IR 05000250/1978025
| ML17338A375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1978 |
| From: | Verdery E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17338A373 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-78-25, 50-251-78-25, NUDOCS 7812190243 | |
| Download: ML17338A375 (11) | |
Text
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Wp0 0 1t * ~ i UNITE D STATE S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W:
ATLANTA.GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos.:
50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
Florida Power and Light Company P.
O.
Box 013100 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Inspection at:
Turkey Point Site, Florida City, Florida Inspection conducted:
October 16-20, 1978 Inspector:
E.
H. Verdery Approved by:
R.
C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch lz//A7S Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection on October 16-20 1978:
(Re ort Nos. 50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25)
refueling, followup of noncompliance, unresolved items, reportable events, IE Bulletins and Circulars and outstanding items.
Observation of site fire and evacuation drills.
The inspection involved 38 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results:
In the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were ident.ified.
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RII Rpt.
Nos. 50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 DETAILS I Prepared b
H. Verdery, Reac or Inspector Reactor Projects Section No.
React, or Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date Dates of Inspection:
October 16-20, 1978 Reviewed by: E R.
C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support, Branch
>~<i&'7Z Date 1.
Persons Cont, acted Florida Power and Li ht Com an H.
E.
- "J.
K.
"D.
"J.
E.
V.
B.
H.
M.
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R.
D.
V. A.
D.
D.
C.
A.
R.
H.
Yaeger, Plant. Manager Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear Jones, (}uality Control Supervisor Moore, Operations Superintendent, Nuclear Wager, Operations Supervisor, Nuclear Ainsworth, Assistant, Superintendent.,
Nuclear Maintenance White, Maintenance Superintendent Williams, Assistant Superintendent, Electrical Maintenance Haase, Technical Department.
Supervisor Kaminskas, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Brady, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Coker, Nuclear Plant Supervisor Reinhardt, gC Operations Engineer The inspector contacted several operations and technical support personnel not listed.
- "Denotes those attending the exit interview.
~Noncom
>1 ia>>rr (Closed)
Infraction (78-12-03):
Failure to Properly Cont.rol Clearances on Nuclear Safety-Related Equipment.
The inspector reviewed the Equipment Clearance Order Books for Units 3 and
~ and determined that for those clearances in effect on October 1b,
RII Rpt.
Nos. 50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 I-2 V
1978, the proper reviews had been made and that, the Nuclear Safety-Related Stamp had been effectively implemented
"in accordance with AP0103.4.
In addition the inspector noted that.
the licensee had instituted, via Special Instruction, the requirement, that the Nuclear Plant.
Supervisor review the Equipment Clearance Order Books on the Peak Shift. each day.
This review will be included in a
subsequent revision to OP0204.2, Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks, Calibration and Operating Evolutions.
Deviation (Closed)
Deviation (77-28-01):
Boron Injection Tank Not Constructed of Materials Specified in FSAR.
IE Reports 50-250/77-26, 50-251/77-26, 50-250/77-28)
50-251/77-28)
50-250/78-01 and 50-251/78-01 discuss an unresolved item involving the inspection of Boron Injection Tanks (BIT).
The licensee has completed his examination of the Unit 4 BIT and thermowell connector during.the most recent. refueling outage.
During that inspection, the licensee verified that there were no cladding discrepancies.
The inspector reviewed the results of the liquid penetrant examinations and had no further questions.
This completes the licensee's inspection as discussed in FPL letters L-78-18 of January 17, 1978, and L-78-46 of February 1978.
Based upon receipt of the licensee's final report, dated October 31, 1978, L-78-348, this item is considered closed.
Unresolved Items (Closed)
Unresolved Item (78-01-02):
Marking of Obsolete Drawings in the Field.
The inspect. or reviewed the August 14, 1978, revision to AP 0103.10 and determined that the controls specified in this procedure will adequately address the marking of obsolete drawings in the field, Additionally, the licensee has promulgated a list of current. training drawings on safety-related systems which have been verified and approved for use by operations and maintenance personnel.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (78-02-04):
Adequacy of Administrative Procedure 0109.1, Preparation, Revision and Approval of Procedures.
The inspect. or reviewed the revision to the subject procedure dated April 7, 1978.
Section 8.5 of that procedure has been revised to require that, all nuclear safety-related plant.
procedures, including radiochemistry procedures, shall be
RII Rpt.
Nos. 50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 I-3 reviewed at least once each forty-two months.
The ambiguity identified when this item was reported has thus been corrected.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (78-09-01):
Ability to Determine the Design Head of the Safety Injection (SI)
Pumps.
The inspector reviewed the results of a full flow test performed on SI pumps 4A and 4B on September 19, 1978.
The results of that test show no appreciable degradation in the performance of these pumps since the original preoperational full flow tests.
In addition, the licensee has developed a sufficient set of data points for these pumps to be able to monitor pump performance in accordance with the In-Service Inspection Program required by
CFR 50.55a.(g).
The inspector had no further questions.
3.
New Unresolved Iteros None identified during this inspection.
4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with Mr. Hays and other licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection on October 20, 1978.
The inspection findings were discussed and the inspector reviewed his concerns relating to the performance of the licensee's personnel during the Emergency Evacuation and Fire Drills.
5.
Review of Plant erations Followin Refuelin of Unit 4 The inspector reviewed selected procedures completed for Unit
following the August to October 1978 refueling outage to determine that:
a.
Systems and components disturbed during the outage were tested and returned to service in accordance with approved procedures.
b.
The control rod withdrawal sequence and authorization were available and in effect prior to the initial startup aft.er refueling.
c.
The licensee's commitments to perform post refueling physic>>
testing were completed.
d.
The surveillance tests required by Technical Specifications were performed during the outag RII Rpt.
Nos. 50"250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 1-4 The review inc]uded the following procedures:
OP ]6]04.]
OP 16204.1 OP 4704.3 MP 1207.]
MP 1507.1 OP 1604.8 QI5 SP21 OP 4104.2 MP ]4007.22 OP 4704.4 MP ]4007.13 MP ]4007.14 OP 0204.5 MP 14007.15 Fuel Transfer System - Periodic Test Manipulator Crane and RCC Change Fixture Periodic Test.
Emergency Containment Filter Systems:
HEPA Filter Performance Test Pressurizer Safety Valve, Repair and Setting Steam Generator Safety Valve, Repair and Setting CRDM Stepping and Drop Time Test Underfrequency Relay Test Report.
Engineered Safeguards and Emergency Power Systems
- Integrated Test Containment Pressure (Wide and Narrow Range)
Instrument. Calibration During Refueling Emergency Containment Filter System:
Adsorber Cells Performance Test Pressurizer Water Level Instrumentation Calibration During Refueling Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Calibration During Refueling Nuclear Design Check Tests During Startup Sequence After Refueling Rod Position Indication Instrumentation Calibration During Refueling FPL letters to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated September 13 and 23, 1978 (L-78-297 and L-78-308) included commitments to perform several startup physics tests.
The licensee had completed all of the subject.
testing with the exception of the power coefficient/defect test.
This test had not been accomplished because of the inability to achieve equilibrium xenon conditions, however, the licensee indicated that. it would be performed as soon as plant.
conditions were established.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Licensee Actions on ]E Bu]]etins and Circu]ars IE Bulletin 78-10 - Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumu]ator Spring Coils.
The inspect, or reviewed the licensee's response, FPL L-78-273, dated August 18, 1978, with cognizant personnel after the inspection by te]econ on October 27, 1978.
No Unit 4 snubbers were identified as having the suspect serial numbers identified in this bulletin.
Additionally, since the licensee is currently replacing all safety-related hydraulic snubbers with mechanical
RII Rpt.
Nos. 50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 1-5 snubbers, the problem with the accumulator springs will be only of short term concern at Turkey Point..
As of the date of the above phone call, there remained only seven safety-related hydraulic snubbers on either unit.
These seven will be replaced during the December 1978, Unit 3 refueling outage.
This item is considered closed.
- Damaged Bergen-Patterson Test Stand.
Turkey Point does not currently have a test stand of the type described in this circular.
Functional testing of hydraulic snubbers will not be required since all safety-related hydraulic snubbers are being replaced by mechanical snubbers.
This item is closed.
- Arcing of GE NEMA Size 2 Contactors.
The inspect, or discussed this item with cognizant licensee personnel.
Licensee stated that no GE switchgear or controllers were installed at Turkey Point nor has there been any evidence of a
similar problem with the installed contactors.
IE Circular 78-15 - Tilting Disk Check Valves.
The inspector determined that the licensee had reviewed this circular and identified that several Anchor/Darling tilting disk check valves are installed at Turkey Point.
The licensee had not completed any review of the installations to determine whether the problem discussed in this circular was present.
This item will remain open pending completion of the licensee's review (250/78-25-01, 251/78-25-01).
- Limitorque Valve Actuators.
The licensee conducted a
survey and determined that there are
of the identified Limitorque actuators installed in each unit..
However the licensee's procedures for manual valve actuation would preclude operation of these valves in the manner described in the circular.
This item is closed.
7.
Re ortable Events Followu The following report. able events were reviewed to ascertain that:
(1) reporting requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2 were met; (2) corrective action was taken as required by Appendix B tn
CFR Part 50; (3) the event was reviewed and evaluated; and (4) the facility was operated within the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the Tec'hnical Specifications subsequent to the even ~
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Y l
RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 1-6 Re ortable Event 251/78-12 This event involved the misloading of a fuel bundle during the fuel shuffle for Cycle 5 on Unit 4.
Due to misreading the final loading pattern, assembly N-04 was placed in core location F-14.
The correct bundle to be loaded in that location was N-07.
This error was not discovered until after the reactor vessel head had been replaced and the plant, was in a hot shutdown condition.
The licensee was given an analysis from the NSSS vendor which verified the validity of the Cycle 5 reload safety evaluation with the misloaded bundle.
The corrective action to prevent recurrence had not been formally developed, however, the licensee intends to implement a
formal validation with the NSSS vendor of the core loading pattern prior to completing the fuel shuffle.
In the past this validation has taken place after the reactor vessel head has been replaced.
The licensee's internal quality control procedures are adequate to prevent errors in the actual loading sequence.
Verification of the control document from the vendor had not been as rigid.
The inspector determined that the licensee does have a
method to verify core symmetry through the use of color coding the fuel bundle enrichments on the core loading map.
The misplaced fuel bundle had the same enrichment as the proper bundle, however, the exposure was somewhat greater on bundle N-04.
The net predicted effect. of this error is an approximate 3-4 percent decrease in assembly power in that core location.
This item will remain open (250/78-25-02, 251/78-25-02).
Metal Im act Monitorin S stem Actuation (MIMS)
This report addresses the MIMS actuation which occurred on August 13, 1978.
There were no unusual noise spikes identified during the licensee's review of this event..
8.
Observation of Site Fire Drill The inspector observed
. the licensee's conduct of a fire drill on October 18, 1978.
The following problems were identified:
During the performance of the drill the site fire alarm system was not automatically actuated.
The Nuclear Control Center Operator had to manually actuate the alarm in the control room.
Several personnel throughout the site stated that they never heard the fire alarm.
The licensee agreed to verify the operation of the fire alarm system (250/78-25-03, 251/78-25-03).
RII Rpt.
Nos
~ 50-.250/78-25 and 50-251/78-25 I-7 Communications during the drill were very confused and in an actual emergency situation some important information might. have been lost.
There are more than five different communication systems which must be manned by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor almost simultaneously.
It. was obvious that additional assistance was needed to handle communications.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor must maintain overall control of the emergency and cannot get tied up in handling telephones and two-way radios.
This item will remain open (250/78-25-04, 251/78-25-04).
The inspector noted that there was a significant reluctance on the.
part of the licensee to fully exercise the various aspects of the fire response team.
This occurred primarily because the planning for the drill did not address what the primary objectives were nor were the drill observers given specific instructions as to what to expect from the various members of the emergency team (250/78-25-05, 251/78-25-05).
9.
Observation of Site Evacuation Drill The inspector observed the licensee's performance of a site evacuation drill on October 19, 1978.
These following comments apply:
This drill was announced well in advance.
The licensee published the date and time the drill would be held to all site personnel.
Announced drills of this type do not provide a realistic assessment of how well the licensee can account for personnel.
b.
The comments concerning confused communications discussed in paragraph 8.b above were even more apparent during this drill.
Assuming that the loss of coolant accident which caused this evacuation had actually occurred, the Nuclear Plant. Supervisor should be evaluated on the basis that he would need to devote much of his time to the safe shutdown of the facility. Site evacuation and communications occupied 100 percent of his time.
Additional comments are contained in IE Report 50-250/78-24 and 50-251/78-2 ~
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