IR 05000263/1978005

Insp Rept 50-263/78-05 on 780411-14 & 27-28.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ie Bulletin Followup & Qualifications of Electrical Cable Splices

ML20056B579
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	05/24/1978
From:	Harpster T, Julie Hughes, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056B575	List: IR 05000263/1978005 ML20056B574 ML20056B577
References
50-263-78-05, 50-263-78-5, NUDOCS 9102070546
Download: ML20056B579 (4)

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I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-263/78-05 ,

Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 35401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

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Inspection At: Monticello Site, Monticello, NN ,

Inspection Conducted: April 11-14 and 27-28, 1978 Inspectors: T. L. Ha s P _ 5 ,

Approved By: R.F.Warnick,Chiefh 4/>t/[7f

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Reactor Projects Section 2 '

Inspection Summary

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Inspection on April 11-14 and 27-28, 1978 (Report No. 50-263/78-05)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of meintenance, IE Bulletin followup, and qualification of electrical cable splice !

The inspection involved 44 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspector ;

Results: Of the areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was iden- l tified concerning maintenance activitie !

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! DETAILS ,

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! Persons Contacted 4  :

i I *L. Eliason, Plant Manager

**M. Clarity, Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation

Protection

! *W. Shamla, Plant Engineer Technical l *D. Antony, Plant Engineer, Operations

! H. Nimmo, Maintenance Supervisor j *R. Scheinost, Quality Assurance Supervisor  !

P. Pochop, Quality Assurance Engineer  !

• • W. Hill, Engineer ,

• • M. Hammer Engineer ,

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l R. Goranson, Engineer

) * Denotes those attending the exit interview on April 14, 197 !

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• • Denotes those attending the exit interview on April 28, 1978.

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s Maintenance  !

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j The inspector reviewed work request authorizations and other asso-

! ( cisted documents to ascertain whether maintenance activities on

} safety related systems and components were conducted in accordance l with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or i l standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification require- l

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ments.

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Work Request Authorization, WRA 78-147 dated February 2, 1978, was i written to investigate the cause of drywell to torus vacuum breaker

! B sticking open (indication of being open). Subsequent to the work i request authorization's review and approval, the description of the l work requested was modified to include " repair as indicated," and

! no additional review was conducted to ensure that the repair did

not constitute a modification or design change. Administrative

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Control Directive 4 ACD 3.6, Revision 6, dated July 7,1977, (step

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6.2.17) " prohibits the extension of work activities beyond the

scope of the approved work request authorization. .If additional work activities are required, a separate work request authorization a shall be processed to authorize these activities. Examples of

unauthorized work could involve the following: repair of an item i when inspection only is authorized."

e This is considered to be an item of noncompliance.

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Io i j IE Bulletin Followup '

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I The inspector reviewed the licensee's' actions with regard to  !

j IE Bulletin 77-05,77-05A and 77-06, f i

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j The inspector determined that the licensee had performed a systematic

' review of the facility to ensure that no connectors or penetrations i

! of the types identified in the bulletins were installed in safety l

related systems. The review included: l

l Review of the applicable penetration and electrical drawings;

!! Specifications (Bechtel 5828-E-18); Visual inspection of the penetrations; 1 .

' Interviews with maintenance, engineering and General Electric 3 personnel; and ,

a General Electric Test Report " Qualification test for F01 >

! Electrical Penetration Assembly" l

The inspector noted that the electrical penetrations are pressurized i with nitrogen and a local leak rate test is performed each operating

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The inspector concluded that the licensee's responses were accurate based on the inspector's review of the available drawings, specifi-  ;

i car. ions and correspondence. No items of noncompliance or deviations i

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wer. identifie i Electrical Cable Splices i i i The inspector determined during inspection on April 11-14, 1978, l that documentation of the environmental qualification of certain 4 safety related electrical cable splices inside the drywell was

! l not available at the site. The particular splices were associated

< with low voltage power and control penetrations (JS-105A, C, D) for l

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valves and circuits in the drywell which are required to function  !

i in a LOCA environment. The splices are butt splices between the

penetration leads and the field cables which were installed by i

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Bechtel construction personnel using an uninsulated splice link  !

(Burndy YSV type or equivalent), and covered with an unidentifiable

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make of heat shrink tubing. Subsequent communications between ,

Bechtel and the licensee indicated that there had been no formal

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qualification of the splice material ;

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(- A splice was disassembled and testing was performed to determine  !

the composition of the heat shrink tubing. The licensee concluded, i through analysis of these results and of the equipment required to i operate under LOCA conditions, that although the penetration splice materials had not been formally qualified, an unsafe condition did  !

not exist since there was assurance that the splices would continue to function for the time required for the safety related components to perform their function. It was also concluded that, although the existing conditions did not constitute a safety hazard, it would be prudent to upgrade the splices using materials qualified  ;

to IEEE Standards 323 and 383. Region III concurred with the (

licensee's conclusion ;

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- On April 25, 1978, the licensee shut down to upgrade approximately ,

100 splices. The inspector reviewed the following documentation

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i associated with the material qualification and splice installatiti: I i Procedure No. 8067 for splicing No. 10 AWG and No. 14 AWG cables;

< Procedure No. 8769 - work travelers for Class lE splice replacement program; Work Request Authorizations78-534 through 76-548 and 78-578; t i

k Craft personnel qualifications for each type of splice; i

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i Quality control inspector training; i Certification of Burndy Kynar insulated terminals and splices; and i Raychem heat shrink tubing certificate of complianc i The inspector observed four splices assembled during personnel qual- ,

ificatio ~

Monticello resumed operation on April 28, 1978, after replacement of the splices. To provide increased assurance that the splices will perform their funct1on in a LOCA environment, the splice materials and methods will be tested in a simulated LOCA environmen ;

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie ' Management Interviews The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) on April 14, 1978, and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 28, 1978, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio ( l-4-

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