IR 05000029/1975005
| ML19339A919 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1975 |
| From: | Durr J, Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339A916 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-75-05, 50-29-75-5, NUDOCS 8011050701 | |
| Download: ML19339A919 (20) | |
Text
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IE;I Form 12 n 75) (Rev) U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION, AND ENFORCDIENT REGIO 5iI 50-29/75-05 50-29 IE Inspection Report No: Docket No: - Yank'e' Atomic Electric Comoany License No: DPR-3 Licensee: e 20 Turnpike Road Priority: Westboroup,h, Massachusetts 01581 Category: C Safeguards Group: Location: (Yankee Rowe) Type of Licensee: PWR 175 MWe M je of Inspection: Special. Announced Dates of Inspection: May 5, 1975 Dates of Previous Inspection: 3/11/75 - 3/13/75 4J j4 4./ ' ),typ,,y jpyq-
Reporting Inspector: f/ acqds Durr, Reactor Inspector (JAT!f ~ Accompanying Inspectors: Nnno DATE DATE DATE , Other Accompanying Personnel: None DATE , ( Reviewed By: if M6 [/+v) 8-/k-Y R.C.HIynes,'SeniorReactorInspector UM '
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. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Enforcement Action , A.
Items of Noncompliance None I B.
Deviations ! I None Licensee's Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items - Not applicable Design Changes None identified Unusual Occurrences None* identified Other Significant Findings A.
Current Findings 1.
Acceptable Areas Correlation Between the Facility's Reauirements and As-Built a.
Status for Fire Stops on Electrical Safety-Related Cables and Penetration Seals A visual examination was performed of the installation of fire barriers and compartment boundary seals, and the application of fire-retardant coating for safety-related cables. There is correlation between this construction and the facility's documented requirements.
(Details,
Paragraph 3) i ~
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Invokement of Facility Requirements for Fire Stops on Electrical Safety-Related Cables and Penetration Seals in Maintenance and Modification Procedures There are no 12quirements for fire stops in this plant and, therefore, they are not addressed in the maintenance and modification procedures.
(Details, Paragraph 4) 2.
Unresolved Items None B.
Status of Previous 1v Reported Unresolved Items Not inspected Management Interview At the conclusion of the inspection the inspector held a mcating at the site with the following personnel to discuss the inspection findings: , Yankee Atomic Electric Company Mr. E. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. W. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. J. Thayer, Assistant Engineer Mr. P. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor The following items were discussed and the inspector's findings were acknowledged by the licensee.
A.
Purpose of the Inspection The inspector stated that the purpose of this special, announced inspection was to examine the documented facility requirements for fire stops on safety-related cables and penetration seals, to visually inspect these items for conformance with the requirements, to examine the licensee's provisions for invoking the requirements during maintenance and modification work and to determine the status ot the licensee's efforts with respect to the actions listed in IE Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A.
(Details, Paragraph 2.b) B.
Current Findings: Acceptable Areas The inspector stated that his review of the following are s re-vealed acceptable areas: ' ... ._.
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Correlation Between the Facility's Requirements and As-Built ! ' -Status for Fire Stops'on Electrical Safety-Related Cables and Penetration Seals The inspector performed a visual examination of all safety-related cable tray penetrations within the scope of the inspection and found the flame barrier requirements were met.
(Details, Paragraph 3) 2.
Invokement of Facility Requirements for Fire Stops on Electrical Safety-Related Cables and Penetration Seals in Maintenance and Modification Procedures
The inspector stated that fire stops are not addressed in maintenance and modification procedures.
However, there are , . no requirements for them.
(Details, Paragraph 4) ] I 3.
Status of Licensee's Efforts re Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A i The licensee provided the inspector with a status report of his efforts to comply with IE Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A.
l (Details, Paragraph 5) . . ( f r e
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. DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted e Yankee Atomic Electric Company Mr. H. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. 7. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. J. Thayer, Assistant Engineer Mr. P. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor 2.
General a.
Plant Status The plant was operating during the inspection.
b.
Purpose of Inspection The purpose of this inspection was to examine the documented facility requirements for fire stops on safety-related cables ' and penetration seals, to visually inspect these items for conformance with the requirements, to examine the licensee's provisions for invoking the requirements during maintenance
and modification work and to determine the status of the licensee's efforts with respect-to the actions listed in IE Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A.
3.
Correlation Between the Facility's Requirements and As-Built Status for Fire Stops en Electrical Safety-Related Cables and Penetration Seals , a.
Requirements The information for the installation of cable trays is found on the plant drawings. An example of this can be found on plant drawing number 9699-FE-36G-7 which has details of specific penetration construction.
, The normal penetration is depicted as going from cable trays into conduit sleeves through floors and walls.
There are no requirements for flame barriers or fire retardant.
coatings on the drawings or in the FSAR.
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Observations The inspector examined the following areas with the res'u'lts indicated: , (1) Control Room (a) Main Console The cables pass through slots cut in the floor. All penetrations were sealed with duct seal from above and a fiber-glass type insulation from below.
(b) Safety Injection Cabinet , The penetrations are conduit sleeves through the floor. All penetrations were sealed with a fiber-glass type of insulation.
(c) Control Room Walls Several cable trays pass through the floor against the walls. The fit up between the cable trays and floor was very close. The front side of the trays - were covered with sheet metal while the backside (approximately 3 inches from the wall) was open.
The inspector could not ascertain if flame barrier material was installed. The licensee stated that flame barrier material was installed.
The inspector took a small sample of the fiber-glass type insulation and applied a flame to it.
It would not burn.
, (2) Switch Gear Room This room is directly below the main control room and all wall penetrations are either conduit or cable tray to conduit sleeves.. Cable tray penetrations through the ceiling are closed with Masonite Board and duct seal . compound.
(3) Cable Tray House I This room is directly above the' control room and most cabling-to-primary-containment penetrations pass through . ... .-.
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. Y here. All cabling comes up through the floor through
' conduit sleeves. There is no insulation material packed in,these sleeves.
- - i The reactor coolant pump leads are asbestos-cloth wrapped for additional protection.
(4) Primary' Auxiliary Building All areas had the cabling enclosed in conduit except for several runs of mineral insulation cable in cable trays.
(5) Safety Injection Building All areas had the cabling enclosed in conduit. However, there is an area, " Manhole #3", which is all safety injection cabling that transitions from underground conduits to short sections of unprotected cables and
then back to conduits.
.(6) Emergency Diesel - Generators Nos. 1, 2, and 3 All cabling is enclosed in conduit.
Each diesel-generator , is in a separate room with interconnecting fire doors.
. (7) Screen House All cabling is enclosed in cond'uit.
(8) Additional Features - Smoke Detection System A smoke detection system has been installed in the following critical areas:
(a) Cable Tray House (b) Main Control Console (c) Switch Gear Room (d) Control Room Ceiling (e') Safety' Injection Building i (f). Vault (documentation) , 4.
Invokement of Facility Requirements for Fir ? Stops on Electrical Safety-Related Cables and Penetration Seals in Maintenance and
Modification Procedures The-inspector determined that the licensee did not have any maintenance- ) or modification procedures for fire stops on electrical-safety-related _, ' l .. I
, , _ i ' . . -7- . cables and penetration seals. The inspector further determined that there were no requirements for fire stops in the plant speci-fications, drawings and FSAR.
. 5.
Status of Licensee's Efforts re"IE Bulletins'75-04 and 75-04A The inspector requested a status report from the licensee regarding
IE Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A. The licensee stated that a curvey of the requirements of Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A relative to the plant has been made and an evaluation is in progress.
(The licensee j has mailed the NRC a letter, No. WYR.75-47, dated April 24, 1975, ' from J. L. French (Yankee Atomic Electric _ Company) to J. P. O'Reilly (U. S. N.R. C. ). This letter provides a schedule for eleven different ' types of surveys and reviews being conducted by the licensee in- , response to-Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A.
The first plant surveys are scheduled for completion on 5/15/75;.the final plant policy review is scheduled for completion on 9/30/75.)
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NUCLEAR - REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN 1 631 PARK AVEf4UE KlNC OF PR US$1 A. PENNSYt.VANI A 19406 e a MAP 141975 , I Yankee Atomic Electric Company License No. DPR-3 ' Attention: Mr. G. Carl Andognini Insp. No. 50-29/75-03 Assistant to Vice President , 20 Turnpike Road Restborough, Massachusetts 01581 Centlemen;
This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. Streeter and Davis of this office on February 25-27, 1975 at the Yankee ::uclear Power Station, Rowe, Massachusetts of activities authorized by AEC License No. DPR-3 and ' to thc discussions of our findings held by Messrs. Streeter and Davis with Messrs. Heider and Autio and other cenbers of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection, and to a subsequent telephone discussion ' between Mr. Streeter and Mr. Autio on March 3,1975.
. Areas examined during this inspection are described in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the inspection consisted ' of selective ensainations of procedures and representative records, intervieus with personnel, and observations by the inspector.
Our inspector also verified the steps you had taken to correct the Items of Konconpliance brought to your attention in our letters dated November 11,~1974, and January 10, 1975. We have no further questions regarding Itens A.l., A. 2., A. 3., and B.l. (a) of our January 10 letter.
Your actions on items II.2. and III.l. of our "ovember 14 letter and , d items A.4. and 3.1. (b) of our January 10 letter have not yet been co=- pleted and will be inspected at a later date.' I In addition, our inspector examined those activities conducted under - your' license relating to the subjects covered in your letters to the Division of Reactor Licensing' dated January 31, 1975, (discrepancies between calculated and measured control rod worths) and dated January 20, . 1975, (tenporary licensee inspection activities).
We have no.further , questions.regarding these natters.
Two Deficiencies identified through your internal management systc= for l-which corrective action uns initiated were reviewed by our inspector and , ! are described 'in the : attached inspection report.
No additional informa-qc Fr4cn is needed for these-itens at this time.
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. ; -2- . During this inspection, it aas found that one of your activities was not conducted in accordance uith a commitment contained in your Final Hazards Summary Repert. This item and references to the pertinent commitment is listed in the enclosure to this letter. Please furnish us with infornation as to corrective steps which will be taken by you and the date ' hen these steps will be completed.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the AEC's " Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
If this report contains any information you (or your contractor' believe to be proprietary, it is that s necessary that you make a uritten application within 20 days to this office to withhold such information from public disclosure.
Any such application must include a full statement of the reasons on the basis of which it is claimed that the information is proprietar:, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in a separate part of the document.
If we do not hear from you in this regard.tithin the specified period, the report vill be placed in the Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
"
Sincerely, 4, l G; 1-w - : ' IEldon J. Brunner, Chief Reactor Operations Branch Enclost res: 1.
Description of Deviation 2.
IE Icspection Report No. 50-29/75-03 cc: H. autie, Plant Superintendent Donald G.
Allen, President bec: IC Chief, FSLE3 IC:HQ (4 cpys ltr., 5 cpys report) IE Files Cent ral :: ail & Files Dir2ctorate of Licensing (4 cpys ler., 13 cpys report) Regulatory Standards (1 cpy ltr., 3 cpys report) PDR Local I'D?. ~ ' * ~~ *
- MC T*C OGC SEUE0 I"3520h"'*l-26G: I Readin; loem Ce>; ion Diructors (11, lil, IV) (keport Only)
f . . ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF DEVIATION Yankee Atomic Power Company Docket No. 50-29 License No. DPR-3 Based on the results of a NRC inspection conducted on February 25-28, 1975, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in accordance 71th a commitment contained in your Final-Ha:ards Report as indicate ~ below: Section 213 of the Final Hazards Summary Report states under " Primary Rod Position Indication" that this indication system provides individual control rod position indication with an accuracy of +3 inches.
Contrary to the above, individual rod positions for rods 4,6,8,9, 14, and 17 on February 27, 1975, were observed by the inspector to be between 4 and 16 inches below the actual positions.
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, . . . . no:I Fqrm 12' (Jan 75) (Rev) . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.T!ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT , RECION I IE Inspection Report No: 50-29/75-03 Docket No: 50-29 Licensee: Yankee Atoeic Electric Company License No: DPR-3 20 Turnpike Road Priority: Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 C Category: Location: Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Safeguards Group: Type of Licensee: PWR, 600 MWt (W) Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: February 25-27, 1975 Dates of Previous Inspection: February 12-14, 1975 . Reporting Inspector: %%%bn% ' 3/75 T Date J. F. Streeter, Inspector l Accompanying Inspectors: [[.(! 4L + M 7// 7/7) A.BIDavis,SeniorReactorInspector "U" Date Date Date Other Accompanying Personnel: NONE Date Reviewed By: (' M/ ? /7)~ . A. B. Davis, Senior Reactor Inspector Date' PWR Section, Reactor Operations Branch . .. ._.
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SIDC4ARY OF FINDINGS Enforcement Action A.
Items of Noncompliance None B.
Deviations Contrary to Section 213 of the Final Hazards Summary Report, the Primary Rod Position Indication was found to not be accurate within 23 inches.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items A.
Items of Noncomoliance, IE:I Insoection Report 50-29/74-16, Details 13.b.(2), 13.b.(3), 13.b. (3), 16. b. ( 7 ), and 16.b. (3) The licensee's corrective actions with respect to these items e re reviewed by the inspector and found conplete.
(Details, 18, 24, 25) B. * Items of Noncomoliance, IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-14, Details 2.c.(2) and 2.c.(3); Report 50-29/74-16, netails 13.b.(6) and 15.b.(2) The licensee's corrective actions with respect to these items were reviewed by the inspector and found to be in progress and not yet complete.
(Details 23 and 27) Desien Chances None Identified Unusual Occurrences None Identified Other Sienificant Findin2s A.
Current Findines -., 1.
Acceptable Areas No inadequacies were identified during inspection of the following areas: --. '
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-2- < . , i a. - Abnormal Occurrences (Detail 4) b.
Flooding Ef fects of Failure of Non-Safety Related Equipment.
(Detail 15) ! I c.
Administration 2.
New Unresolved Ite.ns The following item will require additional information from the licensee.in order to evaluate acceptability: > . < Normalization of Calculated Boron Concentration with Measured Values.
(Detail 2.b.)
3.
Infractions and Deficiencies Identified by Licensee ~
The following Deficiencies were identified by the licensee and ! ! corrective action was completed or initiated in a timely manner, Procedure for Controlling Makeup to Boric Acid Tank (Detail 2.e.)
a.
b.
Safety Injection Actuation Signal Surveillance (Detail 16) I B. ' Status of Previous Unresolved Itens* 1.
The following items have been resolved: a.
Special Orders. (Detail 3.b. (3))
b.
Control Rod Surveillance Program.
fDetail6) c.
Control Rod Banking (Detail 7) J d.
Increase in Core and Loop ATs..(Detail 8) i e.
Performance Discharge Tests of Station Batteries. (Detail.10) f.
Availability of. Battery Charger. (Detail 11) g.
Control Rod Worth Discrepancies. (Detail 13) h.
Operating Memos. (Detail 14) 1.
Use of the Term "N/A".
(Detail 17) j.
Emergency Power Under Voltage Relays (Detail 21) i' k.- Control'of Revisions to Plant Drawings and Procedures (Detail 26) l. :Recalibration of Safety Classified System Instrumentation.
' (Detail 28)
- Includes item previously identified as "open".
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The following items renain unresolved: a.
Hanger Adjustments.
(Detail 3.d. (4)) b.
Revision of In-Plant Audit Procedure. (Detail 5) c.
Inspection of ECCS Circuit Breakers. (Detail 20) d.
Procurement Control.
(Detail 22) e.
Correlation Data - % Flow vs. MCP Current.
(Detail 19) f.
Polar Crane Controt Circuit Failure. (Detail 12) Manacement Interview A management interview was held at the site on February 27, 1975: Persons Present Mr. H. A. Autio, Plant Superintendent Mr. L. X. Bozek, Quality Control and Audit Technician Mr. M. W. Ebert, Plant Reactor Engineer Mr. L. H. Heider, Manager of Operations Mr. W. G. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. N. N. St. Laurent, Technical Assistant to the Plant Superintendent Items Discussed . A.
Purnose of the Inspection The inspector stated that the purpose of the inspection was to review; (1) previous open and unresolved items, (2) previous identified Items of Noncompliance, (3) plant operations, (4) abnormal occurrences, (5) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting conditions for operation.
B.
Review of Items of Noncompliance The items discussed are as identified under the " Enforcement Action" and "Other Significant Findings" sections of this report.
C.
Review of Previous Unresolved Items The items discussed are itemized in the " Status of Previous Unresolved Items" section of this report.
D.
Review of Previous Items of Noncomoliance The items discussed are itemized in the " Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement items" section of this report.
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Revieu of Other Findings The itens discussed are itemized in the "Other Si.;nificant Findings" section of this report.
F.
Status of Procosed Change 112 (Detail 30) G.
Itethod of Handling Licensee Audit Findings (Detail 31) . e.
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DETAILS , , ' l.
Persons Contacted { Yankee-Atomic' Electric Company I Mr.,D.
- Army, ' Engineering Assistant Mr. H. A. Autio, Pleant Superintendent Mr. E. D. Barry, Control-Room Operator Mr. R. L. Berry, Technical Assistant Mr. W..D. Billings, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor
+ Mr. R. L. Boutwell, Engineering Assistant i Mr. L. X. Bozek, Quality Control and Audit Techniciai.
Mr. T. P. ' Danek, Operations Supervisor
Mr. R. E. Durfey, Engineering Assistant
Mr. M. W..Ebert, Plant Reactor Engineer > Mr. J. A. Flanigan, Plant Health Physicist '
Mr. J.
. Gedutis, Technical Assistant - Chemistry Mr.~C. W. Goodwin, Control Room Operator j . Mr. L. H. Heider, Manager of Operations q Mr. W. G. Jones, Assistant Plant Superintendent Mr. K. _ E. Jurentkuff, 'Shif t Supervisor i "Mr. B.
L.. Kirk, Shift Supervisor Mr. L. J. Laf fond, Control Room Operator . j lir. P. E. Laird, Maintenance Supervisor Mr. A.
Lepage, Control Room Operator , ! Mr. R. L. Paradis, Control Room Operator i j ', Mr. L.~L. Reed, Quality Control and_ Audit Coordinator ' Mr. I.
Seybold, Technical Assistant Mr. J. H. Shippee, Instrument and Control Supervisor Mr. J. L. Staub, Technical Assistant , Mr. R. H. Streeter, Storekeeper , f Mr. N..N.
St. Laurent, Technical Assi? tant to the Plant Superintendent Mr. E. A. - Walsh, Shif t Supervisor. < 2.
Safetv Limits (SLs), Limiting Safety System Settines (LSSSs), and i Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs) ! The inspector reviewed selected SLs, LSSSs, and LCOs for the systems ' ! ~ listed below.to determine compliance with Technical Specification f requ'rements..The review consisted of direct observations of' process i instrumentation, monitoring of operations, direct observation-of I consoles', review of in'strumentation charts, review of computer print-j outs, and review of data-sheets.
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Reactor Coolant Svstem The inspector reviewed the recorder chart for fuel assembly exit thernoccuples for the period of August 8 - 14, 1974. Three instances were observed wherein hectup and cooldown rates of the reactor coolant exceeded 500F/hr for short periods as follows: (1) Approxinately 2045, August 6, 1974 600F/hr heatup o ver h hour period (2) Approximately 0330, August 11, 1974 66 F/hr cooldown over h hour period (3) Approximately 2340, August 11, 1974 80 F/hr cooldown over S hour period Technical Specifications section D.2.d(S) limits the heatup and cooldown rate of the main coolant system to 50or/hr. For those cases delineated above the average rate over an hour did not exceed 50 F/hr. The licensee's interpretation of this specifi-cation was that the avern 2 rate for an hour could not exceed 50 F/hr. The inspector n'ad no further questions concerning this
matter.
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Reactivity and Power Control The inspector reviewed Rowe Power Station Log - No. I for the periods January 1-7, 1975 and February 18-23, 1975 and deternined that in all cases while at 1007. power and with the existing reactor coolant pressure, the core inlet tenperature was below 520 F which D is more conservative than the limits for braced stainless steel clad and zircaloy clad fue) assenblies in Figures 16.3.2-1 and 16.3.2-3 of Chapter 16 of the proposed Technical Specifications.
By review of Procedure OP-4601, Rev. 1, " Nuclear Instrumentation Surveillance Checks," the inspector determined that the power trip was less than 108 when tested on December 3, 1974, December 18, 1974, and January 21, 1975, and February 20, 1975.
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f_ . I f-7- . By discussions with a licensee representative, review of the incore instrumentation mimic panel, and observations of a temperature recorder the inspector determined the following: (1) Two fission chambers were available to traverse 20 avail-ab le incora paths, one of which was the hot channel.
(2) More than 16 thermocouples were available to monitor radial core fuel exit tenperatures.
The inspector observed a plot of boron concentration versus burnup for the present core.
Extrapolation of this core appeared to intersect the abscissa at the expected core burnup at end of life. The licensee had not normalized the calculated boron concentration with this neasured value to determine how well this core is meeting predictions, but agreed to do so.
This matter is unresolved pending fullfillment of this commitment.
c.
Core and Internals The inspector determined by review of the Chemistry Log Book for the periods of January 2-20, 1975, January 22, 1975, February 6, 1975, and February 20, 1975 that the 0, Cl~, and F concentrations
in primary coolant bleed samples were ~0.01, <0.1, <.01 respectively ' These values are within those specified in Section 106 of the Final Hacards Summary Report and in proposed Technical Specifications 16.4.18.
d.
Power Conversion Systens The inspector reviewed procedure OP-6100 Attachment K, " Functional Test of Scram Circuits." This procedure demonstrated that a turbine trip caused a reactor trip.
It is performed each time the reactor has been suberitical for more than eight hours.
The inspector reviewed parts of a report prepared byestinghouse - entitled " Steam Turbine Inspection Report."
In the period May 13, 1974 - August 17, 1974, during the refueling outage, turbine main-tenance was performed and trip points were adjusted. The as left trip set points were: (1) Low vacuum - 16.3 ia. Hg.
(2) Thrust bearing - 70 to 73 psig oil pressure . ... -.
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(3) Low lube oil pressure 2 psig . }- (4) Overspeed trip - 23 to 25 psig oil pressure to move weight ! . In addition, the manual trip was demonstrated to' be operable.
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The inspector also determined that procedure OP-2102, " Turbine Startup",' requires the'following to be accomplished after a {
maintenance outage or incidental outage that has.been preceded 'by 2 or more months of continuous operation:
5-(1) Contrdi valve exercise-(2)' Thrust bearing. trip test
~ (3) Overspeed tt-ip oil test
(4) Overspeed trip test (5) JLow bearing oil pressure L trip test.
J ' The inspector reviewed procedure OP-4605, " Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Trip Calibration," to determine proper trip settings.
-This procedure is performed on a 15 month frequency. Trip settings j were satisfactory (i.e. no more' than 15" below normal level) for i SG-1(6/6/74), SG-2(5/30/74), SG-3 (5/29/74), and SG-4(5/28/74).
j .e.
Auxiliarv Svstems j By review of engineering flow diagrams the inspector determined that
two operable paths exist.for boron injection to. the reactor coolant j system. One path was the emergency boration pat'; the_other was ' j from.the boric acid tank to the low pressure storage tank.
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. By directs observation of the boric acid tank, the inspector deter-( mined that 330 gal.. versus a Technical Specification requirenent of 1500 gal, ntnimun) of liquid existed in the tank. By review of , chemistry analysis sheets, the inspector determined the tank content. I i.
- varied between 11.9% and 13% HP03 for five analyes made. between-1/2/75 and 2/20/75. By direct observations of a temperature. gauge j
the inspector. determined the tank temperature to be' 152oF. These ! results werefacceptable.
~ i In reviewing lthe data to determine-the boric acid concentration in the1 oric acid _ tank', it was ' determined that a procedure was' not b , issuedi o cover-the interactions between the chemistry and operations - j t departments in controlling the makeup to the tank and to assure an , _ This evaluation was being
analysis af ter makeup was acconplished.
performed by ' informal, oral communication. This finding was also , . ... --.
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P-9_ , made by an internal licensee audit. This is contrary to Technical Specification.D.L. which states in part that "... plant operations which have a significant direct or potential ef fect on the reactor and its auxiliary systems shall be conducted in accordance with written procedures."
, To correct this situation, a procedure is being prepared. The inspector revieued a handwritten draft of the procedure and ob-tained aL commitment that an approved procedure would be issued by March 31, 1975. This Item of Noncompliance identified by the licensee is considered to be a Deficiency.
f.
Electrical System By review of Memorandum to File H-30 dated "ovember=6, 1973, ntitled " Plant Load Reduction to Repair Damage Caused by e Electrical Fault," the inspector.deternined that the required reactor power l reduction from 600 MWt to <450 :Nt was made when power-from bus Z-126 was lost due to a fault at Harriman ! Station. This was the last loss of a 115Kv line which has ~ occurred. Licensee action was consistent with Technical Speci-- ficationm requirements.
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Emercency Power The inspector revieued procedure OP-4209 Rev. 1, which was per-formed in June 1974Efor all three diesel generators. The pro-i cedure tested the automatic starting of each diesel after inia-ting loss of voltage ott the three associated emergency buses.
, The results were satisfactory -for each diesel generator.
l The -inspector review procedure OP-426 and Abnormal Occurrence A0-73-8 to determine if each operable diesel generator was started within 2 hours to demonstrate operability af ter one diesel generator was found inoperable. The following satisfactory information was. obtained: (1) DG#1_ was inoperable on May 30, 1974 at 1000 (2) DG#2 was start'ed on Iby 30, 1974 at 1135 (3) DG#3-was started on *hy 30, 1974 at 1145 By direct observation thesinspector-deternined the quantity of fuel oil scored in the three day tanks and theidiesel fuel oil storage tank. All tanks exceeded minimum requirements'which are 210 gal in ' ! each day: tank and 8000. gal. in.the average tank.
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i-10- , The inspector determined by conversation with a' licensee repre-sentative that diesel oil acceptance testing consists of a moisture test.
The inspector inforned the licensee that the standard speci-fications being prepared for newer plants required more acceptance testing.
h.
Emerzency Core Cooling Svsten By direct observation in the plant and by revicw of procedure OP-420' Rev. 2 for weekly periods from 1/3/75 to 2/20/75 the inspector verified that the Safety Injection System was in a condition of readi-ness to inject borated water into the reactor. This determination was made by observing valves to be in the properly opened or locked open positions in the LPSI, HPSI and Accumulator piping and by reviewing weekly operating data which documented recirculation operation of the HPSI and LPSI pumps.
i. Other Engineered Safetv Feature ' By review of procedure OP-2100 (and its contained stepwise checkof f initials), the inspector deternined that vapor containment integrity was established at the appropriate time during plant startup f ro cold shutdown on August 25, 1974.
. 3.
Review of Plant coerations a.
The inspector reviewed the following logs and operating records: Shift Supervisor Log 2/1/75-2/10/75 Rowe Station Log No. 1 2/1/75-2/10/75 Rowe Station Log No. 2 2/1/75-2/10/75 Primary Plant Log Sheets 2/1/75-2/10/75 Secondary Plant Log Sheets 2/1/75-2/10/75 Special Order Book 1/1/75-2/25/75 !!aintenance Request Log 12/19/74-2/26/75 Bypass of Safety Function and Nos. 74-48 and 75-1 Jumper Control Requests Plant Information Reports Nos. 25, 26, and 27 The above records were reviewed to determine if: (1) Control room log sheets were filled out and signed.
(2) Auxiliary (primary plant) log sheets were filled out and signed.
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!. . ' _11 (3) Shif t Supervisor Log was being naintained in accordance 'iith the applicable plant procedure.
(4) Log book reviews were being conducted by the plant staff.
(5) Jumpers or bypasses did not contain bypassing discrepancies with Technical Specification require =ents.
(6) Plant Information Reports confirm that reported problens do not involve noncompliances with Technical Specifications requirements.
b.
The inspector had the following comments on the above listed logs and records: (1) Logs were being maintained in accardance with established procedures.
(2) Jumpers and bypasses and Plant Information Reports did not involve noncompliances with Technical Specification requirements.
(3: Improvements had been made by the licensee in the upkeep of the Special Order Book. The concern documented in IE Inspection Report 50-29/74 16, Detail 4.b. (2), is resolved.
- c.
The inspectors toured the general plant accessible areas on February 25 and toured the Vapor Containment on February 27.
Obser-vations were made of the following: (1) Monitoring instrumentation; (2) Annunciator alarms; (3) Duty control room personnel; (4) Radiation exposure control; (5) Housekeeping; (6) Fluid leaks and piping vibrations; (7) Pipe hanger adjustments; (8) Valve positions; (9) Equipnent tag status; and (10) Discussions with control roo$ p'c'rsonnel.
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i . -12-d.
The inspector had the following comnents on itens observed during the tours: '(1) The nulti-channel recorder paper on the Radiation Monitoring Systen Console was not properly timad. The licensee adj ulted the paper and the inspector had no further questions concernin this matter.
(2) The calibration sticker on a safety injection loop pressure transmitter indicated the instrument was past due for calibra-tion and another transmitter did not have a sticker affixed.
The licensee's calibration records indicated that the instru-ments were not overdue for calibration and the licensee affixed stickers on the two instruments that agreed with the calibra:icn records. The insoector had no further questions concerning this natter.
(3) The Primary Rod Position Indication (individual rod indication) display en the main control board indicated that several rods were lower than the actual positions established through cross checks between visicorder calibration data and the Secondary Rod Position Indication (group indication). The follcuing data was gathered from the main control board indicators on Februar 23: . Individual Group (Ac tua l) Indication Indication Errer Control Rod (Inches Yithdrawn) (Inches Withdrat.ni ( ' n <r. t ;
75 80 2/8 5 2/5
84 88 1/3 4 1/3
75 88 1/8 13 1/5
72 88 1/8 16 1/3
84 88 1/8 4 1/3
81 88 1/8 7 1/3 This lack of accuracy in the individual rod position indication system is contrary to the staterent in Section 213 of the Final Hazards Suammary Report which states that "...the accuracy is sufficient for power plant operation, and is within #3 in."
The inspector noted that this same statenent had been incorporated into the licencee's proposed FSAR. This iten is considered to be a Deviation and a response from the licensee addressing this natter is required.
(Refer to Detail 7) . (4) The inspector observed that tne spring hangers on the pressuricer surge line and the rigid hangers on the ?afety injection ring header had not been ad]usted"si*n~ce the last site visit by the ~~ * , inspector. The licensee stated that he had recently issued a
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, . -13-procedure concerning this natter and the work vas to be done soon.
The inspector reviewed a copy of procedure OP-5107, " Inspection and Adjustment of ?ipe I! angers " issued on 2/4/75 and had no further questions on this iten at this time.
The concern docu-nented in IE Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 4.c.(S), recains unresolved pending completion of hanger adjustnents.
Abnormal Cccurrences The inspector noted that no abnormal occurrences had been reported to II:: since the date of IE:I inpsection 50-29/74-16.
The inspector examined the following records to deternine if the related events were reportable as abnormal occurrences or unusual events in accordance with Technical Specification E.2: Systen Records Exactned Description of 'faintenance Charging and MR 74-596 Repaired crack in 51 charging Volume Control JO 74-206 pump suction strainer weld.
Weld Data Sheet LP Inspection Report QA Inspection Record , Stean Generator MR 74-515 Repaired low level Level Control J0 74-135 alarm on #3 steam generatar.
0?-4604 OP-6264 The inspector agreed that the events were not reportable as abnormal occurrences or unusual events and had no further questions concerning this~ natter.
5.
In-Plant Audit Pro:ran The inspector reviewed the status of the In-Plant Audit Progran and noted that the yearly cycle of the audit progran that was due for completion on 5/75 was completed in 12/74. This was accomplished by the licensee in order to convert from a cycle beginning and ending in May to a calendar year cycle.
The inspector revieved a draft of procedure 00A-119, "In-Plant Audit P ro gran. " The procedure as reviewed would resolve the concerns documented in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 5.b. (3). This iten recains unresolved pending licensee issuance of final procedure.
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i-14- , 6.
Control Rod Surveillance Program Reference: (1) NRR letter to licensee dated February 19, 1975 (2) Licensee letter to N3R dated Febr.ary 14, 1975 (3) NRR letter to licensee dated January 22, 1975 (4) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Det.il 6 (5) Licensee letter to Direc*arate of Licensing dated September 4, 1974.
(6) Licensee letter to Division of Reactor Licensing dated August 27, 1964.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation authorized in reference (1) a temporary 4 week extension of the current 12 week surveillance interval for control rod drop testing.
The next control rod drop test must be performed not later than March 22, 1975. The concern docunented in reference (4) is. resolved.
7.
Control Red Banking Reference: IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 7 The inspection reviewed data from control rod position chacks made on 12/26/74, 1/9/75, 1/23/75, and 2/6/75. These checks are nornally made
- every six weeks to provide a periodic pregram to insure proper control rod banking. The checks were conducted bi-veekly for a period to determine why rods 9,10,16, 22, and 24 were being found out of bank i
(lower) by about tuo inches.
The results of the latest surveillance tests mentioned above have re-inforced the licensee's opinion that the rods are not slipping in.
The problem is believed by the licensee to be that the subject rods cannot be moved with the remainder of the rods in the banks beyond 87 3/8."
It has not been determined why certain rods cannot be moved beyond 87 3/8" and this will be the subject of a licensee investigation during the next refueling shutdown.
As stated in the IE:I Insoection Report 50-29/74 16, Detail 7, the licensee has evaluated the safety aspects of this.roblem and believes that safety of plant operations has not been reduced. The Plant Operations Review Co=nittee (PORC) reviewed the banking problem in Meeting 75-8 on February 4 The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter at this tine.
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, . -15- . 8.
Increase in Core and Loon AT's Reference: (1) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail ' (2) IE:I Insoection Report 50-29/74-02, Detail 18 (3) Licensee's Semi-annual Operating Report for the period July 1, 1973, to Decenbar 31, 1973 The PORC has revie ed the increase in cora and icop 2T's that has been attributed by the licensee to scatter of tencerature data.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this natter at this time.
9.
Main Coolant Punn and Check Valve Renairs Reference: (1) IE:I Inspection Repert 50-29/74-16, Detail 8 (2) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/7t-14, Details 2.c. (2) and 2.c. (3) (3) Licensee letter to IE:I dated December 9, 1974.
The inspector verified that the licensee has drafted revisions to procedures 0P-5200, " Main Coolant Check Valve Repair," and OP-3204 " Main Coolant Pump Inspection and Repairs"; however, since this action is incomplete these itens rc ain unresolved.
10. ' t.Iiornance Discharce Tests of Station B :t t2rtes The inspector reviewed procedure AP-3000, nev. 1., "'taintenance Departnent Surveillance Schedule," and determined that the licensee plans to conduct station battery capacity tests every 3 years.
The concern identified in IE:I Inspection Reports 50-29/74 -06, Detail 5, and 50-29/74-14, Detail 19, dealing with the subject tests is resolved.
11.
Availability of Batterr Char 2er lhe inspector reviewed a dcaft of Plant Design Change Request 74-14 which provides for a modification of : o.1 and 2 battery charger circuits that includes adding an alare circuit to give an alarn in the Control Roc whenever the charger fuses open.
The provisions of PDCR 74-14 resolves the concern documented in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/73-04, Detail ll.d.
12.
Polar Crane Control Circuit Failure The licensee has decided to nodify the polar _ crane control circuit by providing a redundant and diverse upper limit interlock.
The licensee is in the m. cess of ordering parts for the nodification an' will probably make the modification during the next re fueling si utdown.
This concern identified in IETI Inspection "eport 50-29/74-06, Detail , 16.b., remains unresolved.
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16- - 13.
Control Rod Vorth Discrepancies Reference: (1) Licensee letter to 11 dated Jaauary 31, 1975 (2) Licensee letter to IE:I dated Septenber 18, 1974.
The inspector reviewed reference (1) fu which the licensee concluded that operation at full power to end-of-life of Core XI with the measured rod worths is covered by the safety analvsis conducted usin; calculated rod worths. The inspector had no further questions con-cerning this matter.
14.
Operatine ?!emos Reference: (1) Licensee letter to IE:1 dated February 12, 1975 (2) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29'75-01, Detail 2 (3) IE:I Inspection Report 50-2r/74-16, Detail 10 The inspector reviewed the licensee's effort in elininating all safety-related Operating '!enos by cancelling the memos or incorpor-ating then into new or existing plant procedures.
The licensee had cor.pleted this action before the '! arch 15, 1975. date established in reference (1). This natter is resolved.
, 15. *Floodin: Effects of Failures of Non-Safetv 2 elated Ecutanent The inspector reviewed the temporary protective measures which *: era initiatet by the licensee to protect vital areas from flooding in the event of a failure of non-safety related equipnent.
The licensee's action was as stated in his letter to the 57C dated January 20, 1975 (UYR 75-9). The inspector had no further questions concerning this natter at this time.
16.
Safety Iniection Actuation Signal Surveillance The inspector reviewed surveillance data for the two containment air pressure switches that initiate a Safety Injection Actuatioc. Signal.
The inspector noted that the monthly operational checks of the switches were not made during January as required by FHSR Section 509 and Technical Specification D.2.1.
The licensee provided the inspector with information that indicated the licensee had previously discovered this missed surveillance test and had taken appronriate corrective action to prevent recurrence. This Iten of Nonconpliance identified - by the licensee is considered to be a Deficiency.
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? . - -17-17.
Use of the Term "'!/A" The licensac provided information that indicated the licensee is presently considering all "N/A" entries in procedures as changes to approved procedures. The "N/A" entries are being approved by two Senior licensed individuals and the PORC.
The concern docu-mented in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/71-16, Detail 13.b.(4), is resolved.
10.
Failure to Renort an Abnornal Occurrence Reference: (1) Licensee letter to IE:I dated February 7,1975 (2) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b. (2) The licensee's corrective action as stated in reference (1) is acceptable. This itens is resolved.
19.
Correlation Data " Flow vs. '!CP Current Reference: (1) Licensee letter to NRC dated February 19, 1975 (2) NRR letter to licensee dated January 30, 1975 (3) Licensee letter to NRC dated January 31, 1975 (4) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b.(2) , The inspector stated that he had reviewed the referenced caterial and could not deternine from the data if the main coolant pump lei current set points were equivalent to a flow of no less th1n 80% of normal main coolant flow. The licensee stated that this problen had been referrud to Westborough for resolutien and that Westborough would resolve the issue with ';RR.
This item identified in reference (4) remains unresolved.
20.
Inspection of ECCS Circuit 3reakers The licensee had draf ted a revision of procedure OP-4506, " Inspection of ECCS Circuit Breakers," to resolve the concerns identified in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b (8). This iten remains unresolved pending issuance of the final procedure.
21.
Emergency Pcwer Under Voltage Relavs The licensee stated that verification testing of under voltage relay setpoints had been incorporated into the preventive maintenance program and would be perferned during the next refueling outage.
The concern documented in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13. b. (9 ), is resolved.
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. i - - . -18-22.
Procure ent :an t rol The licensee stated that Guideline No, 1 is still under revision and an approved vendors list is being conpiled. The revision effort should nahe Guideline No. 1 consistent with procedure AP-0211 in the area of vendors lists. This iten identified in IE:I Inspection ?.eport 50 29/74-16, Detail 14.b., renains unresolved.
23.
Fire Proof Files The licensee has received some additional fireproof files to be used for the storage of plant quality assurance records. This Iten of Noncompliance identified in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/ 74-16, Detail 15.b. (2), remains unresolved pending filing of QA records in these files.
24.
Unaporoved Chances to Procedures Reference: (1) Licensee letter to IE:I dated February 7,1975 (2) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Details 13.b.(3), 15.b. (3), and 16.b. (3) The licensee's corrective action described in reference (1) is ' acceptable. This iten is resolved.
25.
Plant Drrein;s References: (1) IE:I letter to licensee dated February 25, 1975 (2) Licensee letter to IE:I dated February 7,1975 (3) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 16.b. (7) , The liccasee's corrective action described in referenes (1) is . ceptable. Procedure AP-0225 " Plant Drawings", was issued for use on February 20, 1975. This iten is resolved.
26.
Control cf Revisions to Plant Drawines and Procedures The licensee has revised procedure AP-0222, " Job Orders", to assure effective control over the identificatica and revision of drauings and procedures affected by design changes. The concerns identified in IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Details 16.b.(6), 16.b.(7), and 16.c., are resolved.
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- < -19- . 27.
Test Equirnent Requirinc Outside Calibration Reference: (1) IE:I letter to licensee dated February 25, 1975 (2) Licensee letter to IE:I dated Fet. uary 7,1975 (3) IE:I Inspection Report 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b. (6) The licensee's corrective action described in reference (1) is acceptable. This iten remains unresolved pending revision of procedure AP-0215.
28.
Recalibration of Safety Classified Syste, Instr;nentation The licensee stated that when nessuring and test equipment used to perfora calibrations en a safety classified system is found out of tolerance and the out of tolerance condition resulted in a less conseceative safety systen calibration, the Plant Super-intendent *ill review and approve action on the natter.
The concern doeurented in IE:I Inspection ?,eport 50-29/74-16, Detail 13.b.(6), renains unresolved pending revision of procedure AP-6002 to incorporate the Plant Superintendent involvenent.
29.
Adninistration The inspector revicered the licensee's nethod for handling the review Itens of :!oncompliance identified by NRC inspectors and the nethod for processing propcsed tests and experinents. Plant personnel were congizant of requirnents and their responsibilities in these areas. The inspector had no further questions concerning this natter.
30.
Status of Proposed Chance 112 The licensee expessed concern over the NRC delay in reviewing and approving Proposed Change 112 to the Technical Specifications which was subnitted by the licensee on January 3, 1974. This change included plant Technical Specifications in a fornat outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.70.
To aid in the NRC reviev and approval of this change the licensee also provided the Final Hazards Sunnary Report rewritten in FSAR fornat.
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,
l . i , -20-The licensee subnitted a letter to NRC on October 21, 1974, requesting that a progran be established to exped' ~ _ the review of this proposed change. The basis.for this request that approval of the change would substantially assist both the staf f and the ' nC in providing the necessary guidelines to prevent dif ficulties currently encountered with the present Technical Specifications and Fysn.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's re arks and stated that RL had established a schedule for review and approval of the change. The expected completion date is September 1975.
31.
?!ethod of Handline Licensee Audit Findines The inspector informed the licensee that all licensee findings identi-fied by the licansee as Items of Noncompliance would be documented in IE It.spection reports as Items of Noncompliance. The inspector stated that a Notice of Violation would not be issued for such items unless the itens were Violacions or the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions.
The licensee expressed concern over the fact that he would be penalized for an ef fective program (i.e., the more Itens of Noncompliance he discovers and properly resolves the worse his progran appears). The
- licensee also indicated that there was no negulatory requirement for his r, document his findings as Items of Nencompliance. The inspector acknas leged the licensee's cennents.
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