Flood

013

71111.06

Procedures

PT/1/A/0290/003

Turbine Valve Movement

030

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

TN/2/A/EC419099/002

Alternate Suction Source for A/B LPSW Pumps, Support

EC for 2CCW-41 Valve Replacement

001

TO/0/A/EC104970/001

O2R32 CCW Line Stop Leakage / Failure Actions

000

Corrective Action

Documents

2494408

Drawings

O FD-124B-02-02

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System

(Reactor Building Cooling Units)

033

Miscellaneous

OSS-0254.00-00-1039

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Low Pressure

Service Water System

069

71111.12

Procedures

PT/2/A/0151/063

Penetration 63 Leak Rate Test

008

Corrective Action

Documents

2575187

Engineering

Changes

419099

Clearance PRT-0 -25-AB LPSWPSOOS-0235

Clearance PRT-K0-25-AB LPSWPSOOS-0239

Clearance PRT-0 -25-EARLY LPSW -0231

Clearance OPS-0 -25-CCW-ASL INSTALL -0996

Risk Profiles for Units 1, 2 and 3 for the week of October

13, 2025

Risk Profiles and Defense-in-Depth (DID) sheets for Unit 2

for the week of October 27, 2025

Risk Profiles and Defense-in-Depth (DID) sheets for Units

1, 2, and 3 from November 2-14, 2025

Miscellaneous

OSS-0254.00-00-1039

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Low Pressure

Service Water System

069

AD-OP-ALL-0106

Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions

AD-WC-ALL-0420

Shutdown Risk Management

AD-WC-ONS-0420

ONS Shutdown Risk Management

PT/0/A/0600/020

Standby Shutdown Facility Instrument Surveillance

031

71111.13

Procedures

PT/2/A/0202/011

High Pressure Injection Pump Test

108

Calculations

OSC-8966

Allowable LPSW Leakage for Containment Operability

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

2572022, 2570689, 2573510, 2576182, 2575718, 2577381

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

O FD-107B-01-01

Flow Diagram of Liquid Waste Disposal System (Reactor

Building Normal Sump)

2

O FD-121A-02-08

Flow Diagram of Condensate System (Condensate Make-

up and Emergency FDW Pump Section)

019

O-0480C

Piping Layout Intermediate Floor Sections Reactor Building

046

OFD-124A-1.1

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System

Turbine Building LPSW Pumps

55A

Drawings

OFD-124B-1.4

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System (RC

Pump Motor Cooling & RB Fire Protection)

037

OSC-1326.06

Low Pressure Service Water Inlet Header Piping Analysis

Problem

OSS-0254.00-00-1000

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Emergency

Feedwater System

061

OSS-0254.00-00-1027

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Condensate

System, Heater Drain System, and Heater Vent System

055

OSS-0254.00-00-1042

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Liquid Waste

Disposal System

033

Miscellaneous

OSS-0254.00-00-2009

(ELECT) DB Spec for Oconee 230KV Switchyard 125VDC

Power System

010

IP/0/A/3000/011 SY1

230 kV Switchyard Battery SY-1 Quarterly Surveillance

005

OP/2/A/1106/002 E

Unit 2 Polishing Demineralizer Operations

015

PT/1/A/0150/034

Leak Rate History Record and Reactor Building Leak Rate

Verification

014

Procedures

PT/1/A/0151/005A

Penetration 5A Leak Rate Test

014

Work Orders

20737381, 20753280

Corrective Action

Documents

2574667, 2512520

Drawings

OFD-102A-2.1

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System Borated

Water Supply and LPI Pump Suction

Engineering

Changes

24583

Procedures

PT/2/A/0152/012

Low Pressure Injection System Valve Stroke Test

045

71111.18

Work Orders

20669826, 20669826, 20669819

71111.20

Corrective Action

2573749, 2573747, 2574498, 2574376, 2576181, 2576320

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Documents

Clearance PRT-0 -25-TB HVY LIFT -0228

Clearance PRT-2 -25-CT-2 1ST TIM-0068

Clearance PRT-2 -25-CT-5-U2 MFB -0176

Miscellaneous

AD-WC-ONS-0420

ONS Shutdown Risk Management

AD-MN-ALL-0002

Foreign Material Exclusion

AD-OP-ALL-0200

Clearance And Tagging

28

AD-OP-ALL-0203

Reactivity Management

AD-OP-ALL-0204

Plant Status Control

009

AD-SY-ALL-0460

Managing Fatigue and Work Hour Limits

AD-WC-ALL-0420

Shutdown Risk Management

AP/1-2/A/1700/035

Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level

26

IP/0/B/3002/002 A

Polar Crane Inspection and Preventive Maintenance

015

MP/0/A/1150/002

Reactor Vessel - Closure Head - Removal

070

MP/0/A/1150/002 G

Reactor Vessel - Closure Head - Movement of Head From

or To Stand

2

MP/0/A/1710/017 B

Crane - Whiting - Polar - Inspection

019

MP/0/A/3005/012

Containment Inspection/Close Out Procedure

23

OP/1-2/A/1104/006

SF Cooling System

114

OP/2/A/1102/001

Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup

291

OP/2/A/1102/010

Controlling Procedure For Unit Shutdown

OP/2/A/1102/028

Reactor Building Tour and Containment Material Controls

23

OP/2/A/1103/005

Pressurizer Operation

OP/2/A/1103/011

Draining and Nitrogen Purging RCS

OP/2/A/1104/004

Low Pressure Injection System

OP/2/A/1107/014

Removal and Restoration of 4160V Switchgear and 600V

Load Centers

041

OP/2/A/1107/021

Removal and Restoration of CT2 Transformer

013

OP/2/A/1502/009

Containment Closure Control

057

PT/2/A/0600/001 B

Instrument Surveillance Prior To Mode Change

X

Procedures

PT/2/A/0630/001

Mode Change Verification

ONTC-1-LP-015

Test Acceptance Criteria for Valve 1LP-15

014

71111.24

Calculations

OSC-5649

LPSW Test Acceptance Criteria (TAC)

21

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

OSC-5674

Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Calculation for Unit 1 Gate and

Globe Valves at Oconee

044

Corrective Action

Documents

2575485, 2575380, 2533627, 2492238, 2576448,

2576449, 2576450

O FD-124B-01-06

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System (Aux

Building Air Handling Units)

2

O FD-124B-02-01

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System

(Auxiliary Building Services)

081

OFD-102A-1.2

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (LPI Pump

Discharge)

2

Drawings

OFD-124B-02-02

Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System

(Reactor Building Cooling Units)

033

Engineering

Changes

26266

OSS-0254.00-00-1039

(MECH) Design Basis Specification for the Low Pressure

Service Water System

069

Miscellaneous

OSS-0254.00-00-1049

(MECH) Design Basis Spec for the Essential Siphon

Vacuum System

016

IP/0/A/3001/001

Limitorque Preventive Maintenance

098

IP/0/A/3001/010

Maintenance of Limitorque Valve Operators

2

MP/0/A/1210/011

Operator - Limitorque - SB/SMB-00 - Disassembly,

Repair, and Reassembly

040

PT/0/A/0620/018

KHS Out of Tolerance Test

013

PT/1/A/0251/001

Low Pressure Service Water Pump Test

114

PT/2/A/0151/063

Penetration 63 Leak Rate Test

009

PT/2/A/0202/011

High Pressure Injection Pump Test

108

PT/2/A/0203/006 B

Low Pressure Injection Pump Test - Decay Heat

034

PT/2/A/0230/0015

High Pressure Injection Motor Cooler Performance Test

053

PT/2/A/0251/069

LPI Cooler Test

2

PT/2/A/0610/001 J

Emergency Power Switching Logic Functional Test

058

PT/3/A/0261/010

Essential Siphon Vacuum System Test

038

Procedures

TT/2/A/EC419099/002

Alternate Suction Source for A/B LPSW Pumps

000

Work Orders

20630941, 20745331, 20695118, 20745008, 20738577,

20701608, 20760076

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71152S

Corrective Action

Documents

2568486, 2570833, 2572069, 2576228, 2560992,

2567951, 2573453, 2576181, 2576766

Corrective Action

Documents

20630941, 20745331, 20695118, 20745008, 20738577,

20701608

AP/1-2/A/1700/035

Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level

26

AP/1-2/A/1700/036

Degraded Control Room Area Cooling

24

AP/1/A/1700/002

Excessive RCS Leakage

018

AP/1/A/1700/024

Loss of LPSW

030

AP/2/A/1700/002

Excessive RCS Leakage

019

71153

Procedures

AP/2/A/1700/011

Recovery from Loss of Power

067