IR 05000269/1976006
| ML19322B757 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry, Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1976 |
| From: | Epps T, Robert Lewis, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322B742 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-76-06, 50-269-76-6, 50-287-76-06, NUDOCS 7912050753 | |
| Download: ML19322B757 (18) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
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IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/76-6, 50-260/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 Licensee: Duke Power Company Power Building 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28201 Facility Name: Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Category:
C, C and C Loct n on:
Seneca, South Carolina Tyr.: of Inspection:
Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: May 18-21, June 8-10 and 16-18, 1976
Dates of Previous Inspection: March 23-24 and April 6-9, 1976 Principal Inspector:
T. N. Epps, Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Accomp aying Inspectors:
H. L. Whitaner, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch P. T. Burnett, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Principal Inspector: _/
b 7'M (m Date T.N.Epps,RpVtorInspector Reactor Projdcts Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
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Reviewed by:
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Dawa R. C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Items A.
Infractions 1.
Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.4.1 approved maintenance and operating procedures and adequate documentation of functional testing after main-tenance activities were not provided for maintenance performed on safety related systems as follows:
No approved maintenance procedure for repair of a.
Keowee Unit II Generator Supply Breaker on November 8, 1975.
(Details II, paragraph 3.a)
b.
No approved maintenance procedure for the replace-ment of Oconee Unit 3 Penetration Room Ventilation System charcoal filter on January 13, 1976.
(Details II, paragraph 3.a)
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No approved operating procedure to isolate components
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c.
of the Concentrated Boric Acid System for maintenance and to realign the system for normal service for Oconee Unit 2 on January 12, 1976 and Unit 3 on March 8, 1976.
(Details I, paragraph 2.e and Details II, paragraph 3.b)
d.
Inadequate documentation of the functional test, acceptance criteria and evaluation of test results for the return to service after maintenance on Keowce Unit II on November 8, 1975.
(Details II, paragraph 3.c)
Inadequate documentation of the functional test, e.
acceptance criteria and evaluation of test results for the return to service af ce r maintenance on the Spent Fuel Pit pump on October 1, 1975.
(Details II, paragraph 3.c)
2.
Contrary to Technical Specification 6.4.1 maintenance activities on safety-related electrical equipment at Keowee and Oconee were not properly controlled as stated in Section 2.7.1 of the licensee's Administrative Policy Manual in that five reportable occurrences occurred as a result of electrical maintenance activities during the
period of January-June 1976.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
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,IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6-3-B.
Deficiencies 1.
Contrary to Technical Specification 6.4.1.b the Unit 2 refueling procedure was not followed in that inverse multiplication plots were not maintained, results of
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boron sampling were not logged and the results of the chi squared analyses were not recorded on June 16-18, 1976.
(Details III, paragraph 3)
2.
Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 17 and Section 17.2.17 of the licensee's Operational Quality Assurance Topical Report, the nuclear instrumentation strip chart for April 13, 1975, on Unit 2 could not be retrieved.
(Details I, paragraph 7)
LicenseeActiononPreviouslyIdentifiedEnforcementhbtters II.
Not inspected.
III.
New Unresolved Items ( )
76-6/1 Definition of " Safety-Related" The licensee's definition of safety related does not appear to conform to the ANSI 18.7 definition.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
IV.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items Not inspected.
Status is given in IE inspection Reports 50-269, 270, 287/76-2 and 76-4.
V.
Other Significant Findings
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None VI.
Management Interview and Corporate Meeting A.
Management Interviews A meeting was held on May 21, 1976, by T. N. Epps and H. L. Whitener with J. E. Smith and members of the Oconee
staff.
Items discussed included items of noncompliance I.A.1 and the new unresolved item in sections I and III of this
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50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6-4-A meeting was held on June 18, 1976, by T. N. Epps and P. T. Burnett with J. W. Hampton and other Duke Power Company personnel.
Items discussed included noncompliance items I.A.2, I.B.1 and I.B.2, and a summary of inspections in the areas of reportable occurrences, Unit-2 refueling and some Technical Specification requirements.
B.
Corporate Management Meeting A meeting was held with W. O. Parker, H. B. Tucker, J. E. Smith and other DPC management personnel on June 9,1976.
The meeting was conducted by N. C, Moseley, F. J. Long and other Region II personnel.
The following subjects were discussed:
1.
The recurring incidents involving maintenance activities at Keowee that result in loss of the emergency power supply to Oconee.
Concern was expressed that the management controls exercised over electrical maintenance activities appears to be inadequate to assure compliance with Technical Specification requiren ents for emergency W. O. Parker stated that he was also concerned power.
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over the number of Keowee incidents and had written a memo requesting a review into the cause of the incidents.
(Details I, paragraph 6.e)
2.
Unresolved and noncompliance items involving effluent monitors, licensee reponse to noncompliance items, radio-logical analyses, training of utility operators, f amiliarity of personnel with radiation monitor indications and timeliness of corrective actions.
(See IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-5, 50-270/76-5 and 50-287/76-5)
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IE Rpt. Non. 50-269/76-6 I-1
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50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 DETAILS I Prepared by:
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77M Date T.N.Epps,Refdp'rInspector Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: May 18-21, 1976 June 8-10 and 16-18, 1976
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Reviewed by:
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Date R. C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Individuals Contacted a.
Site Inspection Duke Power Company (DPC)_
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Oconee Personnel J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station J. W. Hampton - Manager, Administrative Services L. E. Schmid - Superintendent of Operations O. S. Bradham - Superintendent of Maintenance R. M. Koehler - Superintendent of Technical Services T. S. Barr - Technical Services Engineer R. T. Bond - Performance Engineer B. C. Moore - Assistant Operating Engineer J. N. Pope - Operating Engineer W. M. Harris - Operating Engineer G. A. Ridgeway - Assistant Operating Engineer M. A. Susinno - Assistant Plant Engineer - Maintenance Other Operations Personnel Other Duke Power Company Personnel C. E. McSwain - Assistant Plant Superintendent - Keowee T. H. Patterson - Serviceman A - Keowee J. J. Alward - Field Engineer - Operating Department W. G. Watkins - EM&C Foreman B. H. McCarter - EM&C Foreman E. H. Giadden - Superintendent - Keowee
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6 I-2 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 H. K. Reid - EM&C Engineering Department A. J. Kuck - Maintenance Engineer - Steam Production Department G. Edens - EM&C Junior Engineer M. S. Tuckman - Staff Engineer (Licensing)
R. S. Howell - Senior Design Supervisor - Design Engineering NRC Licensing Personnel G. G. Zech - Project Manager, Oconee b.
Corporate Management Meeting W. O. Parker, Jr - Vice President, Steam Production K. S. Canady - Manager, Project Coordination and Licensing W. A. Haller - Manager, Technical and Environmental Services L. Lewis - System Health Physicist R. M. Koehler - Superintendent of Technical Services (Oconee)
J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station H. B. Tucker - Manager, Nuclear Production 2.
Plant Operations (May 18-21, 1976)
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j The inspector reviewed plant operations at the facility with a.
emphasis on Unit 3 which was the only operating unit.
Sur-veillance specimen holder tubes and specimen capsules were removed from Unit 1.
Unit 2 was shutdown for refueling. Unit 3 was operating at 100 percent of rated power.
Records reviewed included control room and shift supervisor's logs, out of normal logs, work requests and the incident report index. The inspector also conducted a tour of the facility including observations of operations and discussions with personnel in the control rooms.
b.
It was observed in the Unit 3 control room that periodic
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alarms, indicating low instrument air system pressure, were
occurring. The pressure fluctuated between 89 and 96 psig.
Operations personnel stated that instrument air compressors were verified to be operating properly. Pressure fluctuations were due to usage of compressed air during maintenance.
It was also observed that reactor coolant system pr.mp 3Al seals were allowing about 2 gpm leakage to the on;nch tank.
The inspector reviewed data on the pump since the last startup and observed no increasing trend in leakage.
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No discrepancy was identified during other observations.
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IE Rpt. Noa. 50-269/76-6, I-3 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 The inspector observed an out-of-normal check sheet on Unit 3, c.
dated March 8, 1976, where the 3A and 3B concentrated boric acid storage tank (CBAST) breakers were opened for maintenance on a coolant system valve.
The out-of-normal check sheet made no reference to alignment of the boric acid mix tank while the CBAST was out-of-service and indicated "not applicable" where the operating procedures used should be referenced.
This appears to be an example of operating procedural controls not conforming to ANSI 18.7 Section 5.3 - 1972 referenced by the licensee's quality assurance program and Technical Specification 6.4.1 which require that the station be operated and maintenance in accordance with approved procedures.
3.
Maintenance (May 18-21, 1976)
The inspector assisted in reviewing maintenance to determine if the licensee's activities conformed to ANSI 18.7, licensee QA program requirements and Technical Specifications.
After reviewing the above subject area the inspector stated the following to the licensee:
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\\ J Technical Specification 6.4.1.a and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and a.
ANSI N18.7 Section 2.2.15 require that any time, during reactor operation, a safety-related system or component is removed f rom service or returned to service, the task must be accomplished in accordance with approvcd written procedures.
Unless review and approval of an 00N check sheet is accomplished per T.S. 6.1.2.1, the 00N check sheet is not considered to
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meet the above requirement.
See Details II, paragraph 3.b for
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examples.
b.
Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires procedures with appro-priate instructions for maintenance on safety-related systems.
Licensee QA program Section 17.2.11 requires that tests are performed and documented to verify satisfactory performance.
Contrary to the above, acceptance testing requirements, after some maintenance activities, were not identified and documented.
See Details II, phragraph 3.c for examples.
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Technical Specification 6.4.1.e, 10 CFR Appendix B, ANSI 18.7 Section 5.1.6.1 and AFM Section 3.3.2.4 require that any time c.
maintenance is conducted on safety-related structures, systems ( T or components, approved procedures shall be provided and followed.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, I-4 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 Section VIII of the Oconee work request does not represent an approved procedure.
Examples of activities contrary to the above are given in Details II, paragraph 3.a.
4.
Definition of " Safety-Related"
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The inspector compared the licensee's criteria for determining if structures, systems and components are safety-related, with the definition of " safety related" in ANSI 18.7-1972.
The licensee's criteria do not include those plant features necessary to assure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident, such as the BWST level instrumentation.
The licensee stated that such equipment was not originally installed to meet the quality requirements of safety-related equipment and to define such equipment as safety-related now might require upgrading when maintenance is performed.
Safety-related equipment, as defined in ANSI 18.7, must have appropriate administrative controls, but when maintenance is performed on such equipment only original design and installation criteria are required unless the equipment does not perform its intended function.
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Limiting Conditions For Oneration (June 8-10, 1976)
The inspector reviewed various primary system pressure and tempera-ture strip charts, low powar physics test results, completed startup procedures, and observed instrumentation in the control rooms and conducted discussions with operations personnel.
This review was conducted to determine if various technical specification require-ments were met for a selected sample of licensee activities.
No discrepancies were identified.
6.
Reportable Occurrences on Electrical Systems The following occurrences demonstrate a lack of effective Oconee
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administrative control over work conducted on electrical systems.
a.
RO-269/76-2 ES Breaker Failure On January 27, 1976, incorrect spare Engineered Safeguards (ES) electrical breakers were placed in lA low pressure injection, LA reactor building spray and 1A high pressure injection pump motor circuits while EM&C (non Oconce) personnel The were performing periodic maintenance on the breakers.
cause of this occurrence wa; inadequate identification of the proper spare breakers to be used.
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lE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, I-5 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6
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This is contrary to Oconee Technicsi Specification 6.4.1 which requires that maintenance be conducted in accordance with appropriate procedures and 0 once Administrative Policy Manual section 2.7 which requires Oconee to control interfacing individual and organizations.
As corrective action, the licensee stated that a color coding scheme would be implemented by June 1, 1976.
This had been accomplished, but was handled as nonsafety-related and no quality control verification was done.
The licensee committed to get QC verification that the color coding of safety related equipment was correctly performed by July 15, 1976.
b.
R0-287/76-3 Inadvertent Isolation of Standby Buss (yellow buss)
On April 19, 1976, while maintenance was being performed on electrical switchyard breakers the 230 kv yellow buss was in-advertently isolated.
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This is another example of inadequate administrative controls as stated in paragraph 6.a of these details.
c.
RO-287/76-7 Isolation of Keowee Hydro Unit From Underground Feeder On May 26, 1976, during performance of testing, Keowee Unit 1 was removed from service before connecting Keowee Unit 2 to the underground feeder to Oconee.
This violated Technical Specification 3.7.2.
The licensee's report stated that this incident was caused by a breakdown in communications between personnel involved.
This is another example of inadequate administrative and pro-cedural controls.
d.
On June 7,1976, a Keowee Unit 1 generator breaker failure caused Keowee Unit 1 to be unavailable to the overhead line to Oconee. This occurred approxinately five hours after EM&C personnel had conducted maintenance on the breaker.
This appears to be the result of inadequate control over maintenance activities at Keowee.
On June 8. 1976, while performing maintenance on Keowee Unit 1, e.
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Keowee Unit 2 was inadvertently separated from both the under-ground and overhead lines to Oconee by EM&C personnel.
This
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, I-6 f
50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 violated Oconee Technical Specification 3.7.
This is another example of inadequate control over maintenance activities on safety-related equipment.
The above incidents appear to be contrary to Oconee Technical Specification 6.4.1 which requires that the station be maintained in accordance with approved procedures and the licensee's Administrative Policy Manual section 2.7 (Control of Interfacing Individuals and Organizations) which states that in order to assure that the activities of interfacing individuals and organizations do not compromise the safety of the station, or
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the quality of its safety-related structures, systems and components, each nuclear station shall establish measures for the control of such interfacing individuals and organizations.
The inspector stated that this is a repeat of noncompliance item I.A.3 in IE report 50-269/75-10, 50-270/75-11 and 50-287/75-11 and that more strict Oconee management control over interfacing (EM&C, RM&C, etc.) organizations conducting maintenance on safety-related equipment must be established.
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This subject was also discussed in a management meeting between W. O. Parker, Vice President of Steam Production, Duke Power Company and N. C. Moseley, Director, NRC, Region II, on June 9, 1976.
7.
Other Reportable Occurrences R0-269/76-5 Core Flood Tank overpressurization on April 13, 1976, while the Unit 2 LA core flood tank was being pressurized with nitrogen, valve N-128 failed and caused the tank to be overpressurized by 24 psig above the Technical Specification 3.3.3 limit.
The licensee's report stated that a' reactor shutdown was 'rmediately initiated when pressure increased above the 625 ps!g imit.
The inspector asked to see the nuclear instrumentation strip chart showing the power reduction.
The licensee could not find the strip chart.
This is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion 17 and section 17.2.17 of the licensee's Operational Quality Assurance Topical Report which require that operating records be retrievable.
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Evidence was shown by the licensee, in the form of a recording of Mwe output of the main generator, that a power reduction took place.
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kl IE Rpt. Nos.. 50-269/76-6 I-7 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 R0-269/76-6 RB Isolation Valve Failure Licensee corrective action was verified and the inspector had no further questions.
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R0-270/76-4 Polar Crane Operation Without Procedure Contrary to Technical Specification 3.12.3, on May 12,1976, the licensee operated the Unit 2 polar crane over the fuel transfer
canal without an approved procedure.
This item was identified by the licensee.
Licensee corrective action was reviewed and the inspector had no further questions.
R0-287/76-4 Control Rod Overlap Exceeded on April 22,1976, Unit 3, group 7 control rods dropped into the core f rom the 15% withdrawn position.
Licensee corrective action was verified and the inspector had no further questions.
8.
Previous Licensee Committments
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The inspector reviewed licensee action on the following commitments and they are considered closed.
The Unit 3 seismic trigger alarm was made operable by March 1, a.
1976.
b.
Seismic instrumentation calibration has been scheduled on a quarterly basis.
A schedule for non-Technical Specification calibrations of
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equipment with safety significance has been prepared.
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9.
Unit 2 Fuel Damage A Unit 2 fuel assembly end fitting was slightly damaged during handling. A small (approximately 1 inch X 1 inch) piece of sheet metal shroud was bent and had to be removed from the upper end The fitting before the assembly could be reloaded into the core.
inspector viewed a video tape of the damage and reviewed corrective action.
There were no further questions on this item.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, 50-270/76-6 und 50-287/76-6 II-l 7/2 t!7/
DETAILS II Prepared by:
dJ hr H. L. Whitener, Reactor Inspector
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Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: May 18-21, 1976-Cdh-7!2 3he Reviewed by:
H. C. Dance, Chief Date Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Individuals Contacted J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent s
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L. E. Schmid - Operations Superintendent O. S. Bradham - Maintenance Superintendent J. Cox - Station Senior QA Engineer
s T. S. Barr - Technical Services Engineer
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J. N. Pope - Operating Engineer B. C. Moore - Assistant Operating Engineer H. R. Lowery - Assistant Operating Engineer G. A. Ridgeway - Assistant Operating Engineer M. A. Sucinno - Assistant Plant Engineer J. Brachett - Assistant QC Engineer M. Alexander - Maintenance Mechanic 2.
Scope Purpose of this inspection was to continue a review of maintenance and related activities initiated during a previous inspection, April 6-9, 1976, and to review the use of administrative controls which coordinate operation and maintenance activities.
Administrative, quality assurance and procedural requirements for maintenance and related activities are defined in the Technical Specifications, the Quality Assurance Program for operations incorporated as Section 17.2 of tne FSAR, the Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations (APM) and the Station Directives.
Maintenance and related activities were inspected for conformance with the requirements delineated in these documents.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 II-2
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Maintenance and Related Activities a.
Maintenance Section 6.4.1 of the Oconee Technical Specifications requires that the station be operated and maintained in accordance with approved, detailed written procedures which contain appropriate checklists and instructions. This general requirement is further
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stipulated in Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, Criterion V and in the licensee's quality assurance program to implement Appendix B, specifically, Section 17.2.5 of the FSAR, Section 3.3.2.4 of the APM, and in Station Directive 3.3.5(M) (Maintenance Direc-tive No. 8).
Contrary to the requirements of these documents maintenance had been performed on safety-related components without the use of an approved procedure as follows:
(1) Partial disassembly and repair of Keowee Unit II Generator Supply Breaker due to failure of reset mechanism on November 8, 1975.
(Emergency power source which affects Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3)
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(2) Replacemen; ?f Penetration Room Ventilation System charcoal filters on January 13, 1976.
(Emergency discharge for reactor building penetration leakage affecting Oconee Unit 3)
The Station Maintenance Work Request (WR) was used to perform the above maintenance in lieu of an approved procedure. Use of this form is described in Station Directive 3.3.5(M) which states that Section VIII of the WR may be used only to specify mainte:.ance activities such as trouble shooting or to provide brief instructions for certain minor maintenance. The limita-tion of minor maintenance is not clearly identified but the Directive does state that the WR is not to be utilized for jobs which require approved procedures.
The WR in its current form does not constitute an approved procedure in accordance with the requirements of Section 6.1.2.1 of the Technical Specification.
The misuse of the WR as a procedure for performing safety related maintenance appears to be in noncompliance with Section 6.4.1 of the Technical Specifications.
b.
Operations
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Removal of safety-related equipment from and return to service was inspected along with the associated maintenance activities.
Section 6.4.1 of Oconee Technical Specifications requires that (
approved, detailed written procedures be provided for operation
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6, 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 II-3 and maintenance of the complete station and of all safety-related systems.
This general requirement is further stipulated in Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, Criterion V and in the licensee's quality assurance program to implement Appendix B, specifically, Section 17.2.5 of the FSAR, Section 3.1.4 of the APM and Station Directive 3.1.28 (0P), (Out-of-Normal Checksheet).
Contrary to the requirements of these documents the Out-of-Normal (00N) Checksheet had been used in lieu of an approved operating procedure to manipulate components of safety-related systems to accomplish isolation of equipment for maintenance and to realign the system after maintenance involving components in the Concentrated Boric Acid System.
Specifically the "Take Out of Service," Section of Item 10 on the 00N checksheet was used to remove the Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank from service and to specify valve and breaker alignments to isolate the system for maintenance on Valve No. 2CS-68 (Unit 2) on January 12, 1976 and Valve No. 3CS-78 (Unit 3) on March 8,1976.
The only documented realignment is the, " Return to Service,"
Section of Item 10 on the 00N checksheet.
Item 9 of this
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checksheet which is provided for identification of approved e
operating procedures to be used was marked NA, (not applicable).
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The licensee was advised that use of this checksheet, which only requires the review of a control operator, to align safety-related components and systems appears to be contrary to the requirements of Section 6.4.1 of the Technical Specification.
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c.
Testing Functional testing after maintenance to determine that a system or component will satisf actorily perform its function was inspected.
Technical Specification 6.4.1 requires that procedures and instruc-tions be provided for maintenance on safety-related systems and equipment.
This requirement is also specified in the quality assurance program Section 17.2.11 of the FSAR and implementing procedures APM 3.1.4, 3.2.3.6 and 3.3.2.10.
These documents require that af ter maintenance on safety-related systems or components a test is performed and documented to verify satis-f actory performance of the equipment.
Contrary to these requirements the licensee had not referenced or documented testing and test results for equipment returned to service as follows:
Keowee Unit II Generator Supply Breaker, November 8, 1975 -
a.
Licensee personnel stated that Keowee Unit II was started i
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IE Rpt. Non. 50-269/76-6, 50-270/76-6 and 50-287/76-6 II-4 both from Keowee and Oconee control room to verify proper breaker operation.
Ine licensee was unable to produce documentation of the test and test results, b.
Spent Fuel Pit Pump, October 1,1975 - the licensee stated that the proper pump operation la verified by OP 1104/06.
This operation procedure was not pulled and signed off and no entry was made in the control room logbook or other maintenance documentation which identified the appropriaca procedure or which verified or documented the operational results.
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6 III-1 and 50-270/76-6
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DETAILS III Prepared by:P. T. Burnett, Rhdctor Inspector Date
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Nuclear Support Section Reactor Opcrations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: June 8-10 and 16-18, 1976
Reviewed by:
& u-v H. C. Dance, Actifnf Chief Date Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Individuals Contacted J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station L. E. Schmid - Superintendent of Operation J. N. Pope - Operating Engineer O. S. Bradham - Superintendent of Maintenance
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T. S. Barr - Technical Engineer
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J. Phillips - Maintenance Supervisor W. R. McCollum - Assistant Plant Engineer R. T. Bond - Fuel Management Engineer 2.
Maintenance and Modifications During Refueling Outage In Unit 2, the inspector witnessed the movement of the core barrel from the deep end of the refueling canal back to the vessel.
As the barrel was being lowered into position in the vessel, momentary interference between the lifting rig and the guide studs in the vessel flange was evident. The job supervisor told the inspector that the crane operator had not observed any change in the load cell indication as a result of the interference.
Once the core barrel was in position, considerable difficulty was experienced in removing the lifting rig from the core barrel.
That step was not observed by the inspector.
The supervisor later reported that the lifting rig had to be completely reattached to the core barrel to relieve an interference between the rig and the vessel, before the lifting rig could be removed.
He stated that there was no inter-ference between the vessel and the barrel.
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The licensee has a formal program for training and qualifying crane operators, who are required to pass physical, written and practical operating examinations. The inspector verified, by review of training records, that the crane operator used for the core barrel
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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-6 and 50-270/76-6
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III-2 movement had passed all three examinations.
The person supervising
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the core barrel movement was the instructor for crane operation.
The inspector observed that MP/0/A/ll50/6, " Reactor Internals Removal and Replacement," was in use and up-to-date throughout the manipulation of the core barrel.
The inspector also reviewed two completed modification packages.
SMR-0N-0551 addressed the installation of three-stage seals, vice two-stage seal units, in the reactor coolant pumps in unit 2.
The licensee had identified this modification as involving a change in the FSAR, but not an unreviewed safety question.
SMR-ON-507, " Station Modification to Provide Boron Dilution Capability for Term Cooling af ter a LOCA," was also reviewed.
Kevision of drawing or changes in operating procedures were initiated by the management system following completion of the modifications.
3.
Fuel Handling Activities The inspector reviewed the completed copies of procedure OP/1/A/1502/5A,
" Fuel Unloading Unit 1 (BOC3)," and procedure OP/1/A/1502/5B, " Fuel (
Reloading Unit 1 (BOC3)." These procedures were used during the outage for removal of the surveillance capsule tubes on Unit 1.
The inspector witnessed fuel handling operations in the Unit 2 reactor building, in the spent fuel pool and as directed from the c ontr ci room.
Persons assigned to fuel handling operations and positioned in the control room were found to meet the requirements of Technical Specifications.
During discussions with the bridge operator ac the spent fuel pool, the operator was not fully aware of the emergency procedures or actions involved in the area.
This matter was discussed with licensee management.
They expressed the opinion that the necessary knowledge was vested in the shif t supervisor or SRO (refueling),
who would provide the direction in the event of any abnormal situation.
Fuel handling operations were controlled by OP/2/A/1502/06.
The inspector found that contrary to the requirements of that procedurg inverse multiplication plots were not maintained, the results of X analyses were not recorded on enclosure 4.14 and that results of boron sampling were not logged on enclosure 4.8.
The licensee was able to verify from other records that acceptable boron samples were obtained at the specified frequency.
These failures to follow the procedure as required by Technical Specification 6.4.1.b have been cited as a deficiency.
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