IR 05000219/1993010
| ML20045E405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1993 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Finkel A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E390 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-93-10, NUDOCS 9307020091 | |
| Download: ML20045E405 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REPORT NO:
50-219/93-10 DOCKET NO:
50-219
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l LICENSE NO:
DPR-16 LICENSEE:
GPU Nuclear Corporaticn
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Oyster Creek Generating Station P.O. Box 380 Forked River, New Jersey
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FACILITY:
Oyster Creek Generating Station INSPECTION AT:
Forked River, New Jersey INSPECTION DATES:
June 7 - 11,1993
O LEAD INSPECTOR:
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A. Finkel, SeniglReactor Engineer Date'
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Performance Programs Section h
REVIEWED BY:
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i Norman J. Slumberg, Chief Date Performance Programs S : on Operations Branch, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection from June 7 - 10.1993 Onspection Report No. 50-219/ -
93-10)
1-Areas Inspected: Announced safety inspection of the Fire Protection Program and its implementation in the areas of Administrative Controls, Surveillances, Combustible Controls, Fire Equipment Testing, Fire Program Audits, Firewatches and Fire Barrier Penetration Inspection Program.
Results: No safety issues were identified with the fire protection program, system, equipment or personnel. The fire barrier penetrations seals that used silicone foam as the fire barrier material had the penetration dams removed to allow for inspection during the seal l
installation; therefore, the silicone foam fire barrier voids that were described in Information l
Notice (IN) No. 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," were identified and corrected during the licensee's installation program. Also
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periodic inspection verifications require the damming end forms be removed for visual inspection. The latest inspection test results of the fire system indicated that the equipment meets all system test requirements and that the system was operational. Fire brigade training has been given to the fire brigade members with the documentation to support their training classes recorded in the training school records system. Surveillance testing of the fire system -
has been scheduled and performed as described in the fire protection plan. Firewatch personnel are trained on the requirements of their task and in the use of selected fire fighting equipment. Combustible controls are in place and being implemented by the licensee as described in their plant procedures.
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l DETAILS 1.0 PERSONS CONTACTED
Attachment 1 provides a listing of persons contacted during the inspection.
2.0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM (64704)'
.I 2.1 Introduction An NRC inspection was performed to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's fire protection
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program and associated implementing procedures. The inspection included verification of procedure implementation, technical adequacy of procedures and programs, inspection of plant fire facilities, fire brigade training and programs status, firewatch program, manpower assignments and review oflicensees fire audit program. Surveillance and routine fire testing, administrative, and other procedures related to the fire protection program were reviewed by I
the NRC inspector to measure the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
2.2 Plant Tour The inspector toured accessible vital and nonvital areas of the site and visually inspected the fire protection water systems, fire pumps, fire water piping and distribution systems, post indicator valves, yard hydrants, contents of yard fire protection equipment storage cabinets t
and the condition of the fire brigade fire fighting clothes and equipment. The plant tour also included the inspection of the various types of fire detectors, alarm panels, operating position of automatic and manually-fixed suppression equipment, interior plant hose stations, condition of fire barrier penetration seals, and the operating condition of plant fire doors.
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The inspector identified two fire doors that did not latch automatically due to a differential air flow problem within the plant. The two fire doors were listed on the firewatch hourly -
inspection log as a fire compensatory measure. Fire equipment tanks and bottles were filled-to required surveillance procedure levels with controls set in the operation position, j
i The inspector identified that various seismic piping mounting supports and cable tray supports had various types of trash and tools stored in their open ended structure brackets.
The licensee immediately cleaned the p. ant areas when this item was brought to their attention. (See reference paragraph 2.6 of this report for details on this subject).
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'The parenthetical notation following the paragraph title denotes the NRC inspection j
procedure that was used by the inspector in conducting this inspection.
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2.3 Documentation Review
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The fire protection program documents listed in Attachment 2 of this report were used by the NRC inspector in performing his inspection of the fire protection program at this site. The licensee's fire protection policy, procedures and self-initiative tank measuring program reviewed by the inspector appeared to be technical sound and properly implemented.
2.4 Fire Detection Instrumentation System The fire detection instrumentation for this site consists of smoke and heat type detectors.
The plant locations and type of detectors are listed in the updated Final Safety Analysis Repoct (FSAR) Section 9.5, Table 9.5-8. Using this table, an inspection of the following areas was performed by the inspector to ensure that the fire detectors were installed as described in the FSAR and that the systems were operable.
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Emergency Diesel No.1 5 Thermal (Rate of Rise) Detectors 1 Ionization Detector
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Fire Water Pump House 4 Thermal (Rate of Rise) Detectors
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480 Volt Switchgear Room (Zone 3) 7 Ionization Detectors (Zone 4) 6 Ionization Detectors
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(Corridor) 2 Ionization Detectors
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Cable Spreading Room (4A-Zone 1) 3 Ionization Detectors (4A-Zone 2) 3 Ionization Detectors (4B-Zone 3) 4 Ionization Detectors j
(4B-Zone 4) 5 Ionization Detectors
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A and B Battery Rooms (Zone 1) 4 Ionization Detectors (Zone 2) 4 Ionization Detectors (Zone 4 Duct) 1 Ionization Detector j
The inspector verified that the control room fire panels indicated that the above systems were -
J in an operational mode and that there were no trouble lights associated with the above systems.
2.5 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals
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NRC Information Notice (IN) 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," was issued due to voids forming during the silicone foam installation process and not being detected by the installers. The licensee's installation procedure 759.1.006, " Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Repair and Installation Requirements," required that the damming material be removed for inspection after the silicone foam was injected
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into the penetration. Therefore, if voids were found, the correction was made to the penetration during the installation process. Surveillance of these fire barrier penetrations also requires that the damming material be removed for visual inspection of the silicone foam material. Based on the licensee's visual inspection program during installation and their
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present surveillance inspection of the silicone foam penetrations, the foam voicing problem described in IN No. 88-56 appeared not to be a problem at this site.
Information Notice (IN) No. 88-04, " Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," described problems with supporting qualification information on silicone foam fire barrier qualification reports. The licensee documented their qualification i
of silicone foam fire material in engineering report No. Al-88021-02, March 1989. The inspector noted that the engineering support write-up, Attachment "C" of report Al-88021-02 did not describe their method of qualifying the listed silicone foam fire barrier penetrations in this document. Licensee engineering reviewed their qualification process with the inspector; however, the method used was not specified for the listed penetrations in this report Al-88021-02 Attachment "C". The licensee stated that report Al-88021-02 would be corrected to include the qualified installation process. Based on the inspectors inspection of ten
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random selected silicone foam fire barrier penetrations and a review of the installation data associated with these penetrations, the inspector determined that the licensee appeared not to have the problems described in IN No. 88-04 and 88-56 for these type fire barrier i
penetrations at this site.
i 2.6 Control of Combustibles The program for the control of combustibles is described in licensee's procedure 120.5,
" Control of Combustibles." During the site tour, the inspector verified that flammable and combustible liquids and materials were stored in approved storage cabinets and located in assigned areas. The inspector also verified that flammable gases such as hydrogen, acetylene and oxygen containers were stored, marked and controlled as described in procedure 120.5.
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During the site tour, the inspector identified that seismic tube supports and cable tray tube ~
supports had trash in the open portions of the supports. The inspector also found tools in these supports and identified concrete chips, pieces of plastic, and duct tape inside and on top of cables in the lower and upper cable trays in the cable spreading rooms. The licensee -
immediately had the site services organization clean the trash out of these seismic supports and the cable trays. The volume of trash removed by the licensee was not of a significant amount to affect the area fire loading calculations. The licensee is reviewing their
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housekeeping procedures and program controls to ensure that this type of condition does not _
repeat itself. Except for the areas identified above, the inspector determined that the control'
of combustibles for this site was conducted in accordance with their procedure 120.5, j
" Control of Combustibles."
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2.7 Fire Brigade Training and Dritis Fire Brigade training procedures and attendance records for brigade members were reviewed by the inspector. These records were complete and maintained in an up-to-date status by the training school fire instructor. The inspector verified that the training school fire brigade
" Roster Memorandum" was maintained in the control room by the Group Shift Supervisor.
This " Roster Memorandum" is used by the Group Shift Supervisor in selecting qualified brigade members during his shift. Discussions with fire brigade members indicated that the training they are provided is beneficial in maintaining their awareness of current developments in fire protection and fire fighting techniques. The inspector selected ten names from the June 1,1993, control room brigade listing. The training records reviewed for the ten selected fire brigade members verified that they had passed all their training-requirements and were qualified as brigade members.
2.8 Audits of Fire Program The inspector reviewed the latest annual and triennial audit reports performed on the fire protection program plan, fire documentation, and operation of the fire protection system equipment. The licensee included both the. yearly and triennial audit in one report for the year of 1992. The audit report No. O-OC-92-01, June 6 through December 2,1992, evaluated the following areas: (1) the capability of personnel and methods to minimize the ignition of a fire; (2) the readiness of personnel, portable equipment and installed systems to suppress a fire if started; and (3) the measures provided for personnel safety in the event of a fire. The results of the audit findings have been addressed by the responsible organizations and in most cases the audit findings have been closed; however, a few of the findings are still in the process of being closed. The inspector determined that no safety significant concerns were associated with the open audit findings still to be closed.
2.9 Fire Equipment Surveillance Testing Program j
To determine that the required surveillance testing was performed as defined in the Fire Protection Plan, the inspector selected the following components for verification: (1) Fire Suppression System Halon Cylinder Check (Procedure No. 645.6.014), (2) Fire Suppression Water System Underground Flow Test (Procedure No. 645.6,023), (3) Fire Suppression i
Automatic Valve Functional Test (Procedure No. 645.6.010), and (4) Fire Suppression Water j
System Underground Flow Test.(Procedure No. 645.6.023). The recorded test results for the above fire system components indicated that the equipment and systems met the test procedure acceptance requirements and were accepted by the Fire Protection Engineer.
3.0 FIREWATCII PROGRAM i
The licensee's training department has developed a training program for personnel assigned duties as a hot work firewatch. Personnel are trained for hot work firewatch duties for assignment to task where heat sources are used or created that may cause ignition of
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combustibles in the plant. The responsibility of the hot work firewatch is to monitor the area for fire, attempt to extinguish the fire during its incipient stage, and notify the control room of the fire.
A roving firewatch training program is also given to both the fire brigade personnel and assigned operational personnel. This training program includes hot work firewatch training and specific requirements for the roving firewatch in identifying incipient fires that may occur in the plant when fire protection items are taken out of service or otherwise impaired.
i The inspector reviewed the latest training programs given to both the hot work and firewatch'
personnel. The training instructor describes the basic program and discusses recent changes '
.I made to the program. As part of the training, the students each receive training on and practice extinguishing gaseous fuel fires using dry chemical extinguishers.
The firewatch schedule for each shift is listed in the control room. The inspector verified that the two fire doors that would not automatically latch were added to the firewatch listing and were in the firewatch program until the problem could be corrected.
4.0 EXIT MEETING Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at an entrance meeting conducted on June 7,1993.
The findings of the inspection were discussed periodically with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection. An exit meeting was conducted on June 11,1993, at j
which time the findings of the inspection were presented.
Attachments:
1. Persons Contacted 2. Documentation Reviewed
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8 ATTACIIMENT 1 Persons Contacted GPU Nuclear Corporation
- T. Blount, Licensing Engineer
- R. Daley, Fire Protection Coordinator
- C, Hayer, System Engineering Supervisor
- S. Levin, Director Operation and Maintenance
- D. Pysher, Manager Plant Maintenance
- B. Quinn, Station Services Manager
- A. Rone, T.F. Site Director
- J. Rogers, Senior Licensing Engineer
- P. Thompson, Quality Assurance Audit Manager
- T. Trettel, System Engineer
- J. Williams, Training United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Pindale, Resident Inspector
- D Vito, Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting of June 11, 199 _..
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ATTACHMENT 2 Documentation Reviewed GPU Nuclear CorporatiRn 1. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5 2. Procedure No.101.2, " Fire Protection Program"
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3. Engineering Report No. Al-88021-02, March 1989 4. Procedure No.120.5, " Control of Combustibles" 5. Procedure No. 645.6.014, " Fire Suppression System Halon Cylinder Check" 6. Procedure No. 645.6.023, " Fire Suppression Water System Underground Flow Test" 7. Procedure No. 645.6.010, " Fire Suppression Automatic Valve Functional Test" 8. Procedure No. 645.6.023, " Fire Suppression Water System Underground Flow Test" 9. Procedure No. 759.1.006, " Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Repair and Installation
- Requirements" 10. Procedure No. A100-GMM-3900.55, " Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Installation and Repair" 11. Procedure No.119, " Housekeeping"
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12. Audit Report No. O-OC-92-01-1 Reference Documents l
1. NRC Information Notice No. 88-04 and Supplement 1, " Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals" 2. NRC Information Notice No. 88-56, " Potential Problems with Silicone Foam Fire. Barrier Penetration Seals"
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