IR 05000059/1979002
| ML19210B813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Texas A&M University, 05000128, 07001936 |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1979 |
| From: | Norderhaug L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Berg R TEXAS A&M UNIV., COLLEGE STATION, TX |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911120488 | |
| Download: ML19210B813 (82) | |
Text
[>R RECy'#o, A
[b" UNITED STATES
,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y j )s,7 j g 5.i*/.I
REGION V
o, 1990 N. CALIFORNI A BOULEVARD
' %.J SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA
- ,,,a WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94506 November 1, 1979 Docket Nos. 50-59, 50-128, 70-1936 Texas A & M University Office of University Research College Station, Texas 77843 Attention:
Dr. R. R. Berg, Director Gentlemen:
Subject:
Inspection of Texas A & M University This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. B. Brock, Y. Kobori and A. Wieder of this office on October 2-3, 1979 of activities authorized under NRC License Nos. R-23, R-83 and SNM-1518.
It also refers to the discussion of our inspection findings held with Dr. R. R. Berg, Dr. R. D. Neff and Mr. D. Feltz.
The areas examined during the inspection included your program for controlling and accounting for special nuclear material pursuant to applicable provisions of Part 70, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, and specific requirements of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and records, interviews with personnel and observations by the inspectors.
No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection.
In accordance with Section 2.790(d) of the NRC's " Rules of Pri.tice,"
Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, documentation cf findings of your control and accounting procedures for safeguarding sper.ial nuclear material are exempt from disclosure; tharefore, the inspection report will not be placed in the Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution-
Sincerely Ll 3[
,/
/fjf als &
@L.R.Nordehaug, hief /
Safeguards Branch Enclosure:
Inspection Report
Nos. 50-59/79-02,
50-128/79-02
70-1936/79-01
(IEV-337)
791112 0 hN
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MEETING SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION: METROPOLITAN EDIS0N COMPANY
EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR TMI-l
SEPTEMBER 24-27, 1979
Docket No. 50-289
A PDR
Local PDR
TERA
NRR r/f
H. R. Denton
E. G. Case
D. Eisenhut
R. Tedesco
.
R. Vollmer
J. Cc11 ins
B. Grimes
T. J. Carter
L. Shao
W. Gammill
J. Milice
H. Silver
S. Miner
C. Nelson
D. DiIanni
J. Tourtellotte
M. Mulkey
IE (3)
P. Kreutzer, LA
R. Fraley, ACRS (16)
J. R. Buchanan
Licensee List
Meeting Participants /NRC-MET.ED:
Jack Roe
Hal Gaut
Lisa N. Singer / ELD
J. R. Gray / ELD
Alexis Tsaggaris/ Met.Ed.
Cale Donaldson/NRC:IE, Reg. I
William H. Zewe/ Met.Ed.
Len Landry/TMI, Unit 1, I:at.Ed.
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UNITED STATES
yj e(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON,0. C. 20555
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November 1, 1979
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MEMORANDUM F02: Richard H. Vollmer, Director
Thrse Mile Island Task Force
FROM:
Harley Silver
Three Mile Island Task Force
SUBJECT:
MEETING WITH METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY - SEPTELER 24, 1979
TO SEPTEMBER 27, 1979. EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THREE MILE ISLAND,
UNIT 1 (TMI-1)
A series of meetings between the staff and the Metropolitan Edison Company were
held on September 25 and 26. A meeting between the staff, Metropolitan Edison
and representatives of county and State government agencies was held on Seotember 27.
On Sep 'ber 24, the emergency planning review team toured the TMI-i facility. A
public r.
. ting was held during the evening of September 26. The actual agenda and a
list of attendees at all the technical meetings are enclosed.
During the meeting with the public many speakers indicated that they were deeply
concerned about the emergency planning at TMI. Several members of the public provided
written statements. These statements have been reviewed by the staff and are on
file with the Emergency Preparedness Task Force.
.During the technical meetings, the staff explained the objective of the review and
described the NRR Action Plan for Promptly Improving Emergency Preparedness at
Power Reactors (SECY 79-450). The staff explained point-by-point the requirements
for the upgraded emergency plans that are found in Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emer-
gency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants;" Review Guideline Number One, " Emergency
Planning Acceptance Criteria for Licensed Nuclear Powcr Plants;" " Basis for Emer-
gency 3-tion Levels" (NUREG-610); and additional staff concerns including implementing
proceam.:. The questions / issues discussed are enclosed.
As a result of the emergency plan review the i1censee will modify the emergency plan
for TMI-l in accordance with the guidance the staff discussed in detail. The licensee
stated that they will submit for review an upgr ed emergency plan within five weeks
h
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from the end of the meetings.
Harla
' ver
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Three
le Island Task Force
Enclosure:
As stated
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November 1, 1979
R. C. Arnold
Mr. J. G. Herbein,
Dr. Walter H. Jordon
Vice President Nuclear Operations
881 W. Outer Drive
Metropolitan Edison Compary
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
P.O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Dr. Linda L Little
5000 Hermitage Drive
Mr. E. G. Waliace, Licensing Manager
Raleigh, Norta Carolina 27612
Metropolitan Edison Company
260 Cherry Hill Road
George F. Trostridge, Esq.
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street,
l.W.
Mr. G. P. Miller,
Washington, D.C. 20036
Acting Supt., Unit 1
Metropolitan Edison Company
Karin W. Carter, Esq.
P.O. Box 480
505 Executive House
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
P.O. Box 2257
Harrisbarg, Pennsylvania 17120
Mr. W. E. Potts, Unit 1 Supt.,
Technical Support
Honorable Mark Cohen
Metropolitan Edison Company
512 E-3 Main Capital Building
P.O. Box 480
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Ellyn Weiss, Esq.
Mr. J. J. Colitz,
Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman & Weiss
Manager Plant Engineering
1725 I Street, N.W., Su te 506
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Metropolitan Edison Company
Washington, D.C. 20006
P.O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Mr. Steven C. Sholly
304 S. Market Street
Mr. I. R. Finfrock, J r.
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Mr. Thomas Gerusky
Morristown, New Jersey 07950
Bureau of Radiation Protection
P.O. Box 2063
Mr. R. W. Conrad
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
Pennsylvania Electric Company
1007 Broad Street
Mr. Marvin I. Lewis
Johnstown, Pennsylvania 15907
6504 Bradford Terrace
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149
J. B. Lieberman, Esq.
Berlock, Israel, Lieberman
Ms. Jane Lee
26 Broadway
R.D. 3, Box 3521
Etters, Pennsylvania 17319
Ms. Mary V. Southard,
Walter W. Cohen, Consumer Advocate
Chairperson
Dwartment of Justice
Citizens for a Safe Environment
Strawberry Scuare, lath Floor
P.O. Box 405
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17127
Harrisburg, ;ennsylvania 17108
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R. C. Arnold
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November 1,1979
Robert L. Knupp, Esq.
Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt
Assis: ant Solicitor
R.D. #5
Knupp and Andrews
Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320
P.O. Box P
407 N. Front Street
Ms. Karen Sheldon
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108
Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman & Weiss
1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506
John E. Minnich, Chairman
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dauphin Co. Board of Commissioners
Dauphin County Courthouse
Earl B. Hoffman
Front and Market Streets
Dauphin County Commissioner
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
Dauphin County Courthouse
Front and tarket Streets
Robert Q. Pollard
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
Chesapeak Energy Alliance
609 Montpelier Street
- Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Baltimore, Maryland 21218
Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal
Board
Chauncey Kepford
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Judith H. Johnsrud
Washington, D.C. 20555
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power
433 Orlando Averue
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
State College, Pennsylvania 16801
Panel
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Ms. Frieda Berryhill, Chairlady
Washington, D.C. 20555
Coalition for Nuclear Power Plant
Postponement
- Docketing and Service Section
2510 Grendon Drive
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissien
Wilmington, Delaware 19808
Washington, D.C. 20555
Holly S. Keck
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Anti-heclear Group Representing York
Board
245 W. Philadelphia Street
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissibn
York, Pennsylvania 17404
Washington, D.C. 20555
John Levin, Esq.
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission
P.O. Box 3265
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
Jordon D. Cunningham, Esq.
Fox. Farr and Cunningham
2320 N. Second Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110
Ms. Kathy McCaughin
Three Mile Island Alert, Inc.
23 South 21st Street
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Harrisburg, Pennsv1vania 1710d
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NRC TASK FORCE MEETING ON EMERGENCY PLANNING
DATE
TIME
LOCATION
ATlENDEES
9/24
0900 - 1200
Local Area
NRC Staff Only
1300 - 1600
Thre. Aile Island
Site Tour
9/25
0900 - 1200
Liberty Fire Co. No. 1
MRC, Licensee
1300 - 1600
Liberty Fire Co. No. 1
f.dC, Licensee
9/26
0900 - 1200
Liberty Fire Co. No. 1
NRC, Licensee
1300 - 1600
Liberty Fire Co. No. 1
NRC, Licensee
2000 - 2200
Liberty Fire Co. No. 1
Public Comment Meeting
9/27
0900 - 1200
Liberty Fir' Co. No. 1
NRC, Licensees,
State / County
Civi; Defense
1200 - 1600
Tour of State Emer-
NRC, Licensees, State,
gency Operations Center Civil Defense
Liberty Fire Co. No. 1
Adela and Emaus Street
Middletown, Pennsylvania
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Tuesday September 25, 1979
Name
Organization
Jack Roe
Dick Vollmer
NRC/TMI
Alexis Tsaggaris
Met-Ed
Ray J. Hallmark
Energy Inc. for Met-Ed
Robert Fahler
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
Keith Woodard
Pickard, Lowe & Garrick
Len Landry
TMI Unit 1 Health Physicist
Marvin L. Smith
Battelle, PNWL
Richard Roberts
Patriot-News
Karin W. Carter
Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pa.
Donald F. Cameron
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Dale Donaldson
NRC Region I
John Collins
TMI/NRC
Jane Lee
Etters,'nork Co.
Pat Street
TMIA/ Concerned Citizens
Louise Defour
Limerick Ecology Action
John Garver, Jr.
Middletown
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Wednesday September 26th 1979
Name
Organization
Jack Roe
Pat Street
Londonderry Twp
Jane Lee
York,,:a.
M. L. Smith
Battelle PNWL
Dale Donaldson
NRC
Donald F. Camer.on
LASL
Richard Roberts
Patriot-News
Ray J. Hallmark
Energy Inc. for Met-Ed
Keith Woodard
Pickard, Lowe & Garrick
Robert Fahler
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
Alexis Tstggaris
Met-Ed
Wm. H. Zewe
Met-Ed.
Len Landy
Met-Ed.
Bill Johnston
Citizen
harley Silver (part-time)
NRC
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Thursday September 27, 1979
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Name
Organization
Jack Roe
Rich Roberts
Patriot-News
Hal Gaut
USNRC/SP
Donald F. Cameron
Los Alamos Scientific Lab.
Marvin L. Smith
Battelle PNWL.
Eugene W. McPeek
USNRC/OSP
Michael S. Pawlowski
FEMA Region III
John E. Bex
FEMA Region III
Lisa N. Singer
NRC/0 ELD
J. R. Gray
NR"'0 ELD
J. Dougherty
Kevin J. Molloy
Dauphine County OEP
Dick Lamison
C. A. Williamson
Wargaret A. O'Reilly
PADER/BRP
J. Lothrop
C. Crowe
T. Gerusky
DER /BRP
D. Butler
DER /BP
W. P. Dornsife
PADER-BRP
Robert Fahler
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
Alexis Tsaggaris
Met-Ed
William A. Shaffer
EMA LEB Co.
Robert E. Boyer
Dir.-EMA. LES Co.
Paul L. Leese
Dir. EMD. Lane Co.
Dale Donaldson
NRC:IE, Region I
Les Jackson
Dir. E.M. York Co.
Pat Street
Londonderry Twp
Jim Tourtellotte
NRC/0 ELD
John Collins
NRC/TMI Support
Jane Lee
Fairview Twp - York, Co.
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SEPTEMBER 19, 1979
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QUESTIONS AND COMME.NTS CONCERNING
UPGRADING EMERCENCY PLANNING AT
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION
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REGULATORY GUIDE 1.101
EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
1.
Definitions
Provide definitions of any terms that are unique to the power plant under
consideration er are given connotations that differ from normally accepted
usage.
2,
Scope and Applicability
(1) Define the unit, plant, station, or area to which the plan is applicable
and prcsent a summary of the plan's interrelationships with (a) its implementing
procedures; (b) plant oparating, radiological cent ol, and industrial security
procedures; (c) other emergency plans of the company (e.g., an overall
corporate plan); and (d) emergency plans of other participating agencies,
particularly the responsible State agency or other governmental authority
having radiological emergency planning responsibilities in the immediate
offsite area.
3.
Summary of Emergency Plan
(1) Describe the key elements of overall emergency planning logic, incorporating
graded emergency classifications of increasing severity and their relationship
to the participating status of onsite and offsite personnel and agencies.
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4.
Emergency Conditions
4.1
Classification System
(1) Describe the system of classification employed to cover the entire
spectrum of possible radiological emergency situations.
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(2) Define the immediate actions to be taken for each class..'ication.
(3) Describe the classification system used by State and local governments.
(4) List the inclementing procedures asscciated with each class of emergency.
(5) Describe the criteria for characterizing each class and the criteria or
specific emergency action levels to be used to recognize and declare
each class or subclass.
(6) Describe the methods of early warning of the public and the prompt
ir.itiation of protective actions within the emergency planning zone
(EPZ).
4.2 Spectrum of Postulated Accidents
(1) Describe how the postulated accidents are encompassed within the emergency
characterization classes and provide a summary analysis of their imolications
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for emergency planninc.
Inc'iude (a) instrumentation capability for prompt
detection and continued assessment and (b) manpower needs in relation to the
anticipated sequence and timing of events.
5.
Organizational Control of Emergencies
(1) Describe the emergency organization that would be activated on the site
and its augmentation and extension offsite.
(2) Delineate authorities and responsibilities of key individuals and
groups.
(3) Identify the communication links established for notifying, alerting,
and cobilizing emergency personnel.
5.1 Normal Plant Organization
(1) Describe both day and night shift staffs, indicating clearly who is in
the immediate onsite position of responsibility for the plant or station and
his authority and responsibility for declaring an emergency.
5. 2 Onsite Emergency Organization
(1) Describe the onsite emergency organization of plant staff personnel for
both day and nignt snift situations.
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S.2.1
Direction and Coordination
(1) Identify the oosition title of that person onsite who is dt Ignated to
take charge of emergency control measures.
(2) Provide a specific line of succession for this authority.
(3) Provide a policy statement describing the scope of authority and respon-
sibility vested in that role by the company.
U) Describe tha functional r:sponsibilities assigned to this individual.
5. 2. ? Plant Staff Emergency Assignments
(1) Soecify the crganizational groups to which the following additional
functional areas of emergency activity are assigned, including an indication
of how the assignments are made for both day and night shifts and for plant
staff members both onsite and away from the site.
Include at least the
following functional areas:
1.
Plant tystems operations,
2.
Radiological survey and monitoring,
3.
Firefignting,
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Rescue operations,
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5.
First aid,
6.
Decontamination,
7.
Security of plant and access control,
8.
Repair and damage centrol,
9.
Personnel accountability,
10.
Recordkeeping, and
11.
Communications.
5.3 Augmentation of Onsite Emergency Organization
(1) Describe the two categories of offsite support assistance to the plant
staff emergency organization.
5.3.1
Licensee Headquarters Support
(1) Describe the headquarters management, administrative, and technical
personnel prepared tv aug.T. 6L cae plant staff in the performance c.
certain functions required to ccpe with an emergency.
Include at least
the following special functions:
1.
Environs eenitoring,
2.
Legistics support for emergency personnel,
e.g.,
transportation,
temporary quarters, food and water, sanitary facilities in the
field, and special equipment and supplies precurement,
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3.
Technical support for planning and reentry / recovery operations,
4.
Notification of governmental authorities, and
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5.
Release of information to news media during an emergency coordinated
with governmental authorities.
(2) Specify the emergency organization status of supporting headquarters
parsonnel, relative part1sularly to the person directing the plant
emergency organi:ation.
(3) Provide the nature and scope of the support services provided by a
contractor.
(4) Describe the qualifications of the support services contractors.
5.3.2
Local Services Support
(1) Identify the extension of the organizational capability for handling
emergencies to be provided by ambulance, medical, nospital, and fire-
fighting organizations.
(2) Include evidence of the arrangements and ag eements r3 ached with such
organizations in an acpendix.
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(3) Include references to that appendix and to the parts of the plan in
which the functions of these organizations are described.
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5. 4 Coordination with Participating Government Agencies
(1) Identify the principal State agency (designated State authority) and
other governmental agencies (local, county, State, and Federal) having
action respon-ibilities for radiological emergencies in the EPI.
(2) Provide subsections for each such agency that include:
1.
The identity of the agency.
2.
A description of the authority and responsibility of the agency
for emergency preparedness planning and for emergency response,
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particularly in relation to those of the licensee and to those of
other agencies.
3.
A description for each agency of specific response capabilities in
terms of the expertise of personnel and other organizational
resources available. Copies of written agreements with such
agencies should be includea in an appendix. The information
should provide a clear concept of radiological response cperations.
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4.
Activation of the agency function, including titles and alternates
for both ends of the communication links, and primary and alternative
means of communication. Administrative control methods that will
ensure the effective coordination and control o.' the smergency
activities of support organizations should be established.
5.
The designation and location of the Emergency Operations Center of
each State / local government agency.
As an alternative method of providing the information requested in these
subsections, you may choose to submit copies of such agencies radiological
emergency response plans as evidence of acceptable coordination.
If this
alternative is selected, provide a specific cross reference to the informa-
tion requested in this section.
6.1 Activation of Emergency Organization
(i) Describe the communication steps taken to alert or activate emergency
personnel under each class of emergene.
(2) Describe action levels (based on readings from a number of sensors
including tne pressure in containment, the response of the ECCS, etc.)
for notification of offsite agencies.
(3) Describe the objectives of a message authentication scheme.
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6.2 Assessment Actions
(1) Provide a dascription of the methodologic and techniques to be used to
give reasonable assurance that the magnitude of releases of radioactive
materials can be determined, that the magnitude of any resulting radioactive
contamination can be determined, that projectec exposure to persons onsite
or offsite can be estimated and that emergency action levels specified can
be determined all in a timely manner.
6.3
Corrective Actions
(1) Describe he actions can e taken to correct or mitigate the situation
at or near the source of the problem (for example, to prevent an uncontrolled
release of radioactive materials or to reduce the magnitude of a release).
6.4
Protective Actions
(1) Describe the nature of protective actions for which the plan provides,
the criteria for implementing these protective actions, the area involved,
and the means of notifying or warning the persons or population at
risk.
(2) Describe also steps taken (a) to provide to visitors to the pla-t or
site and (*; to inform occupa.rcs in the EPZ informatin concerning how
the emergency plans provide for notification to them and how they can
expect to be c' vised what to do.
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6.4.1
Protective Cover, Evacuation, Personnel Accountability
(1) Describe the plan for timely relocation of persons in order to prevent
or minimite exposure to radiation and radioactive materials.
Include at
least the following items:
1.
Plant Site
a.
Action criteria.
b.
The means and the time required to warn or advise persons-
involved,
i.e.,
(1) Employees not having emergency assignments,
(2) Working and nonworking visitors,
(3) Contractor and construction personnel, and
(4) Other persons who may be in the punlic access areas on
or passing through the site or within the exclusion
area.
Evacuation routes, transportation of personnel, and reassembly
c.
areas, including alternatives for inclement weather and high
,
traffic density.
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d.
Missing persons check.
e.
Radiological monitcring of evacuees.
2.
Offsite Areas
a.
Actions planned to protect persons in the EPZ and criteria
for their implementation.
b.
The means and the time required to warn or advise the persons
involved, including:
(1) Business, property owners, and tenants;
(2) Schools or recreational facilities; and
(3) General public.
6.4.2
Use of Onsite Protective Equipment and Supplies
,
Describe the additional protective actions considered in emergency planning
include. measures for minimi::ing the effects of radiological exposures or
contamination problems by the onsite distribution of special equipment or
supplies. Consider at least the following measures for persons within the
exclusion area include:
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1.
Individual.aespiratory protection,
2.
Use of prote-tive clothing, and
3.
Use of radioprotactive drugs,
e.g.,
individual thyroid protection.
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6.4.3
Contamination Contral Measures
(1) Describe provisions made for preventing or minimizing direct or subsequent
ingestion exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other
surfaces.
6.4.3.1
Plant Site
(1) Describe the protective actions within the exclusion area but outside
of fenced security areas where applicable:
a.
Isolation or quarantine and area access control,
b.
Control of the distribution of affected agricultural products,
including milk,
c.
Control of water supplies, and
d.
Criteria for permitting return to normal use.
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(2) Describe the action criteria (Protective Action Guides) and responsibility
for implementation of the measures planned.
6.4.3.2
Offsite Areas
(1) Describe protective actions planned for the EPZ including the same
elements as in 6.4.3.1 above.
6.5 Aid to Affectd Personnel
(1) Describe measures that will be used by the licensee to provide necessary
assistance to persons injured or exposed to radiation and radioactive material.
6.5.1
Emergency Personnel Exposure
(1) Specify exposure guidelines for entry or reentry to areas in order to
(a) remove injured persons and (b) undertake corrective actions.
(2) Specify exposure guidelines for emergency personnel who will be providing
first aid, decontamination, ambulance, or medical treatment services to
injured persons and a description of how these guidelines will be
implemented.
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6.5.2 Decontamination and First Aid
(1) Describe capabilities for decontaminating personnel,.along with a brief
description of first aid training and capabilities of appropriate members
of the emergency organization.
6.5.3 Medical Transportation
(1) Specify arrangements for transporting injured personnel, who may also be
radiologically contaminated, to medical treat. ent facilities.
6.5.4 Medical Treatment
(1) Describe arrangements made for local and backup hospital and medical
services and the capability for the evaluation of radi3 tion exposure
and uptake.
(2) Incorporate in the plan for both hospital and medical service, assurance
not only that the required services are availaole, but also that persons
providing them are prepared and qualified to handle radiological emergencies.
>
(3) Include written agreements with respect to arrangements mace by you in
the appendix.
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7.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment
(1) Identify, describe briefly, and give the locations of items to be used
or maintained by the licensee.
7.1
Emergency Operations Centers
(1) Describe the principal and alterna' f ve locations from which effective
emergency control direction is given.
(2) Describe their locations relative to the reactors, prevailing wind
direction at:d evacuation routes.
7. 2 Communications Systems
(1) Describe both onsite and offsite communications systems, including
redundant power sourcss that would be recuired to perform vital functions in
transmitting and receiving information throughout the course of an emergency.
7. 3 Assessment Facilities
(1) List monitoring systems that are to be used to initiate emergency measures,
as well as those to be used for continuing assessment. The listing should
be organized as follows:
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7.3.1
Onsite Systems and Equipment
1.
Geophysical phenomena monitors, e.g., meteorological, hydrologic,
seismic.
2.
Radiological monitors,
e.g., process, area, emergency, effluent, and
portable monitors and sampling equipment.
3.
Drocess monitors,
e.g., reactor coolant system pressure and temperature,
containment pressure and temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, status
or if,eup of equipment components.
4.
Fire detection devices.
7.3.2
Eacilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring
1.
Geophysical phenoment, monitors.
2.
Radiological monitors.
3.
Laboratory facilities, fixed or mobile.
7.4
Protective Facilities and Equipment
(1) Describe specific facilities and equipment that are intended to serve a
protective function, including those features that ensure their adecuacy
with respect to their capacity for accommodating the numoer of persons
.
,
.
.
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expected and with respect to shielding, ventilation, and inventory of supplies,
including, for example, respiratory protection, protective clothing, portable
lighting, and communications equipment.
7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities
(1) Provide summary description of onsite facilities.
(2) Describe offsita medical facilities in the appendix along with the
agreements providing for their use.
7. 6 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies
(1) Describe onsite damage control equipment and supplies.
3.
Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
(1) Describe the means to be employed to ensure that the pian will continue
to be affective throughout the lifetime of the facility.
8.1
Organizational Preparedness
8.1.1
Training
(1) Descr be the specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs
to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:
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1.
Directors or coordinators of the olant emergency organization.
Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control
room shift personnel.
.
Radiological monitoring teams.
3.
4.
Fire control teams (fire brigades).
5.
Repair and damage control teams.
6.
First aid end rescue teams.
7.
Local services personnel.
8.
Medical support personnel.
9.
Licensee's headquarters support personnel.
8.1.2
Orills and Exercises
(1) Describe provisions for the conduci of periodic drills and exercisos to
test the acequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and
methods, to test emergency equipment, and to ensure that emergency
organization personnel are familiar with their duties.
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(2) Provide for an initial exercise prios to loa",ng c
t..e
=st unit at
any site and for annual exe--ises thereafi.r using scenarios apprc.iritte
to the Site Emergercy or Ger.:ral Emc.' gene."
._ssifications.
(3) Describe the provisions for coordination with and participation of
offsite emergency personnel, including those of State and local government
agencies.
(4) Describe the test of the communications links and notification procedures
with those offsite agencies to demonstrate that capability fo. etrly
warning of the public is maintained.
(5) Describe the quarterly drills for fire team (fire brigade) members,
annual fire emergency drills containing provisions for a participation
by an offsite fire department, and annual drills of repair and damage
control teams.
(6) Describe the rovisions made for critiques of all drills and exercises.
(7) Describe the methods to evaluate its effectiveness and to correct weak
areas through feedback with emanasis on schedules, lesson pl?ns, practical
training, and periodic examinations.
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8.1.3
Emergancy Plannng Coordinator
(1) Establish and maintain on the normal plant operating staff an Emergency
Planning Coordinator whose responsibility includes the coordination of
offsite emergency planning efforts.
(2) Describe the principal duties of this position.
8.2 Review and Updating of the Plan and Procedures
(1) Provide for an annual review of the emergency plan and for updating and
improving procedures to incorporace results of training and drills and
to account for changes onsite or in the environs.
(2) Describe means for maintaining all coordinata elements of the total
emergency organization informed of the plan and revisions to the plan
ot-relevant procedures. Describe provisions for reviewing and updating
all written agreements at least every two years.
S.3 Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies
(1) Describe the provisions for performing maintenance, surveillance testing,
and inv(ntory on emergency equipment and supplies.
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9.
Recovery
(1) Describe general plans, including applicable criteria, for restoring the
plant as nearly as may be possible to a safe status.
10.
Appendix
(1) Include in the appendix the following items:
1.
Copies of agreement letters with offsite emergency response supporting
organizations and copies or summariss of referenced interfacing
2.
Plots of calculated time-distance-dose for the most serious design
basis accident as called for in the latest revision of Regulatory
Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports
for Nuclear Power Plants," Section 13.3-1.a,
-1.b, and -1.c.
3.
A map or maps, drawn to suitable scale and clearly legible, that
reflect the information called for in Regulatory Guide 1.70,
Section '3.3-6.a and -6.b., and display the exclusion area, low
population zone and EPZ (10, 50 mile) boundaries.
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4.
Listings, by title, of written procedures that implement the plan.
5.
Listings by general category of emergency kits, protective equipment,
and supplies that are stored and maintained for emergency purposes.
A detailed catalog of indificual items should not be included in
the plan.
)
.
.
.
Emercency Planning A#ceotance Criteria
for Licensed Nuclear Power Plants
INTRODUCTION
Confirm that you will submit updated facility plans in accordance with the
format of Regulatory Guide 1.101 by (date) together with the appropriate
State and local plans, which will be evaluated collectively against the
requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, the positions set forth in
Regulatory Guide 1.101, and the acceptance criteria contained herein.
.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
I.
To assure effective coordination of emergency activities among all
organizations having a response role
A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide for an emergency coordinator at all times, including
one individual onsite at the time of an accident, having the
authority and responsibility to initiate any emergency actions
within the provisions of the emergency plan, including the
exchange of information with authorities responsible for
coorcinating offsite emergency measures.
(5.2.1)
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]
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.
2.
Provide for the augmentation of the minimum onsite emergency
organi:ation within 60 minutes for all classes of emergencies
.
above the " alert" level.
(5.3.X)
.
3.
Identify and define by means of a block diagram the interfaces
between and among the onsite functional areas of emergency
activity, licensee headquarters support, local services
support, and State and local government response organizations.
The above shall include the onsite technical support center
and the operational support center as discussed in NUREG-0578.
(5.3.X)
4.
Describe the location and role of the onsite technical support
center.
See item 3 of Section 2.2.2.b of Appendix A to
NUREG-0578 (e.g., communications with NRC and the offsite
emergency operations center).
(7.1.X)
5.
Describe the location and role of the onsite operational
support center. Section item 3 of Section 2.2.2.c of Appendix A
to NUREG-0578.
(7.1.X)
5.
Provide for the dispatch of a representative to the principal
emergency operations center established by the offsite agencies
(not required if licensee's offsite emergency oceration
center is at the same location as that described in item I.3.4).
(7.1.X)
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B.
State / local plans:
1.
Identify authorities responsible for coordinating offsite
emergency activities for the Emergency Planning Zones discussed
in NUREG-0396. (5.4)
2.
Designate the authority and specific responsibility for each
coordinating authority.
(5.4)
3.
Describe the concept of operations from the perspective of
each official having a coordinating role, including the
operational interrelationships of all Federal, State, anc
local organizations providing emergency support services.
(5.4)
Identify the predetermined location of the Emergency Operations
Center to be used for the coordination of all offsite emergency
.
support ' activities.
(5.4, 7.1)
5.
Describe the communication plan for emergencies, including
titles and alternates for both ends of the communication
links and the primary and backup means of communication
(5.4).
Where consistent with the agency function, these
plans will include:
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a.
Provision for prompt and assured activation of the
State / local emergency response network.
b.
Provision for administrative control methods for assuring
effective coordination and control of Federal, State,
and local emergency support activities.
Provision fer communications with continguous State / local
c.
governments within the Emergency Planning Zones (10,
50 miles).
.
d.
Trovision for communications with Federal emergency
response organizations.
Provision for communications with the nuclear facility,
e.
State and/or local emergency operations centers, and
field assessment teams.
II. To assure early warning and clear instructions to the population-at-risk
in the event of a serious radiological emergency
A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide an emergency classification scheme as set forth in
(4.1.X)
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2.
Establish specific criteria, inluding Emergency Action Levels
(EAL) as appropriate, for declaring each class of emergt :y.
(4.1.X)
a.
EALs for declaring a " site emergency" will include
instrument readings and system status indications corre-
spending to an aircorne fission product inventory within
containment which, if released, could result in offsite
doses equivalent to the lower limit of the EPA Protective
Action Guides (PAG) for exposure to airborne radioactive
materials.
b.
EALs for declaring a " general emergency" will include
instrument readings and system status indications corre-
sponding to an airborne fission product inventory within
containment which, if released, could result in offsite
doses equivalent to the upper limit of the EPA Protective
Action Guides (PAG) for exposure to airborne radioactive
,
materi al s'.
3.
Provide a clear and exolicit methocology for relating EALs to
PAGs.
(4.1)
4.
Identify the onsite capacility and resources to procerly
assess and categorize accicents including:
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Instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling.
a.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.3.b of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3)
b.
Radiation monitors.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.b of
Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3)
.
5.
Provide for recommending protective actions to the appropriate
State and local authorities, based on projected dose to the
population-at-risk, in accordance with the recommendation set
forth in Table 5.1 of the Manual of Protective Action Guides
and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incicents, EPA-520/1-75-001..
Upon declaration of a " general emergency", immediate notification
shall be made directiv to the offsite authorities responsible
for implementing protective measures within the Emergency
Planning Zone as discusse in NUREG-0396.
(6.4)
6.
Describe the onsite communications capability for assuring
contact with the offsite authorities responsible for implementing
protective measures including a primary and backup means of
communications.
(6.1)
7.
Provide for periodic dissemination of educational information
to the public within the plum exposure Emergency Planning
Zone regarding the potential warning methodology in the vent
of a serious accident.
(6.4)
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8.
State / local plans:
1.
Identify authorities having a response role within the Emergency
Planning Zone as discussed in NUREG-0396.
(5.4)
2.
Designate the authority and specific responsibility for each
of the responding authorities.
(5.4)
3.
Provide for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day manning of communication link by
authorities responsible for implementing offsite protective
measures. (5.4)
.
4.
Provide an emergency classification scheme that is consistent
with that established by the licensee.
(5.4)
5.
Describe the resources that will be used if necessary to
provide early warning and clear instructions to the populace
within the Emergency Planning Zone asso-iated with the plume
exposure pathway (NUREG-0396) within 15 minutes following
notification from the facility operator (e.g., tone alert
systems, sirens and radio /TV).
(5.4)
6.
Provide for posting information regarding the potential
warning.Tethodology and expected response in areas visited by
transients within the Emergency Planning Zone (e.g., recreational
areas).
(5.4)
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7.
Identify prewritten emergency messages for response organizations
and the public consistent with the classification scheme.
(5.4)
8.
Provisions for testing the ovarall communications link to
assure that the criteria specified in item 5 above is met on
a continuing basis.
(5.4)
III. To assure continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both
onsite and offsite
A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Identify the onsite capability and resources to provide valid
.
and continuing assessment throughout the ccurse of an accident
including:
a.
Post-accident sampling capability.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.a
of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3)
b.
In plant iodine instrumentation. See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.c
of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
(7.3)
Plots showing the containment radiction monitor reading
c.
vs. time fo11cwing an accident for incidents involving
bb\\
]
.
.
.
.
.g.
100% release of coolant activity,100% release of gap
activity, 1% release of fuel inventory, and 10% release
of fuel inventory.
(10)
2.
Identify the capability and resources for field monitoring in
the environs of the plant including te additional dosimetry
specified in the revised technical position issued by the NRC
Radiological Assessment Branch for the environmental radiological
monitoring pecgram.
(7.3.2)
8.
State / local plans:
1.
Identify the agencies having a radiological assessment role
within the Emergency Planning Zonas as discussed NUREG-0396,
including the lead agency for data coordination.
(5.4)
.
2.
Designate the specific responsibilities for each agency
having an assigned assessment role.
(5.4)
3.
Describe the arrangements established with the Department of
Energy Regional Coordinating Office for radiological assistance
under the RAP and IRAP programs.
(5.4)
4.
Designate a centralized coordination center for the receipt
and analysis of all field monitoring dsta.
(5.4)
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5.
Describe the methods and equipment to be employed in detemining
the magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards
following liquid or gsseous radioactivity releases.
(5.4)
IV. To assure effective implementation of emergency measures in the environs
A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide written agreements with each Federal, State, and
local agency and other support organizations having an emergency
response role within the Emergency Planning Zones as discussed
in NUREG-0396. The agreements will identify the emergency
measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable criteria
for their implementation.
(5.4,10)
8.
State / local plans:
1.
Designate protective action guides and/or other criteria to
be used for implementing specific protective actions in
accordance with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure
to a radioactive gaseous plume (EPA-520/1-75-001) and with
those of HEW /FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human
food and animal feeds as published in the Federal Register of
December 15, 1978 (43 FR 58790).
(5.4)
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2.
Designate the informational needs (e.g., dose rates, projected
dose levels, contamination levels, airborne or waterborne
activity levels) for implementing the protective actions
identified in item 1 above.
(5.4)
3.
Describe the evacuation plan and/or other protective measures
for the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the plume
.
exposure pathway (NUREG-0396) including:
(5.4)
a.
Maps showing evacuation routes as well as relocation and
shelter areas.
b.
Population and their distribution around the nuclear
facility.
c.
Means for notification of all segments of the transient
and resident populaton.
d.
Plans for protecting those persons whose mobility may be
impaired due to such factors as institutional confinement.
Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly
e.
for emergency workers, including quantities, storage,
and means of distribution.
1312
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.
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.
.
.
.u-
f.
Means of effecting relocation.
g.
Potential egress routes and their projected traffic
capacities under emergency use.
h.
Potential impe4iments to use of egress routes, and
potential continrency measures.
4.
Describe the protectite measures to be used for the Emergency
Planning Zone associated with the ingest. ion pathway (NUREG-0396)
including the methocs for protectir.g the public from consumption
ef contaminated f6cdstuffs.
(5.4)
5.
Provide for maintaining dose records of all potentially
exposed emergency workers involved in response ctivities.
(5.4)
.
V.
To assure continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency
preparedness
A.
Licensee plans:
1.
Provide, in addition to the drills and exercises identified
in Regulatory Guide 1.101, a joint exercise involving Federal,
State, and local response organizations.
The scope c' such
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is
an exercise should test as much of the emergency plans at,
i i ation.
reasonably achievable wfiut involving full public part c p
Definitive performance criteria will be established for all
levels of participation to assure an objective evaluation.
This jair,t test exercise will be scheduled about once every
five years. (8.1.2)
B.
State / local plans:
Provide for emergency drills and exercises to test and evalu
1.
for
the response role of the agency, including provisions
(5.4)
critique by qualified observers.
Provide for participation in the joint Federal, State, local
2.
(5.4)
and licensee exercise described in A.1 above.
Describe the training program for those individuals having an
3.
(5.4)
emergency response assignment.
Provide for periodic review and updating of the emergency
4.
(5.4)
response plans of the agency.
tion requested
Provide a specific cross reference in Section 5.4 for informa
in State / local plans.
1312
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,
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UNITEC sTATEE
/ p areg"O
NtJr.l.FAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.-
,,,, g
REQlON I
a
f
,
RING OF P AuS5fA. PCMM5YLVAMBA 19404
m
644 PAMR Av1EMut
'*
,
%*...+*
V8i1f171
rt!"MORA?;TJf5f 7"OR: Jack 306 Team 1.cadar, NRR Emergency Planulug Site
Review Cruup
YKOM:
George it. hith, Chief. YFM38, N1
..t*3.fECT:
Ut:MtWfrt5 ON THRRR MTT.E TSTAND EMERGNCY PTAN AND
TMPTEME Tf1NG P10CEDUKE5
Enclosetd pur ymir recTumnt are uuusuents ou the Three Mlle Taland hergency
Plan and isnplurmancing Prucedures. We strongly believe that enese consuents
inust be addenssud during the uite vis1L 11 Lhe respouse capability upgtedlug
ubjec tive is to he ::r.t uf fuer.ively.
.
'
,
GC 78
E. Smith
Cl ial, FM4SD
Enci
ne statud
uc
.
.f. Snierelt
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.
EMERCENCY PLAN - Appandix,11A.hu 65 (5-11-70) of r$AR
x
Ceneral
1.
Page 13A-4, General Emcigency Conditions. what plant operating conditions
(operational parameters) wo id bu indicative of a general emergency?
2.
What is hr ba$is for the equivalent of 6.8 E-3 pci/cc on the liquid efflu-
ent rad!s*,iva runitor as being a general emergency? Does RML-7 read out
in pCl/ccr
af nrt, what monitor reading would be equivalent to 6.8 (-3
pCl/cc?
3.
What is the significance of >125 mR/hr at the site boundary relative to a
general emergency, i.e., what assumptions are made regarding this value
in selecting it as indicative of a general emergency? What duration ul
relvuto is considered, if at all?
4.
Page 13A-4, Ceneral Faergency, Possible Actions.
Undor what conditions
would offsite monitoring be performed /nat be performed?
5.
Page 13A-3, Site Fmergency. Possible Actions. Why l>n' t of fslLe munlior-
ing listed a a possible action?
6.
Page 13A-5, para 2.2.
What are the projected in plant consequencus or
the events listed in the Spectrum ut Accidunts?
?.
Why is Appendix 13A ul the ISAR also dizLeibuLad as another document,
i.e.. SucLion 2 of AP 10047
U.
Ilow are changes Lo Section 2 of AP 1004 incorporataa inta Appendix 13A
of the F5AR7 1s there any time lag?
9.
When audits of the energency plan are performed, are the audits performed
against Appendix 13A or against Section 7 of AP 1004?
10.
Are changas to Appendix 13A and/or Section 2 of AP 1004 reviewed per
in CFR 50.59 prior to implementation? How are such reviews <ccumented?
11.
How and when are changer. to Appencix 13A reported to the Commission in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.59?
12. Para. 3.1.2. Accident Assessment Personnel. Ques accident assessment
include assvasment sf in plant radiological cundlLiuns? If so, by whom?
tivw?
13.
Of the accident assussment personnul listed, wnal are the areas of acci-
dent assessment ul each? Are the " assignments" meant to indicate lead
responsibillly? 11 30, who works for them Lo gather the data /infcrmation?
14.
Para S.I.3.
Can the RMI also perform decontamination as well as supervise?
2 ]56
.
.
,
,
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_ _....
. _ _.
.
.
.
'.
15. The Repair Party Team is composed of Shift Maintenance personne!. Which
individuals passans the skills needed to perturm operaLional related
activities / corrective actions and under whose direction, control and
authority do they operate?
16. Para 3.1.2.
Ihv Shill supervisor is an altarnata for 3 positions.
Is this
a fea>1ble approach considering the nature of the 3 potential duties and the
nature el a bar:kshill response?
1/.
Para 3.1.2.
There is nc Chemistry Supervisor at THI. What is the currect
Litle of the individual (s) who crn assume these dutics? What are Lhv
dutivs?
lu. Para 4.2.1, first paragraph, next-to-last sentence. What is a "UniL"
emergency? It is not defined as a category of emergency elsewhere in the
19.
Para 4.7.2.
What type of TIDs are used for this and how many are on site
.
at the perimeter and at offsite locations?
,
20.
Para 4.4.2.
Who may authorize the acccotance of an voorguncy exposure?
.
What conditions must exist to indicate that tha need for a particular
action in fact should be considered as an emergency action?
,
21. Para 4.4.2.
Where are the offsite decontamination facilitias located?
Are th6y equipped f or vehicular and personnel decontamination operations?
Is there sufficient communications equipment to use at the' locations?
22.
Pura 4.4.5.
What is the response time of RMO to provide these Services?
Is *.hu response Llue rapid enough to consider the support?
23.
Para 5.3.
How/what equipment will he transported to the observation
.
center? How long would the transport take? How is the center equipped
with communications equipment?
74.
Para 5.4.
Ones the telephone system require an operuLor to handle mul-
tiple callc?
25.
Para 5.5.1.
Is the met tower vital powered? Are there backup provisions
for representative mwtuurulugical inf ormoLion?
26. Para 5.5.4.
What two vehicles are readily available? Are they always
unsite? Where are the Auys kepl?
2/.
Pura 5.5.4.
Are laboratory facilities and spare TLDs readily available?
23.
Para b.G.
How familiar are shift maintenance personnel with the facility
and various procedures enlated to nparation of systems and their locations?
29.
Are they required to participate in training or drills?
1312
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30. Para 6.1.1.3.
W5at is a ' periodic examination or assignment"? How are
tne weaknesses defined and identified? If different instructors are
used vach time, hew are weaknesses called to the attention of the next
in>LrucLur to in,ure that the weaknesa, is addres.,cd in the training.
31. WhaL does il muun thuL "lessun plans will bu pruvidad"?
.
I
37.
Para 7.2.
Who specifies that a particular action is considered emergency
f
in nature? What if the individual in charge does not have an HP background?
,
I
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!
33.
The title of Para 7.3 is reentry.
This paragraph seems to imply that no
[
reentry will ha _made until recovery has been entered. How and by whom is
accer.s controlled and exposurns documented during the emergency?
,
34.
The caergency plan should describe the Metropolitan Edisc,s, CPU and CPUSC
,
[
positions which will interface with and support the site emergency organi-
Zation. The general authorities and. responsibilities of these positions
,r
in relation to the sita amargency organization should be specified.
{
,
i
35.
II:v site cmcrgency organization should contain an element for logistical
f
support, i.v., manpower and equipment, and provide for continuous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
t
per day emergency upuratsuns.
If
36.
Para 2.2.2.
What dusu ratus under worse case metrecrology, are calculated
'
to be equal to the full range ut RMA8, itP-R-214, itP-R-219? Do these pro-
l
cedures also provide f or dose rale calculations at the LPZ and nearest
resident?
.
f
37. What is the objective or initial backshill response?
?
38. Para 6.1.2.S.
How/who makes changes to procedures and t.he plan that
I
occur before the annual review? How are personnel apprised of changew?
Are telephone numberf. (procedures) only updated based on drills and
training classes?
39.
What provisions exist for inventaging and operationally checking emergency
F,
vguipsacnt?
,
ii
40.
Puru 8.0.
Itow are those agreements updated?
,
l
11. What provisions (ulher than drills) are there for auditing the emergency
j
planning program.
l
Para 7.3, last sentence. Access must be documented.
43.
What general types of radiological assessment / protective instrumentation
and supplies are availahin?
.
I
i
1M2
J58
i
.
.
, __
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L. -
..
.
.
.
.
EMERCENCY PLAN E4Pt FMFNTTNG PROCEDURES
Gunwral Ccaments
lhe IMI emergency plan implementing procedures ara Leo general in approach.
The philosophy has been that "you Can't put everything in a procedure" and
that "our people are trained in the details and do surveys, etc. every day."
knile proceduras should not be overly deLailed, Lhwy must highlight the impor-
tant details so that the user may refer back Lo Lhe procedura if he is unsure
of what to dn.
There is a Certain amount ut unne::vssary introductory material in the proca-
(
dures that it, ut a philosophical nature. This typn of information is best
placed in the plan and not in a procedure.
t
i
Procedure 1670.1
y
Para
comment /Ou.estio.n
f
3.1
Are the " monitors" area monitors? proce5S sonitors?
-
or both?
i
y
3.2
What is a "significant increase"?
?
?
3.3
There is an
after the word spill. What does it mean?
a
?
[
4.1.3
Who would be noLirled if a backshift, holiday, weckend or
other period when there is no Rad Protection Foreman /
Supervisor present onsite?
l
4.2.2
Since It is assumed that operations personnel will be rul-
-
lowing the procedures in paragraph 4.2, why isn't the basic
[
Lext of the announcement included in the procedure? Where
i
should people assemble if the ECS is the affected area?
t
'
I-
4.3.1
The appropriate procedures should be referenced. Under
whose direction?
-
4.4.1
Should reference the "On-Site Medical Emergency Procedure,"
y
1670.11.
Pencedure;if70.2
3.1
What monitor reddings ccnst.! Lute 100 times the se.t points
for RMAB und HP-R-219? Is the " set pnint" referred to the
alert, or alarm set point? Ts there an alarm associated
with the 100 times value? To what site boundary /LPZ dose
rates do these valuas encrespond?
kb\\
g
.
.
.
.
.
__
__
..
_..
_..
.
-
.
.
3.7
What is the significance of 125 mR/hr? Does this mean
exactly 125 mR/hr or can it be 124 mR/hr? Shouldn't thern
be a range since paragraph 3.2 of procedure 15/0.3 specifins
action level of >175 mR/hr? Arc these values S, Sy or Y?
Aru Lhuru different levels if the dose rate is due to S
l
radiation? Why are they only at the security fence?
!
3.3
What is considered to be a " loss of primary coolant pras-
.
'
sure"? How is the control ruum made awara of "high reactor
'
-
building sump 1 cycl"? What is considered to be "high" -
canctor building pressure?
What projected dosc(s)/ dose rale (s) or nuclide air concen-
t
trations (and at what locaLions) constitute a Sita emergency?
What other operational parameters, i.e., process radiation
.
monitors may be indicative of a site emergency?
i
4.1.4
Whn performs thv,v communications activities? How do they
4.1.6
record the results of the notification effort?
k
4.1.7
Who?
4.1. 8
wno?
.
4.1.9
Aren'L Lhe Leams dispatched by personnel in the CC5?
l
4.1.10
When is it necessary? Whn notifics GPU?
4.1.33
Why not evacuate non.cssential pert unnel as a matter of
-
course and get them out of the planL?
Ihis will eliminate
the need to devoto valuaDiv flP resources to monitoring
assembly areas and " keep track" of conditions and people,
t
(
4. 2
Accident Assescaent Personnui - in this whoist section,
!
operations personnel are not directed to at.was the
potential for a ruleuve or evaluate the anticipated dura-
tio~n or a rulvose which may be occurring.
.
-
4. 2.1. 5
Auxiliary upuraLors are directso to assume duties or, the.
I
Emergency Repair Party. Would they ha repair party moni-
Lurs or would they be assigned to perform operational
actions?
They are not assigned as repair party team
members anywhern else in the plan or procudures and are
not trained as repair party team memDers.
(See procedure
1G70.9, page 7.0, para 3.1.5.2 Emergency Plan, page
12A-10, para 3.1.6)
It is, however, desirable rur them to
be members of the emergency repair team.
13i2 MO
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en,
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.
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--
.-
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.
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.
4
4.2.5.2
How are these readings recorded? Is thern a form for
this purpose? What is done with data once it is
recorded?
4.7.6
Who supervises the in-plant radiological assessment
activitics and radiation protection program?
.
4.2.8
There is no Chemistry Supervisor at TMI. Who per-
i
forms this duty? If he " supervises" the perf ormance
of chemistry activities, who actually does the work?
With whom dess he coordinate and report his acLiviLies
and aanpower needs? Why isn't he included in emer-
gency plan training?
4.2.10.1
Don't they report to the [mergency Control Center?
.
4.4.1.2
Couldn't there be activitivs oLhur than recair? How
~
does he determine if ropairs are necessary (wno dnes
-
{
he conedinate with/take direction from)?
e
Y-
4. S.1. 3
Announcement? do not reflect the correct assembly area
locations.
4.6.4
Can this be done with existing security procedurcs?
f
Are Lhuru any contingency procedures for security,
-
decounLability, etc.? Functional titics indicative
of the emergency duties should be used. i.e., tCS
[
Director rather than Radiation Protection Supervisor,
etc.
I
[mergency
the Radiation Protection Supervisor has too broad a
Organ iza t ion, span of enntrol.
pr
puge 11.0
t=
There is no Chemical Supervisor at TMI.
i
j
The chart shows thw RadiuLion Protection Supervisor
reporting directly to the Emergency Director.
,
'
No one is shown as working with or for the Supervisor
Radiation Protection and chemistry.
Nu une is shown as working for the Chemistry Supervisor.
RadiaLion Protection Foreman does not have any assigned
primary duties in an emergency.
1312
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_ _ _. _.,
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.
.
Proevdure 16/0.3
3.1
What is the basis for >8 R/hr? Ts this an llP-R-214
meter reading value or an actual containmenL value
once the meter reading has been corrected for shinid-
ing of the detector?
3. 2
What is the basis for selecting >125 mH/iir? This is
at the slie boundary whereas the value for a sita
emergency is the security fencu. Aru Lhey the same?
Is this a 6 NY, or y value?
e
3.3
What is rationale for 26.8 x 10~3 pCl/cc on RML7?
Is this a set point?
3.4
Should ha Oreater that or vuual to 25 and 5 rem
respectively.
Is Inis for an infant, child, or adult?
What radionuclide concentrations in air constitute d
general emergency?
What if RHA9 or HP-H-219 are offscale?
.
[
What epuraLional parameters, if any, would be indi-
.,
cative al a general amargency?
-
4.1. 5
10 whom is this recommendation made? Who in the THI
urgunleaLion is authnri7ed to make the recommendation?
A
4.2
the duties during a general emergency may not be the
same as for a site emergency, particularly in terms
nf the sequencing of usents. Offsite monitoring will
prohahly not be as significant in the initial stages
sinca PAG's may De excuedud before the first results
of environmental surveys can be obtained and evaluated.
Prncedure is generally weak.
Proennura 1670,._4
.
1. 2
What provisions exist if the tower is inoperable?
4.9.1-4.9.5
Who determines that the listed accidents have occurred?
What action levels are indicative of each?
Cnclo,urws 1
Are the charts for containment source terms appli-
and 2
cable to the range of containment pressures up to
the pressure upon which the containmenL leak rates
are datermined?
1312
)62
.
-
_ '
. -. -... -.....
- -.
,
.
.
-
.
.
e
Is it feasibic to add the contai m*. projected source
term to the source term of the WJ' (especially in
Unit 2)?
What about containment / meter readings >12 R/hr?
Pages 22, 23
what guidance exists for usa of these graphs?
Procedure 1670.5
~
e
General
Neither this procedure (or any others) address on-sitn,
I-
.in-plant radiation surveys.
[
[-
The GE series survey points are not, referenced nor is
there a map and data sheet with the procedure.
I
g
Functional titics applicable to the emergency organi-
C
7ation should be used throughout the procedure.
7.1.7
[
If inventories are performed properly on. a routine
basis and the kit are provided with tamper proof scals.
(
an inventory by the team would not be necessary. This
i
wastes valuable time.
j
Where is the walkin talkin to be obtained? Why isn't
there a radio kept at the ECS?
t
g
2.1. 3
How is the annitoring team identified during radio
communications? Where does the team get a radio?
g
The precedure only directs them to obtain a radio
r
for the ECS.
.
(
A communications check should be performed.
.
,
Arn operational check of instruments should be per-
formed before departure.
.
2.1. 4
The proevdurva for performing the dosa rate surveys
should be specirled and referenced.
Data to be
rvcorried should be specified.
.
3. 0
1herv should be no basic differenen between monitoring
during a site or general eJuergency.
3.2
these should all be separata procedures with greater
3. 3
detail, to includa data sheets and survey methods.
3. 4
These sectinns relate to procedures 1670.8, 1670.11.
.1. 5
The procedure does not address in plant surveys.
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3. ?. 't
The instrument type should be specified. Action levels
should be specified.
I
3.3.1
There is also an assembly area at the florth Warehouse.
3.3.3
Who determinus wisich washdown area will be used.
.
[
3.5.2
By whom? What will they be told? Who can authoric'-
Lhe entry? Who will record the entry and monitor
.
exposure?
,
'
3. b. 3
How can communications be maintained if individuals
are masked?
{
Procedure 1G/0.6
)
Caneral
Functional titles should be used throughoul.
I
{i
During a general emergency, the team may nd be able
-
1. 0
to provide assessment informaLion until too late.
g
Radiation levels may be low for a long period as in
I
the case of a 30 day couFs~i of accident LOCA. Speed
g
is not always a rwallsLle objective.
[.
2.1.3
Monitoring map and data shevL should be included as
(*
part of the pror:edure.
I
{-
instruments should be checked for nonrability prior
Lo departure
k
2.1.4
The survey method must be specified, i.e., window
{
open/ closed, height above ground, etc.
T*
2.1. 6
k
How is air sampler operated if powerverter does not
function?
r
.*
?.1. 8
Is a profilter used?
.
~
2.1. 9
15 ft* - 4.25 x 105 cc, not b x 106 cc.
[
WhdL ss Litu residencu Lime at this flow rate? What
-
is the MDA? Why no background count?
.
2.1.15a
Where are the spare TLDs? Are they of thn r.ame type?
Are they annealed? Who at FCS will analyte the TLDs?
2.1.15d
What types of TLDs are used? Are they available?
What does " sufficient" mean?
2.2.2
How are samnies marked?
l 3 l q.
.m
4,
J0
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c
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,
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.. _ _.
_ _....
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2.2.3
Cross activity? y isotopic?
.
2.3
This belongs in a separate proceduru.
This part of
,
the procedure i; much too vague.
'
What is done with runoff? What equipment is available?
What provisions exist for personnel decontamination?
In procedure 1670.5 personnel found to be contaminated
are sent to the washdown areas.
Ts there any communi-
.
cation between the assembly are.a monitors and washduwn
.
~
area monitors? What are the release levels for per-
!
sonnvi? How are survey /deenntamination results
[
documented?
}.
Procedure 1670.7
General
this procedurn is out of date. See NUREG OG00.
P
{
Fanctional titles should be used throughout.
C
No provisions fnr continued accountability or site
{
access control.
e
{l
No compensatory security meuzures specified in the
event of ovacuation of island.
2.7
Who are suurch and rescue team.wahnrs?
4.1
This is not a truw stuLuteent. How will Met-Ed make
this recommendation? Who from Met-Ed will make it?
E
To wnum will the recommendation be made?
?
j
Procedure 1670.8
r
2.1
the " repair team" should have some members from the
[
operations discipline. Not all actions will be " repair"
g
per se.
G
2. 2
Replace job title, Radiation Protection Supervisor,
with a functional omorgency organization title.
-
i
4.0
The term "should" is used.
This would Imply that
-
they "may".
Who can authorite it?
4.3
Ry whom?
iM2
365
,,
at
....
.
.
,
.
.
..
.
- - - -
- -
.
.
H
Procedure Ifi70.9
Rrnak this into Lwu separate prncadures, one for training and one for drills.
3.0
Ooes the Supervisor of training really do this? How
4:'n weaknesses identified? How can tney be corrected?
What assurance is there that enrrective action is
adnquate?
'
3.1.1
This assigns Supervisor Rad Protection / Chemistry as
-
the instructor or his designee.
Para 3.0 states that
Supervisor or training assigns instructor.
Isn't
i
-this contradictory?
~
3.1.2.7
At the time or an emergency how is it known "who has
received the appropriate training? Is a listing of
quallried people kept up to date?
,
I
3.1. 3.1
This team will also perform in plant assessment
(radiological and chemistry) as well as protective
.
Functions in the radiation protection area.
P.
3.1.8
Division support is much broader in scope than por-
t
trayed here. What McL Ed, CPU, CPUSC people will
- -
penvide assistancv. What will their training consist
.
of? The training should be required - more than just
,
an invitation.
Course conteat for Group 2 Accident Assessment dous not
reflect their duties.
-
b
there are no test / assignments or " hands on" with equipment.
<
3. 5
[
What about key consultant groups; Porter-Gertz, RMC,
PP&L, etc.
f
4.1. 4.1
What quallrication9/ familiarity do the observers for
the areas havn to have?
4.1. b. 4
Dons the Supervisor of training really do this? Under
whose authority arv the items tasked? Who follows
tasks to complettua? Is an end datn for completion
.
of the corrvetive action assigned along with the task?
4.1. D. 9
How is this review documented? Who really does the
review?
4.2
Why is this drill Lne responsibility of Supervisor, Radia-
tion ProLaction and Chemistry?
,
J
1312
166
. -. -.
.
.
.
,...
-
. -.......
-
,
s
...".
-
<.
.
.
i
No critique forms, followup. Why doesn' t the same coraec-
y
tive action acchanism exist t'or medical emergency drills?
4.3
Why is drill administered by 55 of Operations? Scenarios
are developed withouL management involvement.
E
4.3.5
Inadequate.
It only li>Ls the participants of that
)
partichTar drill.
followup is loose.
~
.
It is intended that any of the above may be a part of the Site / General Emergency
Orill and still moet the requirement?
!
No observers used for urill other than rad neergency.
No critiques, etc.
L
P_ro_cedure 1670.11
,3
-
g,,'
No decon guidance or procedure.
It
&
Procodurv 1670.12
f
Specily minimum operable. Hava spares,
j
3. 3.
If it's not complete what time frame is alluwoo Lo
e
correct deficiencier.?
t
}
3.4
Quarterly?
.
Inventnty Check 1.ist
How does person performing the inventory knew what procedures are to be in the
,
{
hooks and what revisions are current?
$
CP-100 cartridges -,huuld use CP-200.
h
What type ut TLDs are these and what are they used for?
-5
f
What is a "high range dosimeter"?
.
%
.
I
s
I
-
.
.
.
'
.
ACTION PLAN FOR PROMPTLY IMPROVING
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (SECY 79-450)
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPROVEMENTS
AND COMMITMENTS REQUIRED FOR OPERATING PLANTS AND NEAR TERM OL'S
Provide a implementation scisedule for the following items:
I.aplementation
Item
CategoryM
1.
Implement certain short ters actions recommended
A
'
by Lessons Learned task force.
2.1.8(a) Post-accident sampling
Design review complete
A
Preparation of revised procedures
A
Implement plant modification:
Description of proposed modification
A
2.1.8(b) High range radioactivity monitors
2.1.8(c) Imprcsed in plant iodine instrumentation
A
.
1312
168
.
.
,
2-
Implementation
Item
CategoryY
2.
Establish Emergency Operations Center for Federal,
State and locai Officials.
l
(a) Designate location and alternate location and
A
provide communications to plant
(b) Upgrade Emergency Operations Center in
conjunction with in plant technical support
center
B
3.
Improve offsite monitoring capability
AI
4.
Conduct test exercises (Federal, State, local,
licensee)
(a) Test of ifcensees emergency plan
A I
(b) Test of State emergancy plans
AI
(c) Joint test exercise of emergency plan: (Federal,
State, local, licensee)
New OL's
B
All opgerating plants
within 5 years
1# ategory Aj: Implementation prior to OL or by January 1, 1980 (see NUREG
C
Category A
Implementation prior to OL or by mid 1980.
Category B:
Implementation by January 1, 1981.
1312
169
.
.
.
Additional Staff Questions
Describe the principle and alternative locations for briefing the news media.
Provide a schedule of implementation for upgrading the emergency plan, procedures
and equipmant.
.
1312
J70
.
.
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Juiv 23, 1979
For:
The Canafssianers
F.xecutive Ofractor for Operations /{S
l t). G
w
Thru:
-
Fr:m:
ifarcia 2. Centan, Ofrec se, Office of Nuclear Reac:=r
Regulation
.
Sub,fect:
ACT*CN PLAN FC2 PRCMPTI.Y IPPROVING EtERGENCY PREPAREMESS
~
-
Purpose:
To infom the Cassission of the staff's plans to take
famedfate steps to facreve ifcensee preparsiness at all
~.
operating power plants and for near-ters CL's.
Discussion:
Whfie the emergency plans o/ 411 ;cwer reac:sr ifcensees
.
have haen Ptviewed by the staff in de ;ast for conformance
to the genersi previsicas of Appendfx ! ts 10 CFR ? art 50,.
the me.it recent guidance on amergency 31anning, primarily
that given in Regulatory Guida 1.101 "F.::ergency Planning
for Nuclear Pcwer Plants", has not yet been fully implementad
,
by. ost riector Ifcensees. Further, there are same addi:1cnal
areas whart imprevements in amargency planning have been
,
highlighted as particularly signf Ticant by the Three Mile
/
Island ac:fdent.
-
,
,
The NRR s:sf" plans to undertake an fatensive effort over
abcut the next year to fs:cMye 11censac ;rwaredness at
all operating ;cwer rtactors and these reactsrs scheduled
-
for an operating itsanse decision within :he next year.
-
-
This effort will be cJesely ecordinated with a similar
ef"crt by the Office of State Programs :s fwgreve Stata
and iccal response plans thrcugh the c:ncurrence precass
and Office of. Inscection and bforcanent ef" orts to verify
precer factanentation of Ifcsnsee emergency preparedness
activities.
-
The sain eienents of the staf" affert, as ifsted in
Sciosurt 1, art as fo11cws:
(1) llegrade ifcansee eneriency plans :o satisfy
Requiac:ry Gufde 1.101, wf.h
- acf al atcantion
ts :ta develc: cent of 2n1 form ac-icn iavel
-
'
cr'taria tasec sn sian. ;ar:setars.
.
1312 Hi
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O
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=m-
,
y-
e s
- em
en -
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.
The Commissioners
-2-
(2) Assure the implanentation of the relatad recommenca.
tions of the NRA Lassons Lsarned Task Forca involving
instrmentation to follow the c:urse of an accident
and relata de information previded by this
instraentation to the emergency picn actfon inveis.
This will faciude ins:rmentation for ;ost ac:fdant
sameling, high range radioactivity.nont*ars, and improved
in-plant radfoiodine fastraentation. The impleneitaticn
of ne Lassons Learned rt:anaandation on instrt.sentation-
'
for detaction of fnadequate core cooling will also be
factored into 2e energency pian action Tevel critatia.
~
(3) Destraine t. hat an Esergency Coeratinris Cantar for.
.
Few.al, Stata and loca! ;ersonnel has been est.abif shed.
with suitable ematunfrations to.he plant, and cat
upgrading of de factitty in ac::rdanca with the Lassons
Learned rec:mmandation for an in-plant tachnical supoor.
cantar is tinderwy.
(4) Assure that imoreved Ifesnsas offsf ta =enitoring capabfi-
f tf es (including additional it.J's or ecuf valent) have been
provided for all sitas.
.
(5) Assess te ref artonship of Sht:flocal pian's "a the
" *
.
Ifcansee's and Federal plans so as to wsure *he
capanfif ty to take appropriata energency actior4s.
Assure that this' cacanf3 fty will be extanded to a
distance of 10 sites as soon as practicai, but not
-
Iatar than January 1,1981. This f tam w1TI be
performed in conjunction with de Offfes of Stata
-
Programs and the offier.of Inspection antf Fnfor:anent.
.
(6) Require tast axercisas of taproved I=ergency pians
(Federal, Stata, Iccal, ifcauses), etview plans for
-
such exercisas, and participata in a ifmitad numcar
of joint exercisas. Tests of ifcanses plans will be
recuirtd :o be c:nductad as soon as practical for
all fac111ttes and before etactor startuo for new
i fcensats. Exercises of stata plans wf T12e ;er'or..cd
'
1312
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The Commissioners
-3-
in conjunction with the concurrence revfews of the
Office of State Programs.,oint tast u ercises
'
involving Federal, State, Incal and Ifcensees will
be conductad at the rate of about 10 per year, which
would result in all sites being uercised once each
five years.
The staff rwiew will be acccmolished by about 5
rwfew taans, similar :s the cercast used :n assure
sui *able implementation of the physical sacurity
.
provisions of 10 CFR 73.35. As a minimum, the taams
-
. will consist of a taan leader frts: 1RR, a = ember fnz
t.cs Alamos Scientific Lab. (LASL) and, at least for field
visits, a mester from 2e IE Regional of" ice. LAIL will
be used as the source ef non-MRC taas members because of
the usartisa gained and fam111arity with de plants accuired
'
.
during.he physical sacurity reviews. The Ofvision of
.
Operating Reactors will have the responsibility for c=noie-
ting these reviews for both operating reacton and near-taras
-
OL's.
J. R. Miller, Assistant Direr.tcr, CCR wfil be respnn-
.
sible for facismentation of the pregram. Generai ;cifcy
and technical direction will be provided by 31 f an Grimes,
Assistant Director, CCR.
The ffrt: sites 2 he revio: sed by, the t.eams will be those
..
scheduled for operattug ifcansas vithin the nut yedr and
.
those sites in areas ef relatively lifgh ;cqulacion. Major
aflestones for ce orogram are being devnicped and will
include regional meetingr with 1icansees to dfscuss the
pregram, site visits by the review team, and =setings
-
with Iccal officials.
.
.
Coordination:
This action plan has been.discussad with the Taik Force on
Emergency Planning and the Task Force Chairman
7. F. Carter,
has advisad that the Task Force delfberations s date have
indicated no reason why.'RR should not preceed. The Office
cf State Pregems concurs in thf s plan. The Office of
inspection and inforcament concurs in the plan.
.
$
13i2
173
.
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" " * * " * *
- -
...mm
%-_.____
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..
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.
Me C:enissfoners
.4
.
Nlut expects to perfors this task without augmentation of
resourtas beyond those authorized for FT79 and.:780.
-
-
l/
$
~
.-
Marcid R. Oenton, Ofrect:r
Offica of 'tuclear Reactor Regulation
Enctcsure:
Isargency Precarsdness Imerevements
'
for Ccarsting Plant:. and hear
Tern,CL's
.
CI'mLT3tJTICM
C=::n ssicners
-
f.= mission Staff Of*icas
Exec Cir for Operations
AC23
-
secr ear 4.t
.
.
.
.
-
.
'
1312
]74
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~^
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CCLQ515tE NO.1
.
DERGENCY 79EPARENE!3 0990VOTNT3
'AND C0m!*MENTS RfCUIRED FOR OPERATING :lANTS AND NEAR
Imolenentation
Itse
C_3tacoryL
,
1.
Upgrade smergency plans to Regulatory Guide 1.101
A I
with special attantion :s action level critaria
-
based. :n plant parameters.
2.
Isrplement certafn short tars actions.eccrutanded
by.Lasscas Learned task forca and usa these in
-
action level critaria.3/
2.1.3(a) ? cst-accident sampiing
Design review c:moleta
A
.
.
-
Pracarstion of rtvfsed ;recadures
A
Implement plant nodifications
,
.
- Qascript.on el. proposed wcdi?ieat!au
A
d
-
-
7.1.8(!:) Hfgh range radioactivity monitors-
,
2.1.3(c) I=:reved in plant fadine instr.=rentation
A
.
3.
E1:abitsh icer3wtcy Cperations Canter for Federal,
~
Stata :nd Iocal Officials
,-
(a) Designata location and alternata location and
AI
pievide c=mnunications to plant
(b) Upgrade !=nriency Operations Canter-in
c:njunc:fon with in-plant tac.%fcal
suppor: cantar
i/
',a:agety A:
- oiementati:n pedor ::.L Or by January 1, IvCO (sne '.UtEN. 2c 3).
-
.
u :ascry AI:
..M i centation rion :: 0L 3r by sid..ISEO.
C.t:ascry 4:
- cicenta: Ton :y January 1,1981.
2/
~
he f::i eanta:1:n Of :?.a '.as: ens *.aar ed.ask ?:r:a.=s ~ creation f:am 2.i.2(:.,..
tas:-:.en:a:t:n f:r detaction :f inacacua:a ::rt :: cling, wil! alto te fact:rt:
g iat: * e ic t:n 'aYei OM aria.
.
.
.
-
I."5"8 l2 )/D
A
M
F*
.
.--_ -.;
.-
--
-
..
.
_ __ _
_
-
.
.
.
.
.
/
-
,-
.
._
.
.
.
.
..
.
.-
.
.
.
,
-!-
,
.
'
Ia.clementatica
Ites
Catacerv
_
4.
Improve offsita monitcMng capability
A
5.
Assure adequacy of Stata/ local plans
(a) Agains: -w eMtaria
A
,
.-
(b) Against upgraded cMtaMa
B
5.
Conduct tast exarcisas (Feder:1, Stata, local,
Ifcansee)
-
'
(a) Test of Ifctnsees energency plan
Al
(b) Test of State emergency plans
AI
,
(c)
'ofnt.ast exercisa of emergency plans
(Federal, Stata, local, ifcansee)
.1ew Ct.'s
S
-
All operating plants
rWithin G years
-
.
.
e
.
.
.
1 M 2
176
.
O
h
- " "
- - - - - -. - -..
_%
,_
_,{,
M
,
.
,
.
.
.
For interim use and emnent - 9/1979 '.
-
--
.
BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION t.EVELS FOR NtJCLEAR p0WER FACII.ITIES
This document is provided for interim use during the initial phases of the NRC
effort to promptly imoreve emergency preparedness at operating nuclear ':ower
plants. Changes to the document can be expected as experience is gained in its
use and public coments are received. Further, the Ccmission has initiated a
rulemaking procedure, now scheduled for completion in January 1980 in the area of
Emergency Planning and Preparedness. Additional requirements are to be expected
- , when rulemaking is r.cmoleted and some modifications to this dccument may be
necessary.
Four classes of Emergency Action Levels are established which replace the classes
in Regulatory Guide 1.101, each with associated examples of initiating conditions.
The classes are:
Notification of tjnusual Event
Aler
Site Emergency
General Emergency
The rationale for the notification and alert classes is to provide early and
prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences
given operator error or equipment failure or which mignt be indicative of more
serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. A gradation is provided
to assure fuller response preparations for more serious indicators. The site
' emergency class reflects conditions where scme significant releases are likely or
are occurring but where a core melt situation is not indicated based on current
-
information. In this situation full mobilization of emergency personnel in the
near site environs is incicated as well as dispatch of monitoring teams and
associated comunications. The ger.eral emergency class involves actual or iminent
'
substantial core degracation or melting with the potential for loss of containment.
The imediate action for this class is sheltering (staying insice) cather than
evacuation until an assessment can be mace that (1) an evacuation is incicateo
and (2) an evacuation, if indicated, can be ccmpleted prior to significant
release and transport of racioactive material :o the affected areas.
De examole initiating conditions listed after the imeciate actions for each
class are to form the basis for establishment by each licensee of the scecific
clan instrumentation readings wnien, if exceecec, will initiate the emergency
class.
1312
177
,
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.
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.,
.
Some background information on release potential and expected frequencies for
the various classes is provided in this material. Note that there is a wide
band of uncertainty associated with the frequency estimates. The release
potential given reflects the amount that could be released over a long time
period or under favorable meteorological conditions without exceeding the
exposure criteria of a more severe class. Release of these amounts in a
short time period under unfavorable meteorological dispersion conditions
might trigger the criteria of a more severe class.
.
.
$
.
'
i
s
Stale anil/or Ineal Ullsfie
Class
I.lcensee Actfons
Antl orIly. Att inns. _._.
i
Notification of unusual event
1.
Prtnnptly infonn State and local of f-
1.
Provide fire or see.orit y
&
N
site authorities of nature of unusual
assistance if reeprested
Class Description
condition as soon as discovered
M
'
2.
Staneihy uni 11 vet hal
Unusual events are in process or have
2.
Augment on-shift resources
closcout
occurred which Indicate a potential
]
degradation of the level of safety
3.
Assess and respond
o.r_
of the plant.
~
4.
Close out with verbal sunnary to
3.
Iscalate in a nmre severe
Purpose
offsite authorities; followed by
class
written stannary within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
Purpose of offsite notification is to
(1) assure that the first step in any
or
response later found to be necessary
i
has been carried out. (2) provide
5.
Escalate to a core severe class
current information on unusual events,
and (3) provide a periodic unscheduled
test of the offsite connunication
Ifnk.
Release Potential
e
No releases of radioactive material
requiring offsite response or
annitoring are expected unless
further degradation of safety
systems occurs.
Expected l~requency
Once or twice per year per unit.
.
'
t
e
o
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
_.
.,
..
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
.
1.
ECCS initiated
2.
Radiological effluent technical specification limits exceeded
3.
Fuel damage indication. Examples:
a.
High offgas at SWR air ejector monitor (greater than 500,000 uci/sec;
corresconding to 16 isotopes decayed to 30 minutes; ~or an increase of
"*
100,000 uci/sec within a 30 minute time period)
b.
High coolant activity sample (e.g., exceeding coolant technical speci-
fications for iodine spite)
c.
Failed fuel menitor (PWR) indicater increase greater than 0.lf. equivalent
fuel failures within 30 minutes.
Abnormal coolant temperature and/or pressure or abnormal fuel temperatures
5.
Exceeding either primary / secondary leak rate technical specification or
primary system leak rate technical specification
6.
Failure of a safety or relief valve to close
7.
Loss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power capability
8.
Loss of containment integrity requiring shutdcwn by technical specifications
9.
Loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection system function
requiring shutdown by tachnical specifications (e.g., because of malfunction,
personnel error or procecural inadequacy)
10. Fire lasting more than 10 minutes
_
11. Indications or alarms on process or effluent parameters not functional in
control roem to an extent requtring plant shutdown or other significant
loss of assessment or communication capability (e.g., plant c:mputer, all
meteorological instrumentation)
12. Security threat or attemated entry or attempted sabotage
13. Natural pnenemenon being experienced or projected beyond usual levels
a.
Any earthquake
o.
50 year flaca or low water, tsunami, nurricar.e surge, seic e
- . Any tornado near sita
o.
Any nur*icane
1312
)80
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Other hazards being experienced or projected
Aircraft crash on-site or unusual aircraft activity over facility
a.
b.
Train derailment on-site
.
Near or onsite, explosion
c.
d.
Near or onsite toxic or fla.mmable gas release
e.
Turbine failure
'
15. Other plant conditions exist that warrant increased awareness on the part
of State and/or Tocal offsite authorities or recuire plant shutdown uncer
technical specificatien requirements or involve other than normal controlled
shutcown (e.g., coolcewn rate exceeding technical soecification limits, pipe
cracking found during cperation)
16. Transportation of contaminated injured individual from site to offsite
hospital
17. Racid dearessurization of pWR secondary sfce.
_
.
s'
i
DJ
O
State anl/or inval nffsite
Class
1.lcensee Actions
Anthortly,pition.,_
,_._
pa
Alert
1.
Promptly infonn State and/or local
1.
Provide fire or,renrlty
m
,__
authoritt!s of alert status and reason
assistance II t eilnested
Class Description
for alert as soon as discovered
2.
Augment resources by attivating
Events are in process or have
2.
Augment resources by activating on-site
near-site 100 and any other
occurred which involve an actual
technical support center,,on-site
primary response cenleis
or potential substantial
operations center and near-site
degradation of the level
emergency operations center (EOC)
3.
Alert to slanilhy stains key
of safety of the plant.
emergency personnel IncInillnit
3.
Assess and respond
monitoring teams and
Purpose
associated consmnilcations
4.
Dispatch on-site monitoring teams and
Purpose of offsite alert is
associated consnunicottons
4.
Provide confleinatoe y of fsite
to (1) assure that emergency
radiation imnillorin't and
personnel are readily available
5.
Provide periodic plant status updates
ingestlini pathway dose
to respond if situations
to offsite authorities (at least every
projections II artnal seleases
becomes more serious or to
15 minutes)
substantially exreeil technical
,
perfonn confirmatory radiation
spectIlration limits
monitoring if required (2)
6.
Provide periodic meteorological assess-
provide offsite authorities
ments to offsite authorities and, if
5.
Hafntain alert status until
current status infonnation,
any releases are occurring, dose estimates
verbal closcont
and (3) provide possible
for actual releases
unscheduled tests of response
or
center activation.
7.
Close out by verbal sonenary to offsite
~-
i
authorities followed by written stenary
6.
Escalate to a more severe e. lass
Release Potential
within b hours
Limited releases of up to 10
or,
curies og curies of Xe-133I 131 equivalent or
.
up to 10
8.
Escalate te a more severe class
equivalent.
Expected frequency
Once in 10 to 100 years per
unft.
.
.
O
e
e
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.,
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDIT!ONS: ALERT
1.
Severe loss of fuel cladding
High offgas at SWR air eje: tor monitor (greater than 5 ci/sec; corresponding
a.
to 16 isotopes decayed 30 minutes)
b.
Very high coolant activity sample (e.g., 300 uci/cc equivalent of I-131)
Failed fuel monitor (FWR) indicates increase greater than 1". fuel failures
c.
within 30 minutes or Si, total fuel failures.
2.
Rapid gross failure of one steam generator tube with loss of offsite power
3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes (e.g., several hundred
gpm primary to secondary leak rate)
Steam line break with significant (e.g., greater than 10 gpm) primary to secondary
leak rate or MSIY malfunction
5.
primary coolant leak rate greater than '50 gpm
5.
High radiation levels or high airtorne contamination wnich indicate a severa
degradation in the control of radioactive materials (e.g., increase of factor
of 1000 in direct radiation readings)
7.
Loss of offsica power and loss of all onsite AC power
3.
Loss of all onsite DC power
9.
Coolant pump sei:ure leading to fuel failure
10. Loss of functions needed for plant cold shutdown
-
11. Failure of the reactor protection system to initiate and c:mplete a scram
wnicn brings the reactor succritical
- uel damage accident wo 1 release of radioactivity to contain:.:ent or fuel handling
building
13. Fire potentially affecting safety systems
All alarms (annunciators) lost
15.
Raciolacical effluents grea:ar than 10 tir.ies tecnnical s:ect'ica-ion instar:anecus
l'aits [an 'nstantaneous este mi:n, if ::ntinued Over 2 nours, woui: resu': n
d
accu-i nr at -he si a beuncary ;ncer average e:acrolegical ::nci:1:ns:
15. 2n; frg security ::m: misa
1312
083
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17. Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected
a.
Ear,houake greater than OBE levels
b.
Flooc, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche near design levels
Any tornado striking facility
c.
d.
Hurricane winds near design basis level
18. Other har-ds beir.g experienced or projected
a.
Aircraft crash on facility
b.
Wssile impacts from wnatever source on facility
Known explosion damage to facility affe-ting plant operation
c.
d.
.Ent7 into facility environs of toxic or flamable gases -
Turbine failure causing casing penetration
e.
19. Other plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of
technical support center and near-site emergency operations center
20. Evacuation of control room anticipated or required with control of shutdown
systems establisned from local stations
.
1312
184
- e
,e
Ln
State asnt/no I n. a t lit i s i t e CO
Class
licenseeActions
O
Autligi lly Ayllnsis _ _,
.
Site Emergency
1.
Promptly infonn State and/or local off-
1.
proviere a,;y assistan,c
N
site authorities of site.cmergency status
regnes teel
Class Description
and reason for emergency as soon as dis-
-
m
covered.
2.
Activate Inemillais publir
Events are in process or have
2.
Augment resources by activating on-site
"" " I ' ' ' ' "" " I """ """' "#
_
occurred which Invelve actual
technical support center, on-site
s a us an innyl o public
or likely inajor failures of
emergency operations center and near-
pu indic npdates
p'Jant functions needed for
site emergency operations center (LOC)
3.
Auirm nt s eson:v es liy activat ing
protection of the public.
near-site Itn: and any citier
3.
Assess and respond
primary respon.c senters
4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring
4.
Ulspate.h Fey emeinene y pee snnucI
Purpose of the site emergency
teams and associated conummicatloas
including monitoren t ranis and
warning is to (1) assure t8:at
associated communie.it Inns
response centers are manned,
5.
Provlife a dedicated individual for plant
5.
Alert in staniltiy status other
(2) assure that mosiltoring teams
status updates to offsite authorftles
emergency personnel (e.g.,
are dispatched, (3) assure that
and periodic press briefings (perhaps
those needed for evainallon)
personnel required for evacuation
joint with offsite authorftles)
and dispate:h personnel to near-
I
of' near-site areas are at duty
site duty stations
stations if situation becomes
6.
Make senior technical and igananement
more serious. (4) provide
staff onsite available for cons';1tation
6.
hovide oUsne ininillnrinis
current infonnation for and
with ifRC and State on a periodic basis
"
'y"l,'y" ',}','d "" rs
corsultation with offsite
,,
authorities and public, and
7.
Provide meteorological and dose estimates
7.
Continuously aness lufmmation
(5) provide possible unscheduled
to offsite authorities for actoal
froni licensee and of fsite
'
test of response capabilities
releases via a dedicated Individual
monitoring with scyard in
in U. S.
or automated <fata transmission
changes in pente live av.tions
alreaily Init lateil f or gent.Ilr asiil
Release Potential
D.
Provide release and dose projections
mobillring evaruation s esninv es
based on available plant condition
-
U*
i
n mi1 animaIs
Releases of up to 1000 cf of
infensiation and foreseeable contingencies
C"", nend >Iai
I-131 equivalent or up to
,
,q
,
,
,,
106 ci of Xe-133 equivalent.
9.
~ jose out or reconsnend reduction in
""4 " "" " """d
I" ""'""'I
emergency cl1ss by briefing of offsite
'IISI""C"
Expected frequency
authorities at tot and by phone followed
9.
provide pre n lirteilnys, poihaps
by w itten suninary within H hours
with IItensec
Once in one hundred to once
10. ifaintain site emnigency status
in 5000 years per unit.
o_r
,
,,,,,
,,,,,,,,
,g,
,,,,,,
10. Escalate to general emergency, class
P'nergency clau
.
ser
,
,
II. I sca la t e i n gein e a l emri gem.y t iau
.
,
.
'
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
EXAMPLE _ INITIATING CONDITIONS: SITE EMERGENCY
1.
Known loss of coolant accident greater than makeup pump capacity
-
'
2.
Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry (indicators should
include instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling, coolant activity
and/or containment radioactivity levels)
3.
Rapid failure of more than 10 steam generator tubes with loss of offsite power
,
~4.
BWR steam line break outside containment without isolation
5.
FWR steam line break with greater than 50 gpm primary to secondary leakage
and indication of fuel damage
- 6. ' Loss of offs-ite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than'15 minutes
7.
Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes
8.
Loss of functions needed for plant hot shutdown
9.
Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building (e.g.,
large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level)
10. Fire affecting safety systems
.
~
11. All alanns (annunciators) lost for more than 15 minutes and plant is not in
cold shutdown or plant transient initiated while all alanns lost
12.
a..
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than
50 mr/hr for 1/2 hour or greater than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two
minutes (or five timesDiese levels to the thyroid) at the site
boundary for adverse meteorolooy
b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters
(e.g., radiation level in containment with leak rate appropriate
,
for existing containment pressure) or are measured in the environs
13. Iminent loss of physical control of the plant
Severe natural phenomena being experienced or projected witt. plant not in
cold shutdown
a.
Earthquake greater than SSE levels
,
b.
Flood, low water, tsunami, hurricane surge, seiche greater than design
levels or failure of protection of vital equipment at lower levels
c.
Winds in excess of design levels
,
1312
186
.
,
.
.
.
.
..
_
15. Other hazards being experienced or projected witn plant not in cold shutdown
Aircraft crash affecting vital structures by impact or fire
a.
b.
Severe damage to safe shutdown equipment from missiles or explosion
c.
Entry of toxic or flammable gases into vital areas
-
16. Other plant conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency centers
and monitoring teams and a precautionary public notification
,
17. Evacuation of control room and control of shutdown systems not estabitshed
from local stations in 15 minutti
-
1312
387
_
i
,e
Class
e,t a t e an.1/ni I n a t tills li e
g
t.lcensee Actions.
_ _Anthorlly A. s lons _ _ _
cy)
General [mergency
1.
promptly Inform State and/or local offsite
1.
proviele any av.lslani c i nquesteel
authorities of general emergency status
Class Description
and reason for emergency as soon as
2*
AdivM e l'inne dia t e 3.idel li-
N
discovered (parallel notification pf
not t lica t ion of imies ycra y s talia,
Events are in process or have
State / local)
and provide pidellr re e in' llc
M
occurred which involve actual
"I "'" "'
-
or furninent substantial core
2.
P,ugment resources by activating on-site
3.
Reconnen.1 shelteriny for 7 mile
degradation or melting with
technical support center, on-site
radius and 'i miles ilownwind
potential for loss of contain-
emergency operations center and near-
and assess nevil to exlend
ment integrity.
site emergency operations center (EOC)
distances
Purpose
3.
Assess and respond
4.
Anwnt monn es W ad ivalinel
near-site 100 anel any other
Purpose of ti,e tjeneral emergency
4.
Dispatch on-site and offsite monitoring
primary mponse tenten
warning is tr. (1) initiate pre-
teanis and associated consnunications
5.
Dispatch Fey energenry per sonnel
determined protective actions
fi...suding sminitoring leane; and
for pubif e, (2) provide
5.
Provide a dedicated individual for
associated ce.memnitrallons
continuous assessment of Infonna-
plant status updates to offsite
6.
filspalth other emergency
tion from Itcensee and offsite
anthorities and periodic press
measurements, (3) fnitiate
briefings (perhaps joint with
personnel to denly statinais within
additional measures as indicated
offsite authorf tles)
5 mile radius and alert all
by event releases or potential
others to standley status
releases, and (4) provide
6.
Hake senior tecimical and management staff
7.
provide offsfle munlioring
current Infonnation for and
onsite available for consultation trlth
results to licensen an.I nthers
consultation with offsite
NRC and State on a periodic basis.
and jointly assess these
authorities and public.
,
II*
0""II""""SIY d "" I " I"'"d l I ""
7.
provide nideomlogical and dose estimtes
Release Potential
to offsite authorities for actual
I""' I I '"" * ""
""'I " N ' I ' " '""" I -
releases via a dedicated indlyldval or
torin
'
'
Releases of more than 1000 ci of
automated data transmiss!on
g, n e te (Ive
ni s. la
Iy
.
I-131 equivalent or more than
Infllaleil Inr pulelle and
.
106 cl of Xe-133 equivalent.
Provide release and dose projections
nWillizing ey
l ines
onia n
.
based on available plant condition
9.
Reconnend placinq milk animals
Expected frequency
infonnation and foreseeable contingencies
williin 10 miles on stored feed
and assess necil to extend
less than once in about 5000
9.
Close out or reconenend reduction of
distante
years per unit. LtIc threatening
emergency class by briefing of offsite
10.
mvl e Invn in,lelings, per haps
doses of fsite (within 10 miles)
authorf tles at EOC and by phone followed
"
""'""
once in about 100,000 years
by written simanary within il hours
per unit.
11. Consl.lar iclocallon in alter nale
IOC iI acInal dose ae e immslalinn
,
in near-sfle 10f: exaceds lower
hoen.I of I PA PAf;s
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17. liainlain general encrymn y status
unt il i Im;enul or t eilne.I lon of
encren nry riav.
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EXAMELE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY
1.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 rem /hr W.3. or
5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual meteoroloaical
conditions
b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate approcriate for existing
containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or
are masured in the environs.
Note: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary
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unless these levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to
continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
2.
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier,
(e.g., loss of core geometry and primary coolant boundary ar.d high potential
for loss of containment).
Ncte: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. If more than gap activity
released, extend this to 5 miles downwind.
3.
Loss of pnysical control of the facility.
Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of
large a.tcunts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any
core melt situation. See the specific PWR and SWR sequences.
Notes:
a.
For sequences where significant releases are not yet taking
place and large amounts of fission products are not yet in the
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containment at:noschere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation.
Consider 5 m'ile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector) if
large amounts of fission products are in :ne containment
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atmosphere. Reconnend sheltering in other carts of the plu:.e
exposure E.:ergency planning Zone under this circumstance.
b.
For secuences where signift: ant releases are not yet taking
place anc containment failure leacing to a direct atmosoneric
release is likely in the sequence bu: not imminent and large
amounts of fission products in addition to noole gases are in
ne ::ntainmen a=cs:nere, consicer :recau:icnary evacuaticn
to 5 miles anc 10 mile sownwino evacua:icn (250 o iCo sec :r).
- . Fce sacuencas ehere ia ge accun s :# #iss'en :r::uc s : ner :han
cole ;ases are in - e ::n a'~ en a=cs:nere inc ::ntad cam
'aibre f s ;uega: 'm'
en, sc: c eac s e ar #:r : :sa areas
wnere evac;2-':n : ann;'; :e ::: :Ia 2 :sf:re ra".!: * Of !c-iv:y
.91-I ca'i*n.
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d.
As release infonnation beccmes avaf f able adjust these actions
in accordance with dose crojections, time available to evacuate
and estimated evacuation times given current ecnditions.
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EXAMPLE FWR SECUENCES
1.
Small and large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to per#crm leading to severe
core degradation or melt. Ultimate failure of containment likely for melt
sequences. (Several hours available for response)
2.
Transient initiated'by loss cf feedwater and condensate systems (principal
heat removal system) followed by failure of emergency feedwater system for
extended period. Core melting possible in several hours. Ultimate failure
of containment likely if core melts.
3.
Transient recuiring operation of shutdcwn systems with failure to scram.
Core damage for some designs. Additional failure of core cooling and makeup
systems would lead to core melt.
Failure of offsite and onsite power along with total loss of emergency
'eecwater makeup capability for several hours. Would lead to eventual core
melt and likely failure of contairment.
5.
Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS. Subsequent failure of containment
heat removal systems over several hours could lead to core melt and likely
failure of containment.
NOTE:
Most itkely containment fatture mode is meltthrough with release of gases
only for dry containment; quicker and larger releases likely~ for ice
concenser contairments for melt sequences or for failure of containment
isolation system for any PWR.
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EXAMPtJ BWR SEOUENCES
1.
Transient (e.g., loss of offsite power) plus failure of requisite core
shut down systems (e.g., scram or standby liquid control system). Could
lead to core melt in several hours with containment failure likely. More
severe consequences if pump trip does not function.
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2.
Small or large LOCA's with failure of ECCS to perform leading to core melt
degradation or melt. Loss of containment integrity may be inminent.
3.
Small or large LOCA occurs and containment performance is unsucesssful affecting
longer term success of the ECCS. Could lead to core degradation or melt
in several hours without containment boundary.
Shutdown occurs but requisite decay heat removal systems (e.g., RHR) or non-
safety systems heat removal means are rendered anavailable. Core degradation
or melt could occur in about ten hours with subsequent containment failure.
5.
Any =ajor internal or external events (e.g., fires, earthouakes, etc.) which
could cause massive comron damage to plant systems resulting in any of the
above.
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