IR 05000029/1975014
| ML20002A408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 12/02/1975 |
| From: | Martin T, Mccabe E, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002A403 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-75-14, 50-29-75-14, NUDOCS 8011170100 | |
| Download: ML20002A408 (9) | |
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LIE:I Form 12 (Jdn 75) (Rev)
- 0 U. S. IRICLEAR REGULATORY CO:CIISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCD1ENT
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REGION I
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lIE Inspection Report No:
50-29/75-14 Docket No: 50 90
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jLicensee: Yankee Atonic Electric Company License No: ppv-?
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l 20 Turnpike Rd Priority:
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k'estborcugh, Massachusetts Category:
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Safeguards
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Yankee Rowe Power Station Group:
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Location: Rowe, Massachusetts
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! Type of Licensee:
Eb'R (k') 600 MWr
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'Typ'c of In:pec* ion:
Routine, (Announced)
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! Dates of Inspection:
Oct. 22-24, Oct. 28-31. & Nov. 4-7. 1975
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Dates of Previous Inspection:, Oct. 8-10, 1975 M
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/.7/h 7 f Reporting Insp ctor:
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.s T. Marti Reactor Inspector
" Acco:panyi: 3 Inspectors: j
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DAT~r T. Stetka, Reactor / Inspector-DATE DATE
, Other Accompanying Personnel:
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I2./~2.I'77 b
Reviewed By:
DATE E. C. McCabe, Nuclear Support Section Leader
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Reactor Operations Branch
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SU101ARY OF FI" DINGS
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Enforcement Action
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None Other Significant Findings
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A.
Current Findings l.
Acceptable Items These are areas which v2re inspected on a sampling basis and findings did not involve an Itca of Noncompliance, Deviation, or Unresolved Ite=s.
a.
Refueling Preparation.
(Detail 4)
b.
Refueling.
(Detail 5)
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c.
Television Camera.
(Detail 6)
d.
Refueling Reccvery.
(Detail 7)
e.
Steam Geaerator Blowdown Line Modification.
(Detail 8.c)
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2.
Unresolved Items i
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These are items for which more information is required in order to determin'e whether the ite=s are acceptable or Items of Non *
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compliance.
a.
Containment Leakage Rate Testing.
(Detail 3)
b.
Replacement of the Core Eo,lddown Ring procedure revision.
(Detail 8.a)
c.
Testing of the Pressurizer Code Safety Valves procedure revision.
(Detail S.b)
B.
Status of Previous 1v Unresolved Items Not inspected Management Interview j
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A canagement interview was held on site on November 7, 1975.
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Persons Present
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Mr.11. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. W. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent Items Discussed A.
Putpose of Inspection.
(Detail 2.)
B.
Containment Leah Rate Testing.
(Detail 3.)-
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C.
Television Camera.
(Detail 6.)
D.
Maintenance.
(Detail 8.)
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DETAILS
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1.
Persono Contacted Mr. H. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. G. Eaird, Control Rocn Operator Mr. R. Ecrry, Technical Assistant Mr. S. Durfey, Technical Assistant Pr. M. Ebert, Reactor Supervisor Mr. R. Eppinger, Engineering Assistant Mr. J. French, Manager of Operations
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Mr. T. Henderson, Engineering Assistant Mr. R. Herzog, Shift Supervisor
'Mr.
L'. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. B. Kirk, Shift Supervisor Mr. L. Laffond, Control Roou Operator Mr. P. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor Mr. I. Scybold, Engineering Assistant Mr. J. Staub, Technical Assistant Mr. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Superintendent Mr. E. Tarnuzzer, Senior Engineer 2.
Inspection Purpose
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The inspection was perforced for the following purpose.
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J a.. To examine the licensee's ce=pliance with the provisians of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.
b.
To verify that the pla.'ned refueling operations were adequately covered by approved procedures..
To verify that the refueling is perforned per approved procedure, c.
license technical specificaticas, licensee ce==itments, and regulatory requirements.
d.
To verify plans and approved procedures exist to return syste=s and components, disturbed during the refueling outage, to their operating condition.
To verify major maintenance itecs are being perforced per applicable c.
approved procedures.
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3.
Containnent Leakage Rate Testing The in*spector reviewed the Reactor Containment Euilding Integrated Leak Rare Test (Sutrary Technical Report 1074); witnessed Tyer B tests (containment penetration leak rate tes.ts) on various electrical penetrations; witnessed Type C tests (containment isolation valve Icak rate tests) on various valves; inspected the containuent ecuip-cent hatch closure seal; and examined containnent penetrations associa-ted'with the personnel air-lock, cuergency personnel access hatch, con-tainment support columns, and various pipes.
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a.
Pressure Source Isolation The licensee dc=onstrated local leakage rate testing of electrical penetration canisters (Type B Test) for the inspector's observation.
The inspcetor noted that the portable nitrogen gas bottle remained connected to.the canister via a closed valve during the performance of the ticed pressure loss test.
Neither the test procedure nor
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the test rig prevented leakage from the pressure source through the isolation valve from masking canister leakage. A change in test
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procedure and test rig is indicated.
This item is unresolved.
b.
Electrical Penetration Leakane
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The licensce'sitest procedure or electrical penetration canisters d
calls for r3coval of an outer pipe plug, connection of a test rig, t
. canister pressurization, pressure source isolation, and a ti=cd pressure loss leakage rate test.
If leakage is detected, an atte=pt is made to determine its direction.
Leakage on the contain=ent side of the canister has been discounted in the past, when the outer canister boundary had been decohstrated leak tight.
Assigncent of zero leakage to canisters which have been deconstrated to leak only into the containment has not been pistified.
Installaticn of a test rig in place of the outer pipe plug provides an unusual barrier'
to leakage, through the plug port, not present during norcal opera-tions. To assign zero leakage to these canisters, the outer leakage barrier must be leak tight during operation.
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The licensee is examining alternate test schemes and the i= pact of,
including the previously deleted leakage in the local leak rate summation.
(Additional inforcation on this Unresolved Item can be found in Region I Inspection Report 50-29/75-10, Detail 5.c)
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c.
Equipment Hatch Seal
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The inspector examined the single equipment hatch seal gasket.
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l The material was deforced, extrud(d, and ragged. Although
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the seal had reached an advanced state of deterioration, no
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leakage path through the seal was identifiable with the un-x
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p aided'cye.
The licensee now plans to replace the seal du' ring this outage.
The seal had not been replaced prior to the termination of the inspection. This item is unresolved.
d.
Equipment Hatch Seal Testing
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Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 requires Type B testing of the equipment i
hatch door seal at least every 3 years. Due to the single
"0" ring seal design, local leak rate testing is not technically c-.,
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The licensee's position is that the vapor contain:ent
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t continuous leak rate monitor provides an acceptable alternative
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test fo'r the equipment hatch seal leak tightness.
This item is
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unresolved and has been referred.to NRC Management for resolution.
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Air Lock Seal Testing
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l Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 requires Type B testing of the personnel
air lock docr seals after each opening.
Due to the single "O"
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ring seal design on each door, seal testing without pressurizing
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the entire air lock is not technically feasible.
Vapor contain,-
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doors, but the seals are tested for leakage only once every 6
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The licensee's position is that the vapor e7ntainment continucus
leak rate monitor provides an acceptable alternative test for the j
personnel air lock door seals.
This ites is unresolved and has been referred to NRC canage=ent for resoluticn.
f.
Testing Isolation Check Valves
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a.
The cajority of lines'that penetrate the prf=ary containment and
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contain incc=ing flow only, have two check valves for isolation.
Presently the licensee does not test these check valves for leak rate.
These valves serve t.he same isolation function as the auto-
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catic isolation valves containing out going flow that are required to receive Type C tests.
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A requirecent to test check valves for leak rate is an unresolved
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item and has been referred to URC manage =ent for resolution.
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Type C Testing With L'ater c.
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Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 requires that Type C testing be perforced using air or nitrogen.
Isolation trip valves in the Main Coolant Sample Line, Neutron Shield Tank Sample Line, Main Coolant Drain Line, and Steam Generator Blowdown Lines are leak tested with water.
The licensee's positien is that water leakage testing is acceptable and that gas leakage testing is not technically feasible in these instances.
This item is unresolved and has been referred to ::RC canagecent for resolution.
h.
Isolation Valve Leakage Testing
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The licensee de=enstrated his technique for performing Type C testing on auto =atic trip isolation valves.
The inspector noted that no provision had been made to co=pletely drain the isolation
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valve seat of water or to insure the valve differential pressure was at least the minimum pressure required by Technical Specifi-cations. With a water seal on the valve seat and a system back-pressure that c,ould reduce the differential pressure below the test cainum, the test data would be questionable.
The licensee is reviewing his test procedure and considering piping codifications that would allow proper testing.
This item is un-
resolved.
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.i. ' Emergency $anhole Seal Testinc
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Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 requires Type B testing of doors with resilient seals at least every 3 years at a pressure not less than the peak accident pressure.
The vcpor containment ener-sency canhole has a single door that is bolted in place without design provisions for local leak rate testing.
Past testing and future plans for testing do not meet Appendix J requircaents.
The licensee position is that a soap bubble test of the seal with a slight positive pressure in the containment, and the vapor con-tainment continuous leak rate conitor, provide acceptable alterna-tives to Appendix J requirements.
This item is unresolved and has been referred to NRC management
for resolution.
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Expansion Eellows Testing Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 requires Type B testing of containment penstrations whose design inccrporates expansion bellows at least every 3 years. When questioncd on this item, the licenste stated that the fuel transfer tube and vapor con-
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tainment internal structure support colucns are equipped with expansion bellcus.
Local leak rate testing does not appear to be technically feasible in these cases.
The licensec position is that the vapor containment continuous leak rate conitor provides an acceptable alternative testing means.
This item is unresolved and has been referred to NRC esuagene.'t for resolution, k.
Valve and Penetration List
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The licensee 1.s developing a complete list of isolation valves and penetrations to be provided to the NRC for evaluation.
This item is unresolved.
4.
Refueling Preparation The inspector reviewed the Core XI - XII Refueling Manual and verified
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that approved procedures would be available for fuel movecent and re-lated activitied. On a sampling basis, specific procedurcs were re-yieved for technical content, co:pliance with licence technical speci-fications and regulatory requirements, icplementation of licensee com-mittents, and confor:ance with industry standards.
The inspector then reviewd the following additional docut. ants.
a.
OP-4505 Inspection and Testing of Fuel Handling Equipment.
b.
OP-8415 Radiation Work Pernits.
c.
AP-80ll Health Physics Procedures for Extended Shutdown and Refueling Perieds.
d.
AP-9011 Chemistry Test Frequencies and Specifications for Extended Shutdowns.
No discrepancies were noted in these reviews and the inspector had no further questions on this item.
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5.
3efueling One inspector toured the vapor containment, spent fuel pit building, new fuel vault, refueling charging floor, and control room. The inspector exanined fuel storage, observed fuel covement and novement N
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auditing, inspected equipment, discussed the operations with the operators and supervisors, watched instrumentation, and reviewed logs and executed procedures.
No discrepancies were identified and the inspector had'no further questions concerning the refueling operation itself.
6.
Television Camera During a pause in the refueling operation, a television camera was lowered into the vessel to view structural items below the core.
When viewing problems developed, the camera was withdrawn and the 5.2 inch outsida diameter annular plexiglass light cover was found to be missing. A new stainless steel mesh cover was nade and installed, and the camera was lowered below the core in search for the plexiglass cover.
The lost cover was located, but in the process the camera became trapped below the core.
Unsuccessful efforts to retrieve the camera included partial core unloading for better access, better lights and a second canera, and tools that would provide
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different pivot points.
Finally, all fuel was off loaded and the
lower barrel lifted to free the camera.
When screws were found missing from the camera, the licensee committed to retrival of the screws and the light cover.
The inspector observed the earlier attempts at camera retrieval and provided initial laison between the licensee and NRC when contingency plans for leavir.g the light cover in the vessel were voiced.
The licensee perforced an evaluation that indicated the light cover could Fe safely left in the vessel since it would decompose to har=-
less gaseous hydro-carbons at operating te=peratures.
Information provided by the licensee subsequent to the inspection in-dicates that the light cover and car. era screws have been recoved frc:
the vessel and only ninute chips frc: the plexiglass cover remain.
The licensee plans no further effort to remove these chips based upon his earlier analysis.
The inspector had no further c,uestions on this ite=.
7.
Refueling Recoverv The inspector selected various components and systems, on a sampling basis, that had been disturbed durin.; this refueling outage.
In each case, the inspector was able to identify a written plan or checkoff that would require the 1:ple=entation o: an approved procedure to return that compenent or system to an operating condition following completion of the refueling.
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The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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8.
Maintenance i;:
The inspector selected several major maintenance items, verified that approved procedures were available for their performance, and examined the technical content of the associated maintenance
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packages.
a.
Replacement of the Core Holddnwn Ring To compensate for reduced holddown forces on the core, associa-ted with the lighter fuel weight and increased flow lift forces, a new core holddown ring is being installed and its fittings
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refurbished.
The procedure does not have specific language ensuring that metal filings resulting frca the refurbishment would not be introduced into the reactor vessel.
The licensee has agreed to insert the needed provisions. This item is unresolved, b.
Testing of Pressurizer Code Safetv Valves
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The current revision of OP4503 (Test of Pressuricer Code Safety Valves) specifies a nitrogen lift test versus the planned steam lift test tc be performed by Wyle Laboratories.
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'a This item is unresolved pending verification of a procedure
,revisionap[rovingasteamlift test to set the valves.
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c.
Steam Generator Blowdown Line Modification Each stea= generator had two blowdown lines installed originally.
This modification cuts and caps one line while inserting an isolation valve in the other.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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