ML19322B717
| ML19322B717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1976 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Moseley N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322B715 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912050719 | |
| Download: ML19322B717 (3) | |
Text
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Duxz POWER COMPANY Powra Butto NO 422 SocTu Cucacu SrazzT, CnAar.orTz. N. C. asa4a wlLLI AM O. PA R M E R. J R.
VICE P.CSectmf Itht.no8eC: Asta 7C.
s e t.- p. we,io, sr>.ees March 22, 1976 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director U. S. Nucle tr Regulatory Commission Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re:
IE:II:TNE 50-269/76-1 50-270/76-1 50-287/76-1
Dear Mr. Moseley:
Duke Power Company does not consider information contained in Inspection and Enforcement Reports 50-269/76-1, 50-270/76-1, and 50-287/76-1 to be proprietary.
Plea,se find attached responses to Items I.A.1, I.A.2, I.A.3, and'I.B.
V / truly yours, l
Mw &.
William O. Parker, Jr.
EDB:=mb Attachment 7nzor>o 7/ 7
RESPONSE TO IE INSPECTION REPORT
,j '
50-269/76-1, 50-270/76-1, 50-287/76-1
~
I.A.1 Contrary to Technical Specification 3.4.4, emergency condenser circulating water discharge valve CCW-8 was electrically inoperable for one and one-half hours on February 10, 1976, before manual operability was demonstrated.
This infraction applies to Units 2 and 3.
Response
The Condenser Circulating Water System Gravity and Recirculation Flow Test procedure has been revised to state that a failure of CCW-8 to operate during this test is a violation of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications and that ar.propriate action must be taken on any operating unit (s) until valve CCW-6 is operable.
Valve CCW-8 may be declared operable if the valve is verified manually operable and an operator is assigned responsibility for its operation.
I.A.2 Contrary to Tcchnical Specification 6.4.1.e, preventive and corrective maintenance was conducted during 1974 and 1975 on several Category I hydraulic restraints without an approved procedure.
This infraction applies to all three units.
Response
Maintenance procedures MP/1/A/3000/12, MP/2/A/3000/12 and MP/3/A/3000/12 have been revised to properly define an operable hydraulic shock suppressor, and enclosures to the procedures have been provided for documentation of inoperable suppressors.
Also, notification of the shift supervisor is required if a suppressor has been determined to be inoperable to assure that limiting conditions for operation are not exceeded.
Additionally, maintenance procedure MP/0/A/3000/24 has been written to assure that proper maintenance is conducted on the Oconee restraints.
This pracedure defines removal and replacement, repair, and functional testing ci hydraulic suppressors that are determined to be inoperable accord 2ng to procedure MP/1/A/3000/12, MP/2/A/3000/12 or MP/3/A/3000/12.
I.A.3 Contrary to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix 3, Criterion XII and FSAR Section 16.2.12(e), items and processes determined to be acceptable based on measurements made with a pneumatic calibration device were not re-evaluated, as required by Administrative Policy Manual, Section 2.3.3.2, when the
- device was found to be out of calibration on January 8,1976.
i
Respons2:
To prevent the recurrence of a similar incident, criteria have been established to account for instrument drift which may occur between calibration intervals.
" Evaluation tolerances" have been established for all test equipment at limits at which instrument drift is considered significant. Procedures have been revised to document any instance of a test device being determined to exceed its " evaluation tolerance".
It is then required that proc,edures which have been performed with the unacceptable instrument be evaluated.
" Calibration tolerances", more restrictive than " evaluation tolerances",
have been established to provide reasonable limits for drift occurring between calibration intervals.
Devices determined to exceed their
" calibration tolerances", but not their " evaluation tolerances", will be recalibrated, but procedures performed with the device will not require evaluation.
I.B Contrary to Technical Specification 6.5.2.6 and licensee Standing Order No. 9 implementing the Technical Specification requirement, no entry had been made in the Unit I control room log book that valve CCW-8 had failed during testing.
Response
This deficiency has been discussed with Control Room personnel involved as well as all Oconee Shift Supervisors.
The importance of clearly documenting significant abnor=alities in accordance with the above mentioned policies has been stressed.
m e,g em.
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