ENS 42109
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
05:00 Nov 2, 2005 | |
| Title | Tech Spec Required Shutdown Due to Degradation of Containment Coatings |
| Event Description | On November 2, 2005 at approximately 00:00 Central Standard Time (CST), Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
During a review of the containment coatings in both Unit 1 & 2 containments, it was discovered that the containments have not been maintained with the analysis of record performed by Sergeant and Lundy (S&L). The S&L analysis performed for Unit 2 was based on the known condition of coatings when the analysis was performed. There was no explicit margin for further degradation. Subsequent discoveries of degraded or unqualified coatings cannot be accommodated by the existing analysis as written. An Operability Recommendation (OPR) was performed for Unit 2 and approved on 10/30/05 at 2000. Following this OPR, a further review of containment coatings in the Unit 2 containment was performed and showed a potential for approximately 11 square feet of unqualified coatings [in] the Zone of Influence (ZOI) for the containment sump. The OPR allowed for a maximum of 5.68 square feet of loose material in the ZOI. A Unit 2 containment walk-down was performed on the evening of November 1, 2005. This revealed that the unqualified coatings in the ZOI were approximately 11 square feet. This information placed Unit 2 in an unanalyzed condition, which lead the operators to enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 2300 on November 1 due to both trains of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) being declared inoperable for sump recirculation capability. Actions are currently underway to remove enough unqualified coatings to be within the assumptions made in the OPR and restore Containment Sump recirculation capability. When this is completed, the technical specification shutdown will be terminated, and Unit 2 will make preparations to return to full power. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 and ECCS is not required. However, the condition is also applicable to Unit 1 containment. Actions have been underway since the identification of the original issue to remove unqualified containment coatings. The Plant Manager has placed a hold on entering Mode 4 on Unit 1 pending completion of corrective actions. Presently there are 2 workers and a Radiation Protection technician inside containment. The licensee said that workers will go inside containment and remove the degraded coating. This will take approximately 45 minutes and have a total exposure to personnel of 85 millirem. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 01:06 CST the licensee exited from Technical Specification 3.0.3. requirements and plans to hold power on Unit 2 at 97% power pending further assessment and evaluation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Kozak).
On November 2, 2005, at 01:13 [ET] PBNP submitted Emergency Notification #42109, to report a TS required shutdown due to potential of an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and an event or condition that potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The condition related to the discovery of degraded containment coatings in the zone of influence (ZOI) for the containment sump. A subsequent evaluation concluded that the degraded coatings would not have significantly affected sump recirculation flow capability. Additionally, the zone of influence was identified to be approximately one-third that assumed for the design-basis calculation. Based on the conservatism in the sump blockage analysis, the degraded coatings in the Unit 2 containment within the original ZOI did not affect the conclusion that equipment needed for accident mitigation would have operated as designed. Therefore, the Emergency Notification made on November 2, 2005, documenting that this condition created the potential of an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, is retracted. The Technical Specification required shutdown is also retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (H. Peterson). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Point Beach  Wisconsin (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-3.78 h-0.158 days <br />-0.0225 weeks <br />-0.00518 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Charles Stalzer 01:13 Nov 2, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | John Knoke |
| Last Updated: | Dec 21, 2005 |
| 42109 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Not Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
| After | Cold Shutdown (0 %) |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (99 %) |
Point Beach with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 532392018-03-01T22:43:0001 March 2018 22:43:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities ENS 529762017-09-18T22:24:00018 September 2017 22:24:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Control Room Envelope Not Maintained ENS 507402015-01-15T23:04:00015 January 2015 23:04:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Inadequately Sealed Piping Penetrations and Postulated Flooding Event ENS 503962014-08-24T05:00:00024 August 2014 05:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Out of Service ENS 502622014-07-08T05:24:0008 July 2014 05:24:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Unit 2 Spray Addition Declared Inoperable Due to Tank Indication Greater than 67% ENS 489212013-04-14T11:20:00014 April 2013 11:20:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Containment Spray Chemical Addition Flow Path Isolated ENS 484022012-10-12T09:20:00012 October 2012 09:20:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Reactor Power Exceeded Fsar Analyzed Value ENS 466462011-02-28T03:59:00028 February 2011 03:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Degraded Accident Mitigation Due to Safety Injection Out of Service ENS 464752010-12-13T18:10:00013 December 2010 18:10:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Not Meeting Rod Group Allignment Limits ENS 443512008-07-16T20:16:00016 July 2008 20:16:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Fire Propagation Between Rooms Could Affect Appendix R Safe Shutdown ENS 439072008-01-15T20:15:00015 January 2008 20:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release, 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Unusual Event - Loss of Offsite Power ENS 437502007-10-26T00:30:00026 October 2007 00:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Systems Out of Service ENS 436492007-09-18T13:43:00018 September 2007 13:43:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Refueling Water Storage Tank Temperature Above Operating Limits ENS 434872007-07-12T15:15:00012 July 2007 15:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Fire Inspection Analysis of Pressurizer Porvs and Block Valves ENS 434242007-06-14T23:19:00014 June 2007 23:19:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Tech Spec. Required Shutdown Due to 72 Hour Completion Time Not Met ENS 433532007-05-09T21:23:0009 May 2007 21:23:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Due to Identified Non Compliant Fire Protection Manual Operator Actions ENS 431492007-02-06T20:15:0006 February 2007 20:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Control Room Emergency Filtration System Declared Inoperable ENS 430402006-12-09T00:12:0009 December 2006 00:12:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Crefs System Inoperable ENS 426112006-05-30T14:23:00030 May 2006 14:23:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Control Room Emergency Filtration System Inoperable ENS 421292005-11-08T14:44:0008 November 2005 14:44:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Design Basis for Long Term Cooling Not Correctly Modeled ENS 421092005-11-02T05:00:0002 November 2005 05:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Tech Spec Required Shutdown Due to Degradation of Containment Coatings ENS 420202005-09-27T15:00:00027 September 2005 15:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Postulated Faults Have Electrical Current in Excess of the Maximum Listed Interrupting Ratings. ENS 418852005-08-02T01:00:0002 August 2005 01:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Potentially Inoperable Safety Injection Pumps ENS 418562005-07-20T09:51:00020 July 2005 09:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Minimum Recirculation Valves Will Not Automatically Open in Local Operating Mode ENS 417582005-06-08T22:24:0008 June 2005 22:24:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Fire Organizational Plan No Longer Aligned with Safe Shutdown Analysis ENS 417542005-06-07T23:00:0007 June 2005 23:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Appendix R Safe Shutdown Strategy Deficiency ENS 414472005-02-27T17:58:00027 February 2005 17:58:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Loss of Dc Battery Chargers ENS 412122004-11-19T22:22:00019 November 2004 22:22:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to a Steam Leak on an Instrument Isolation Valve Inside Containment ENS 406262004-03-30T18:15:00030 March 2004 18:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Safety Injection Accumulator Level Greater than Allowed by Technical Specification 2018-03-01T22:43:00 | |