IR 05000269/1993016
| ML16148A790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1993 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A789 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-93-16, 50-270-93-16, 50-287-93-16, NUDOCS 9306160281 | |
| Download: ML16148A790 (7) | |
Text
NUCLEAR 4UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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o
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/93-16, 50-270/93-16 and 50-287/93-16 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and 50-287 and DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Inspection Conducted: May 3-7, 1993 Inspector:
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Date Signed Approved by:
1f1, Chief Date Signed M
1s and Processes Section D vision of Reactor Safety Branch SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Inservice Inspection (ISI) for snubbers and pipe supports and previous open item Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie One Inspector follow-up item was identified for discrepancies found outside the area covered by the inservice inspection activities. The discrepancies included two bent support rods, standing water inside the pressurizer quench tank, and gaps between a base plate and the concrete. Two previous unresolved items were closed; one involved a pipe support calculation deficiency and the other involved the conduct of annual visual acuity examinations for quality control (QC) inspectors. The licensee's inspectors performed very good work during the inspector's observation. Only one minor discrepancy was found by the NRC inspector for the inspection of 17 snubbers and 13 pipe support PDR ADOCK 05000269 Q
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Carpenter, QC Inspector
- T. Coleman, Component Engineer
- D. Coyle, System Engineer
- J. Davis, Safety Assurance Manager
- J. Houston, Vice President on site
- P. Hubbard, Component Engineering Manager
- D. Kelley, Civil Engineer Supervisor F. Linsley, Snubber Engineer
- M. Patrick, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- B. Peele, Engineering Manager
- S. Perry, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- T. Royal, Component Engineer J. Turner, QC Supervisor J. Warren, QA Supervisor P. Wells, Civil Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Harman, Senior Resident Inspector
- W. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- B. Desai, Resident Inspector
- J. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Project, Region II
- Attended exit interview on May 6, 1993
- Attended exit interviews on May 6 & 7, 1993 Inservice Inspection of Pipe Supports - Unit 2 (73052,73753,73755)
The inspector observed work activities and reviewed documents and records to determine whether inservice inspection (ISI) was being conducted in accordance with applicable approved examination procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitments. The' applicable code for the Unit 2 ISI is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code,Section XI, 1980 edition with addenda through winter 1980. The approved examination procedure is QAL-14, Revision 13, "ISI visual examination, VT-3 and VT-4," dated November 2, 199 The inspector observed the licensee examiners performance of inspections on 13 pipe supports, in various systems, located in the Reactor and Turbine Buildings. The visual inspections included a check on configuration; service induced defects such as distortion, cracks, bent members, and weld failures; clearance requirements; and/or component settings. The inspection results were compared with the applicable
procedure, QAL-14. The inspector's observations generally agreed with the information reported by the licensee's ISI examiners except for the one minor discrepancy noted below:
Table 1 Support N Re Discrepancies/Remedies 2-01A-1-1-0-1401B-HI
2-01A-1-1-0-1401B-H40
2-01A-0-1401B-H6
2-O1A-0-1401B-H7
2-03-0-1401A-R11
2-07A-6-0-1400A-H61
2-01A-0-1481A-H5B D1 The 3/16"0 U-bolt was bent 2-01A-0-1481A-H6B
2-01A-0-1481A-H3B
2-01A-0-1481A-H4A D1 51A-0-1479A-H12A D2 51A-0-1479A-H13A D2 2-03A-1480A-H6276
The inspector only found one minor discrepancy as shown in the table, which was not found and recorded by the licensee's ISI examiner Overall, the licensee's ISI examiners performed satisfactory inspections of the pipe support The licensee had completed the inspection of 125 pipe supports, of a total of 177 pipe supports to be inspected during this refueling outag The licensee's ISI examiners did find some minor discrepancies. Up to date, the only serious problem found was that support No. 2-01A-1-1-0 1401B-H40 had worn out at the rear bracket, and the eye rod connected to the rear bracket, due to misalignment between the snubber and the pipe clamps, and the pipe's constant movement. The licensee will replace the worn part During the inspector's observation of the licensee's pipe support inspection and the snubber inspection (see next paragraph), the inspector found some defects outside the scope of ISI inspection of
supports and snubbers in the Reactor and Turbine Buildings. These defects were listed below: Rods in two rod supports were bent; the supports were near the pressurizer tank in the reactor building. One of the bent supports should be modified or relocated, since it interfered with a structural beam and was apparently bent during the original installatio Standing water was found in the Quench Tank underneath the pressurizer tank. If the water is not removed from the tank and stays there too long it may corrode the tank, since some corroded debris and scum were found in the wate The base plate on support No. 2-14B-1400R-44038 has a gap of 3/16" at two anchor bolt areas, and a gap of 1/16" at another two anchor bolt areas, between the base plate and concret The licensee will evaluate the above defects and resolve the problem Pending the licensee's evaluation, these defects are identified as Inspector Follow-up Item 50-270/93-16-01, Pipe Support Related Defects Found During Inservice Inspectio The support inspection records signed off by the licensee's ISI examiners and listed in Table 1 were reviewed by the inspector. The records were found to be acceptabl The inspector reviewed personnel qualification documentation for four examiners who performed the inspections of the pipe supports listed in Table 1 above. These qualifications were reviewed in the areas of activity qualified to perform, expiration date, and annual visual acuity and color vision examination. The certification records were found to be acceptabl Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Snubber Inspection (70370) - Unit 2 All snubbers in safety-related systems, and non-safety related systems required to protect safety-related systems, in each unit are required to be operable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.14 and 4.18 require 100 percent visual inspection and ten percent functional testing of these snubbers during each refueling outage. TS 4.18.1 states that snubbers located in accessible areas can be inspected during normal operation, and those located in inaccessible areas, are to be inspected during refueling outages. Procedure Nos. MP/1/A/3018/010 for hydraulic snubbers and MP/1/A/3018/019 for mechanical snubbers are used in the inaccessible areas. Procedure Nos. MP/1/A/3018/011 for hydraulic snubbers and MP/1/A/3018/020 for mechanical snubbers are used in the
accessible area The NRC inspector observed while the licensee's snubber inspectors inspected the 17 snubbers listed in Table 2 below. Three of the snubbers were in the Turbine Building and fourteen of the snubbers were in the Reactor Building; all of the snubbers were in inaccessible areas. Then, the NRC inspector inspected again, independently, to see if the licensee's inspectors found and recorded all the defects. These examinations were conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the examination procedures being used by the licensee. These verification examinations generally agreed with the findings of the licensee's inspectors (visual examiners). No discrepancies were foun Table 2 Snubber Inspection Support N Bld Snubber Discrepancies Type 2-01A-0-1401B-R14 Turbine Hydraulic None 2-01A-0-1401B-R15 Turbine Hydraulic None 2-01A-0-1401B-R16 Turbine Hydraulic None 2-03-0-1480A-H7A Reactor Hydraulic None 2-03A-1480A-H3A Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1479A-H1A Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1479A-H2A Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1479A-H3A Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1066A-RCPM-2Bl-SS1 Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1066A-RCPM-2B1-SS2 Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1066A-RCPM-2Bl-SS3 Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1066A-RCPM-2B2-SS1 Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1066A-RCPM-2B2-SS2 Reactor Hydraulic None 2-50-0-1066A-RCPM-2B2-SS3 Reactor Hydraulic None 2-03-1480A-H6103 Reactor Mechanical None 2-03A-1480A-H6263 Reactor Mechanical None 2-57-0-1480A-AWIZ Reactor Mechanical None The licensee had completed visual inspection on all the snubbers in the accessible areas prior to this refueling outage and on all the snubbers, except four snubbers on the roof area, in the inaccessible areas during this refueling outage before this inspectio The licensee is still in the process of establishing inspection and acceptance criteria for the inspection of the gap between washers and spherical bearings at the rod ends, near the brackets, or the piston rod eyes, near the pipe clamps. This problem was already identified as Unresolved Item 50-269, 270, 287/91-05-01 which remains ope.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-269, 270, 287/92-29-02, Failure to Identify Pipe Support Design Deficiencies
This unresolved item involved the problem that a bent anchor bolt in design calculation for support No. 1-03A-1-0-400B-SR56 was not detected by at least four persons during their review of the calculation. The bent anchor bolt could not be torqued and was recorded as defective during IE Bulletin 79-02 test program. In subsequent reviews and revisions for the calculation, the preparers and checkers missed the anchor bolt deficiency, and qualified the support to be acceptable. (If the bent anchor bolt is excluded from the calculation, the support would have been inadequate.)
The inspector discussed the problem with the licensee's engineers and reviewed "Commitment for Corrective Action Form" ID No. 4144 and the revised support design calculation (Rev. 1).
The memo to file, attached to this commitment for corrective action, stated that they (the preparers and checkers) may have concluded the anchors were acceptable based on the conservatisms in the analytical mode The licensee's engineers prepared Rev. 1 to the calculation by using the STRUDL computer model and adding a horizontal beam (existing) to restrain the support movement and to allocate the force to the other big column. Rev. 1 qualified the support with a factor of safety of 17.66 for the anchor bolts; this calculation assumed that the bent anchor bolt did not exist. This factor of safety of 17.66 is greater than 5.0 required by IE Bulletin 79-02 for long term qualificatio The inspector reviewed the revised calculation and found two errors on the calculation. First, the applied load of 1841 lb should have been applied to Node 7 instead of Node 6; this node is a support and fixed point. This meant that this load applied a shear load to the anchor bolts without applying a bending moment to the member and therefore a tensile load to the anchor bolt Second, the horizontal beam has two notches from edge of the flange to the web; the calculation did not consider this significant area reduction of beam member and the huge increase in the stresse The licensee's engineers re-ran the frame analysis using the correctly applied node point and the reduced section area of the beam. The reactions at the base plate node point were used as input to a finite element analysis for the base plate. The final results showed that the members were acceptable with the reduced section area and the anchor bolts had a factor of safety 15.6 During the exit meeting, the licensee stated that the bent anchor bolt had been replaced. Based on the above actions taken by the licensee, this item is considered close * (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-269, 270, 287/92-29-03, Failure to Conduct Annual Vision Acuity Examination This item concerned two ISI QC inspectors whose vision acuity examination had expired. One QC inspector had a lapse of five months and the other one had a lapse of one month on the eye examinations. The inspector discussed the problem with the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor and reviewed
"Commitment for Corrective Action" No. 4145. A "Problem Investigation Process (PIP)", PIP Serial No. 0-092-0693 was generated to resolve and correct this problem and was attached to the corrective action. The PIP stated that the cause of this problem was an oversight of the requirements to perform the annual test for the QC inspectors. The problem occurred during a period after a reorganization caused the shift of responsibility to oversee these requirements from the QC supervisor, or clerk, to the nurses in the health unit. The nurses did not understand the vision acuity examination requirements and importance for the QC inspector The licensee did a review of the current expiration dates for all the QC inspector and found them all to be acceptable. The licensee did not go back to review how many inspectors had expired vision acuity examinations during the last couple of years. AT the inspector's request, the licensee reviewed records for the last three years and found that another inspector had a lapse of one week. (The one week and one month lapses were due to the illness of the inspector involved; for the five month lapse stated above, it was due to the misunderstanding of vision acuity examination requirements by the nurses.)
The licensee has now reassigned, to the QA and QC supervisors, the responsibility to oversee all the QC inspectors qualifications and examination requirements. The nurses in the health unit only provide schedule assistanc Based on the licensee's action taken, this item is considered close.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 6 and May 7, 1993 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license (Open) Inspector Followup Item 50-270/93-16-01, Pipe Support Related Defects Found During Inservice Inspection - paragraph 2.