ENS 50210
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
19:45 Jun 18, 2014 | |
| Title | Loss of Hpci Room Cooling |
| Event Description | At 1545 [EDT], while testing of the Emergency Service Water system (ST-8Q) was being performed at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF), two of five unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) in the East Crescent were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent Area were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from the areas, in the event that ECCS and RCIC were used to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The West Crescent Area Ventilation Subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. However, this condition could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of HPCI and it is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). As part of the testing, the throttle valves to the unit coolers (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were cycled and normal flow was restored. This condition no longer exists. The licensee is investigating the loss of flow to the "H" and "K" unit coolers and the restoration of flow by cycling the unit cooler supply throttle valves. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
FitzPatrick is retracting EN # 50210 made on June 18, 2014 at 2120 EDT. The plant was at 86% power at the time. The ENS notification was an 8-Hr non-emergency notification to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) when it was discovered that two of five unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22H and 66UC-22K) were found with indicated flow of 0 gpm while testing. The other three unit coolers in the East Crescent (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, 66UC-22F) were found with sufficient flow. At least four unit coolers are required to support the functionality of the East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem (TRO 3.7.C). The East and West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystems support the Operability of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system by removing heat from these areas in the event that ECCS and RCIC are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. As part of testing, throttle valves to unit coolers 66UC-22H and 66UC-22K were cycled and normal flow was restored. The West Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem remained functional. The accident mitigating function of the division of the ECCS and RCIC located in the West Crescent Area were unaffected by this condition. Initial review of this condition determined that it could have prevented the function of one division of the ECCS, including the single train of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), located in the East Crescent. Therefore, this condition was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the Safety function of HPCI. This EN# 50210 is being retracted based upon a subsequent engineering analysis that determined that there is reasonable assurance that the three unit coolers with sufficient flow (66UC-22B, 66UC-22D, and 66UC-22F) would have been capable of removing accident heat loads as a function of time to maintain East Crescent area temperatures at a value which ensures operability of supported equipment. The analysis considered unit cooler heat transfer capability at the modified design condition flow of 22 gpm for historically observed lake temperatures and for flow at tested conditions. Additional margin in flow at the tested condition provided increased heat removal capability and provided added assurance that accident heat load would have been removed. The East Crescent Area Ventilation subsystem was, therefore, functional with three unit coolers (functionality never was lost) and the supported ECCS remained Operable. The Operability determination for the condition has subsequently been revised based upon the engineering analysis, to state the condition was not immediately reportable per 10 CFR 50.72. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector Notified R1DO (Kennedy) |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Fitzpatrick  New York (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.58 h0.0658 days <br />0.0094 weeks <br />0.00216 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Henk Verwey 21:20 Jun 18, 2014 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | Aug 13, 2014 |
| 50210 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (86 %) |
| After | Power Operation (86 %) |
FitzPatrick with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 571202024-05-09T20:29:0009 May 2024 20:29:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable ENS 558712022-04-29T16:51:00029 April 2022 16:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inoperable ENS 555932021-11-18T22:02:00018 November 2021 22:02:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable Due to Isolation Valve Failure to Automatically Open ENS 546572020-04-10T07:00:00010 April 2020 07:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 526642017-04-04T11:35:0004 April 2017 11:35:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Inadvertently Isolated During Conduct of Maintenance Surveillance ENS 516132015-12-18T22:22:00018 December 2015 22:22:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Trains of Containment Atmosphere Dilution System Inoperable ENS 509792015-04-12T22:00:00012 April 2015 22:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Temporary Loss of Control Room Envelope Boundary ENS 505322014-10-13T23:35:00013 October 2014 23:35:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Injection Degraded Accident Mitigation Capability ENS 502102014-06-18T19:45:00018 June 2014 19:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Hpci Room Cooling ENS 496602013-12-18T20:00:00018 December 2013 20:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Safety Function for the Hpci Suction Automatic Low Cst Level Swap Over Inoperable ENS 484102012-10-16T11:00:00016 October 2012 11:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Shutdown Cooling Isolation Capability Lost ENS 482702012-09-03T06:25:0003 September 2012 06:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Erroneous Indication on Flow Indicating Controller ENS 482582012-08-30T16:15:00030 August 2012 16:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Failed Pressure Control Valve ENS 463552010-10-23T04:45:00023 October 2010 04:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable Due to Power Supply Failure ENS 450082009-04-22T15:21:00022 April 2009 15:21:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 429642006-11-04T23:10:0004 November 2006 23:10:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable 2024-05-09T20:29:00 | |