IR 05000155/1975012
| ML20002D762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1975 |
| From: | Hunter D, Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002D761 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-75-12, NUDOCS 8101220423 | |
| Download: ML20002D762 (22) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!DtISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION III
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Report of Operations Inspection IE Inspection Report No. 050-155/75-12 Licensee: Consumers Power Coepany 212 West Plchigan Avenue Jackson, Pdchigan 49201'
Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant License No. DPR-6-Charlevoix, Michigan Category: C
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Type of Licensee:
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Type of Inspection:
Routine, Announced Dates of Inspection:
Septecher 22-26, 1975 WA
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Principal Inspector:
D. R. Hunter
/6.23 77 (Date)
Accompanying Inspector: None
/I.*J../rdaln q
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f N'/ 2 3 N-Reviewed By:
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i Senior Inspector
'(Da t ef)
l Reactor Operations Branch
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Inspection Summarr Inspection of Septenber 22-26, (75-15): Reviewed abnormal occurrence reports; records; design and design change modifications; maintenance activities; items of noncompliance; inspector identified items; safety limits, limiting safety systems settings,,and limiting conditions for operations; unresolved items; and a facility tour.
One item of noncompliance was-identified related to a facility modification.
Enforcement Items
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A.
Violations
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None.
B.
Infractions Contrary to 10 CFR 50.59, a documented safety evaluation was not provided as required prior to a codification involving the emerBency electrical system.
(Report Details, Patagraph 1.d)
This infraction had the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence related to health and safety.
C.
Deficiencies None.
Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Enforcement Matters
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None.
Other Significant Findings A.
Systems and Components None.
B.
Facility items (Plans and Procedures)
On September 16, 1975, seven mixed oxide fuel assemblics were
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V received on site and were stored in the new fuel storage area.
On September 25, 1975, twenty uranium oxide f' el a ssemblics were u
received on site, off loaded,-and remain in the shipping containers in the containment sphere laydcen area in preparation for storage.
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C.
Managerial Items Mr. C. B. Szczotka replaced Mr. J. J. Zabritski as Quality ' Assurance
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Engineer at the Big Rock Point facility. Mr..Szczotka was previously
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assigned to the Quality Assurance department at the. Palisades Nuclear Station.
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D.
Noncompliance Identified and Corrected by Licensee Contrary to Criterion V oE Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, the failure to perform a modification within the procedural guidelines resulted.
in an unauthorized modification to a safety related system.
This item is an infraction.
(Report Details, Paragraph 1.b)
E.
Deviations None.
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F.
Status o'f Previously Reported Unresolved Items 1.
The operation of the liquid poison tank level above the high level alarm light appears to be adequate and, based on the completion of the design review during the next refueling
outage, is considered acceptable.
(Report Details, Paragraph 6.a)
s 2.
The operation and the operating procedures for the personnel access hatch, the equipment access hatch, and the emergency escape lock were reviewed and no apparent discrepancies were noted.
This item is considered acceptable.
(Report Details, Paragraph 6.1)
3.
The review and scope of review of plant operations by the plant review committee was evaluated and is considered acceptabic.
(Report Details, Paragraph 6.j)
Management ~ Interview
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The management interview was conducted on September 26, 1974, with the-following persons present:
C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer C. C. Tysen, Maintenance Engineer C. E. Axtell, Chemistry and Radiological Protection Supervisor R. E. Schrader, I&C Supervisor
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A.
Abnornal Occurrence Reports The inspector stated that'the' review of Abnormal 0ccurrence Reports 19-75, 20-75, 21-75, and 22-75 indicated two apparent itens of noncompliance (A0 20-75 and A0 22-75). The' licensee acknowledged the statement.
(Report Details, Paragraph 1)
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B.
Plant Records The inspector noted that a number of areas' vere reviewed during the inspection and that record, retention appeared' adequate with'
exceptions, as noted.
(Report Details, ParagraphL2)
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The completion of the plant safety related systecs, components, and structures list / prints.(Q-lists) were not yet. apparent as'a part of the overall ad=inistrative program.
2.
The plant operational and maintenance records, in certain
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areas did not include the required records of superseded'
procedures.
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The Plant Quality Assurance Records, including the Plant History File, are presently divided anong the responsible supervisors in lieu of being stored in a single approved area.
C.
Items of Noncompliance The inspector stated that the closeout of the items of noncocpliance associated with Inspection Report Ec. 050-155/75-05 would be delayed until after co pletion of the NRC review of the latest abnormal occurrences (A0 20-75 and 22-75).
These two occurrences appear to be repeat itets and the uverall program of facility' changes will require further evaluation. The licensee' acknowledged the above statement.
(Report Details, Paragraph 5)
The inspector alsh noted that the. corrective actions associated with Inspection Report No. 050-155/75-10 were in progress. The licensee indicated that these corrective actions should be completed by October.1, 1975, as indicated in the response to Inspection Report No. 050-155/75-10.
D.
Facility Tour The inspector stated that a limited facility tour was conducted and no major discrcosncies were noted.
The licensee acknowledged the statecent.
(Report Details, Paragraph 8)
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E.
Per sonnel, Equipment, and Escape Hatches'
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The inspector, stated that the review of the operation and operating-procedures for the personnel access hatch, equipment access. hatch, and the emergency escape lock revealed no apparent discrepancies and appeared acceptable.
The licensee acknowledged the statement.
(Report Details, Paragraph 6.c)
F.
Review and Scope of Review of Plant Operations The inspector stated that the verification of the review and scope of review of the plant operations by the plant review' committee was completed and that no major discrepancies were noted. The inspector stated that the review and scope of review appeared acceptable.
(Report Details, Paragraph 6.j)
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer C. C. Tyson, Maintenance Engineer J. A. Axtell, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Supervisor R. E. Schrader, Instrument and Control Supervisor T. M. Brun, Assistant Chemistry and Radiation Protection Supervisor R. C. Abel, Operations Engineer J. L. Keumin, Associate Engineer C. M. Evans, Engineer
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R. W. Voll, Reactor Engineer
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B. Szczotka, Quality Assurance Engineer E. McNamara, Shif t Supervisor P. C. Sevener, Shift Supervisor 1.
Review of Abnormal Occurrence Reports The following abnormal occurrence reports were reviewed to ascert'ain that the reviews, evaluations, information, and corrective actions were as reported to the plant management and the NRC.
a.
AD-50-155/19-75, Reactorcleanupsystemvalvesdesignjeficiency reported on September 9, 1975.
The licensee reported-that duringadesignreviewoftg7,resinsluicevalvesasaresult of an item of noncompliance-it was revealed that valves (CV-4091, CV-4092, CV-4093, and the canual valves in series with CV-4092, and CV-4093) were deficient in one of two ways depending upon the seat / seal materials utilized. Nylon-neoprene seals and seats are rated at only 180 F (below the DBA design criteria) and teflon seals and seats are rated at only 1000 psig (below the design pressure on the system). The inspector reviewed the immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee which included tagging of the manual valves inside the containment and also tagging the manual valves on Cae headers outside the containment.
Even though the outside valves appear to be of the same design', they are at a distance from the containment and should not be exposed to the high temperature conditions
(235 F), in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident.
The low pressure piping and valves are also protected by an installed safety valve which would discharge to the containment sump at about 175 psig if the isolation valves were to 1/
Ltr, CP to DL, dtd 9/18/75.
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IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-10.
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experience' limited Icakage. The inspector also verified.that-all of the valves (remote and manual operated) were normally closed except when being used to sluice resins..Under these-conditions the containeent integrity appeared to have.been protected within the design of the system, during previous operations.
During the review of the occurrence the inspector noted-that the outside manual resin sluice valves were not-designated as containment isolation valves and maintained under administrative control although they were the first valves outside the containment. 'The inspector asked the licensee to consider the possibility of placing these valves under administrative control.
The inspector and the licensee representative reviewed other plant syster.s to determine if any similar valve arrangements existed and none were noted, b.
A0 50-155/20-75, discovery of unauthorized addition of load.
toemergencylighgyngpanelonSeptember9,1975.
The licensee reported-that a small electrical load was added to the energency panel 5L as a result of the work in the field being corpleted without proper review and approval.
The inspector verified that a minor non-safety related modification (FC-310) was to be performed, and the field work resulted in wiring a portion of a lighting circuit to the SL panel (MP 75-SPS-225-01). 'The inspector noted the issuance of another facility change (FC-318) which will correct the situation.
The inspector verified that the 2 amp load was only a srall fraction of the battery load in the event of a loss of offsite power. The failure to perform this modification within the intent of the facility change (FC-310) resulted in an unauthorized, unreviewed modification to a safety related system.
The breakdown in administrative controls which caused the occurrence was identified by the licensee and is considered to be an item of noncompliance with Criteria V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
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c.
A0 50-155/21-75, Containment isolation valve testing procedureinadequgye(T365-04)onSeptember9,1975.
The licensee reported-that the leakrate test performed on
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valves CV-4091, CV-4092, and CV-4093 was not valid due to using a telltale tap located on the wrong line.
The discrepancy was discovered rhile tracing the resin sluice lines and valves because of other problems requiring d2 tailed valve tagging operations.
The inspector verified the perfor-
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mance of the special operations procedure. 0-C15-1(0), performed (
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Ltr, CP to DL, dtd 9/19/75.
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Ltr, CP to EL, dtd 9/19/75.
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on September 12, 1975,' to loak' test the valves (CV-4091,.
CV-4092, and CV-4093) via on opened valve flange. The valves appeared to have been effectively leak tight (a few drops / minute). This discrepancy has apparertly_
existed since early plant construction, although the leak rate _ testing has only been perforced since 1973. The inspector noted that a system codification appears to be s
warranted in order to adequ.ately leak test'the valves.in the future.
d.
A0 50-155/22-75, Unauthorized addition of load to energency A-C power panel 8L in July' 1975, classified as an abnorcal
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occurrence on September 12, 1975. The licensee reportedl/
that during the installation of the new system in 1975, electrical equipecnt was connected to the emergency panel 8L.
Since the installation was not declared safety related, no_ facility change form was issued to cover the modification even though the 1.25 KVA load was connected to the emergency bus. The inspector verified that the load was a small portion of,the emergency-blackout load.
The inspector noted that a *
facility change was being considered as a cethod to review the modification and to alter the circuit as required to provide appropriate corrective action. This apparently included providing power to the alarm and communications systems from the bus supplied by the diesel generator.
The licensee representative indicated that the inadequacy was discovered because of a loss of power to a system computer during the weekly testing of the energency diesel generator. An investigation into the intermittent failure of the coeputer revealed the unreviewed loads connected to the emergency bus; and a further review determined that no facility change had been initiated.
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that tiec the item was classified as an abnormal occurrence.
I The inspector noted that this occurrence appeared to indicate a problem in the area of major modifications performed with offsite engineering assistance.
(Report Details, Paragraph 5)
The failure to perform the safety related ecdification (emergency power system) in accordance with the f acility change procedures,and failure to provide a documented
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l safety evaluation, is considered an item of noncompliance pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
This item is an infraction.
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2.
Plant Records The inspector reviewed the plant records program to ascertain whether the control, storage, retention, and retrieval of records and documents was in conformance with the applicable specifications -
l4 and procedures.
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CP to DL, ler dtd 9/22/75.
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The as-built drawing. control'was reviewed by the inspector.
It was noted that a newly implemented design. change notice form (DCN) was 'being utili-'d to record the as-built drawing changes. 'The inspector re..cwed several drawings to insure design changes / drawing changes had been entered and documented.
(1) Heating and Ventilation System (M-125)
f Facility Change (FC-263) performed to modify the ventilation supply valve solenoid valves-(SV-9051.and SV-9052).
Facility Change (FC-218) performed to provide a dew point sampling station.
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(2) Post Incident System (M-106/123)
Facility Change (FC-268) performed to provide fill
- ater makeup to the main condenser for emergency core
.ooling.
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Facility Change (FC-270) performed to provide an
open-ended sight glass (LG-3676) on the core spray heat exchanger for testing p7rposes.
(3)
Station Power System (k'0-740)
Facility Change (FC-278) to provide a new battery charger and under-voltage and ground detector relays.
(4) The as-built drawings were stored in the computer room on print racks due to a lack of the new storage facility which is being designed at the present time.-
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The inspector reviewed the method of updating the controlled drawings utilized by the operations group for operations
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j and tagging. purposes.
The inspector noted that the operations engineer updates the operations drawings as the facility changes
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are performed. The operators utilize these drawings (k size)
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and the valve check lists to perform operating evolutions..It
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was noted by the inspector that the drawings used by operations were not up-to-date in all cases (vents and drains).
This fact was indicated as a possibic system and personnel safety related problem by the inspector. These minor drawing discrepancies were' recognized by the operating staff and have apparently existed since the-initial plant construction.
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Review of operations department records
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(1)
Generation / Station Power / Substation Data Sheets-July 1,
1975, through September 22, 1975. The inspector noted the emergency diesel generator readings on several occasions during the review period. The inspector noted that on three occasions _that the diesel generator reading were taken,'the phase amperes were not balanced.
7/31/75 phase amps 50,30, and 0 0, 25, and 60
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8/21/75 phase-amps 80, 90, and 100 The inspector verified that the first two sets of
readings were the result of a fuse failure (vibration).
The latter set of readings was apparently a meter
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accuracy problem.
The inspector verified that the log sheets had been reviewed. The log sheets were stored in a file cabinet drawer in the shift supervisors office.
(2) Control Room Log Sheets-July 1, 1975, through September 22, 1975.
The inspector reviewed the general log sheets and
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specific log sheet readings associated with nuclear safety related systecs.
' Reactor / steam drum pressure - 1320 psig Steam flow - 788,000 (1bs/hr)
Feedwater temperature - 357 (OF)
NMS 1, 2, and 3 - 98, 97, 97 (percent)
Off-gas airflow - 11.3 (sef)
CRD pusitions - pattern (E-4 at 19)
LPS N2 pressure - 2060 (psig)
Ventilation System N2 pressure - 2000 (psig)
LPS tank temp - 151 (OF)
Emergency DG fuel oil. level - 30.2 (inches)
. Incore Instruments - 18 or 254 in service Stack gas background - 65 (CPS)
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The inspector noted that all-the above readings for the specified period of review appeared to be normal.
The off-gas monitor was noted to be out of service for maintenance on several occasions on July 29, 1975.
The control room logs had been reviewed and were stored in a file cabinet in the shift supervisors office.
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(3) Critical approaches and period reports Data' sheets were reviewed for the startup in June 6-7, 1975.
The data sheets'and previous data' sheets were stored in a file cabinet drawer in the Shif t Supervisors office.
(4) Heat balance data sheets-July 6,1975, through September 14,.
1975. The review of the heat balance data sheets and storage in the shift supervisors office revealed no apparent discrepancies. The heat balances indicate no limits'on reactor power level were exceeded and the power
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level on September 14, 1975, was 199.9 MWt at.62.6 MWe.
The. heat balance data sheets were reviewed by the reactor'
engineer.
(5) Hot channel worksheets
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The hot channel worksheets were stored in the shift
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supervisors office in a file cabinet drawer. The specific review of two selected worksheets indicated no apparent discrepancies.
August 31, 1975 D-72 04-53 Thermal Power 198.4 (mit)
Core Avg heat flux 145.466 (BTU /hr-ft2)
Hot channel peaking factor 1.82 Hot channel rod size factor 1.079 Core max. heat flux 285,644 (BTU /hr-ft2).
MCHFR 2.36 MAPLHCR (9.1165 or 92% of TS-MAX)
8.40 (kw/ft)
September 14, 1975 FS7 05-58 Thermal Power
'200.0 (MWt)
Core Avg. heat flux 145.861 (BTU /hr-ft2)
Hot channel pe'aking factor 2.40 Hot channel rod size factor 1.0668
Core max. heat flu'x 373,451 (BTU /hr-ft )
MCHFR 2.36 MAPLHCR 8.10 (kw/ft)
(6) Primary System Leakrate Tests
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June 1, 1975, through September 19, 1975 the primary system leakrate tests were stored in the shift supervisors office in a file cabinet drawer.
The review of the Icakrate calculation on 9/19/75 indicated 0.156 gpm unidentified and 2.26 gpm identified. No apparent
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discrepancies were noted.
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(7) Scram Sheets I.
The record of all scrams, nunerically sequenced, were
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stored in the shift supervisor's office in a file
. cabinet drawer.. No apparent. discrepancies'were note'd.
(8) Plant Operating Charts The review of chart storage in the computer room in metal shelves included verification of selected records.
No discrepancies were identified.
Nuetron Monitforing System Charts Channels 1, 2 and 3 Channels 4 and 6 Ch:nn:Is 5 and 7 Area Radiation Monitor System Charts
Process Radiation Monitor System Charts Control Rod Drive System CRD Teeperature Charts
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-Stack Cas System Charts Plant Conductivity Charts _ (selected-cond.)
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Plant Temperature Charts (selected equip.)
Incore Flux System Charts Cleanup System Differential Pressure Charts Flow charts Radwaste Domin. Conductivity Charts Condensate Demin. Conductivity Charts Reactor Protection Channels 1 and 2 Charts.
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Recirculation System Flow Charts l
Fire Protection System Pressure Charts Reactor Vessel Level /Feedwater Flow Charts
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Reactor Vessel Pressure / Steam Flow Charts Reactor Vessel / Steam Drum Temperatare Charts
Control Room Operators Logbooks Reactor Operator Logbooks
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' Radioactive Waste Disposal Logbooks Makeup / Condensate Denin.-Logbooks
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(9) Operation Surveills.rc,e' Tests The co pleted tests were stored in.the shift supervisors office in a file cabinet.-
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Review of Maintenance Department Records The review of the storage and availability of records in the
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maintenance trailer was complete'd. No apparent discrepancies were noted.
(1) Maintenance activities and naintenance orders.
(2)
Superceded caintenance procedures after June of 1975 and others if they were used-in the field (records of maintenance).
(3) Welding qualifications.
(4) Facility changes.
(5) Nondestructive testing (NDT) results.
(6)
Inservice inspection results.
(7)
Surveillance testing results (new program).
(8) Maintenance training and qualification records.
The records were filed in cabinets or in loose leaf notebooks in the trailer.
Review of the Instrument and Control Department Records
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The review of the storage and availability of records in the I and C supervisors office was completed.
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a (1) _ Maintenance activities and maintenance forms
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(2)
Facility changes
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(3) Superceded maintenance and test procedures The procedures we're only available if' they were. performed in the field and returned to the I and C shop for retention.
If'two or more revisions were performed between usages, no superceded procedures were available.
The ' record of review (QA-05) by the PRC was retained as a permanent record of procedure change.
(4)
Surveillance tests
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(5)
I and C training and qualifications The inspector noted a training program was estcblished for the technicians to provide two hours per week classroon training.
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Chenistry and Radiological Department R'ecords The review of the storage availability of records in the Rad Pro supervisors office was cocpleted.
Records reviewed
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(1) Monthly plant radiation and survey file (2) Personnel exposure records (3)
Radioactive waste release records Gascous Liquid (4) Radioactive waste shipment record (5) Records of radioactive shipments'
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(6) Emergency plan drill records (7)
Scaled source Icak test records (8) Superceded procedures The procedures were only available (except Emergency Plan)
if they were utilized and filed.
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(9) Surveillance tests t
(10) Water chemistry records
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Review of selected chemistry trend records maintained at the plant (1975) revealed no apparent discrepancies.
Primary Ccolant PH Conductivity Boron Concentrations Cleanup Demineralizer Turbidity -
Conductivity PH Reactor Cooling Water System Chromates Conductivity Liquid Poison Tank
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Pentaborate (20.5%, 2/19/75)
g.
' Technical Department and Administrative Supervisor Records A review of selected record storage and availability of the records in the adninistrative assistants (clerks) office was performed:
(1) Nonroutine reports to the NRC (AO, UE, SR)
(2) Technical Specification and Final Hazards Summary Report file (3) Plant Review Committee minutes
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Safety and Audit Review Board minutes (5) AEC/NRC* correspondence file (chronological or subject)
(6) Plant Safety Meeting records (7) Operating records h.
Weakncsses in the overall record maintenance and record control systems as indicated in the applicable subparagraph.
(1) Records are storca in various office areas throughout the facility in file cabinets, binders, and shelves which do
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not appear to meet the guidelines as estab_11shed by' ANSI N.45, 2. 9.
The liccusee has recognized the lack of adequate storage and an appropriate storage facility is being planned by the licensee.
(2) Responsibility for record retention has been assigned to specific supervisors. The detailed written procedures for document. control, retention, storage and retrieval have not yet been prepared.
(3)
Detailed written procedures relating to records of procedure changes and superceded procedures have not been prepared.
Procedure change records are available in the form of the ' completed procedures and the record of review ~of the procedure changes by the Plant Review Committee is available-(Form QA-05).
3.
Design and Design Chqnges and Modifications
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The inspector reviewed selected facility changes to insure the activities were perforced in accordance with applicable procedures.
a.
Control Rod Drive System (CRD), FC-269 dated July 25, 1974, performed to provide a casing drain on #1 and f2 CRD pumps.
The drains were added as a result of seal leakage $/ entering the lube oil systen. -The plant was at norcal power operations and the pump operaticn was not affected by the codification.
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apparent discrepancies were noted, b.
Reactor Vessel Internals (RVI), FC-287, dated February 7,1975,
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performed to codify the main beam clanplock and tack weld the bolts to the upper jaw of the main beam clarplock.
modificationwasperforcedasaresultofafailure1}e
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of the assembly.
No apparent discrepancies were noted.
4.
Maintenance Activities The inspector reviewed the following maintenance activities to insure the items were performed in accordance with applicabic procedures.
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Electrical Power System (75-EPS-15701) dated June 6,1975. The emergency diesel generator starter' solenoid contacts were inspected.8/ No apparent discrepancies were noted.
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CP to DL, Itr dtd 6/26/74.
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CP to DL, Itr dtd 2/21/75.
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CP to DL, ltr dtd 11/26/74.
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Control Rod Drive System (CRD-455(1)) dated February 19, 1975.
The control rod jog bypass on withdrawal was removed and the
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system tested to insure no continued rod withdrawal function.
No apparent discrepancies were noted.
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5.
Itens of Nonconpliance a.
Inspection' Report 75-05 was transeitted to Consumers on iby 20, 1975, and requested a response regarding certain facility changes perforced at the Big Rock Plant Facility.- In response /-
to this request Consurers. stated generally that apparent-inadequacies in the area of facility ' changes should be corrected in the future through utilization of the new Adninistrative Procedures.
The inspector review of Adninistrative Procedures 1.9 and the Quality Assurance Manual III, section 3 revealed discrepancies between the two docurents with regards to
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processing facility changes /nodifications.
The Big Rock plant technical specification (Palisades T.S.
section 6) requires that the Plant Review Co=nittee review all groposed facility changes.
The /.d=inistrative Pretedure 1.9. A.1 and A.2 for major codifications does not appear to
follow the Quality Assurance Manual nor the Technical Specifications. The inspector. verified that the plant staff was aware of this apparent discrepancy and that all facility changes / codifications are being processed in
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accordance with the Quality Assurance Manual, Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. As a result of Abnormal Occurrences A0 20-75 and 22-75 which represent continued' facility chanEe problens (Paragraphs Ib and Id)
this item remains unresolved.
6.
Outstanding Inspection Items The review of the status of engineering stud a.
Liquid P' ison System Tank' unresolved iten S/y related ' to the-o I
revealed a nu=ber of significant itens.
The co:pletion of the design review on the LPS tank will not be co pleted until the outage in January 1976.
The review will apparently require an-inspection of the tank level' floats to determine the exact diecnsions relative to height and displacerent.
Rough calculations by the technical engineer indicate that the free-floodable space above the high level light was approxinstedly twenty gallons.
The present concentration in the tank is 20.5-percent by weight pentaborate, an_d a twenty gallon dilution of the 850 gallons of solution would not 9/
CP to IE:III, Itd dtd 6/28/75.
}h/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-10.
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decrease the concentration below the 19 percent 'by weight -
limit. The inspector noted that there is no installed (piped) source of makeup water to the tank and that ther'e was apparently no history of explosive valves leaking.
It
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appears there is reasonable assurance that no technical specification has been violated and maintaining the Icvel above the high level light appears conservative..The completion of the design review will allow the establishnent of administrative limits in order to preclude exceeding the technical specifications under any postulated allowable level-concentration combination.
The design review had also
- revealed a number of minor problems with the liquid poison system procedures.
The system conditions and operations as
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indicated by the design review at the present time appear acceptable.
Escape lock inner door, outside operating lever interference 11/--
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b.
The inspector verified during the facility tour, that the
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operating level / conduit interference had been cleared by adjusting the operating lever.
c.
Emergency diesel generator circuit breaker change The inspector noted that the indicated facility change required to eliminate the use of local caution signs and jumpers when either of the diesel generator bus tie breakers is racked out (the diesel generator output breaker closure ir Jefeated without the jucper installed) had not been co 31cted. The licensec representative indicated that the itei.was'being tracked as an action item (AIR BR 22-75).
d.
NMS channels (AO 01-74)13/ 14/ 15/
The inspector reviewed the status of the corrective action
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required to eliminate the nonconservative failure in the 150V DC power' supply.for the power range picoanneters.
The licensee representative stated that the last communication with Cencral Electr'ic engineering occurred through upper management on August 27, 1975, and the modification package was being assembled at that time.
e.
Unusual Event 11-7416/, dated Julv 18, 1974, reactor shutdown system control relay failure.
The inspector reviewed the failure history of CE HFA relay coils at the plant. Thirty two (32) HFA relays are utilized in safety related systems (10 relays normally energized, 2 relays with 50% duty, and I
11/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-11.
12/ RO Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/73-02.
13/ RO Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/73-03 J4/ IE:III Inspection Rpt Nu. 050-155/75-08.
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15/ IE:1II Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-11.
16/ CP to DL, Itr dtd 8/16/74.
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20 relays nornally deenergized). The inspector verified
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that the RPS relays IK5A and 1K5B were replaced (RPS-74-1010
maintenance order) in 1974 and the RPS relays IK4A and 1K45 (75-RPS-1002 naintenance order) and 2K4A and 2K4B (75-RPS-1003 maintenance order) were replaced in 1975. The inspector noted that no other failures had occurred in safety related systens.
This item is considered resolved.
f.
Picoanneter cable replacecentI7/ I8/ 19/
The irispector reviewed with the licensee representative the replacement of several picoanreter cable / detector units. The licensee representative indicated that the high terperature in the area of the cables catise then to becone brittle af ter they cool.
If the cables are ficxed in this brittle condition when they are at anbient terperatures, cracking and breakdown of insulation apparently occurs. The licensce has sparc cabic/
detector units prefabricated for installation as required and a review of the airflow to the detector areas is continuing.
g.
Core spray reon outside floor drain
The inspector verified that the core spray roens floor drain flowpath was to the radioactive vaste systen 20/ 21/ 22/
h.
Air compressor area floor drains The inspector verified that the floor drains in the area of the air compressors (previously covered by the renoved station battery cells) flowed to the turbine building sunp. The licensee representative indicated this conpleted the survey occurrence._grentdrainsasaresultofapreviousabnorral of all equi 3_ 24/ 25/ This iten is considered resolved.
17/ RO Inspection Rpt No. 050-125/73-01.
18/ RO Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/73-04 19/ RO Inspection Rpt No. 050-1455/74-01 20/ CP to DL, It r dtd 1/31/75.
21/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-10.
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22/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-11.
23/ CP to DL, Itr dtd 1/31/75.
24/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-10.
25/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-11.
26/ IE:III Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/74-11.
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Personnel, equipment, and escape hatches The; inspector reviewed the licensee evaluation-and' actions concernin the operation of the. personnel and equipment hatches.2g/ The actions included caution tagging the. hatches
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sechanical. interlock handles - to bc:left in the "mid-travel" or
" atmosphere locking ring" position to provide proper equalizer valve / check valve operation.
The inspector reviewed an instruction memo to'all personnel stipulating the personnel and equipment h'atch mechanical interlock / equalizer-check valve operations.
The inspector noted that consideration is being given to other design improvements to insure-proper operation and monitoring of the hatch mechanical interlock systems.
The.
. inspector reviewed the newly written and approved operation procedures for the hatches. The operation of the hatches as indicated appears 1 acceptable. This' item is' considered
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resolved.
j.
The revicu and scope of. review of plant-operations 2/ was
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evaluated by the inspector. The licensee had completed a.
review of the facility program to establish the requirements and methods utilized by the Plant Review Committee to perform and documcat this technical specification requirement. Th e..
inspector verified the established review of. operations 11or.s, data sheets, and selected records utilizing the review form
.QA-05.
The plant superintendent or his designee insures
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that'the required PRC quorum reviews the packages fsr each'
day.
This manner of specifically reviewing-operations appears acceptable and the iten is considered resolved.
k.
The inspector reviewed the required actions at specified primary voter qualitics as established by the technical
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specification 4.1.2(b).fS/ The review of off-normal procedure D2.28 Abnornal Water Quality revealed no apparent discrepancies.
During the review of an abnormal occur:cace concerning a chcralstry sampling program 29/, the inspector noted the necd.
for acceptance criteria on certain chemistry data sheets.
The licensee representative noted'that he was in the process of reviewing procedures at that time in preparation for the-i new administrative procedures and technical specification programs.
22/ Ibid.
2p/ RO Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/74-04.
29/ 1E:111 Inspection Rpt No. 050-155/75-11.
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Safety Limits, Liniting Sr_f_ety Systens Setpoints, and Lietting
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Conditions for Operation The review of the technical specification requirements were completed during this inspection.
No apparent' discrepancies
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were noted.
a.
Reactor cleanup system duri,g the week of September _8, 1975, including the performance of special operating procedure, 0-CIS-1(0) performed on September 12, 1975, to assure resin-sluice valve Icak tightness.30/ 31/
b.
Review of delected operations department records for the.
period of July 1, 1975, through September 22, 1975..
c.
Review of the chemistry and radiological department water chemistry trend plots for 1975. -
d.
Facility change (FC-267) performed on July 25, 1974, - CRD system.
e.
Facility change (TC-287) perforced on February 7, 1975 - RVI system.
f.
E,intenance activity (75-EPS-15701) dated June 6,1975 - EPS systen.
g.
Maintenance activity (CRD-455) dated February 19, 1975, -'CRD systems.
h.
Review of the operations of the personnel and equipment hatches and the cecrgency escape lock hatches. The review includes the review of the newly issued operating procedure for the hatchen.
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8.
Facility Tour
a.
The inspector reviewed the control room status including observing the control rod sequence at approximately 60 percent power after a. forced reduction due to a ground on one condensate pump motor circuit, b.
The inspector viewed the ceergency dicsc1 generator room for cicanliness, diesel oil Icaks, and equipment storage.
The inspector observed the hand priming pump'to be in the down position and held firmly by the packing gland nut.
30/ CP to DL, Itr dtd 9/18/75.
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3J/ CP to DL, Itr dtd 9/19/75.
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% c inspector noted that the temporary cooling water supply c.
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(service water to the.hcater coils) to.the containment'
ventilation supply air system was not being utilized at the present tire due to cooler.wcather.-
d.
n e inspector reviewed the controls established on the large maintenance; rollup door to prevent exiting the restricted controlled area without passing a frisker
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station. The inspector discussed the rope barricts with the shift supervisor.and the plant superintendent.
c.
The inspector reviewed the switchgear room, air-compressor area, and the auxiliary heating boiler area. Le inspector observed the caution tags installed on the IA-2A and IE-2B
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bus tie breakers. The inspector also noted the caution signs-on the air conpressor area and the heating boiler area floor drains to be installed in accordance with previo_us commitments.3_2/_
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32/CP to DL, ltr dtd 1/31/75.
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