IR 05000269/1976001

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IE Insp Repts 50-269/76-01,50-270/76-01 & 50-287/76-01 on 760203-06 & 10-13.Noncompliance Noted:Emergency Condenser Circulating Water Discharge Valve Inoperable for 1.5-h Prior to Initiation of Manual Operation
ML19322B730
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1976
From: Epps T, Robert Lewis, Whitener H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19322B715 List:
References
50-269-76-01, 50-269-76-1, 50-287-76-01, NUDOCS 7912050730
Download: ML19322B730 (20)


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UNITED STATES g

7t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/76-1, 50-270/76-1 and 50-287/76-1

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Licensee:

Duke Power Company Power Building 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28201 Facility Name:

Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket Nos.:

50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos.:

DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Category:

C,C,C Location:

Seneca, South Carolina

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Type of License:

B&W, PW2, 2568, Mwe Type of Inspection:

Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection:

February 3-6 and_10-13, 1976

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Dates of Previous Inspection: December 2-5, 1975 1'

Principal Inspector:

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V Date T.N.Epps,Res/torInspector Reactor Proje' cts Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Accompanying Inspectors:

H. L. Whitener, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch P. T. Burnett, Reactor Inspector (Feb. 3-6, 1976)

Nuclear Support Section

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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch l

F. Jape, Reactor Inspector (Feb. 12-13, 1976)

Reactor Projects Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Brarch i

T 1912050

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7, IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-1,

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50-270/76-1, and 50-287/76-1-2-

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I W. H. Bradford, Reactor Inspector (Feb. 3-6, 1976)

Nuclear Support Section

Reactor Operations and Nuclear

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Support Bra".ch d L'M

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Reviewed By:

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j R. C. Lewis, Section Leader Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2

i Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

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IE Rpt. Noo. 50-269/76-1,

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50-270/76-1, and 50-287/76-1-3-

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.

Enforcsment Items A.

Infractions 1.

Contrary to Technical Specification 3.4.4, emerge.ncy condenser circulating water discharge valve ecw-8 was electrically inoperable for one and one half hours on February 10, 1976, before manual operability was demon-strated.

This infraction applies to Units 2 and 3.

(Details I, paragraph 2a.)

2.

Contrary to Technical Specification 6.4.1.e, preventive and corrective maintenance was conducted during 1974 and 1975 on several Category I hydraulic restraints without an approved procedure.

This infraction applies to all 3 units.

(Details I, paragraph 3)

3.

Contrary to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XII and FSAR Section 16.2.12(e), items and processes determined to be acceptable based on measurements made with a pneumatic calibration device were not re-evaluated, ar required by Adninistrative Policy Manual, Section 2.3.3.2, when the device was found to be out of calibration on January 8, 1976.

(Details II, paragraph 3.d)

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Deficiency Contrary to Technical Specification 6.5.2.b and licensee Standing Order No. 9 laplementing the' Technical Specification requirement, no entry had been made in the Unit-1 control room log book that valve ccw-8 had failed during testing.

(Details I, paragraph 2.b)

II.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters Inadequate Instrumentation Drawings (IE Investigation Reoort 50-269/75-8 50-270/ 75-9 and 50-287/ 75-9)

Followup revealed the licensee's corrective actions, as stated in a letter to NRC, dated September 3, 1975, are complete.

Safety-related pneumatic instrumentation systems have been reviewed and corrected applicable drawings have been issued.

This item is closed.

(Details V, paragraph 2)

IE Inspection Report 50-269/75-8, 50-270/75-9 and 50-287/76-9 The 3 noncompliance items in the referenced report concerning emergency electrical power systems are closed.

(Details I, paragraph 4)

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IE Rpt. Noo. 50-269/76-1, j

50-270/76-1, cnd 50-287/76-1-4-

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III.

New Unresolved Items 76-1/1 Instrument Calibration A program of scheduled periodic calibrations had not been established for instrumentation associated with safety-related i

systems but not identified as requiring calibration in the Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

(Details II, paragraph 3.b)

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76-1/2 Electrical Equipment Calibration Administrative control for coordinating and scheduling periodic calibration and preventive maintenance on safety-related relays and breakers will be transferred to the s:ation maintenance group by August 1, 1976.

(Details II, paragraph 3.c)

IV.

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items Oconee 1 (50-269)

73-12/1 Calibration of Effluent Monitors Not inspected.

74-3/3 Training of Unlicensed Utility Operators The licensee has not fully developed this program.

The item remains open.

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74-12/1 Incomplete Inservice Inspection Plan The licensee has developed this plan.

The iten is closed.

(Details III, paragraph 4)

Oconee 3 (50-287)

74-13/2 Reactor Coolant Flow Ancmaly This problem has been referred to the Office of Reactor Regulation (Licensing).

It remains open pending further verification that no problem exists.

74-14/2 Ventilation Control Between Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings This item remains open.

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IE Rpt. N:s. 50-269/76-1,

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50-270/76-1, and 50-287/76-1-5-

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Oconee 1, 2 and 3 (50-269, 50-270 and 50-287)

74-10, 08, 11/3 Operator Replace =ent Training This item is closed.

(Details I, paragraph 6)

74-10, 08, 11/4 SRC Quorum Not inspected.

74-10, 98, 11/5 Procedure changes Not inspected.

74-10, 08, 11/11 Non-Technical Specification Violations This item is closed.

(Details I, paragraph 7)

75-12, 13, 14/1 Fire Protection Program Weaknesses-Not inspected.

V.

Other Significant Findings Unit-1 was shutdown on February 7, 1976, for the second refueling outage.

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VI.

Management Interview A hanagement interview was held in two parts.

The first part was held on February 6, 1976, by T. N. Epps, H. L. Whitener, P. T. Burnett and W. Bradford with J. E. Smith and members of the Oconde staf f.

Items discussed included a summary of items reviewed during this inspection.

This included closecut of unresolved item 74-10, 08, 11/3, a licensee commitment to establish a program for control and inspection of slings and hoisting equipment as discussed in Details 3, paragraph 3.

The second part was held by T. N. Epps, H. L. Whitener and F. Jape on

February 13, 1976, with J. E. Smith and members of the Oconee staff.

Items discussed include the noncompliance items in Section I of this Summary, Status of Unresolved Items, and the Status of Previously

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Identified Items of Noncompliance in Section II of this Summary.

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IE Rpt. No;. 50-269/76-1, I-l 50-270/76-1, and 50-287/76-1 i

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DETAILS I Prepared by:

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Date T.N.Epps,p[dctorInspector Reactor Proje ts Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nulcear Support Branch Dates of Inspection:

February 3-6 and 10-13,1976

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Reviewed by: <_

R. C. Lewis, Section Leader Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

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Individuals contacted Duke Power Company (DPC)

Site Personnel J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station

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L. E. Schmid - Superintenu.nt of Operations O. S. Bradham - Superintendent of Operations R. M. Koehler - Superintendent of Technical Services T. S. Barr - Technical Engineer J. Cox - Station Senior QA Engineer W. Martin - Junior Engineer M. Alexander - Maintenance Mechanic

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Corporate Of fice Personnel

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M. S. Tuckman - Staff Engineer (Licensing)

2.

Emergency Condenser Circulatine Water Valve (CCW-8) Failure On February 10, 1976, the licensee ran PT/1/A/0261/06 to functionally test the emergency condenser circulating water system for Unit 1.

The licensee observed that the valve (CCW-8) in the return line f rom the condensers to the keowee tailrace did not open electrically.

The valve in question is in a common return line for emergency condenser circulating water from each Ocones. unit.

It, therefore, affects the operability of the energency condenser circulating water system for each Oconee unit.

. Oconee Technical Specification 3.4.4 requires each unit's a.

emergency condenser circulating water system to be operable

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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-1, I-2 50-270/76-1, and 50-287/76-1

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when the reactor coolant system is above 250 F.

Contrary to this requirement, the licensee did not verify CCW-8 to be manually operable for approximately one and one half hours and did not initiate shutdown of Oconee Units 2 and 3.

A licensee representative stated that CCW-8 was initially

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assumed to be manually operable.

The inspector stated that in

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such a case'the valve must immediately be deacnstrated to be manually operable.

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Another finding, as a result of the inspectors review of this incident, revealed that no entry had been made in the Unit 1 control room log 'oook that the test was being conducted or that a problem existed with CCW-8.

This is contrary to Technical Specification 6.5.2.b. and licensee standing Order No. 9 implementing the Technical Specifiction, which require the licensee to note significant abnormalities in the control

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room log.

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3.

Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors

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IE Bulletin No. 75-05 required information concerning hydraulic

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shock and sway suppressors.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the bulletin and reviewed results or the last sur-veillance conducted on hydraulic restraints on Units 1, 2 and 3.

This surveillance involved inspection of 90 suppressors on each Oconee unit as identified in procedure MP/0/A/3000/12.

It was found that several restraints needed oil and 3 restraints on Unit 2 l

required approximately 1/2 to 1 gallon of oil to be added.

The licensee stated that edch of the 3 above mentioned restraints had a total capacity of 1.96 gallons and the functional portion

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needed.61 gallons to operate, with the remainder in the reservoir.

The licensee's completed procedure MP/0/A/3000/12 noted that no oil was visible in the sight glasses on 11 Unit 2 restraints and noted I

several seal problems and that these problems were corrected.

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Oconee Technical spec.ification 6.4.1.e requires that preventive and corrective maintenance on safety equipment be conducted in accordance

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with approved procedures.

Contrary to the above, no maintenance j

procedure exists for assuring that proper maintenance is conducted

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on Oconee restraints in recordance with the manufacturer's recom-mendations.

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NRC Licensing requested that the licensee submit a Technical Speci-l fication change to add new limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements relating to Category I hydraulic re-

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straints. The inspector observed that no criteria exists for determining operability of restraints.

The licensee committed to develop such criteria before NRC Licensing approves the Technical Specification changes on this subject.

4.

Followup on Previous Items of Noncompliance The inspector reviewed corrective actions taken by the licensee on three items of noncompliance identified in IE Report 50-269/75-10, 50-270/75-11 and 50-287/75-11.

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The subject items involved f ailure to provide backup emergency electrical power from the Lee Station and failure to properly control maintenance activities.

The licensee submitted responses dated October 24, 1975 and November 21, 1975.

The following items were among these verified during this inspection:

Revisions to procedures OP/0/A/1107/03 and OP/0/A/1107/03A, a.

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"Oconee Nuclear Station and Lee Steam Station Procedure for Furnishing Emergency Power, Backup Power, or Power fu e Test

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Purposes to Oconee," were reviewed.

These procedure; require immediate isolation of the 100 KV transmission line and a Lee unit for furnishing electrical power to Oconee, upon request from Oconee personnel.

Requirements for changing the above procedures were included in the procedures and appeared to give Oconee personnel authority to disallow changes if necessary.

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The inspector also verified by review of the completed pro-cedure OP/0/A/610/6 that interim testing was conducted in August, 1975, to verify that a Lee unit could be startad and connected to the 100 KV line and supply power to the 4160 volt main feeder busses.

A training program has been implemented for dispatchers and c.

Lee operating personnel.

The training program included time involved in supplying power to Oconee and what loads may be connected to the 100 KV transmission line, communications for establishing power from Lee to Oconee and major procedural steps involved.

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Licensee Adminstrative Policy Manual changes that relate to these noncompliance items were also reviewed.


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A licensee representative stated that the policy of the Operations Superintendent being primarily responsible for

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interf ace control with outside organizations is being changed to assign this responsibility to the Maintenance Superintendent.

j There are no further questions on the subject of noncomplainee

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items at this time.

5.

Contamination in Unit 2 Turbine Building Drain Licensee report A0-270/75-19, dated October 17, 1975, reported un-planned release of radioactive liquid through the turbine building drain from an incorrectly routed 2 inch diameter pipe.

The in-spector verified by direct observation that the portion of this line from the turbine building drain to the auxiliary building wall has been removed and the stub of 2-inch pipe has a cap welded on the exposed pipe end to prevent recurrence.

There are no further questions on this item.

6.

Operator Replacement Training (Unresolved Item 75-10, 08, 11/3)

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The licensee's operator training program is used in operator replacement training.

NRC Licensing stated, in a letter to the licensee dated June 18, 1975, that individuals who sucessfully coupleted the DPC training program were eligible to sit for an

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examination without the need to perform a reactor startup.

Thi.4 unresolved item is closed on the basis that NRC Licensing has reviewed the licensee's operator training program and has expressed the above position.

7.

Non-Technical Specification' Violations (Un' resolved Item 75-10, 08, 11/11)

Development of the licensee's Administrative Policy Manual and the operational quality assurance progran have emphasized the importance of meeting all requirements.

Discussions with licensee personnel yielded no indication that this was still a problem.

This item is closed.

8.

Review of Unit 3 Alarms Licensee documentation showed that a review of Unit 3 control room alarms was conducted and two more alarms were found to be inoperable due to not having been wired.

The licensee is taking steps to correct these alarms.

The inspector had no further questions.

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Administrative Procedure No. 5 Revision The inspector verified that administrative procedure number 5 had been revised to define responsibility for operation of different valves in the plant.

There are no,further questions on this item.

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IE Rpt. Nss. 50-269/76-1, I})

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  • DETiILS II Prepared by:

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H.' L. White'ner, Reactor fnspector (Dac'd Nuclear Support Section

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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspectio :

February 3-6, 10-13, 1976

4 Reviewed by:

W H. C. Dance', Section Leader

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Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.

Individuals Contacted J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station O. S. Bradham - Maintenance Superintendent L. E. ScFaid - Operating Superintendent T. S. Barr - Technical Services Engineer R. Adams - I&C, Maintenance i

D. Thompson - Mechanical and Electrical, Maintenance E. Hite - Engineer, Maintenance D. Rogers - Engineer, Maintenance M. Alexander - Engineer, Maintenance J. D. Shaw - I&C Supervisor D. Clardy - I&C Supervisor R. D. Nichols - Training

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N. Pope - Operating Engineer G. Ridgeway - Assistant Operating Engineer F. Owens - Assistant Shift Supervisor R. Casler - Assistant Shif t Supervisor C. Groce - Relay, Meter and Cecmunications Department 2.

Scope of Inspection Areas inspected included instrument calibration required by Technical.

Specifications,.alibrations of instrumentation associated with safety related systems or functions but not id e tified in the Technical Specifications, review of certain records supporting information in the semi-annual report, and a review of plant operation c

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3.

Calibrations a.

Calibrations Listed in Technical Specifications Selected instrument or equipment calibrations required by the Technical Specifications were reviewed for seven safety related systems.

These calibrations were reviewed to determine that f requency of performance, content of procedures, trip setpoints, acceptance values and test results and evaluations are consis-tent with the applicable requirements of Section 4.1 of the Technical Specifications, Section 17.2 of the FSAR and Sections 2.3, 3.2 and 4.2 of the Administrative Policy Manual.

Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified, except as discussed in paragraph 3.d of these details, b.

Calibrations Not Listed in Technical Specifications Calibrations were reviewed for instrumentation, not delineated in the Technical Specifications as requiring calibration, but which is associated with safety related systems or which may be used to assess system status to insure compliance with the s '

Technical Specifications.

The purpose of the review was to ascertain that the licensee has established specific require-ments and has developed adequate procedures for calibration of the instrumentatioc. The inspector found that specific require-ments and approved procedures have been developed for calibra-tion of safety related instrumentation not directly specified in the Technical Specification surveillance requirements and is being performed on an, "as you can," basis as a matter of good operating practice.

Of the procedures selected for

review, the licensee had performed the calibrations in accordance with approved procedures containing step by step instructions and specific acceptance criteria.

However, a formal pre-planned schedule for periodic calibration has not been fully implemented in this area.

The licensee stated that instrumenta-tion which is associated with safety related systems or which is used to assess system status to insure compliance with Technical Specifications will be identified on a pre-planned periodic schedule under formal administrative control by May 1, 1976.

This matter was identified as an unresolved item at the management interview.

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Electrical Relays, Breakers, and Power Distribution Eauipment Calibration, inspection and maintenance of safety related electrical equipment is perforned by the Relay, Meter and Communication or Electrical Maintenance and Construction departments depending on the size and nature of the electrical

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components.

These departments, separate corporate entities from the Oconee Nuclear Station, perform the electrical equipment calibration program using station approved procedures.

Currently this program is coordinated by the station Operations Group with the work essentially being accomplished during refueling The licensee stated that interface responsibility with outages.

the offsite departments will be transferred to the station Maintenance Group by August 1, 1976.

This will establish full administrative control for coordinating and scheduling the preventive maintenance and periodic calibration of safety related electrical equipment at Oconee.

At the management interview these items were identified as unresolved pending review of the program established under administrative control of the Maintenance Group.

d.

Measuring and Test Eouipment Certain measuring and test equipment was identified and reviewed for storage, calibration frequency and specifications, instrument accuracy, instrument tagging, and traceability to national standards. Within the areas inspected one anomaly was observed.

A Heise pneumatic calibrator, OI/C #14 was found to be out of the specified tolerance when calibrated on January 8, 1976.

The instrument (0 to 30 psig range) has a specified error

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tolerance o# 1 03 psig.

When calibrated on January 8, the instrument stror was found to bc.07 psig.

Contrary to 10 CFR

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part 50, Appendix B, criterion XII, as implemented by the Duke Power Company Quality Assurance Program in Section 17.2.12(e)

of the FSAR and Lnplementing administrative procedure in

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Section 2.3.3.2 of the Administrative Policy Manual, the licensee failed to identify and evaluate the application in which 0 I/C #14 had been used after it was determined that the device was outside of the specified tolerance.

From discussions with a licensee management representative the inspector deter-mined that an evaluation is normally implemented by including a statement in the test instrument procedure requiring notifica-tion of appropriate personnel and the bnplenentation of an evalution.

This requirement is not included in all test instrument procedures. The representative stated that the evaluation requirement will be included in all test instrument calibration procedures.

This matter was identified as an apparent item of noncompliance during the management interview, e.

Personnel Qualification The inspector reviewed the qualifications of two instrument, technicians having responsibilities in performing instrument calibrations.

The purpose of this review was ta ascertain

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that personnel experience, on the job training and related technical training meets the requirements of paragraph 6.1.1 of the Technical Specifications and sections 4.5 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.1.

Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.

4.

Semi-Annual Report Reports ending December 31, 1974, and June 30, 1975, were reviewed to determine that information reported meets the requirements of the Technical Specifications Section 6.

No discrepancies were observed in this review.

Facility records of I-131 identified in the primary coolant were reviewed on site for the six months ending June 30, 1975, to ascertain the accuracy of reported data.

Several minor discrepancies were noted and were discussed with licensee management.

The inspector had no further questions at this time.

5.

Plant Operations Certain facil'ity operating records, process monitors and alarms,

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valve alignments, equipment tagging, radiation controls, housekeeping conditions, plant equipment conditions, and operations staffing were observed during the plant operations inspection.

Records reviewed included selected portions of the operating logs, shif t supervisors logs, our-of-normal logs, tagging logs, standing orders and problem reports.

The plant tour included the control rooms, levels 1, 2, 3 of the auxiliacy building, turbine deck and outside tanks.

Operational conditions discussed with the licensee as a result of log reviews include a high quench tank temperature (Unit 3),

leakage by pressurizer power operated and safety relief valves (Unit 3), core flood tank leakage and core flood tank fill and drain operations. A log entry concerning transfer of fluid to the core flood tank (Unit 3, 1/17/76) was discussed with the licensee as an additional example of an inadequate log entry (item of noncom-pliance concerning log er.tries is discussed in Details I).

The inspector and licensee personnel found it necessary to rely on the operator's memory in order to track the conditions that led to the inadvertant filling of the BAMT with demineralized water.

No further discrepancies were identified within the areas inspected.

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DETAILS III Prepared by: M

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PT T. Burnetf, Reactor Inspector Date Nuclear Support Section

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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch i

Dates of Inspection: nFebruary 3-6, 1976 Reviewed by:

Y Zh 76 H. C. Dance, Section Leader

/ Date Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.

Personnel Contacted

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J. E. Smith - Plant Manager O. S. Bradham - Maintenance Superintendent R. M. Koehler - Superintendent of Technical Services T. D. Curtis - Junior Engineer W. R. Campbell - Reactor Engineer M. S. Tuch=an - Staff Engineer Licensing T. S. Barr - Technical Engineer 2.

Preparation for Refueling (Unit 1 only)

At the time of the on-site inspection the licensee planned to begin the refueling outage on February 7, 1976, with fuel handling operations to begin approximately 8 days af ter the start of the outage.

The :ontrolling procedure for the refueling operations, OP/1/I./1502/02, had not been reviewed by the Site Review Committee (SRC) at that time.

l Approved procedures for fuel inspections were available on site.

The controlling procedure is TT/1/A/122/01.

Subsidiary procedures address fuel handling, physical measurements, visual inspections and examinations of various components of the fuel bundle.

Fual examinations will be performed by contractor personnel.

The interf ace between the licensee and the contractor is for infor-mation only'and not for supervision.

The licensee identified no definitive requirements in the Technical Specifications that would be addressed in the measurements beyond the requirement to report abnormal degradation in fuel cladding (6.6.2.la(3)).

(Technics].

Specification 4.13 does require a report of the inspection within 90 days of its completion.)

The licensee agreed to consult with the fuel vendor to obtain an operative definition of " abnormal

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IE Rpt. No. 50-269/76-1 III-2 (

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degradation in fuel cladding." This would guide the personnel performing the inspections so that the licensee would be informed promptly if the condition of the fuel bundle appeared to deviate from the description in the FSAR or the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.

The licensee planned no fuel sipping operations during this outage.

There are no reconstitutable fuel bundles in this unit.

3.

Pre-Fuel-Handling Activities (Unit 1 only)

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During an outage in January 1976, the licensee completed preventive maintenance and surveillance of the safety-related cranes using procedure MP/0/A/3000/10. This procedure follows ANSI B30.2, and the personnel performing the work are qualified to that standard.

A schedule of inspection and preventive maintenance has been imple-mented for safety-related cranes.

The licensee had no program for control and inspection of slings and hoisting equipment.

The licensee committed to implement such a program for equipment to be used during refueling of Unit 1 prior to starting that activity.

He further co=mitted to implement a broader program by July 15, 1976.

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Licensee personnel stated that plans were being made to increase the capacities of the polar cranes to permit lifting the core barrels for inservice inspection.

4.

Maintenance (Unit 1 only)

' Planned maintenance activities during the refueling outage include; eddy current testing of the steam generators, replacement of reactor coolant pump seals and replacement of electrical penetra-tions.

Approved procedures exist for each of these activities.

The licensee has completed the In-service Inspection Manual fee the unit. The inspector verified that the procedures to be used in 7.he eddy current examination of the steam generator tubes are cont.ined within ebe ISI Manual. This closes outv.anding item 74-12/1.

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DETAILS lV Prepared by: T/)

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&Z A/19/7/,

W.H.Bradford,[ReactorInspector Date Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear l

Support Branch Dates of Inspection:

February 3-6, 1976 1/## 70 Reviewed by: [(

dWA-H. C. Dance, Section Leader

' Da t'e Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.

Individuals Contacted J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station T. S. Barr - Technical Services Engineer R. P. Bugert - Training Supervisor Roger Nichols - Training Specialist

J. W. Cox - Station Senior QA Engineer J. L. Dunlop - Station Assistant QA Engineer Operating Personnel Craft Personnel 2.

Procedures The inspector verified that.the changes made_to safety related system procedures were as described in Section 6 of the Technical Specifications.

The content of the procedures was in conformance with the Technical Specifications and the technical contents were adequate for control of safety related operations within the applicable regulatory requirements.

This was accomplished by a review of a random selectica of procedures from Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, paragraph C.

The following procedures were reviewed:

Control Rod Drive System

, Component Cooling System

Service Water System Auxiliary Building Heating and Ventilating Unit Startup Condensate and Feedwater System The review also included changes made to other procedures associated with the above systems.

This review consisted of six abnormal condi-tion alarm procedures, four emergency procedures, and six maintenance procedures.

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IE Rpr. Nos. 50-269/76-1,

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,J0f 70/76-1, and 50-287/76.1 IV-2 3.

Training The inspector reviewed the formal training and retraining activities for licensed and nonlicensed personnel.

This was found to be in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications, Section 6.1, ANSI-N18.1, Appendix A of 10 CFR 55 and Regulatory Guide 8.13.

The inspector reviewed individual training record folders for licensed and nonlicensed personnel.

The training records were selected at random and consisted of eight licensed and ten nonlicensed personnel.

The review verified that training and retraining was given as required by the program in the following areas:

a.'

Administrative Controls and Procedures i

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Radiological Health and Safety c.

Industrial Safety

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Security Procedures e.

Emergency Plan f.

Quality Assurance g.

Fire Fighting h.

Formal Technical Training 1.

On-the-Job Training The inspector conducted informal interviews with three licensed and five nonlicensed personnel.

Training and retraining in the above areas was verified to be in accordance with the Technical Specifi-

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cations, Section 6.1 and ANSI-N18.1.

l 4.

Review and Audits

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The inspector reviewed the minutes of the Safety Review Cc=mittee meetings for 1975, and changes to the Technical Specifications made during 1975.

This review verified that proposed tests, experiments, changes to procedures which may constitute an unreviewed safety question, Technical Specification violations, and changes to the Technical Specification were reviewed in accordance with the Technical Specifications, Section 6.

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The inspector reviewed the Station Quality Assurance program and audit records for 1975.

It was verified that the Quality Assurance Audit program was in accordance with ANSI-N18.7-1972 and the Technical Specification ;*

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DETAILS V Prepared by:

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m F. Jape, Reactor Ip,spectol Date

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Reactor Projects Mction No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection:, February 12-13, 1976 Reviewed by:

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2[7g Date W.C.Seidle,(gectionLeader Reactor Projects Section No.1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.

Individuals Contacted Duke Power Company (LPC)

O. S. Bradham - Superintendent of Maintenance A. M. Segrest - Engineer Associate J. W. Cox - QA Supervisor J. D. Shaw - Instrument Control Supervisor R. A. Boughham - QA Electrical Inspector

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Inadequate Instrumentation Drawings Afo{Jowupinspectionofthepreviouslyidentifiednoncompliance item-related to inadequate instrumentation drawings was conducted.

l A sample of 14 drawings, selected from safety-related instrumentation systems, was compared with the as-built system.

There were no dis-crepancies identified and this item is closed.

During a previous inspection / several discrepancies were identified

between the drawings and the as-built systems.

Reexamination of these i

systems revealed that all discrepancies have been corrected.

All safety-related pneumatic instrumentation systems at Oconee were reviewed by licensee personnel.

Updated drawings were issued on January 26, 1976,

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to accurately reflect the as-built system.

The 14 systems examined by the inspector and licensee representatives are as follows:

If Item of noncompliance, reported in IE Investigation Report Nos.

50-269/75-8, 50-270/75-9 and 50-287/75-9, Details, paragraph 2.

2/ IE inspection Report 50-269/75-13, 50-270/75-14 and 50-287/75-15, Details IV, paragraph 2.

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Oconee 1 0-422X-28, "BWST Level Trans."

0-422X-25, "BWST Temp Trans."

0-422X-13, "BWST Level Trans."

Oconee 2 0-1422X-28, "BWST Level Trans."

0-1422X-25, "BWST Temp Trans."

0-1422X-13, "BWST Level Trans."

0-1422X-6.01, "DHR Low Trans."

0-1422X-6.02, "DHR Flot. Trans."

0-1422H-9, "RB Vent Cooling H 0 Flow" 0-1422H-10, "RB Vent Cooling 0 Flow"

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Oconee 3 0-7422X-28, "BWST Level Trans."

0-2422X-13, "BWST Level Trans."

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0-2422U-10, "CBAST_LeveLTrans."_

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0-2422X-3, " Emergency HPI Flow Trans."_

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