IR 05000029/1990025
| ML20029A201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1991 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029A188 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-90-25, 50-29-90-25, NUDOCS 9102050042 | |
| Download: ML20029A201 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Report No:
50-29/90-25 Docket No:
50-29 Licensee No:
DPR 3 Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company 580 Main Street Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398 i
Facility Name:
Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:
Rowe, Massachusetts
- Dates:
November 14,1990 - January 2,1991 Inspectors:
T. Koshy, Senior Resident Inspector R. Barkley, Project Engineer L. Briggs, Senior Examiner
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Approved By:
[liog'ge, Chiel, Icactorfrojects Section No. 3A
' D' ate Summary: Inspection on November 14. 1990 - January 2.1991 _Beport No. 50-29/90 25 Areas insprcici Routine inspection on daytime and backshifts in the areas of plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance and surveillance, security, engineering and technical support,
safety assessment and quality verification.
Unresolved.hCtDS At the end of the inspection period, one item remained unresolved.
The licensee post-malification/ maintenance testing program allows the possibility of one technician's error causing safety-related equipment to be made inoperable (UNR 90-25 01 Section 6.1).
i 9102050042 910123 PDR ADOCK 05000029 j
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
P_.nt Onerations
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Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS) entered the report period during the power ascension
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phase following core XXI refueling outage.
On December 5,1990, the reactor tripped due to steam generator low levels. This was the result
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of isolating an air line on the secondary side of the plant without adequate review of all the connected equipment. The licensee committed to conduct walkdown inspections and update the air system drawings to prevent future recurrence of this problem.
On December 12, 1990, the licensee brought the reactor to Mode 2 to effect repairs on steam generator No. I level instrumentation tubing.
On December 13, 1990, the licensee prepared contingency plans to address the potential consequences of a strike by security personnel. This plan adequately addressed staffing for plant operations, maintenance, security, and the fire brigade.
The contract has expired and negotiations are still continuing.
On December 14-18,1990, the plant remained at 82 percent power while one of the three main feedwater pump motors was replaced.
Radielegical Controls Itadiation Protection personne! implemented effective radiation exposure controls during the weld repair of the steam generator level instrumentation tubing. The plant was brought to a low
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power level to reduce personnel exposure.
MaintflHmee and Surveillance The technical specification surveillance activities observed were well proceduralized, timely and
. comprehensive. Plant engineering and plant maintenance demonstrated thorough preparation and coordination for the weld repair on the reference leg of the steam generator level instrumentation.
(Section 4.2)
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Sttutily Security management took prompt action to develop an up-to-date contingency plan to prepare for a potential strike by the security staff.
This plan adequately addressed the essential requirements of the Security plan. (Section 5.1)
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Executive Summary i
Enginceting.3nd Technical Supoort A post modification test was not done on the safe shutdown system subsequent to a modification on the flow instrumentation. (See unresolved item 90-251 in Sectic.n 6.1). The licensee has adequately addressed the TMI action items reviewed in Section 6.2.
Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification Licensee Event Reports adequately characterized operacional events with proper root cause determinations; the reports were timely. Examples were noted where a single personnel error remained undetected, resulted in the return to service inoperable safety related equipment (see UNR 90-25 01 above).
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TABl.E OF CONTENTS EX EC UTI V E S U hi hi A R Y,.....................................
TA B L E O F CO NTENTS
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iv 1.
SUhth1ARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES............,
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i 2.
P LA NT OPER ATIONS...................................
I 2.1 Plant Operations Review............................
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2.2 Safety System Review................................
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2.3 Review of Temporary Changes, Switching, and Tagging...........
2.4 Plant Trip Due To Loss Of Control Air.....................
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2.5 Plant Shutdown for Instrumentation Tube Repair................
2.6 Strike Contingency Plan
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3.
R A DIOLOGICA L CONTROLS......
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h1 AINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE.......................
4.1 Technical Specification Surveillance Activ! tics.................
4.2 Weld Repair On Steam Generator Instrumentation Tube
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5, SECURITY
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5.1 Potential Strike by Onsite Security Force
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6.
ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT....................
6.1 Inadequate Post hiodification Testing (UNR 90-25-01)............
-7 6.2 Review of Thil Action Plan items
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7.
SAFETY ASSESShiENT ANIS QUALITY VERIFICATION
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7.1 LER 90-06, Revision 1, Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
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7.2 LER 90 008, Inoperable Vapor Container. Atmospheric Recirculation Fan..................................,.......
7.3 LER 90-009, Failure to Perform Surveillance Required by Technical Specifications (TS).................................
7.4 LER 90-010, hianual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Pre-S ta rt u p Testi n g...................................
7.5 Plant Information Report 90-05, Roof Fire
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REVIEW OF PERIODIC REPORTS..........................
9.
h1 ANAG EhiENT h1EETINGS
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9.1 Preliminary inspections Findings I1
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9.2 Region Based Inspections.............................
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DETAILS 1.
SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS) entered the report period during the power ascension phase following the core XXI refueling outage. On November 26,1990, a load reduction was performed to conduct repairs on the main condenser. On December 5,1990, the reactor tripped due to steam generator low level. This y/as the result of isolating an air line on the secondary side of the plant without adequate review of all the connected equipment. On December 12, 1990, the licensee took the reactor from Mode 1 to Mode 2 to effect iepairs on the steam generator No. I level instrumentation.
On December 13, 1990, the licensee prepared contingency plans to address the potential consequences of a strike by the security staff. The licensee's contract with the security officers has expired and negotiations are still continuing.
On December 14-18,1990, the plant remained at 82 percent power while one of the three main feedwater pump motors was replaced. On December 23 24,1990, the reactor power was cut back 10 percent due to reduced power demand in the area.
2.
PLANT OPERATIONS (71707, 71710, 92709)
2.1 Plant Operations Review The inspector observed plant operations during regular and backshift tours of the following areas:
Control Room Safe Shutdown System Building Primary Auxiliary Building Fence Line (Protected Area)
Diesel Generator Rooms intake Structure Vital Switchgear Room Turbine Building Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) Building Safety injection Building The following items were checked during daily routine facility tours: shift stafBng, access
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cc ntrol, adherence to procedures and limiting conditions of operation (LCOs), instrumentation, recorder traces, protective systems,. control room annunciators, area radiation and process monitors, emergency power source operability, operability of the Safety Parameter Display
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System (SPDS), control room logs, shift supervisor logs, and operating orders. On a weekly basis, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) trains were verified to be operable. The l
condition of plant equipment, radiological controis, security and safety were assessed. On a l
biweekly frequency, the inspector reviewed safety-related tagouts, chemistry sample results, shift l
turnovers, portions of the containment isolation valve lineup and the posting of notices to l
workers Plant housekeeping and fire protection were also evaluated.
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Inspections of the control room were performed on weekends and backshifts on November 13 15, 20,23 and 28, and December 10-14,17-19 and 21. Deep backshift inspections were performed on November 12th (8 a.m. to 2 p.m.),18th (12 p.m. to 5 p.m.), and 25th (10:45 a.m. to 6 p.m.), and on December 15th (6 p.m. to 9 p.m.). Operators and shift supervisors were found alert, attentive and responded appropriately to annunciators and plant conditions.
Cognizant shift personnel were knowledgeable of plant conditions and ongoing maintenance and surveillance activities. Shift turnovers were conducted professionally with effective control exercised over control room access. Shift documentation adequately characterized operating history and the observed off-normal conditions. Equipment problems were resolved in a timely manner.
2.2 Safety System Review The emergency diesel generators (EDG), EDG fuel oil, and safety injection systems were reviewed to verify proper alignment and operational status. The review included verification that (i) accessible major flow path valves were correctly positioned, (ii) power supplies were energized, (iii) lubrication and cor.ponent cooling were proper, and (iv) components were operable based on a visual inspection of equipment for leakage and general material condition.
System walkdowns to nsess the material condition of the High Pressure Safety Injection and Low Pressure Safety Injection, and the Low Pressure Safety Injection accumulator were performed. Selected accessible valves were verified to be in the correct position and locked when required by plant procedures.
2.3 Review of Temporary Changes, Switching, and Tngging Temporary Change Requests (TCRs), which were approved in support of implementing lifted leads and jumper requests and mechanical bypasses, were reviewed to verify that: controls established by AP-0018, " Temporary Change Control," were met; no conflicts with the Technical Specifications were created; the requests were properly approved prior to installation; and a l
safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 was prepared if required. Implementation of the requests was reviewed on a sampling basis.
The switching and tagging log was reviewed and tagging activities were inspected to verify plant equipment was controlled in accordance with the requirements of AP 0017, " Switching and Tagging of Plant Equipment."
Licensee administrative control of off normal system configurations by the use of TCRs and switching and tagging procedures, as reviewed above, was in compliance with procedural instructions and was consistent with plant safety. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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2.4 Plant Trip Due To Loss Of Control Air On December 5,1990, at approximately 7 a.m., the plant tripped from 100 percent reactor power due to low level on the steam generators. The trip occurred when control air valve CA-V-1239, was secured for tagging. The valve was closed to isolate a leaking fitting in the control air line that supplies air to the turbine control valve test solenoids. This line, unknown to the operator, also supplied control air, via a pilot valve (Top Hat pilot) that is positioned by turbine cont ol valve control oil pressure, to a second pilot valve (HDT pilot) in the heater drain tank (HDT) level control system. The HDT pilot valve was positioned by the air from CA-V-1239 to allow control air from CA-V-1234 to pass through it to position the HDT Dump Valve, CV-402A, and provide normal control of HDT level. Normally, if the plant trips, the turbine control valve control oil is dumped from the Top Hat pilot valve to reposition the valve. This secures the air to the HDT pilot valve and bleeds off the air in the line between the pilot valves. The HDT pilot then repositions to stop air to the HDT dump valve and bleed off the air in the valve actuator. This causes the HDT dump valve, CV-402A, to fail open to dump the HDT contents directly to the main condenser. When the operator secured control air valve, CA-V-1239, the HDT dump valve failed open (same as losing control oil pressure on a plant trip) and dumped the contents of the HDT to the main condenser. This loss of input to the main feedwater system caused a low suction pressure trip on all main feedwater pumps, which resulted in a reactor trip due to low steam generator levels.
On December 6,1990, subsequent to the plant trip, the inspector discussed the activities that preceded it with the operators involved and Instrument and Control (l&C) personnel.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the following prints of the control air system: 9699-FM-26A (revised May 2,1989),9699-RK-6A (revised January 24,1989), and 9699-FK-7A (revised May 2, 1989). From the discussions and print review, the inspector determined that the operators exercised appropriate caution when closing CA-V-1239 by listening to the air leak as the valve was being closed to make sure that they had the correct valve. The prints indicated that CA-V-1239 supplied air to only the turbine control valve test solenoids. The only way that the operators could have identified that the Top Hat pilot valve and subsequently the HDT pilot valve was supplied control air by CA-V-1239 was a physical tracing of the air line. This was not done prior to the plant trip due to its difficulty to reach and its potentially hazardous (high) k> cation.
Following the plant trip, I&C personnel did perform a hand over-hand tracing of the air line to ascertain the cause of the trip.
The licensee stated that they have an ongoing program to verify that system configurations agree with timir respective drawings. Several systems are checked during the year. The licensee committed that the control air system would be moved up in priority such that it would be the next system to be checked. The inspector verified the as-built verification progress. The licensee corrective action was deemed adequat. _ -
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2.5 Piant Shutdown for Instnunentation Tube Repair On December 10,1990, the licensee observed an unusual increase in the Vapor Container drain tank level. A licensee inspection on December 11,1990 to identify the cause of this leakage led to the discovery of a leak on the reference leg of the No I steam generator wide range level instrumentation, The leak wiu at a welded connection between the root valve and the reservoir on the reference leg. The licensee estimated the leak at 0.5 gpm.
At 3:30 p.m. on December 12, 1990, licensee management decided to bring the plant to an orderly shutdown (Mode 2) to conduct the repair. Subsequent to the repair, plant operations conducted a leak inspection. The details of the repair are discussed in Section 4.2.
2.6 Strike Contingency Plan On December 14, 1990, the licensee precaled a contingency plan for the safe operation of the plant in case of strike by the security staff (see additional discussion of the security area in Section 5.1). The licensee's plan addressed the personnel needs for all areas of plant activity, including reactor operations, security, and maintenance.
The licensee management conducted a prompt evaluation for the staffing needs in fire brigade and the security response force. The licensee maintained regular contacts with the contractors union for monitoring the potential for the strike. This contingency plan currently remains in effect until a negotiated contract is approved.
The NRC inspector was onsite and reviewed the licensee readiness on December 15,1990 (the potential for strike existed from this day). The inspector verified the staffing levels and the qualifications of the operational staff in the contingency plan. The contingency plan remains in effect until the security officers' contract is approved. Licensee management was prc'npt in l
assessing the potential for a strike and in the development of an approved contingency plan.
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RADIOLOGILAL CONTROLS (71707)
Radiological controls were reviewed on a routine basis relative to industry radiological standards, administrative and radiological control procedures, and regulatory requirements. Selected work evolutions were observed to determine the adequacy of program implementation commensurate
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with the radiological hazards and importance to safety.
The radiological department provided a thorough coverage on the welding activity on steam generator level instrumentation tubing. For effective radiological exposure control, the plant was brought to Mode 2 before the commencement of any work activity in the steam generator
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4 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (71710,61726,62703,92'00 93702)
The inspector observed and reviewed maintenance and surveillance activities relative to industry standards, administrative controls, and regulatory requirements. Selected work evolutions and surveillance tests were observed to verify safety and compliance. Specific areas examined were licensee use of station procedures, codes and standards, QA/QC involvement, management over:ight, safety tag use, jumper use, equipment alignment and post-maintenance testing (Ph1T).
In addition, the inspector evaluated radiological controls for worker protection, fire protection, limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), deficiency review, and reporting per Technical SpeciGeations (TS).
4.1 Techulent Specification Surveillance Activities The inspector reviewed the following surveillances conducted by the electrical maintenance group:
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OP-4500 " Weekly Check of the Station Batteries"
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OP-4522 " Inspection and hiaintenance of Station Batteries Nos.1,2 & 3"
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OP-4565 " Weekly Check of the Diesel Fire Pump Batteries"
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OP-4580 " Weekly Check of the Safe Shutdown Diesel Generator Batteries" In addition, the inspectors observed the performance of procedure OP-5010, "Use of Valve Leak Sealant," which references vendor procedure (Furmanite) N-90598, " Seal, On-Line, The Face-to-l Face Body-Bonnet Flange on Valve VD-V-617 hianual Isolation Valve on S/G Blowdown Line l
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He also witnessed portions of procedure OP-4669, Rev.7, " Area Radiation hionitoring Channel Calibration" for Rht-ARht-122 (SI/ Diesel Building Area hionitor). No problems were
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noted _with these procedures. Adequate cautions and precamions were provided in the procedure (most of the procedures reviewed were of the improved format which Yankee is incorporating during the biennial review process), were provided with independent signoffs where required, and contained adequate acceptance criteria.
The inspector witnessed the performance of operations surveillance and IST test procedure OP-4204, Rev. 41, " Test or Operation of the Safety Injection Pumps and Determination of ECCS Subsystem Leakage" on HPSI pump #3 and LPSI pump #3. This procedure, also of the improved Yankee procedural format, was found to be technically acceptable. The data recorded by the procedure was adequate and technically acceptable for performing trending in accordance l
with the requirements of Section XI of the ash 1E Code. The IST data sheets for these pumps were reviewed and the data found acceptable and in conformance with the limits imposed by
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AShlE Section XI.
Overall, the conduct of these maintenance and surveillance tasks were viewed as controlled, well proceduralized, timely and comprehensive.
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4.2 Weld Repair On Steam Generator Instrumentation Tube This maintenance activity was the result of the tube leak detected on steam generator level instrumentation. A visual inspection of the pipe was conducted on December 11,1990. This revealed a pin hole leak down stream of the root valve BF-V 626, on the one inch pipe to the coupling weld. The weld was found to be inadequate in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B31.1. Thickness inspection of the pipe on both sides of the coupling did not reveal any pipe thinning. The licensee ground out the defect and the undersized portion of the weld. A weld repair was made and liquid penetrant iLP) and visual examinations were performed. The Operations department conducted an additional leak inspection after the system pressure was restored.
The licensee concluded that the primary cause of the leak was the poor weld coupled with some corrosion which contributed to the final failure. There was no indication of cracking or erosion.
The licensee visually inspected similar piping on steam generators 2, 3, and 4 and no discrep<.ncies were identified.
The maintenance activity was performed with adequate planning. The management oversight was noteworthy in the identification of the root cause and the corrective action.
5.
SECUll1TY (71707, 92700, 92709)
Selected aspects of plant physical security were reviewed during regular and backshift hours to l
verify that controls were in accordance with the security plan and approved procedures. This review included the following security measures: guard staffing, vital and protected area barrier
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integrity, maintenance of isolation zones, and implementation of access controls including authorization, badging, escorting, and searches, No inadequacies were identified.
l 5.1 Potential Strike by Onsite Security Force
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At 1:00 p.m. on December 13, 1990, the licensee informed the NRC Resident inspector that contract negotiations between the security contractor and the security officers' local union had been unsuccessful and that the potential for a strike of the security guards existed effective 6:00 p.m.,
December 15.
The union informed the licensee of its intention to establish an informational picket line when the strike occurs. The current contract, which contained a "no strike, no lockout" provision, expired on December 6,1990. The union vote on December 15, 1990 did not ratify the new contract offer.
The licensee's contingency plans include satisfying security plan commitments through the use of licensee Security Department management, supervisors and security contractors' nonunion personnel. In anticipation of the possibility of long-term needs, the contractor has begun augmenting the above contingency force with suitably qualified personnel from other sites.
These personnel were provided appropriate site-specific training prior to assuming security force duties.
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The security of6cers continued normal work activities in accordance with the previous contract.
The next negotiation session was scheduled for January 17,1991. Licensee security management closely monitored the activities of the security staff. The licensee management action and the contingency plan in this matter were deemed adequate.
6.
ENGINEERING AND TECllNICAL SUPPORT (37828,92701)
6.1 Inadequate Post Modification Testing During the recent refueling outage, the licensee upgraded several existing flow instruments to-implement an ASME Section XI based inservice Tesung (ISI) Program. For example, the safe shutdown system now indicator had inadequate range for monitoring the primary pump (P-82)
performance. This pump is part of the dedicated remote shutdown system for maintaining the primary and secondary water inventory.
In accordance with the approved installation procedure OP 5000.288, the licensee replaced the orince plate located at the discharge of P-82. The pipe support and the flange bolts were removed and reinstalled for this modification. However, post modification testing was not conducted to ensure the integrity of the piping assembly. ASME Section ii IWA 5214, paragraph (c), suggests a visual test to establish the piping integrity for modifications that disturbed the integrity of bolted connections The cognizant engineer for the modi 6 cation amended the installation procedure to perform the leak check during the next scheduled quarterly surveillance flow test. This action resulted in declaring the safe shutdown system (a non-Technical Specification system) to be operational before the required post modification testing. The hensee program permitted a cognizant engineer to override the prompt need to perform a post modification test and the review and approval process failed to detect this inadequacy. This constitutes another example of one individual's action for declaring an equipment to be functional without adequate testing (the first examfe involves the return to service of an inoperable containment recirculation fan - see LER discussion in Section 7.2).
The problem with the safe shutdown system, was identified on December 12,1990 during the performance of OP-4253, the operational verification test on the safe shutdown system. The flow indicator was not calibrated to reflect the change in the orifice plate. This resulted in unacceptable indicated flow and the system was declared inoperable. Even though this system would have provided the required now in case of an emergency, it would have raised confusion on the inadequate indicated flow. The licensee took prompt action to calibrate the flow indication and review all incomplete modifications to ensure that an adequate post modification test was conducted. No other similar concerns were identified. The licensee is evaluating the need for programmatic changes to prevent the reoccurrence of similar incidents and in response to an NRC violation in the post-maintenance testing area issue recently issued in Inspection Report 90 ?
This is an unresolved item pending NRC review of licensee corrective actions (UNR 900
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6.2 Review of Thll Action Plan items As a result of a review of the status of completed TMI Action Plan items (NUREG-0737) which apply to Yankee Atomic, several items were found to have been previously inspected but not specifically closed or resolved by previous inspection reports.
All of these items were determined to be closed. The inspector noted no conflicts with Yankee Atomic's stated status of the TMI Action Plan items as provided in their letter to the NRC dated April 18, 1989.
Item II.IL4.2.B - Training for Mitigating Core Damage: During inspection 81-16, the adequacy of training provided to licensed operators was reviewed and found to be acceptable. However, concerns were raised regarding the level of training in this area provided to Health Physicists and Instrumentation and Controls technicians. At that time, Yankee Atomic was undecided as to the level of training that was needed to be provided to these personnel. Since that time, Yankee Atomic has formalized and greatly expanded the training program for these two positions and has achieved accreditation of these training programs. The inspectors reviewed the training program for I&C and HP technicians and discussed the training previously provided on mitigating core damage with the I&C training instructor. The inspectors found adequat training effort devoted to technical areas related to core neutronics, thermodynamics and post-accident radiation levels. This issue is considered closed.
Item II.E.1.1.3 - Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) System Long Term Modifications: Yankee Atomic analyzed the AFW system for the plant and modified the system to improve reliability and redundancy.
Following completion of these modifications, changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) which incorporated these changes in the system design and performance characteristics were submitted and approved. These modifications were reviewed in Inspection Report 81-16 and found acceptable; hon,:r, several actions (such as the issuance of revised TS)
remained outstanding at that time. The required TS revisions have since been completed. This issue is considered closed, items II.E.1.2.1. A. II.E.1.2.1.B. II.E. I.2.2. A and II.E.1.2.2.C - AFW Initiation and Flow:
This item was reviewed in inspection report 81-16. At that time, Yankee Atomic's actions to address this item were deemed adequate, although NRR had not issued approval of their request for an exemption from the requirement to automatically initiate AFW. On August 16,1982, the NRC accepted Yankee Atomic's requested exemption from this requirement. Thus this item is considered closed, item II,E.4.1.3 - Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations: The system for venting hydrogen from the vapor containment and for allowing the connection of an external hydrogen recombiner, or both, was reviewed in inspection report 80-16. Howeve., the TMI Action Plan item was not closed at that time due to lingering regulatory issues regarding the need for permanently installed hydrogen recombiners, TS on the operability of the venting system and, subsequently, the conformance of the system with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(ii). Subsequent to that, Yankee Atomic was issued technical specifications regarding the operability of the H2 venting system and the H2 vent valves. The permanent installation of H2 recombiners at Yankee Atomic
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9 was determined to be unnecessary given the long time required in a post accident environment for the containment H2 levels to reach a flammability concentration, although provisions have been made for installing H2 recombiners post-accident. Finally, the NRC issued an exemption on October 30,1984 from the seismic and redundancy requirements of 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(ii)
for the hydrogen recombiner valve system and approving the system design as currently installed.
Thus this item is considered closed, items ll.E.4.2. Items 1 to 4 - Containment isolation Dependability - Imorove Diverse isolation:
The hardware modifications required by these TMI Action Plan items were reviewed in inspection reports 80-02,80-08,80-16 and 81-16. However, these reports did not specifically address the acceptability of Yankee Atomic's actions related specifically to these four items. The inspector reviewed these inspection reports as well as the FSAR and the system design for the containment isolation and actuation systems. No discrepancies with the requirements of these four Action Plan items were noted. These items are closed, item II.E.4.2.5.B - Containment isolation Dependability-Containment Pressure Setpoint Modification:
This item was reviewed in inspection report 81-16 and left open pending resolution of the issue with NRR. Subsequently, NRR approved Yankee Atomic's position on this issue in a letter dated July 28, 1981 which retained the existing containment isolation pressure setpoint at 5 psig. This item is closed, items II.E.4.2.6. II.E.4.2.7. and II.E.4.2.8 - Containment isolation Valve Denendability: These TMI Action Plan items dealt with the containment isolation valve dependability of the containment purge valves. The items were briefly addressed in inspection report 80-16 but remained open at that time due to the resolution of outstanding issues with NRR. By letter dated November 12, 1982 from the NRC to Yankee Atomic, it was concluded that because the containment vent or purge valves at Yankee Atomic are closed and sealed closed during operation, the requirements of Items II.E.4.2.6 and II.E.4.2.7 were met, item II.E.4.2.8
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l governing the TS on the operation of these valves is not applicable. These items are closed.
7.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION (40500)
The inspector reviewed selected portions of the licensee's self-assessment program to verify
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implementation and determine if those programs contribute to the prevention of problems through monitoring and evaluating plant performance, providing assessments and findings, and communicating and following up on corrective action recommendations.
7,1 LER 90-06, Revision 1, Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) Failed TS Surveillance Test, addresses some additional data regarding the capability of the EDGs to assume the full load when the ambient temperature is 66 degrees Fahrenheit or higher. This event was discussed in inspection report 50-029/90-16. The licensee's special task force has identified three root causes for the above event. The root cause evaluation has thoroughly addressed all the three probable
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causes. The long-term corrective actions addressed in Inspection Report 90-16 should be adequate for addressing the programmatic aspects of post maintenance testing of EDGs. No deficiencies were identified.
7.2 LER 90-008, Inoperable Vapor Container Atmospheric Recirculation Fan, addresses the licensee finding on November 4,1990 of the misconnected fan after corrective maintenance.
This event was addressed in report 90-20 as an additional example of the Notice of Violation transmitted on October 19, 1990. The licensee assessment of the discrepant condition and the reporting was timely. The corrective actions were evaluated in the above referenced report.
This event indicates that one individual's error can lead to safety-related equipment being made inoperable and it can remain in that condition until called upon for service.
See further discussion on this concern and the unresolved item in Sections 6.1, No other discrepancies were identified.
7.3 LER 90-009, Failure to Perform Surveillance Required by Technical Specifications (TS),
addresses the lack of a monthly surveillance on process monitors for main steam line and primary vent stack. The licensee identified personnel error as the root cause. The TS amendment No.
126, dated November 1989, had changed the surveillance requirements on these instruments.
The licensee's evaluation has explained the unusual surroundings that resulted in this condition.
The corrective actions implemented are adequate to prevent recurrence. The inspector had no further questions.
7.4 LER 90-010, Manual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Pre-Startup Testing.
This event deals with the unexplained reactor SCRAM signal that appeared on November 8, 1990. This event and the corrective actions were addressed in inspection report 90-20. The licensee's evaluation, reporting and the corrective actions were adequate. No discrepancies were identified.
7.5 Plant Information Report 90-05, Roof Fire, addresses the fire at the Emergency Diesel Generator housing on August 15, 1990. The licensee investigation of the problem clearly identified the root cause and eliminated this situation for all the three EDGs. The licensee's immediate corrective action and long term corrective actions were thorough, No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.
REVIEW OF PERIODIC REPORTS (90712,90713)
Upon receipt, the inspector reviewed periodic reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications and other internal licensee reports. This review verified, as applicable: (1) that the reported information was valid and included the NRC-required data; (2) that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specification; and (3) that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following reports were reviewed:
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Monthly Statistical Report for plant operations for the inonth of November.
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Emergency Notifications made on December 5,10 & 27,1990.
9.
MANAGEMENT MEETINGS (30702)
9.1 Preliminary Inspections Findings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings. A summary of findings for the report period was also discussed at the conclusion of the inspection and prior to report issuance.
9.2 Region Ilnsed Inspections Two Region based inspections were conducted during this inspection period. Inspection findings were discussed with senior plant management at the conclusion of the inspection. These inspection were as follows:
12 ale Subiect Rpar Insnector i1/26-29 Security 90-19 R. J. Albert 12/18-21 Emergency Operating 90-26 L. Briggs Procedure l
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