IR 05000250/1978020
| ML17338A354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1978 |
| From: | Andrea Johnson, Martin R, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17338A348 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-78-20, 50-251-78-20, NUDOCS 7812120237 | |
| Download: ML17338A354 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 4***0 Report Nos.:
50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
Florida Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 013100 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Inspection at:
Turkey Point Site, Florida City, Florida Inspection conducted:
September 5-8, 1978 Inspectors: I A. H. Johnson H. L. Whitener R. Vogt-L well Approved by:
R.
D. Martin, Chief Nuclear Support Section No. l Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Da e Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Se tember 5-8 1978:
(Re ort Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 Areas Ins ected:
A routine, unannounced inspection was performed in the areas of:
refueling maintenance accomplished on safety related equipment; safety related piping support and restraint surveillance program; and preparation for refueling and fuel handling activities.
The inspection involved 85 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the three areas inspected, two examples of one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Infraction:
The use of or failure to revise an obsolete procedure to perform a maintenance or surveillance activity (250/251/
78-20-01)
Paragraph I.5.E.(1)
and II.5.b., respectively).
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RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 DETAILS I Prepared by:
A. H.
nson, Reacto Inspector Nuclea Support Secti n No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date Dates of Inspection:
September 5-8, 1978 Reviewed by:
R.
D. Martin, Chief Nuclear Support Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch lo rc D
e 1.
Persons Contacted Florida Power and Li ht Com an
- H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager-J.
K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear-D.
W. Jones, equality Control Supervisor-H.
M. Ainsworth, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent-J.
E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear-V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear
- R. J.
Spooner, gAO Supervisor-L. C. Huenniger, Plant Supervisor, Nuclear
""T
~ A. Finn, Plant Supervisor, Nuclear-J.
R. Pendland, Licensing Engineer
-"R.
B. Wallace, gA Engineer P. J. White, Maintenance Superintendent G. Jones, Plant Supervisor, Nuclear R, Tucker, gA Engineer J
~ Sullivan, Refueling Coordinator F. Martone, Mechanical Planner-Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not inspected.
3.
Unresolved Items
RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 I"2 No new unresolved items this report period.
4.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with Mr. Yaeger and members of his staff (denoted in paragraph 1)
on September 8,
1978.
At this meeting the inspector discussed the areas inspected and summarized the inspection findings as discussed in this report.
The licensee did not take exception to the item of noncompliance.
5.
Refuelin Maintenance The inspector conducted a
review of the following Unit 4 refueling maintenance activities:
a.
Plant Work Orders Title 2807 2809 2811 2884 2895 2909 Pressurizer Relief Valves Reactor Coolant Pump "A" Reactor Coolant Pump "C"
"C" Component Cooling Water Pump Hydraulic Snubber Removal Hydraulic Snubber Removal b.
Clearance Orders Title 8-71 8-81 8-82 8-83 8-84 8-85 8-93 8-112 8-146 8-189 8-220 9-19 9-54 Unit 4 Boron Injection Tank 4A Reactor Coolant Pump 4C Reactor Coolant Pump 4A Reactor Coolant Pump 4C Reactor Coolant Pump 4A Reactor Coolant Pump Pressurizer Relief 6 Relief Stop Valves Normal Containment Coolers Flux Mapper Containment Spray A, B, C Accumulator Level 6 Pressure Indication Unit 4 Pressurizer Control Heaters CVCS Penetration
RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 I-3 c
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Maintenance of Snubber No.
The inspector observed the maintenance teardown of hydraulic Snubber No. 58, noting that approved Plant Work Order (PWO) 2909 and Maintenance Procedure (MP) 0707.2 were at the work location and were being used in performing this maintenance activity.
d.
Maintenance Activit Reviews and Acce tance Criteria The Unit 4 refueling maintenance activities of 5.a, 5.b and 5.c above were reviewed by the inspector to verify that:
The maintenance activities were accomplished using approved procedures by qualified personnel.
The required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating maintenance activities.
The maintenance activities were inspected in accordance with the licensee's requirements.
Provisions for assuring that system valves, breakers, etc.
are aligned for normal service.
Provisions for testing equipment following maintenance.
The inspector used one or more of the following acceptance criteria for the above items:
Technical Specifications ANSI 18.7-1972 Final Safety Analysis Report Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972 equality Assurance Manual Plant Administrative Procedures F~indin n
Findings were acceptable with the exception of items listed below:
(1)
Technical Specifications, Section 6.8.1 requires that written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented,-
and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements of Section 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI 18.7-197 ~
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RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 I-4 Section 5.1 of ANSI 18.7 states in part that the policies (Administrative)
shall assure that documents, including revisions or changes, are reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel and are distributed to and used by the personnel performing the prescribed activity.
Contrary to the above, Maintenance Procedure (MP)
1207.1, Pressurizer Safety Valve Repair and Setting, was revised with approval 7/18/78 and distributed 8/2/78 but was not implemented to perform Plant Work Order (PWO)
2807 on 8/15/78.
Instead, the obsolete MP 1207.1 was used to perform the pressurizer safety valve maintenance.
The above item and item 5.b of Details II of this report are in noncompliance with Technical Specifications, Section 6,8.1 and are designated as two examples of an item of noncompliance.
(251/78-20-01)
(2)
Administrative Procedure (AP)
0190.19, Control of Maintenance on Nuclear Safety-Related Systems, Section 8.1.2 requires that the Assistant Superintendent Nuclear Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, or the ISC Supervisor or their designee will determine if a nuclear safety system is involved in the maintenance activity and, if so, will indicate yes under Nuclear Safety-Related on the PWO forms.
He will further determine whether a maintenance procedure is required and approve the PWO in the Nuclear Supervisor approval signature block.
Contrary to the above, the Nuclear Supervisor approval signature block was not signed on the following Unit 4 refueling plant work orders (PWO):
PWO Title 2807 2809 2811 2884 Pressurizer Relief Valves Reactor Coolant Pump "A" Reactor Coolant Pump "C" Component Cooling Water Pump "C" The above item is in noncompliance with Technical Specifications, Section 6.8.1 and is similar to an item of noncompliance identified in Inspection Report No.
78-12.
Whereas, the above item was identified prior to the licensee's response to report No.
78-12, this item is reported as another example of the noncompliance identified in Inspection Report No. 78-1 RII Rpt.
Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 I-5 (3)
Technical Specifications, Section 6.8.1 requires that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.1 and 5 '
of ANSI 18.7-1972.
Section 5.8 of Administrative Procedure (AP) 0103.4, In Plant Equipment Clearance Order, requires in part that all clearances on Nuclear Safety-Related Equipment listed in Technical Specification 3.0 shall be given proper review before issuance by the Nuclear Watch Engineer or Nuclear Plant Supervisor and a
Licensed Senior Reactor Operator.
Their approvals are to be indicated by use of a stamp labeled
"Nuclear Safety-Related".
Contrary to the above, during the Unit 4 refueling period of August 13, 1978 to September 7,
1978, the following clearances were not approved and/or stamped to indicate that they were safety-related:
Clearance No.
Title 8-71 8-81 8-82 8-83 8-84 8-85 8-93 8-112 8-146 8-189 8-220 9-19 9-54 Unit 4 Boron Injection Tank Unit 4 "A" Reactor Coolant Pump Unit 4 "C" Reactor Coolant Pump Unit 4 "A" Reactor Coolant Pump Unit 4 "C" Reactor Coolant Pump Unit 4 "A" Reactor Coolant Pump Pressurizer Relief 8 Relief Stop Valves Normal Containment Coolers Flux Mapper Containment Spray A, B, C Accumulator Level 8 Pressure Indication Unit 4 Pressurizer Heater Controls CVCS Penetration
The above item is in noncompliance with Technical Specifications, Section 6.8.1 and is similar to an item of noncompliance identified in inspection report No.
78-12.
Whereas, the above item was identified prior to the licensee's response to Report No.
78-12, this item is reported as another example of the noncompliance identified in Inspection Report No. 78-12.
(4)
Criterion II of Appendix B to
CFR 50 states that the equality Assurance Program shall provide control over activities affecting quality of the identified structures,
RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 1-6 systems and components to an extent consistent with their importance to safety.
Appendix C to the FPM, Topical Quality Assurance Report states that the Quality Assurance Program is committed to ANSI 18 '-1972.
Section 5.3.5 of ANSI 18.7-1972 states that permission to release equipment or systems for maintenance shall be granted by responsible operating personnel and that the granting of the permission by the Operations Group shall be documented.
Contrary to the above, documentation could not be provided for the following Unit 4 refueling Plant Work Orders (PWO):
PWO Title 2895 2909 Snubber (Hydraulic) Removal Snubber (Hydraulic) Removal The above item is in noncompliance with ANSI 18.7-1972, Section 5.3.5 and is similar to an item of noncompliance identified in Inspection Report No.
78-12.
Whereas, the above item was identified prior to the licensee's response to Report No. 78-12, this item is reported as another example of the noncompliance identified in inspection report No. 78-1 RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 DETAILS II Prepared by:
H.
.
itener, Re ctor nspector Nuclear Support Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection:
September 5-8, 1978 Reviewed by:
R.
D. Martin, Chief Nuclear Support Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch laqq g ate 1.
Persons Contacted-H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager-J.
K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
="R. J.
Spooner, (}AO Supervisor
+D.
W. Jones, QC Supervisor P. J. White, Maintenance Superintendent-H. M. Ainsworth, Assistant" Maintenance Superintendent J. J. Sullivan, Maintenance Supervisor P.
H. Bennett, (}C Surveillance Technician R. E. Tucker, gA Engineer-R.
B. Wallace, QA Engineer Other technicians and Document Control personnel
+Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
Not in the scope of this inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items None 4.
Exit Interview Areas of inspection and inspection findings were reviewed with Mr. Yaeger and members of his staff on September 8,
1978, and are discussed in this report detail.
Attendees at this interview are denoted in paragraph RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 II-2 5.
Pi e Su orts and Restraints The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance program for safety-related hydraulic supports and restraints.
This included a review of procedures for technical adequacy; examination of various installed dynamic and fixed pipe supports and restraints; and review of recent surveillance records.
Pertinent aspects of this review are discussed below.
a
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Shock Su ressor Surveillance Procedures (1)
Visual Ins ection Procedure The inspector reviewed Maintenance Procedure 0707.2,
"Snubber Inspection and Repair" (dated August 8, 1978) for technical adequacy and discussed his findings with the licensee as follows:
(a)
Limits of operable piston rod travel have not been identified in the acceptance criteria and verified for the hot and cold positions.
(b)
Acceptance criteria for fluid level is not adequate.
The criteria for operability as stated is that the sum of the number of inches of piston rod extension and number of marks from extension of the fluid level indicator must equal or be greater than 4-3/4.
By this method, if the piston rod extension is greater than 4-3/4 inches the snubber would meet the acceptance criteria regardless of fluid level, even if the reservoir is empty.
(c)
Procedure instructions and data sheets do not specifically delineate all items to be inspected.
Items to be inspected need to be defined to assure uniform inspection and to docu-ment the results.
(d)
Appendix 1 to Procedure 0707.2 (repair instructions)
does not provide detailed instruction for assembly/
disassembly of the snubbers and does not include parts list or drawings.
(e)
The procedure does not require that a functional test be performed on a snubber prior to installation after maintenanc RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 (2)
Functional Test The inspector reviewed Maintenance Procedure 0707.4,
"Func-tional Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers",
(dated, August 8, 1978)
for technical adequacy and discussed this findings with the licensee as follows:
(a)
The acceptance criteria does not include a correction to the measured lockup velocity and bleed rate to correct for the difference between test temperature and operating temperature.
(b)
The procedure does not require that free motion of the piston rod be verified.
The licensee will evaluate the items in 5.a.1 and 5.a.2 above and address these matters in a revision to Procedures MP-0707.2 and MP-0707.4.
Procedure revision will be completed by December 1,
1978, or prior to reuse.
This item is identified for inspector follow-up (250/251/78-20-02).
b.
Administrative Controls The inspector reviewed selected QA and Administrative procedures to determine that adequate controls had been established for implementing the shock suppressor inspection and test procedures.
Procedures either partially or totally reviewed included:
TQR - 5 (1/23/76):
Instructions, Procedures and Drawings TQR - 6 (1/23/76):
Document Control TQR - ll (1/23/76):
Test Control QP 5.1 (12/15/75):
Operating Plant Procedures QP 11.2 (9/15/74):
Test Control - Operation AP 0190.13 (3/23/77):
Corrective Action For Conditions Adverse to Quality AP 0190.16 (8/23/76):
Scheduling and Surveillance of Periodic Tests and Checks Required by Technical Specifications AP 0190.25 (7/16/76):
Compliance Review Program (TQR = Topical Quality Requirements)
(QP = Quality Procedure)
(AP = Administrative Procedure)
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 II-4 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires, in part, that written procedures and administrative policies shall be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Sections 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972.
Section 5.1 of ANSI N18.7-1972 further requires that these policies shall assure that documents affecting safety-related activities are distributed and implemented in performing these activities.
The inspector's review showed that administrative procedures have been established for implementing review of changes to controlled documents such as the Technical Specifications and Surveillance Checklists.
AP 0190.25 prescribes that a Potential Action Document (PAD) and Compliance Review Sheet be implemented by the gC supervisor for Technical Specification changes.
This procedure assigns the responsibility to the (}C supervisor as follows:
(1)
Implement and review the completed Compliance Review Sheet for evaluation of the impact of required changes.
(2)
Notify the appropriate plant personnel of any changes to plant programs or procedures which are necessary to assure compliance with the required changes.
(3)
Assure that actions to bring programs or procedures into compliance with required changes are tracked in an appropriate manner.
From discussions with licensee personnel it appears that notifica-tion of affected departments and personnel and tracking of changes are generally by verbal communication.
written notification or written acknowledgement of completed changes are not required by the procedure.
The inspector identified the failure to obtain and document in writing acknowledgement that assigned changes are accomplished by some specific deadline as a weakness in this administrative control.
The licensee agreed to evaluate this condition but made no commitment to revise the procedure at this time.
AP 0190.16, Section 8.3, requires each surveillance requirement for which the plant is responsible shall be listed on a Surveil-lance Checkoff List.
The inspector's review showed that the surveillance requirements implemented by the Technical Specifica-tion change for shock suppressors (Sections 3.13 and 4'4) dated May 19, 1978, had not been included in the Surveillance Checkoff
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 II-5 Lists for varible frequency visual inspection of hydraulic shocks and refueling outage functional testing of hydraulic shocks and visual inspection of mechanical shocks.
The inspector identified the failure to revise obsolete documents, Surveillance Checkoff Lists, to reflect current Technical Specifi-cations in a timely manner as apparent noncompliance with admi-nistrative policies (AP 0190.16) required by Technical Specifica-tion 6.8.1
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This is a second example of apparent noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 as previously identified and discussed in Details I, paragraph 5.e.l.
(250/251/78-20-01)
c.
Test Results The inspector reviewed the results of recent functional testing (August 31, 1978)
and found of the three units tested, all had failed to meet acceptance criteria.
Two units had bleed rates less than the 2 to 15 inch per minute acceptance criteria.
One unit had a lockup velocity greater than the 6 to 25 inch per minute acceptance criteria.
The inspector also examined three disassembled hydraulic shock suppressors and observed severe wear rings on the inner wall of the cylinder and frozen ball joints.
Due to failures observed, the licensee elected to functionally test all hydraulic shock suppressors.
Preparation for these tests was in progress at the conclusion of this inspection.
d.
Acce tance Criteria The inspector reviewed the basis of the hydraulic shock suppressor acceptance criteria and discussed NRC requirements with licensee personnel as follows:
(1)
Locku Velocit and Bleed Rate The licensee has established criteria for lockup velocity and bleed rate through an engineering analysis.
However, as discussed in paragraph 5.a the acceptance criteria for functional testing does not include a correction for tempera-ture difference between test and operating conditions.,
The licensee agreed to determine the correction factor and verify that the corrected functional test results meet acceptance criteria.
Any failures should be reported to the NRC.
This matter will be.reviewed at a subsequent inspection (250/251/78-20-03).
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 II-6 (2)
Seal Material The inspector discussed the NRC position that for shock suppressors with non ethylene propylene seals, a seal life-time must be determined on the basis of the material charac-teristics and operating conditions.
The licensee believed that all seals were ethylene propylene but agreed to perform a record review and confirm this.
This matter will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection (250/251/78-20-04).
(3)
Re resentative Sam le The inspector advised the licensee that the term,
"Represen-tative sample",
as used in the Technical Specification, requires evaluation of the factors affecting shock suppressor operation.
The licensee agreed to develop written guidelines for selection of the snubber test sample (250/251/78-20-06).
(4)
Verification of Visual Ins ection The inspector advised the licensee that functional testing cannot be used to determine operability of a snubber which does not meet the visual inspection acceptance requirements.
The operability of the snubber must be determined on the basis of an engineering evaluation of existing conditions; and furthermore, if a deficiency is identified and not corrected at that time, the evaluation must confirm opera-bility over the next inspection interval.
6.
Plant Tour The inspector, accompanied by licensee personnel, toured the Unit 4 containment building to visually examine installed piping supports, restraints and associated hardware.
Items observed are as follows:
Snubber No.
Comment
10
46
34
1 Loose lock nut at turnbuckle Support plate rusting OK Loose lock nut OK OK OK OK
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RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-20 and 50-251/78-20 OK Possible interference with conduit and instrument line Appeared to be fully extended Loose bolt; one of four bolts connecting a spool piece to the snubber extension rod.
In addition to the above, the inspector randomly observed a number fixed supports, adjustable hangers and component support structures and noted no deficiencies.
The licensee stated that when the visual inspection is performed (prior to unit startup) all discrepancies will be noted, recorded, evaluated for effect on operability, corrected and if appropriate, reported to the NRC.
The licensee will also evaluate the problem of frozen ball joints and determine corrective action.
The above items were identified for further NRC review 251/78-20-05).
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RII Rpt.
No. 50-251/78-20 III-1 DETAILS III Prepared by:
R.
ogt-owell, Reactor Inspector Nuclear Support Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch (o-~-7g Date Dates of Inspectio
September 5-8, 1978 Reviewed by:
YCg, R.
. Martin, Chief Nuclear Support Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted Florida Power and Li ht Com an
- H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
+J.
K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
- D. W. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor
"-J. E. Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear
- V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear
- H. M. Ainsworth, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear V. A. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor E.
R. Knuckles, Reactor Engineer J
~ F. Englehardt, Reactor Engineer C. J. Baker, Nuclear Plant Supervisor J.
Wade, Chemistry Supervisor D.
C. Bradford, Refueling Outage Coordinator J.
M. Puckett, Health Physics Day Shift Supervisor B. J.
Coward, Health Physicist
+Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not applicable to this inspection report period.
3.
Unresolved Items No new unresolved items this report period.
4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with Mr. H. E. Yaeger and other members of his staff as denoted in paragraph 1 on September 8,
1978.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio RII Rpt.
No. 50-251/78-20 III-2 5.
Pre aration for Refuelin
- Unit 4 The inspector reviewed operating procedures to verify that approved procedures were available for new fuel receipt and inspection and fuel transfer and core verification.
Operating Procedure 16009', "Site Removal of New Fuel Assemblies From Shipping Containers and Handling of Shipping Containers",
was reviewed to verify that provisions have been provided for the inspection of new fuel assemblies.
The inspector reviewed several
"New Fuel Receiving Records" for the month of May 1978.
The inspector reviewed the following procedures to ascertain that provisions have been established to insure that the requirements of the Technical Specifications are met during the refueling process:
16000.1 16002.6 16002.5 16004.2 16701.1 1407.21
- Limits and Precautions for Handling Fuel Assemblies
- Preparations and Precautions for Refueling Fuel Shuffle
- Refueling Core Shuffle
- Refueling Systems Interlocks Verifications
- Gantry Crane Inspection and Preventive Maintenance
- Refueling Activities Checkoff List The official copies of these procedures and the documentation of the applicable stages of completion of the activity covered by these procedures were reviewed by the inspector.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Fuel Handlin Activities The inspector observed fuel handling activities both from the main control room and from the refueling deck inside the containment.
The activity was reviewed to assure that:
(a)
proper core monitoring was being maintained (b)
fuel accountability methods were being implemented (c)
proper make-up and license requirements for the crews on the refueling deck and in the control room were established (d)
coordination of the refueling crew in the control room and on the refueling existed (e)
Technical Specification boron concentration requirements were being observed (f)
containment integrity requirements during the refueling operations was being observed (g)
actual fuel assembly handling was being properly performed (h)
general good housekeeping was being observed on the refueling bridge and refueling dec ~
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RII Rpt.
No. 50-251/78-20 III-3 Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
7.
Fuel Si in and Ins ection Discussions with the refueling outage coordinator and the plant chemistry supervisor revealed that no plans are currently being made for fuel sipping operations based on the fact that the primary system activities have been relatively low during the preceding cycle.
In reference to fuel assembly inspection, Westinghouse plans to conduct a detailed inspection of four recycled assemblies with the intent of shedding some light on the potential role that crud deposition may be playing on an observed and as yet unexplained flux depression phenomenon observed in two core locations.
This flux depression phenomenon had been discussed with an NRC inspector during a previous inspection.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
S ent Fuel Pit (SFP) Overflow At the re uest of the USNRC R
q egional Office, the inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding an overflow of the spent fuel pit which took place on Sunday, September 3,
1978, and the subsequent decon-tamination plans and activities conducted by the licensee.
The apparent cause of this incident was failure of an operator to secure the SFP recirculation pump after making a valve lineup to equalize the fuel transfer canal and the SFP levels.
Approximately 3300 gallons overflowed into the cask washdown area and the storm drain system, which is outside the SFP building but within the restricted area.
Cleanup operations had not been completed at the conclusion of this inspectio