IR 05000219/1990001
| ML20033F145 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1990 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033F140 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-90-01, 50-219-90-1, NUDOCS 9003160128 | |
| Download: ML20033F145 (12) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Region I L
Report No.
50-219/90-01
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I Docket No.
50-219 License No.
DPR 16
l Licensee:
GPU NuclearCorocration P. O. Box 388 Forked River. New Jersev 087310388 Facility Name:
Ovster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
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Inspection Conducted: January 2126. 1990 Inspectors:
O. 3. d.ex NE db & #f#
C. G. Amalo, Emergency Preparedness date Specialist, Region I
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E. F. Fox, Jr., Sr. Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I Approved:
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W. J. Lazarlis, Chief, Emergedcy date Preparedness Section, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards F
Inspection Summary: Insoeetion on January 22 26.1990 (Inspection Report No. 50-219/90-01)
Areas Inspected: Announced, follow up, safety inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness program. The inspection areas included: changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures, and the emergency preparedness program; emergency response facilities, equipment, instrumentation and supplies; organization and management control; training; response to actual conditions requiring emergency classification; changes to dose projection calculation methodology; and off-site activities.
Results:
No violations, deviations or unresolved items were identified. The licensee has been responsive to NRC concerns, improved projected dose calculation methodology, and introduced practical training methods in order to improve exercise performance.
9003160128 900306 PDR. ADOCK 05000219 Q
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following personnel were contacted. Unless noted otherwise, personnel listed below are GPU Nuclear Corporation staff.
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- J. Barton, Deputy Director, Oyster Creek Division
- T. Blount, lead Emergency Planner, Oyster Creek
- J. Bontempo, lead Emergency Planner, Oyster Creek
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K. Brown, Manager, Environmental Controls
- K. Burkholder, Emergency Planner, Oyster Creek Emergency Planning Department R. Chislom Cohen, Deputy Coordinator, Emergency Management Ocean County
- B. De Merchant, Licensing Engineer, Corporate Services Division
- N. Di Nucci, Nuclear Engineer, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, Department of Environmental Protection, State of New Jersey
- E. Fitzpatrick, Director, Oyster Creek Division and Vice President
- G. Giangi, Manager, GPUNC Emergency Preparedness Department
- S. Kempf, Jr., Senior Off Site Emergency Planner
- D. Mac Farlene, Manager, Site Audits K. Mulligan, Operations Support Manager, Oyster Creek Division A. Peters, Sergeant, Southern Region Coordinator, N. J. State Police, Office of Emergency Management S. Polon, Site Manager Communications, Office of Communications M. O'Brien, Registered Radiological Technologist, Department of Radiology, Southern Ocean County Hospital J. Sevilla, Sergeant, GPU Site Protection Service J. Shea, Technical Support Management Training Coordinator
- R. Sullivan, Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Department Manager
- I. Wazzan, Emergency Planner, Oyster Creek
- J. Williams, Oyster Creek Support Training Manager
- J. Robillard, Lead Auditor, Oyster Creek Ouality Assurance J. Rogers, Licensing Engineer, Corporate Se: vices Division W. Rupert, Captain, Ocean County Sheriff's Department J. Vouglitos, Manager, Environmental Controls, Oyster Creek
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- Denotes personnel who attended the exit meeting. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel.
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2.0 Licensee Action on Previousiv identified items
(CLOSED) (50-219/88 05 09) IFl The licensee did not provide adequate initial assistance to support the bomb disposal team upon its arrival. The inspectors l
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i reviewed Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 9473 IMP 1300.40, Rev. 6,
" Site Security Emergency Actions" and the site Security Contingency Plan and i
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determined procedures are in place to ensure adequate support for a bomb I
disposal team upon its arrival.
3.0 Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures To determine if the standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and Section G of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 are met, the inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
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3.1 The development and maintenance of the GPU Nuclear Corporation Emergency Plan for both GPU nuclear sites is the responsibility of the i
GPU Corporate Emergency Preparedness Department. The Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Department is tasked with the responsibility for developing and maintaining Oyster Creek Implementing Procedures. GPU Nuclear has developed administrative procedure, " Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure System",9470-ADM 1218.01, Rev.1.
This procedure provides for acceptable review, distribution and control of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures changes.
3.2 No changes to the Emergency Plan have been made since the last routine, safety inspection. Changes to the implementing Procedures were acceptable and the inspectors concluded they did not result in a decrease of emergency preparedness effectiveness.
Based on the above review, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
4.0 Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)
ERFs are designed and maintained to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8)
and (b)(9), and the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, Supplement I to NUREG 0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97. Equipment, instrumentation, supplies, status boards, maps, safety system diagrams, plans, i
procedures, and communication systems were reviewed or tested on a sampling
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basis for each of the eight Oyster Creek ERFs.
4.1 The inspectors determined that the ERFs were maintained in a state of
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readiness. Instrumentation was functional and within the calibration period. Communication systems tested included the NRC Emergency
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Notification System, the NRC Health Physics Network, and the emergency notification system to the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management and Ocean County Emergency Management. Notification calls were made and verification received using current procedures. All tested equipment worked properly. Rapid facsimile machines are also
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available which can transmit simultaneously to multiple terminals and
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electronically verify transmission receipt.
4.2 The EOF library is being enhanced by the addition of plant procedures, diagrams, aperture cards and reader, and data for use by EOF technical support personnel. The licensee plans to install addition projection capability at the EOF. Upon installation, this added capability will display projected dose calculation results. The housekeeping of the Operations Support Center and the Auxiliary Emergency Operations Facility was less than desirable. When this was called to the licensee's attention, corrective action was taken. Following re inspection, the inspectors concluded corrective actions had been taken.
Based on the above findings, this ponion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
5.0 Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program
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The GPU Nuclear Corporation emergency preparedness program structure was reviewed, personnel were interviewed and activities evaluated to ascertain if GPU Nuclear Corporation is maintaining and controlling an emergency preparedness program required by 10 CFR 50.54(t) which meets the standards of
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10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR
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5.1 Since the last routine inspection, GPU Nuclear Corporation studied its functions and structure. As a result, a reorganization took place which consolidated functions and reduced the number of divisions from thirteen to eight. The Emergency Preparedness Department (EPD) was assigned to the Nuclear Assurance Division (NAD) headed by a former Oyster Creek Division Director. The EPD manager reports directly to the NAD Director. The structure of the EPD and the Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Department was not changed. Staff functions remained the same and there were no personnel changes. The inspectors concluded this reorganization did not decrease emergency preparedness effectiveness.
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5.2 The Training Department and the Communication Office support the emergency preparedness program. The Training Department was not affected by the reorganization. The Communication Division was reclassified as an Office. Communication Office staffing level for emergency preparedness response was not changed. The inspectors concluded this reorganization did not decrease emergency preparedness effectiveness.
Based on the.above review, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
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6.0 Training Emergency preparedness lesson plans, training matrix, examinations, training and attendance records and the Emergency Response Organization qualification roster were reviewed. Training Department staff were interviewed and a practical training session observed. This was done to verify that emergency
preparedaess training is in compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and Section IV.
F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. The status of off site and accident management training, and the role of the on. site simulator in cuergency preparedness training were reviewed, 6.1 Emergency preparedness training is scheduled on a regular basis over the
. course of a year. Training is current and at least three mar; agers are
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qualified for key Emergency Response Organization positions. The
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problem of rescheduling of missed training noted in previous inspection reports has been corrected due to an employee incentive program and management approval required for rescheduling.
6.2 Accident management training has begun. Engineers assigned to the L
Technical Support Center (TSC) are trained in symptom based l
Emergency Operating Procedures. This activity is considered Technical Support Management training by the Training Department and was developed in response to NRC concerns regarding training of Technical Support Center engineers in accident management noted in NRC Document SECY 89 012. The extension and continuation of this training is uncertain according to the Training Department staff responsible for it.
The future of this type of training will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection. TSC engineers were also trained in the use of the Safety Parameter Display System.
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6.3 Training of volunteer fire company and ambulance company members who would come on site to sopport licensee emergency response activities was current. Medical training for these personnel and personnel of the support hospital and back up, support hospital staffs was given by a medical consultant. Training of governmental and volunteer off site emergency workers is the responsibility of the New Jersey State Police, Office of Emergency Management. Each year this organization sends a letter to U. S. FEMA II attesting to the completion of this training. This certifying letter was not available at the time of this inspection.
6.4 There is no on site replica simulator, however, one is under construction.
Emergency preparedness has been classified as a secondary simulator user for the on site simulator. Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Department staff are members of the Simulator Review Committee who review simulator design packages from the emergency preparedness perspective. Emergency communication systems for use in the simulator have been identified and approved and located for the systems designated.
A Curie Transport model is under development for the simulator which will also be programmed to replicate severe accidents. Simulator models must be quality assurance reviewed and certified for operator training through single mode failure. It is the licensee's intent to run drills and i
exercises from the on site simulator beginning in 1991 provided it is operational and has been accepted. Operators will receive eight hours of l
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emergency preparedness training using the on site simulator. This training will include classification, notification to off site emergency response organizations and development of Protective Action Recommendations.
Operators currently receive eight hours of emelpncy preparedness classroom instruction including classification, notification and Protective Action Recommendation development.
6.5 Practical training has begun which the licensee's refers to as "on the job training". This is being done in response to a need to improve exercise performance and a NRC concern. Training is given by Emergency Preparedness and Training Department staff members. Scenarios of various length have been developed, some of which go through classification, notification and Protective Action Recommendation
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deve!opment. This training is given in the Control Room and other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), " Hands on" training in the use of ERF equipment is given in addition to instruction in what to do. It is the licensec's intent to develop team work and team spirit using this methodology. The inspectors observed an evening Control Room practical training session. One scenario went through classification and notification while the other stressed communication system operation ard
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cmergency notification form completion. The scenarios were well thought out, and effectively used.
6,6 Emergency preparedness examinations and question bank were reviewed.
Examinations were balanced among emergency preparedness topics.
Format was good in that minimum reliance was placed on multiple choice questions. The review did indicate a need for more demanding questions relating to Protective Action Recommendations. Licensee staff agreed with this recommendation.
Based on the above review and observations, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
7.0 Independent Audits / Reviews An independent review / audit is required at least every twelve months by 10 CFR 50.54(t) which shall include a determination for adequacy of the licensee, State and local government interface. Provisions shall be made so the results of the interface determination are available to State and local governments. Section 6.5.2 of Appendix A to the licensee's Technical Specifications requires an independent Safety Review of the 50.54(t) oudit/ review report and Section 6.5.3 requires this audit shall be performed under the cognizance of the Vice President responsible for Quality Assurance.
7.1 The 50.54(t) audit / review was conducted by the Site Audit Department during the first calendar quarter of 1989. The audit included emergency preparedness training and public information. Oyster Creek Operations Quality Assurance observed the annuel exercise,. drills, and activities at government Emergency Operations Centers. The Site Audit Department team, including two members who were not GPU Nuclear Corporation staff, and a former TMI Emergency Preparedness treine: who is now with the GPU corporate Emergency Preparedness office, audited Oyster Creek emergency preparedness training. The audits concluded a satisfactory emergency preparedness program was in place. The State / local government / licensee interface was determined to be adequate and the audit findings were communicated to the New Jersey State and Ocean County Governments on May 17, 1989.
7.2 The Teclinical Specifications required independent safety review was completed and a report issued. There were no nuclear safety related finding f,,
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
8.0 Notification and Communications
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Communications systems were checked to ascertain if the standards of 10 CFR
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Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the guidance of I&E Information Notice 86-97
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were met.
8.1 Siren availability during 1989 was 97% The inspectors observed activation of the sirens by the Ocean County Sheriff's Office. The sirens
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were partially activated to conduct the quarterly " growl" test. Tests such
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as these are run using a personal computer in parallel with the control box. Results were shown in real time on a video display and a hard copy
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was printed. One siren malfunctioned. Repair was ordered and the siren returned to service within a matter of hours. If this malfunction had
occurred during a real event, the Sheriff, per procedures, would order route alerting in the defective siren's coverage area. This system is used to wst sirens daily, a frequency which exceeds Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) specifications. However, these tests are not as comprehensive as those for the FEMA specified biweekly test. If a tested siren function fails, an audible alarm sounds. A Sheriff's staff member identifies the malfunctioning unit and calls the Oyster Creek Control Room. Operators then call the Emergency Preparedness
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Program. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. is notified and they dispatch a repair team. This utility, which is the principle owner of Oyster Creek, has a pool of eight persons plus bucket trucks for siren maintenance.
8.2 The inspectors determined the siren activation radio frequency is also used by Oyster Creek during an emergency. This dual use, with the potential for simultaneous use, could jam the activating signal. The inspectors discussed this with the licensee who agreed to consider development of administrative procedures to reduce the probability of simultaneous jamming.
8.3 The Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Department reviews communication systems quarterly and updates an inventory of these as necessary. The inspectors went over this list and concluded independent, redundant and diverse communication capability is availabl,.
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8.4 On August 21,1989, Oyster Creek lost the Public Telephone Network beyond the local calling area. The loss was due to severance of a New Jersey Bell main trunk cable which took place at 9:00 a. m. The GPU microwave tie lines from Oyster Creek to GPU's Morristown, N. J.
Headquarters and the GPU Reading, Pennsylvania Power Dispatcher were unaffected. However, the load placed on this system began to approach unacceptable levels. Telephone load shedding procedures were available but not used. 'Ihe main emergency preparedness concern was loss of communications between the site and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at Lakewood. Although reestablishment of the direct link was not possible, there was an alternate dial up path. Normal telephone service was restored at 5:00 p. m. on the 21st. The licensee notified the NRC of the event per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(v). GPU was installing a microwave link at the EOF at the time of this inspection. This link will provide independent, and diverse communication capability to the site.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
9.0 Public Information and Off Site Activities Correspondence, documentation and records, and personnel were interviewed and a siren test observed to determine if the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)
and (b)(12), and the requirements of Sections IV. D. 3. and IV. F. of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 were met.
9.1 Oyster Creek Public Information personnel continue to support the Emergency Preparedness Program. Eight staff members are radiation worker and Emergency Dimetor/ Emergency Support Director qualified.
They are vital area access cleared, subject to fitness for duty rules and are on call. These individuals report to the Control Room following declaration of an Emergency action level and prepare press releases on site.
9.2 A telephone book insert appears in the Ocean County directory for both area codes. Brochures in the form of calendars were mailed to all residents as well as employers and institutions within the ten mile emergency planing zone (EPZ) Sixty thousand calendars were sent; this is a decrease of 20,000 from the number sent last year. The decrease was due to refinement in the mailing list which eliminated addresses in ZIP code areas lying outside the 10 mile EPZ. A mass media briefing was
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held before the annual exercise and a briefing packet prepared for attendees.
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9.3 The licensee maintains an on going' interface with State and County government. State Police and County officials were contacted to determine their evaluation of the licensee's support. They responded they
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were very pleased. All Letters of Agreement for off site iesponders to support the licensee in the event of an accident are current. Emergency Action Levels were called to the attention of cognizant off site officials in a letter dated March 2,1989. Training of off site officials is a responsibility accepted by the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management. At the time of this inspection, the State's letter to U. S. FEMA certifying this training was not available.
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9.4 The Radiation Emergency Area at the back-up, support hospital in Stafford Township was inspected to determine the adequacy of licensee support and maintenance. Medical, Health Physics, security and public information plans and procedures were current. Supplies and equipment matched the inventory list. Survey equipment was functional and within the stated calibration period. A decontamination facility is available.
Direct access from the parking lot was provided. Arrangements to transport injured /over exposed personnel by helicopter have been i -
arranged.
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Based on the above, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
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Dose Calculation and Assessment Facilities were inspected, records checked and staff interviewed to determine if the following standards and requirements were met: 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
Sections IV. B and IV. E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 and footnote 2 to Section II. F. I. (ATT 3) of NUREG 0737, SUPP.1.
10.1 Releases during accident conditions are monitored by the Radioactive Gaseous Emissions Monitoring Systems (RAGEMS), one of which is the stack monitor, RAGEMS I. During the protracted cold spell, accompanied by high winds, of December 1939, insulation around the RAGEMS I sample line was partly torn off and the sample line froze.
Flow was reduced and Control Room annunciation followed.
Instrumentation and Controls staff investigated the failure. A repair order was issued and the line returned to normal service within 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of the
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event. An Action Item was issued to Plant Materials to winterize this line.
10.2 Specifications for the Containment High Range Monitors were reviewed against those in NUREG 0737. Specifications for these monitors met those of the NUREG for gamma only detectors.
10.3 Revisions are being made to the Radiological Assessment Code (RAC)
and computer which will replace the Meteorological Information Data Acquisition System at the Emergency Operations Facility. As a result RAC will be available at all three dose assessment locations on and off site (Emergency Control Center, Technical Support Center and Environmental Assessment Control Center). There will be direct input of meteorological and release data. Pathway specific release models have been developed with built-in, default iodine to noble gas ratios. These ratios are in the range of 0.0001 to 0.00001. Field data can be imputed as well as data for other pathways such as an isolation condenser tube rupture.
Based on the above review and findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
i 11.0 Response to Actual Events Actual event history was reviewed, personnel interviewed and facilities inspected l
to determine if the licensee's actions were in compliance with the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and (b)(5) and the requirements of Sections IV.B and IV. F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
11.1 Five actual Unusual Events (UEs) were declared at Oyster Creek since
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l the last routine inspection. One of these was due to a Technical Specification shut-down. The other four were due to low intake water level. The inspectors reviewed bathymetry and meteorological data and determined the cause was strong and persistent westerly winds. These natural conditions resulted in water pile-up along the east bank of Barnegat Bay which reduced the level in Forked River and the intake canal. Water level is sensed by a pair of pressure differential monitors at the intake. If a trigger point is passed, there is control room annunciation. Operators enter the annunciator response procedures. In this case, the magnitude of the pressure differential required entry into the Abnormal Operating Procedures (ABNs). The ABNs were followed and the referral to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures for
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classification noted. The UEs were properly declared and notifications made in the prescribed time.
11.2 The inspectors noted the Classification Procedure reference was given at the end of the ABN and suggested the licensee consider inserting this reference at the end of the first ABN procedure where it is appropriate and each procedure thereafter. The licensee agreed and began the change procedure prior to the end of the inspection.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is acceptable.
12.0 Fitness For Duty-To determine if the licensee has developed administrative procedures required by 10 CFR 26 applicable to Emergency Response Organization personnel on call, the inspectors interviewed personnel and reviewed documentation.
12.1 The licensee has developed a GPU Nuclear Corporation procedure, entitled " Fitness-For-Duty Program",1000-ADM-2002.06 Rev. O. Section 4.1 delineates requirements for Emergency Response Organization personnel who are listed for an on-duty team. These personnel are classified as "on-call". They are required to respond fit for duty on a one hour response basis. If they are unable to respond fit for duty, they shall make provisions for an alternate. Security Officers and Emergency Response Facility managers are tasked with evaluation of personnel on an as need basis.
Based on the above review, the inspectors concluded the licensee's procedure appears adequate.
13.0 Exit Meeting 13.1 An exit meeting was held with licensee personnel identified in Section 1 of this report. The inspector presented the results of the inspection and advised the licensee no violations, deviations or unresolved items were identified. Licensee management acknowledged these findings and indicated they would evaluate them and take appropriate corrective action regarding the items identified.