CNL-24-013, Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Report
| ML24074A001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/2024 |
| From: | Hulvey K Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| CNL-24-013 ANP-4067, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML24074A001 (1) | |
Text
1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 CNL-24-013 March 14, 2024 10 CFR 50.4 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 NRC Docket No. 50-296
Subject:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Report
Reference:
TVA letter to NRC, CNL-21-053, "Request for License Amendment Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564 Revision 2 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3, in Support of ATRIUM 11 Fuel Use at Browns Ferry (TS-535)," dated July 23, 2021 (ML21204A128)
In the reference letter, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted a request for Technical Specification (TS) amendments for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1, 2, and 3.
The proposed license amendments, in part, revised TS 5.6.5.b, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR), to allow application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies for determining core operating limits in support of loading Framatome fuel type ATRIUM' 1 11.
In Attachment 4 to the reference letter, in part, TVA committed to submit the BFN Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Report (i.e., ANP-4067) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for information only, prior to startup from the BFN Unit 3 Cycle 21 refueling outage. This report was approved by TVA on January 23, 2024, and is included in the enclosure to this letter.
1 ATRIUM is a trademark or registered trademarks of Framatome, Inc., its affiliates and/or its subsidiaries in the United States of America and may be registered in other countries throughout the world. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use is strictly prohibited.
Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CNL-24-013 Page 2 March 14, 2024 There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this submittal. Please address any questions regarding this submittal to Stuart L. Rymer, Senior Manager, Fleet Licensing, at slrymer@tva.gov.
Respectfully, Kimberly D. Hulvey Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
Enclosure:
ANP-4067, "Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis," Revision 0, Framatome, November 2023 cc (Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Digitally signed by Edmondson, Carla Date: 2024.03.14 06:37:00 -04'00'
Enclosure CNL-24-013 ANP-4067, Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis, Revision 0, Framatome, November 2023
0414-12-F04 (Rev. 004, 04/27/2020)
Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis ANP-4067 Revision 0 November 2023
© 2023 Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Copyright © 2023 Framatome Inc.
All Rights Reserved ATRIUM is a trademark or registered trademark of Framatome or its affiliates, in the USA or other countries.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page i Nature of Changes Item Section(s) or Page(s)
Description and Justification 1.
All This is the initial release.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page ii Contents INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 1-1 DISPOSITION OF EVENTS AND PLANT MODELING SENSITIVITIES................................................................................................. 2-1 Disposition of Events for ATRIUM 11 Fuel Introduction.......................... 2-1 Plant Specific Modeling Sensitivities....................................................... 2-1 Inadvertent Startup of the HPCI Pump Modeling Considerations........................................................................................ 2-2 MECHANICAL DESIGN ANALYSIS.................................................................. 3-1 THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN ANALYSIS.................................................. 4-1 Thermal-Hydraulic Design and Compatibility.......................................... 4-1 Safety Limit MCPR Analysis................................................................... 4-1 Core Hydrodynamic Stability................................................................... 4-2 Voiding in the Channel Bypass Region................................................... 4-3 ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES........................................... 5-1 System Transients.................................................................................. 5-2 Load Rejection No Bypass (LRNB).............................................. 5-4 Turbine Trip No Bypass (TTNB)................................................... 5-4 Feedwater Controller Failure (FWCF).......................................... 5-5 Loss of Feedwater Heating.......................................................... 5-6 Control Rod Withdrawal Error...................................................... 5-6 Inadvertent HPCI Pump Start....................................................... 5-7 Two Loop Pump Seizure.............................................................. 5-8 Slow Flow Runup Analysis...................................................................... 5-8 Equipment Out-of-Service Scenarios...................................................... 5-9 TBVOOS.................................................................................... 5-10 FHOOS...................................................................................... 5-10 PLUOOS.................................................................................... 5-10 Combined TBVOOS and FHOOS.............................................. 5-11 Combined TBVOOS and PLUOOS............................................ 5-11 Combined FHOOS and PLUOOS.............................................. 5-11 Combined TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS............................ 5-11 Reduced Feedwater Temperature at Startup............................. 5-11 Recirculation Pump Out-of-Service............................................ 5-12 Licensing Compliance........................................................................... 5-13 Axial Exposure Ratio.................................................................. 5-13
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page iii Licensing Power Shape............................................................. 5-13 POSTULATED ACCIDENTS............................................................................. 6-1 Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA).......................................................... 6-1 Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA)........................................................ 6-1 Fuel and Equipment Handling Accident.................................................. 6-2 Fuel Loading Error (Infrequent Event).................................................... 6-2 Mislocated Fuel Bundle................................................................ 6-3 Misoriented Fuel Bundle.............................................................. 6-3 SPECIAL ANALYSES....................................................................................... 7-1 ASME Overpressurization Analysis........................................................ 7-1 ATWS Event Evaluation.......................................................................... 7-2 ATWS Overpressurization Analysis............................................. 7-2 Long-Term Evaluation.................................................................. 7-3 ATWS with Core Instability........................................................... 7-3 Standby Liquid Control System............................................................... 7-3 Fuel Criticality......................................................................................... 7-4 OPERATING LIMITS AND COLR INPUT.......................................................... 8-1 MCPR Limits........................................................................................... 8-1 LHGR Limits........................................................................................... 8-2 MAPLHGR Limits.................................................................................... 8-2 REFERENCES.................................................................................................. 9-1
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page iv Tables Table 1.1 EOD and EOOS Operating Conditions...................................................... 1-2 Table 4.1 Plant-Related Uncertainties for Safety Limit MCPR Analyses................... 4-4 Table 4.2 Results Summary for Safety Limit MCPR Analyses.................................. 4-5 Table 4.3 BSP Endpoints for Nominal Feedwater Temperature................................ 4-6 Table 4.4 BSP Endpoints for Reduced Feedwater Temperature............................... 4-6 Table 4.5 Nominal Feedwater Temperature Boundary Points................................... 4-7 Table 4.6 Reduced Feedwater Temperature Boundary Points.................................. 4-8 Table 4.7 ABSP Setpoints for the Scram Region...................................................... 4-9 Table 5.1 Exposure Basis for Transient Analysis.................................................... 5-15 Table 5.2 Scram Speed Insertion Times................................................................. 5-16 Table 5.3 Base Case Limiting Transient Event NSS Insertion Time........................ 5-17 Table 5.4 Base Case Limiting Transient Event TSSS Insertion Time...................... 5-18 Table 5.5 Loss of Feedwater Heating Transient Analysis Results........................... 5-19 Table 5.6 Control Rod Withdrawal Error CPR Results.......................................... 5-20 Table 5.7 RBM Operability Requirements............................................................... 5-20 Table 5.8 Flow-Dependent MCPR Results.............................................................. 5-21 Table 5.9 TLO and SLO Pump Seizure Results...................................................... 5-21 Table 5.10 ATRIUM 11 LHGRFACp Transient Results............................................. 5-22 Table 5.11 ATRIUM 10XM LHGRFACp Transient Results....................................... 5-23 Table 5.12 Licensing Basis Core Average Axial Power Profile................................. 5-24 Table 7.1 ASME Overpressurization Analysis Results.............................................. 7-5 Table 7.2 ATWS Overpressurization Analysis Results.............................................. 7-6 Table 8.1 TLO MCPRp Limits for OSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC..................... 8-3 Table 8.2 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC..................... 8-4 Table 8.3 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC................... 8-7 Table 8.4 TLO MCPRp Limits for OSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB............... 8-10 Table 8.5 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB............... 8-11 Table 8.6 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB............. 8-14 Table 8.7 TLO MCPRp Limits for OSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast.... 8-17 Table 8.8 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast.... 8-18
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page v Table 8.9 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast.. 8-20 Table 8.10 MCPRf Limits........................................................................................... 8-22 Table 8.11 Steady-State LHGR Limits...................................................................... 8-22 Table 8.12 LHGRFACp Multipliers............................................................................. 8-23 Table 8.13 LHGRFACf Multipliers.............................................................................. 8-24 Table 8.14 MAPLHGR Limits.................................................................................... 8-24
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page vi Figures Figure 1.1 Browns Ferry Power / Flow Map................................................................ 1-3 Figure 5.1 LRNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters....................................... 5-25 Figure 5.2 LRNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level................................ 5-26 Figure 5.3 LRNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures.................................... 5-27 Figure 5.4 TTNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters....................................... 5-28 Figure 5.5 TTNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level................................ 5-29 Figure 5.6 TTNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures................................... 5-30 Figure 5.7 FWCF at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters...................................... 5-31 Figure 5.8 FWCF at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level............................... 5-32 Figure 5.9 FWCF at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures.................................... 5-33 Figure 5.10 IHPS at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters........................................ 5-34 Figure 5.11 IHPS at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level................................. 5-35 Figure 5.12 IHPS at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures.................................... 5-36 Figure 7.1 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Key Parameters................................................................................................ 7-7 Figure 7.2 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Sensed Water Level............................................................................................... 7-8 Figure 7.3 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Vessel Pressures.................................................................................................. 7-9 Figure 7.4 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Safety /
Relief Valve Flow Rates.......................................................................... 7-10 Figure 7.5 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Key Parameters.............................................................................................. 7-11 Figure 7.6 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Sensed Water Level............................................................................................. 7-12 Figure 7.7 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Vessel Pressures................................................................................................ 7-13 Figure 7.8 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Safety /
Relief Valve Flow Rates.......................................................................... 7-14
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page vii Nomenclature ABSP automated backup stability AER axial exposure ratio AOO anticipated operational occurrence AOT abnormal operational transient APRM average power range monitor ARO all control rods out ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AST alternate source term ATWS anticipated transient without scram ATWS-I anticipated transient without scram with core instability ATWS-RPT anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip BEO-III Best Estimate Enhanced Option III BFN Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant BOC beginning-of-cycle BPWS banked position withdrawal sequence BSP backup stability protection BWR boiling water reactor CDA confirmation density algorithm CFR Code of Federal Regulations COLR core operating limits report CPR critical power ratio CRDA control rod drop accident CRWE control rod withdrawal error EFPD effective full-power days EFPH effective full-power hours EM evaluation model EOC end-of-cycle EOCLB end-of-cycle licensing basis EOC-RPT end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip EOC-RPT-OOS end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip out-of-service EOD extended operating domain EOFP end of full power EOOS equipment out-of-service EPU extended power uprate defined as 120 % original licensed thermal power FFTR final feedwater temperature reduction FHOOS feedwater heaters out-of-service FoM figure of merit FSAR final safety analysis report FW feedwater FWCF feedwater controller failure GSF generic shape function
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page viii Nomenclature (Continued)
HPCI high pressure coolant injection ICF increased core flow IHPS inadvertent HPCI pump start LFWH loss of feedwater heating LHGR linear heat generation rate LHGRFACf flow-dependent linear heat generation rate multipliers LHGRFACp power-dependent linear heat generation rate multipliers LOCA loss-of-coolant accident LPRM local power range monitor LRNB generator load rejection with no bypass MAPFAC maximum average planar multipliers MAPLHGR maximum average planar linear heat generation rate MCPR minimum critical power ratio MCPRf flow-dependent minimum critical power ratio MCPRp power-dependent minimum critical power ratio MELLLA maximum extended load line limit analysis MELLLA+
maximum extended load line limit analysis plus MSIV main steam isolation valve MSRV main steam relief valve MSRVOOS main steam relief valve out-of-service NCL natural circulation line NEOC near end-of-cycle NSS nominal scram speed NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.
OPRM oscillation power range monitor OSS optimum scram speed Pbypass power below which direct scram on TSV / TCV closure is bypassed PCT peak cladding temperature PIRT phenomena identification and ranking table PLU power load unbalance PLUOOS power load unbalance out-of-service PRFO pressure regulator failure open RBM (control) rod block monitor RCPOOS recirculation pump out-of-service RDF rated drive flow RHR residual heat removal RPT recirculation pump trip RTP rated thermal power
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page ix Nomenclature (Continued)
SE safety evaluation SLC standby liquid control SLMCPR safety limit minimum critical power ratio SLO single-loop operation SRV safety/relief valve STP simulated thermal power TBV turbine bypass valve TBVIS turbine bypass valves in service TBVOOS turbine bypass valves out-of-service TCV turbine control valve TIP traversing incore probe TIPOOS traversing incore probe out-of-service TLO two-loop operation TSSS technical specifications scram speed TSV turbine stop valve TTNB turbine trip with no bypass TVA Tennessee Valley Authority CPR change in critical power ratio MCPR change in minimum critical power ratio
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 1-1 INTRODUCTION Reload licensing analyses results generated by Framatome Inc. (Framatome) are presented in support of Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22. The analyses reported in this document were performed using methodologies approved (Reference 1) by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for application to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN). The technical limitations and conditions associated with the application of the approved methodologies have been satisfied by these analyses.
The Cycle 22 core consists of a total of 764 fuel assemblies including 328 fresh ATRIUM 11 assemblies and 436 irradiated ATRIUM 10XM assemblies. The licensing analyses support the core design presented in Reference 2 and the use of the maximum extended load line limit analysis plus (MELLLA+) operating domain.
The Cycle 22 reload licensing analyses were performed for potentially limiting events and analyses identified in Section 2.0. The results of analyses are used to establish the Technical Specifications / core operating limits report (COLR) limits and ensure design and licensing criteria are met. The design and safety analyses are based on both operational assumptions and plant parameters provided by the utility. The results of the reload licensing analyses support operation for the power / flow map presented in Figure 1.1 and also support operation with the equipment out-of-service (EOOS) scenarios presented in Table 1.1.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 1-2 Table 1.1 EOD and EOOS Operating Conditions Extended Operating Domain (EOD) Conditions Increased core flow (ICF)
Maximum extended load line limit analysis plus (MELLLA+)
Combined final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) / coastdown Equipment Out-of-Service (EOOS) Conditions*
Turbine bypass valves out-of-service (TBVOOS)
Feedwater heaters out-of-service (FHOOS)
Power load unbalance out-of-service (PLUOOS)
Combined TBVOOS and FHOOS Combined TBVOOS and PLUOOS Combined FHOOS and PLUOOS Combined TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS Recirculation pump out-of-service (RCPOOS),
Base case and each EOOS condition are supported in combination with 1 main steam relief valve out-of-service (MSRVOOS), end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip out-of-service (EOC-RPT-OOS), up to 18 traversing incore probe (TIP) channels out-of-service (TIPOOS) (per operating requirements defined in Section 4.2), and up to 50 % of the local power range monitor (LPRM) out-of-service.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
RCPOOS is the EOOS implying single loop operation (SLO). Operation in single loop is only supported up to a maximum core flow of 50 % of rated, a maximum power level of 43.75 % of rated, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 1-3 Figure 1.1 Browns Ferry Power / Flow Map
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 2-1 DISPOSITION OF EVENTS AND PLANT MODELING SENSITIVITIES Disposition of Events for ATRIUM 11 Fuel Introduction A disposition of events to identify the limiting events which need to be analyzed to support operation at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant with extended power uprate (EPU) MELLLA+
conditions was performed for the introduction of ATRIUM 11 fuel. Events and analyses identified as potentially limiting were either evaluated generically for the introduction of ATRIUM 11 fuel or are performed on a cycle-specific basis. The results of the disposition of events are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of Reference 3.
The plant parameters and fuel design developed for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 were evaluated to determine if the conclusions of the disposition of events remain applicable. The review concluded that analyses affected by the evaluation were included in the Reference 4 calculation plan and addressed as part of the reload analyses.
Plant Specific Modeling Sensitivities As part of the initial application of the AURORA-B AOO methodology to a plant, justification must be provided to ensure that conservative plant parameters are being used. This requirement is defined in Limitation and Conditions 7 and 11 of the Reference 5 safety evaluation. In particular, these limitations and conditions state:
7.
As discussed in Section 3.6 of this SE, licensees should provide justification for the key plant parameters and initial conditions selected for performing sensitivity analyses on an event-specific basis. Licensees should further justify that the input values ultimately chosen for these key plant parameters and initial conditions will result in a conservative prediction of FoMs when performing calculations according to the AURORA-B EM described in ANP-10300P.
11.
AREVA will provide justification for the uncertainties used for the highly ranked plant-specific PIRT parameters C12, R01, R02, and SL02 on a plant-specific basis, as described in Table 3.2 of this SE.
In order to comply with these requirements, sensitivity studies were performed for each of the three figures of merit that are required to license Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22: change in minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) (Table 2.3 of Reference 3), transient nodal power (Table 2.4 of Reference 3), and overpressure (Table 2.5 of Reference 3). These sensitivity studies address the key parameters required for licensing with the exception of C12 which is described below. In addition to these sensitivity studies, licensing calculations also look at a
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 2-2 wide range of core exposures and flow rates to ensure that the conservative statepoints have been analyzed.
Uncertainties associated with phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) parameters R01, R02, and SL02 were evaluated for the initial transition (Section 2.2 of Reference 3). The conclusions made from that evaluation remain applicable for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22.
In addition to these plant parameter sensitivities, the sensitivity of the transient results to initial control rod position (PIRT parameter C12) was also examined in the initial transition of ATRIUM 11 fuel at Browns Ferry (Section 2.2 of Reference 3). The process developed for the initial transition remains applicable for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22.
Limitation and Condition 16 of the Reference 5 Safety Evaluation (SE), also requires a plant specific justification. This justification is provided in Section 2.2 of Reference 3.
Inadvertent Startup of the HPCI Pump Modeling Considerations The approval of the AURORA-B methodology included a Limitation and Condition 12 related to the inadvertent HPCI pump start (IHPS) event. Section 2.3 of Reference 3 provides the necessary discussion to demonstrate compliance with this limitation.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 3-1 MECHANICAL DESIGN ANALYSIS The mechanical design analyses for ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 fuel assemblies are presented in the applicable mechanical design reports (References 6, 7, 8, and 9). The maximum exposure limits for the ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 fuel designs are:
54.0 GWd/MTU average assembly exposure (ATRIUM 10XM) 57.0 GWd/MTU average assembly exposure (ATRIUM 11) 62.0 GWd/MTU rod average exposure (full-length fuel rods)
The maximum calculated rod oxide thickness for ATRIUM 11 fuel is presented in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 of Reference 8. The maximum calculated rod oxide thickness for ATRIUM 10XM fuel is presented in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 of Reference 9. The calculated oxide thickness complies with the approved limit provided in Reference 10.
The ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 LHGR limits are presented in Section 8.0. The fuel cycle design analyses (Reference 2) have verified that the ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 fuel assemblies remain within licensed burnup limits.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-1 THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN ANALYSIS Thermal-Hydraulic Design and Compatibility The results of thermal-hydraulic characterization and compatibility analyses are presented in the thermal-hydraulic design report (Reference 11). The analysis results demonstrate that the thermal-hydraulic design and compatibility criteria are satisfied for the Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 transition core consisting of ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 fuel assemblies.
Safety Limit MCPR Analysis The safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) is defined as the minimum value of the CPR ensuring less than 0.1 % of the fuel rods are expected to experience boiling transition during normal operation or an abnormal operational transient (AOT). The SLMCPR for all fuel in the core was determined using the methodology described in Reference 12. The analysis was performed with a power distribution that conservatively represents expected reactor operation throughout the cycle.
The Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 SLMCPR analysis used the ACE/ATRIUM 10XM critical power correlation, described in Reference 13, for the ATRIUM 10XM fuel. The ACE/ATRIUM 11 critical power correlation, described in Reference 14, was applied to the ATRIUM 11 fuel assemblies.
In the Framatome methodology, the effects of channel bow on the critical power performance are accounted for in the SLMCPR analysis. Reference 12 discusses the application of a realistic channel bow model. For this cycle, the channel bow model uncertainty has been augmented for those channels experiencing fluence gradients outside the bounds of the measurement database.
The plant-related uncertainties used in the SLMCPR analysis are presented in Table 4.1. The radial power uncertainty used in the analysis includes the effects of up to 18 TIP channels out-of-service, up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service, and a 2,500 effective full-power hours (EFPH) LPRM calibration interval.
Analysis results support a two-loop operation (TLO) SLMCPR of 1.08 and a SLO SLMCPR of 1.09. Analysis results, including the SLMCPR and the percentage of rods expected to experience boiling transition, are summarized in Table 4.2.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-2 Core Hydrodynamic Stability Browns Ferry Unit 3 will implement a plant specific application of the Best-estimate Enhanced Option III (BEO-III) with the Confirmation Density Algorithm (CDA) analysis methodology as described in Reference 15. The CDA enabled through the oscillation power range monitor (OPRM) system and the backup stability protection (BSP) solution described in Reference 15 will be the stability licensing basis for Browns Ferry. Cycle-specific analyses have been performed with RAMONA5-FA modeling recirculation pump trips from limiting MELLLA+,
maximum extended load line limit analysis (MELLLA) with FHOOS and SLO statepoints. The LPRM traces for all statistical cases were analyzed with the CDA consistent with the Reference 15 methodology. The minimum required TLO and SLO stability operating limits are bounded by the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) limits provided in Section 8.1. All cases with a channel decay ratio greater than 1.0 within the 95/95 population were confirmed to meet the requirements of the Reference 15 methodology. The 95/95 statistical Tmin calculation was confirmed to be greater than 1.2 seconds for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22.
The BSP solution may be used by the plant in the event that the OPRM system is declared inoperable. Reference 16 describes two BSP options based on selected elements from three distinct constituents: BSP Manual Regions, BSP Boundary, and Automated BSP (ABSP) setpoints.
The Manual BSP region boundaries were calculated for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 using STAIF (Reference 17) for nominal and reduced feedwater temperature operation (both FFTR and FHOOS). The endpoints of the regions are defined in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 for nominal and reduced feedwater temperature, respectively. The Manual BSP region boundary endpoints are connected using the Generic Shape Function (GSF) and are provided with Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 for nominal and reduced feedwater temperature, respectively. The BSP Boundary for nominal and reduced feedwater temperature is defined by the MELLLA boundary line, per Reference 18. The ABSP Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Simulated Thermal Power (STP) setpoints associated with the ABSP Scram Region are listed in Table 4.7. These ABSP setpoints are applicable to nominal and reduced feedwater temperature operation.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-3 Voiding in the Channel Bypass Region To demonstrate compliance with the NRCs 5 % maximum bypass voiding around the LPRM requirement (see Section 5.1.1.5.1 of the Reference 19 Safety Evaluation), the bypass void level has been evaluated throughout the cycle. The maximum bypass void value at the LPRM D level and at the axial elevation equivalent to the top of the TIP tube have been confirmed to remain below this limit for the Cycle 22 design.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-4 Table 4.1 Plant-Related Uncertainties for Safety Limit MCPR Analyses Parameter Uncertainty Feedwater flow rate 1.8%
Feedwater temperature 0.8%
Core pressure 0.7%
Total core flow rate TLO SLO 2.5%
6.0%
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-5 Table 4.2 Results Summary for Safety Limit MCPR Analyses Minimum Supported SLMCPR Percentage of Rods in Boiling Transition TLO - 1.08 0.0851 SLO - 1.09 0.0550
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-6 Table 4.3 BSP Endpoints for Nominal Feedwater Temperature Endpoint Power
(%)
Flow
(%)
Definition A1 75.9 52.7 Scram Region (Region I)
Boundary Intercept on MELLLA+ Line B1 35.5 29.0 Scram Region (Region I)
Boundary Intercept on natural circulation line (NCL)
A2 66.1 52.0 Controlled Entry Region (Region II) Boundary Intercept on MELLLA Line B2 25.5 29.0 Controlled Entry Region (Region II) Boundary Intercept on NCL Table 4.4 BSP Endpoints for Reduced Feedwater Temperature Endpoint Power
(%)
Flow
(%)
Definition A1 64.9 50.5 Scram Region (Region I)
Boundary Intercept on MELLLA Line B1 29.4 29.0 Scram Region (Region I)
Boundary Intercept on NCL A2 68.3 54.9 Controlled Entry Region (Region II) Boundary Intercept on MELLLA Line B2 24.5 29.0 Controlled Entry Region (Region II) Boundary Intercept on NCL
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-7 Table 4.5 Nominal Feedwater Temperature Boundary Points Scram Region Exit Region Flow
(% rated)
Power
(% rated)
Flow
(% rated)
Power
(% rated) 52.70 75.90 52.00 66.10 51.52 71.76 50.85 61.62 50.33 67.98 49.70 57.57 49.15 64.52 48.55 53.92 47.96 61.35 47.40 50.63 46.78 58.45 46.25 47.64 45.59 55.79 45.10 44.94 44.41 53.36 43.95 42.50 43.22 51.13 42.80 40.28 42.04 49.08 41.65 38.27 40.85 47.20 40.50 36.45 39.67 45.49 39.35 34.79 38.48 43.92 38.20 33.29 37.30 42.48 37.05 31.94 36.11 41.17 35.90 30.70 34.93 39.98 34.75 29.59 33.74 38.89 33.60 28.59 32.56 37.90 32.45 27.68 31.37 37.02 31.30 26.87 30.19 36.22 30.15 26.15 29.00 35.50 29.00 25.50
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-8 Table 4.6 Reduced Feedwater Temperature Boundary Points Scram Region Exit Region Flow
(% rated)
Power
(% rated)
Flow
(% rated)
Power
(% rated) 50.50 64.90 54.90 68.30 49.43 61.22 53.61 63.33 48.35 57.86 52.31 58.87 47.28 54.79 51.02 54.86 46.20 51.99 49.72 51.26 45.13 49.43 48.43 48.01 44.05 47.09 47.13 45.09 42.98 44.95 45.84 42.46 41.90 43.00 44.54 40.08 40.83 41.20 43.25 37.93 39.75 39.56 41.95 35.99 38.68 38.07 40.66 34.23 37.60 36.70 39.36 32.65 36.53 35.45 38.07 31.21 35.45 34.31 36.77 29.92 34.38 33.27 35.48 28.76 33.30 32.33 34.18 27.71 32.23 31.48 32.89 26.77 31.15 30.71 31.59 25.92 30.08 30.02 30.30 25.17 29.00 29.40 29.00 24.50
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 4-9 Table 4.7 ABSP Setpoints for the Scram Region Parameter Symbol Setting Value (Unit)
Comments Slope for Trip mTRIP 2.00 (% RTP / % RDF)
Slope of ABSP APRM flow-biased trip linear segment.
Constant Power Line for Trip PBSP-TRIP 35.0 (% RTP)
ABSP APRM flow-biased trip setpoint power intercept.
Constant Power Line for Trip from zero Drive Flow to Flow Breakpoint value.
Constant Flow Line for Trip WBSP-TRIP 49 (% RDF)
ABSP APRM flow-biased trip setpoint drive flow intercept.
Constant Flow Line for Trip.
(see Note 1)
Flow Breakpoint WBSP-BREAK 30.0 (% RDF)
Flow Breakpoint value Note 1: WBSP-TRIP can be set to 49.0 % RDF or any higher value up to the intersection of the ABSP sloped line with the APRM flow-biased STP scram line.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-1 ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES This section describes the analyses performed to determine the power-and flow-dependent MCPR operating limits (MCPRp and MCPRf) for base case operation.
The AURORA-B methodology (Reference 5) is used with the Framatome THERMEX methodology (Reference 20) for the generation of thermal limits. AURORA-B is a comprehensive evaluation model developed for predicting the dynamic response of boiling water reactors (BWRs) during transient, postulated accident, and beyond design-basis accident scenarios. The evaluation model (EM) contains a multi-physics code system with flexibility to incorporate all the necessary elements for analysis of the full spectrum of BWR events that are postulated to affect the nuclear steam supply system of the BWR plant. Deterministic analysis principles are applied to satisfy plant operational and Technical Specification requirements through the use of conservative initial conditions and boundary conditions.
The foundation of AURORA-B AOO is built upon three computer codes, S-RELAP5, MB2-K, and RODEX4. Working together as a system, they make up the multi-physics evaluation model that provides the necessary systems, components, geometries, processes, etc. to assure adequate predictions of the relevant BWR event characteristics for its intended applications.
The three codes making up the foundation of the code system are:
S-RELAP5 - This code provides the transient thermal-hydraulic, thermal conduction, control systems, and special process capabilities (i.e. valves, jet-pumps, steam separator, critical power correlations, etc.) necessary to simulate a BWR plant.
MB2-K - This code uses advanced nodal expansion methods to solve the three-dimensional, two-group, neutron kinetics equations. The MB2-K code is consistent with the MICROBURN-B2 steady state core simulator. MB2-K receives a significant portion of its input from the steady state core simulator.
RODEX4 - A subset of routines from this code are used to evaluate the transient thermal-mechanical fuel rod (including fuel/clad gap) properties as a function of temperature, rod internal pressure, etc. The fuel rod properties are used by S-RELAP5 when solving the transient thermal conduction equations in lieu of standard S-RELAP5 material property tables.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-2 The AURORA-B AOO methodology (Reference 5) includes an evaluation of the impact of code uncertainties on Figures of Merit (FoM) (e.g. MCPR, peak pressure) using an approved process that has wide acceptance in the nuclear industry.
The ACE/ATRIUM 10XM critical power correlation (Reference 13) is used to evaluate the thermal margin for the ATRIUM 10XM fuel. The ACE/ATRIUM 11 critical power correlation (Reference 14) is used in the thermal margin evaluations for the ATRIUM 11 fuel.
System Transients The reactor plant parameters for the system transient analyses were provided by the utility.
Analyses have been performed to determine MCPRp limits protecting operation throughout the power / flow domain depicted in Figure 1.1.
At Browns Ferry, direct scram on turbine stop valve (TSV) position and turbine control valve (TCV) fast closure are bypassed at power levels less than 26 % of rated (Pbypass). Below Pbypass scram occurs when either the high pressure or high neutron flux scram setpoint is reached. MCPR limits are monitored at power levels greater than or equal to 23 % of rated, which is the lowest power analyzed for this report, consistent with Reference 21.
The limiting exposure for rated power pressurization transients is typically at end of full power (EOFP) when the control rods are fully withdrawn. To provide additional margin to the operating limits earlier in the cycle, analyses were also performed to establish operating limits at a near end-of-cycle (NEOC) core average exposure. Analyses were performed at cycle exposures prior to NEOC to ensure the operating limits provide the necessary protection. The end-of-cycle licensing basis (EOCLB) analysis was performed at EOFP + 15 effective full power days (EFPD). Analyses were also performed to support extended cycle operation with FFTR and power coastdown. The licensing basis exposures used to develop the neutronics inputs to the transient analyses are presented in Table 5.1.
All pressurization transients assumed one of the lowest setpoint main steam relief valve (MSRV) is inoperable. The basis supports operation with 1 MSRV out-of-service.
Reductions in feedwater temperature of less than 15 F from the nominal feedwater temperature and variations of +/-10 psi in dome pressure are considered base case operation not an EOOS condition. Although the base case operating condition assumes a maximum reduction of 15 F
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-3 from the nominal feedwater temperature, the Browns Ferry Operating License does not allow operation at 100 % power in the MELLLA+ domain with final feedwater temperature less than 384.5 F. Analyses were performed to determine the limiting conditions in the allowable ranges.
FFTR is used to extend rated power operation by decreasing the feedwater temperature. The amount of feedwater temperature reduction is a function of power with the maximum decrease of 70 F (55 F + 15 F bias) at rated power. Analyses were performed to support combined FFTR / Coastdown operation to the core average exposure provided in Table 5.1. The analyses were performed with the limiting feedwater and dome pressure conditions in the allowable ranges. Operation with FFTR is not allowed in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
System pressurization transient results are sensitive to scram speed assumptions. To take advantage of average scram speeds faster than those associated with the Technical Specifications requirements, scram speed-dependent MCPRp limits are provided. The analytically adjusted timing for optimum scram speed (OSS) insertion times, nominal scram speed (NSS) insertion times, and the Technical Specifications scram speed (TSSS) insertion times used in the analyses are presented in Table 5.2 compared to the surveillance testing timing. The OSS and NSS MCPRp limits can only be applied if the scram speed test results meet the required insertion times. System transient analyses were performed to establish MCPRp limits for OSS, NSS, and TSSS insertion times.
The Technical Specifications (Reference 21) allow for operation with up to 13 slow and 1 stuck control rod. One additional control rod is assumed to fail to scram. The OSS, NSS, and TSSS analyses were performed to conservatively account for the effect of the slow and stuck rods on scram reactivity. For transient events below 26% power (below Pbypass) without direct scram, the results are relatively insensitive to scram speed, and only TSSS analyses are performed.
Thermal limits are typically based on the worst MCPR from the highest core flow and lowest core flow for a given core power. Therefore, transient analyses are performed for a wide range of core flows for a given power level. This range of transient statepoints support desired thermal limit development for plant operation. If less restrictive limits are required, then more than a single power dependent limit could be developed utilizing results from intermediate flows for a given power. See Section 8 for thermal limit development discussion.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-4 Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the base case limiting transient event and results as a function of power used to generate the base case operating limits for NSS and TSSS insertion times, respectively.
Load Rejection No Bypass (LRNB)
Load rejection causes a fast closure of the TCV. The TCV closure creates a pressure compression wave traveling through the steam lines into the vessel causing a rapid pressurization. The increase in pressure causes a decrease in core voids which in turn causes a rapid increase in power. Fast closure of the TCV also causes a reactor scram and recirculation pump trip (RPT). Turbine bypass system operation, which also mitigates the consequences of the event, is not credited. The excursion of the core power due to void collapse is terminated primarily by the reactor scram and revoiding of the core.
LRNB analyses assume the power load unbalance (PLU) is inoperable for power levels less than 50 % of rated. The LRNB sequence of events is different than the standard event when the PLU is inoperable. Instead of a fast closure, the TCV close in servo mode and there is no direct scram on TCV closure. The power and pressure excursion continues until the high pressure scram occurs.
LRNB analyses were performed for a range of power / flow conditions to support generation of the thermal limits. Responses of various reactor and plant parameters during the LRNB event initiated at 100 % of rated power and 105 % of rated core flow with TSSS insertion times are shown in Figure 5.1 - Figure 5.3.
Turbine Trip No Bypass (TTNB)
A turbine trip event can be initiated as a result of several different signals. The initiating signal causes the TSV to close in order to prevent damage to the turbine. The TSV closure creates a pressure compression wave traveling through the steam lines into the vessel causing a rapid pressurization. The increase in pressure causes a decrease in core voids which in turn causes a rapid increase in power. Closure of the TSV also causes a reactor scram and an RPT which helps mitigate the pressurization effects. Turbine bypass system operation, which also mitigates the consequences of the event, is not credited. The excursion of the core power due to void collapse is terminated primarily by the reactor scram and revoiding of the core.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-5 In addition to closing the TSV, a signal is also sent to close the TCV in fast mode. The consequences of a fast closure of the TCV are very similar to those resulting from a TSV closure. The main difference is the time required to close the valves. While the TCV full stroke closure time is greater than the TSV (0.150 second compared to 0.100 second), the initial position of the TCV is dependent on the initial steam flow. At rated power and lower, the initial position of the TCV is such that the closure time is less than the TSV. However, the TCV closure characteristics are nonlinear such that the resulting core pressurization and MCPR may not always bound those of the slower TSV closure.
TTNB analyses were performed for a range of power / flow conditions to support generation of the thermal limits. Responses of various reactor and plant parameters during the TTNB event initiated at 100 % of rated power and 105 % of rated core flow with TSSS insertion times are shown in Figure 5.4 - Figure 5.6.
Feedwater Controller Failure (FWCF)
The increase in feedwater flow due to a failure of the feedwater control system to maximum demand results in an increase in the water level and a decrease in the coolant temperature at the core inlet. The increase in core inlet subcooling causes an increase in core power. As the feedwater flow continues at maximum demand, the water level continues to rise and eventually reaches the high water level trip setpoint. The initial water level is conservatively assumed to be at the low level normal operating range to delay the high-level trip and maximize the core inlet subcooling resulting from the FWCF. The high water level trip causes the TSV to close in order to prevent damage to the turbine from excessive liquid inventory in the steam line. Valve closure creates a pressure compression wave traveling back to the core causing void collapse and a subsequent rapid power excursion. The closure of the TSV also initiates a reactor scram and an RPT. In addition to the TSV closure, the TCV also close in the fast closure mode. Because of the partially closed initial position of the control valves, they will typically close faster than the stop valves and control the pressurization portion of the event. However, TCV closure characteristics are nonlinear such that the resulting core pressurization and MCPR results may not always bound those of the slower TSV closure at rated power (steam flow increases above rated before fast TCV closure). The limiting of TCV or TSV closure, for the initial operating conditions, was used in the FWCF analyses based on sensitivity analyses. The turbine bypass valves (TBV) are assumed operable and provide some pressure relief. The core power
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-6 excursion is mitigated in part by pressure relief; however, the primary mechanisms for termination of the event are reactor scram and revoiding of the core.
FWCF analyses were performed for a range of power / flow conditions to support generation of the thermal limits. Analyses performed at power levels greater than or equal to 65 % assume a maximum feedwater runout of 22.79 Mlbm/hr. For power levels equal to above Pbypass (26 %
power) up to 65 %, analyses assumed a maximum feedwater runout of 19.82 Mlbm/hr. For power levels below Pbypass, a maximum feedwater runout of 16.68 Mlbm/hr was assumed. A discussion of this input is provided in Comment 24 of Reference 22.
Figure 5.7 - Figure 5.9 show the responses of various reactor and plant parameters during the FWCF event initiated at 100 % of rated power and 105 % of rated core flow with TSSS insertion times.
Loss of Feedwater Heating The loss of feedwater heating (LFWH) event analysis supports an assumed 100 F decrease in the feedwater temperature. The result is an increase in core inlet subcooling which reduces voids thereby increasing core power and shifting the axial power distribution towards the bottom of the core. As a result of the axial power shift and increased core power, voids begin to build up in the bottom region of the core acting as negative feedback to the increased subcooling effect.
The negative feedback moderates the core power increase. Although there is a substantial increase in core thermal power during the event, the increase in steam flow is much less because a large part of the added power is used to overcome the increase in inlet subcooling.
The increase in steam flow is accommodated by the pressure control system via the TCV or TBV, so no pressurization occurs. A cycle-specific analysis was performed in accordance with the Reference 23 methodology to determine the change in MCPR for the event. The LFWH results are presented in Table 5.5.
Control Rod Withdrawal Error The control rod withdrawal error (CRWE) transient is an inadvertent reactor operator initiated withdrawal of a control rod. This withdrawal increases local power and core thermal power which lowers the core MCPR. The CRWE transient is typically terminated by control rod blocks initiated by the rod block monitor (RBM). The CRWE event was analyzed assuming no Xenon and allowing credible instrumentation out-of-service in the RBM system. The analysis further
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-7 assumes the plant could be operating in either an A or B sequence control rod pattern. The rated power CRWE results are shown in Table 5.6 for the analytical unfiltered RBM high power setpoint values of 107 % to 117 %. Analysis results indicate standard filtered RBM setpoint reductions are supported. Analyses demonstrate the 1 % strain and centerline melt criteria are met. Linear heat generation rate (LHGR) limits and associated multipliers are presented in Section 8.2. Recommended operability requirements supporting unblocked CRWE operation are shown in Table 5.7 based on the SLMCPR values presented in Section 4.2.
Inadvertent HPCI Pump Start The inadvertent startup of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system results in the injection of cold water to the reactor vessel from the HPCI pump through the feedwater sparger.
Injection of this subcooled water increases the subcooling at the inlet to the core and results in an increase in the core power. The feedwater control system will attempt to control the water level in the reactor by reducing the feedwater flow. As long as the mass of steam leaving the reactor through the steam lines is more than the mass of HPCI water being injected, the water level will be controlled and a new steady-state condition will be established. In the scenario when HPCI flow becomes more than the steam flow, water level can increase until the HPCI pump trip is reached, thereby shutting of HPCI flow. In this case, a L8 trip is avoided.
The HPCI flow in the Browns Ferry units is only injected into one of the two feedwater lines and thus through the feedwater sparger on only one side of the reactor vessel, resulting in an asymmetric flow distribution of the injected HPCI flow. This asymmetric injection of the HPCI flow may cause an asymmetric core inlet enthalpy distribution and a larger enthalpy decrease for part of the core. A conservative mixing fraction was used to account for the asymmetric injection of the HPCI flow (Section 2.3 of Reference 3).
The IHPS analyses were performed for a range of power and flow conditions to support generation of the base case operating limits for realistic and maximum allowable average scram insertion times. Figure 5.10 - Figure 5.12 present the responses of various reactor and plant parameters for IHPS transient initiated at rated core power.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-8 Two Loop Pump Seizure Final safety analysis report (FSAR) Section 14.5.6.4 addresses the one recirculation pump seizure event in two-loop operation. The event assumes an instantaneous seizure of one of the recirculation pump motor shafts. Flow through the affected loop is rapidly reduced due to the large hydraulic resistance introduced by the stopped rotor. This causes the core thermal power to decrease and reactor water level to swell. The sudden decrease in core coolant flow while the reactor is at power results in a degradation of core heat transfer to cause fuel damage.
The two-loop pump seizure analysis was performed for rated power and increased core flow to support generation of the base case operating limits for realistic and maximum allowable average scram insertion times. The results for the TLO pump seizure event are provided in Table 5.9. A comparison to the limiting MCPRs provided in Table 5.3 demonstrate TLO pump seizure is a non-limiting transient.
Slow Flow Runup Analysis Flow-dependent MCPR limits (MCPRf) and LHGR multipliers (LHGRFACf) are established to support operation at off-rated core flow conditions. Limits are based on the critical power ratio (CPR) and heat flux changes experienced by the fuel during slow flow excursions. The slow flow excursion event assumes recirculation flow control system failure such that core flow increases slowly to the maximum flow physically attainable by the equipment (107 % of rated core flow).
An uncontrolled increase in flow creates the potential for a significant increase in core power and heat flux. A conservatively steep flow runup path was used in the analysis. Evaluations were performed to support operation in all the EOOS scenarios.
A steady-state hydraulic model, using bounding statepoint assumptions, is used to calculate the change in CPR during a two-loop flow runup to the maximum flow rate. The MCPRf limit is set so an increase in core power, resulting from the maximum increase in core flow, assures the TLO SLMCPR is not violated. Calculations were performed over a range of initial flow rates to determine the corresponding MCPR values causing the limiting assembly to be at the SLMCPR for the high flow condition at the end of the flow excursion.
Analysis results are presented in Table 5.8. MCPRf limits providing the required protection are presented in Table 8.10. MCPRf limits are applicable for all exposures.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-9 Flow runup analyses were performed to determine LHGRFACf multipliers. The analysis assumes recirculation flow increases slowly along the limiting rod line to the maximum flow physically attainable by the equipment. A series of flow excursion analyses were performed at several exposures throughout the cycle starting from different initial power / flow conditions.
Xenon is assumed to remain constant during the event. LHGRFACf multipliers are established to provide protection against fuel centerline melt and overstraining of the cladding during a flow runup. LHGRFACf multipliers are presented in Table 8.13.
The maximum flow during a flow excursion in SLO is much less than the maximum flow during TLO. Therefore, the MCPRf limits and LHGRFACf multipliers for TLO are applicable for SLO.
Equipment Out-of-Service Scenarios The EOOS scenarios supported are shown in Table 1.1. As noted in Table 1.1, base case and each EOOS condition is supported in combination with 1 MSRVOOS, EOC-RPT-OOS, up to 18 TIP channels out-of-service (per operating requirements defined in Section 4.2), and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service.
When end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) is inoperable, no credit is assumed for RPT on TSV position or TCV fast closure. The function of the EOC-RPT feature is to reduce the severity of the core power excursion caused by the pressurization transient. The RPT accomplishes this by helping revoid the core thereby reducing the magnitude of the reactivity insertion resulting from the pressurization transient. Failure of the RPT feature can result in higher operating limits. Analyses were performed for LRNB and FWCF events assuming EOC-RPT-OOS.
The analyses presented in this section also include these EOOS conditions protected by the base case limits. No further discussion for these EOOS conditions is presented in this section.
Base thermal limits presented in Section 8.0 are applicable with or without function of the EOC-RPT.
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 presents the limiting LHGRFACp transient analysis results for each EOOS scenario used to generate the operating limits for all scram insertion times.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-10 TBVOOS The effect of operation with TBVOOS is a reduction in the system pressure relief capacity which makes the pressurization events more severe. While the base case LRNB and TTNB events are analyzed assuming the TBV out-of-service, operation with TBVOOS has an adverse effect on the FWCF event. Analyses of the FWCF event with TBVOOS were performed to establish the TBVOOS operating limits.
FHOOS The FHOOS scenario assumes a feedwater temperature reduction of 70 F (55 F + 15 F bias) at rated power and steam flow. The effect of reduced feedwater temperature is an increase in core inlet subcooling changing the axial power shape and core void fraction. Additionally, steam flow for a given power level decreases because more power is required to increase coolant enthalpy to saturated conditions. Generally, LRNB and TTNB events are less severe with FHOOS conditions due to the decrease in steam flow relative to nominal conditions. FWCF events with FHOOS conditions are generally worse due to a larger change in inlet subcooling and core power prior to the pressurization phase of the event.
Separate FHOOS limits are not needed for operation beyond the EOCLB exposure since a feedwater (FW) temperature reduction is included to attain the additional cycle extension to the FFTR / coastdown exposure, i.e., FFTR is equivalent to FHOOS since both are based on the same feedwater temperature reduction.
PLUOOS The PLU device in normal operation is assumed to not function below 50 % power. PLUOOS is assumed to mean the PLU device does not function for any power level and does not initiate fast TCV closure. The following PLUOOS scenario was assumed for the load rejection event.
Initially, the TCV remain in pressure / speed control mode. There is no direct scram or EOC-RPT on valve motion.
Loss of load results in increasing turbine speed. Depending on initial power, a turbine overspeed condition may be reached to initiate a turbine trip resulting in scram and EOC-RPT.
Without a turbine trip signal, scram occurs on either high flux or high dome pressure to terminate the event.
Analyses were performed for LRNB events assuming PLUOOS.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-11 Combined TBVOOS and FHOOS FWCF analyses with both TBVOOS and FHOOS were performed. Operating limits for this combined EOOS scenario were established using these FWCF results and results previously discussed. Separate TBVOOS and FHOOS combined limits are not needed for operation beyond the EOCLB exposure since a FW temperature reduction is included to attain the additional cycle extension to the FFTR / coastdown exposure.
Combined TBVOOS and PLUOOS Limits were established to support operation with both TBVOOS and PLUOOS. No additional analyses are required to construct MCPRp operating limits for TBVOOS and PLUOOS since TBVOOS and PLUOOS are independent EOOS conditions (TBVOOS only impacts FWCF events; PLUOOS only impacts LRNB events).
Combined FHOOS and PLUOOS LRNB analyses with both FHOOS and PLUOOS were performed. Operating limits for this combined EOOS scenario were established using these LRNB results and results previously discussed. Separate FHOOS and PLUOOS combined limits are not needed for operation beyond the EOCLB exposure since a FW temperature reduction is included to attain the additional cycle extension to the FFTR / coastdown exposure.
Combined TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS Limits were established to support operation with TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS. No additional analyses are required to construct MCPRp operating limits for TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS since TBVOOS and PLUOOS are independent EOOS conditions (TBVOOS only impacts FWCF events; PLUOOS only impacts LRNB events). Separate TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS combined limits are not needed for operation beyond the EOCLB exposure since a FW temperature reduction is included to attain the additional cycle extension to the FFTR / coastdown exposure.
Reduced Feedwater Temperature at Startup During reactor startup, it is beneficial to reduce feedwater temperature to avoid excessive wear on reactor equipment. The desired feedwater temperature is less than the temperature assumed in the FHOOS licensing analyses performed each cycle. Therefore, previously defined
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-12 EOOS scenarios are not adequate to cover operation during startup with the desired reduction in feedwater temperature.
Analyses were performed to support all cycle exposures with or without EOC-RPT-OOS.
Analyses were also performed to support all cycle exposures with TBVOOS in combination with or without EOC-RPT-OOS. The analyses consider both NSS (above Pbypass cases) and TSSS. In addition, these analyses inherently cover all remaining non-PLUOOS equipment out-of-service scenarios defined in Table 1.1. Two separate startup feedwater temperatures are evaluated as provided in Item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Limits for startup feedwater temperatures are included in Tables 8.1 - 8.9 and Table 8.12.
The reduced feedwater temperatures are not applicable above 50 % of rated power. The startup feedwater temperatures cannot be less than the values defined in Item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. If this requirement is met, reactor startup is restricted to the 85 % rod line or less.
Recirculation Pump Out-of-Service Recirculation pump out-of-service (RCPOOS) is the EOOS implying single loop operation. The pump seizure event assumes the reactor is operating with one recirculation pump inactive and an instantaneous seizure of the pump motor shaft of the active recirculation pump occurs. Flow through the active loop is rapidly reduced due to the large hydraulic resistance introduced by the stopped rotor causing core thermal power to decrease and reactor water level to swell. The sudden decrease in core coolant flow while the reactor is at power results in a degradation of core heat transfer which could result in fuel damage. The high water level setpoint is not reached; therefore, no reactor scram occurs.
Analysis assumptions have been constructed to seek a balance between operating flexibility and margin to thermal limits. Maximum core power is restricted to 43.75 % of rated and core flow is restricted to 50 % of rated; active recirculation drive flow is assumed 17.73 Mlb/hr. The results for the SLO pump seizure event are provided in Table 5.9. A comparison to the limiting MCPRs provided in Table 5.3 demonstrate SLO pump seizure is a non-limiting transient.
For RCPOOS, the TLO transient MCPRs and LHGRFAC multipliers remain applicable.
Therefore, when developing the thermal limits, the only impacts on the LHGR and maximum average planar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR) limits is the application of a MAPLHGR
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-13 multiplier discussed in Section 8.3. The same situation is true for the EOOS scenarios. The TLO EOOS LHGRFAC multipliers remain applicable.
Licensing Compliance In order to ensure that plant operation stays within the licensing evaluations that have been performed, two sets of criteria are defined. The first is defined as an exposure ratio and is intended to ensure that the licensing bases for the limiting NEOC limits will continue to be met.
The second is the licensing basis power shape. These criteria are intended to ensure that end of cycle limits also remain valid.
Axial Exposure Ratio The intent of the axial exposure ratio (AER) monitoring is to provide a guideline for reactor operation to assure that the actual operation remains within the bounds of the licensing basis relative to plant transients sensitive to spectral shift operation for the NEOC cycle exposure.
Only the AER at the full power condition at the NEOC core average exposure of 30,919.0 MWd/MTU is relevant in meeting this criterion. The AER should be less than or equal to the target AER of 1.0757.
Licensing Power Shape The licensing axial power profile used by Framatome for the plant transient analyses bounds the projected end of full power axial power profile. The conservative licensing axial power profile generated at the EOCLB core average exposure of 33,270.1 MWd/MTU is given in Table 5.12.
Operation is considered to be in compliance when:
The integrated normalized power generated in the bottom 7 nodes from the projected EOFP solution at the state conditions provided in Table 5.12 is greater than the integrated normalized power generated in the bottom 7 nodes in the licensing basis axial power profile, and the individual normalized power from the projected EOFP solution is greater than the corresponding normalized power from the licensing basis axial power profile for at least 6 of the 7 bottom nodes.
The projected EOFP condition occurs at a core average exposure less than or equal to EOCLB.
If the criteria cannot be fully met, the licensing basis may nevertheless remain valid but further assessment will be required.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-14 The licensing basis power profile in Table 5.12 was calculated using the MICROBURN-B2 code.
Compliance analyses must also be performed using MICROBURN-B2 or POWERPLEX-XD.
Note the power profile comparison should be done without incorporating instrument updates to the axial profile because the updated power is not used in the core monitoring system to accumulate assembly burnups.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-15 Table 5.1 Exposure Basis for Transient Analysis Core Average Exposure (MWd/MTU)
Comments 14,769.0 Beginning of cycle 30,919.0 Break point for exposure-dependent MCPRp limits (NEOC) 33,270.1 Design basis rod patterns to EOFP + 15 EFPD (EOCLB) 34,917.8 Maximum licensing core exposure including FFTR / Coastdown 33,047.6 Cycle 21 EOC (short window) 33,594.9 Cycle 21 EOC (nominal window) 33,928.8 Cycle 21 EOC (long window)
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-16 Table 5.2 Scram Speed Insertion Times Control Rod Position (notch)
Surveillance Timing*
TSSS (seconds)
NSS (seconds)
OSS (seconds) 48 (full out) 0.000 0.000 48 0.200 0.200 46 0.45 0.380 0.350 36 1.08 0.960 0.930 26 1.84 1.590 1.560 6
3.36 2.900 2.800 0
(full in)
Transient analyses explicitly account for the Technical Specifications operation allowance for up to 13 slow and 1 stuck control rod by assuming 15 control blades fail to scram.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-17 Table 5.3 Base Case Limiting Transient Event NSS Insertion Time Power ATRIUM 10XM MCPR Limiting Event ATRIUM 11 MCPR Limiting Event 100 0.49 LRNB 0.47 FWCF 90 0.52 FWCF 0.56 FWCF 77.6 0.69 FWCF 0.70 FWCF 65 0.87 FWCF 0.82 FWCF 50 0.96 FWCF 0.96 FWCF 26 1.39 FWCF 1.55 FWCF 26 at > 50%F below Pbypass 1.58 FWCF 1.70 FWCF 26 at 50%F below Pbypass 1.39 FWCF 1.44 FWCF 23 at > 50%F below Pbypass 1.71 FWCF 1.81 FWCF 23 at 50%F below Pbypass 1.58 FWCF 1.47 FWCF
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-18 Table 5.4 Base Case Limiting Transient Event TSSS Insertion Time Power ATRIUM 10XM MCPR Limiting Event ATRIUM 11 MCPR Limiting Event 100 0.56 FWCF 0.53 FWCF 90 0.66 FWCF 0.63 FWCF 77.6 0.84 FWCF 0.77 FWCF 65 1.02 FWCF 0.91 FWCF 50 1.13 FWCF 1.12 FWCF 26 1.49 FWCF 1.67 FWCF 26 at > 50%F below Pbypass 1.58 FWCF 1.70 FWCF 26 at 50%F below Pbypass 1.39 FWCF 1.44 FWCF 23 at > 50%F below Pbypass 1.71 FWCF 1.81 FWCF 23 at 50%F below Pbypass 1.58 FWCF 1.47 FWCF
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-19 Table 5.5 Loss of Feedwater Heating Transient Analysis Results Power
(% rated)
CPR 100 0.11 90 0.12 80 0.13 70 0.14 60 0.15 50 0.17 40 0.19 30 0.24 23 0.30
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-20 Table 5.6 Control Rod Withdrawal Error CPR Results Analytical RBM Setpoint (without filter)
(%)
CPR CRWE MCPR*
107 0.22 1.30 111 0.26 1.34 114 0.28 1.36 117 0.29 1.37 Table 5.7 RBM Operability Requirements Thermal Power
(% rated)
Applicable MCPR 27 % and < 90 %
1.39 TLO For rated power and a 1.08 SLMCPR.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-21 Table 5.8 Flow-Dependent MCPR Results Core Flow
(% rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPR ATRIUM 11 MCPR 30 1.55 1.48 40 1.46 1.35 50 1.43 1.31 60 1.41 1.28 70 1.36 1.24 80 1.25 1.21 90 1.20 1.17 100 1.15 1.13 107 1.08 1.08 Table 5.9 TLO and SLO Pump Seizure Results State point Power / Flow
(% rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPR ATRIUM 11 MCPR 100 / 105 TLO 0.27 0.29 43.75 / 50 SLO 0.80 0.71
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-22 Table 5.10 ATRIUM 11 LHGRFACp Transient Results Power
(% rated)
Nominal Operation and FHOOS*
Startup FHOOS 1*
Startup FHOOS 2*
TBVIS TBVOOS TBVIS TBVOOS TBVIS TBVOOS 100.0 0.95 0.94 90.0 0.91 0.90 77.6 0.88 0.82 65.0 0.84 0.71 60.0 0.82 0.69 55.0 0.79 0.68 50.0 0.74 0.63 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.56 40.0 0.66 0.59 0.57 0.51 0.57 0.51 26.0 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.42 26.0 at > 50 % F below Pbypass 0.37 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28 23.0 at > 50 % F below Pbypass 0.36 0.30 0.33 0.26 0.33 0.26 26.0 at 50 % F below Pbypass 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.35 23.0 at 50 % F below Pbypass 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.38 0.30 Nominal operation and FHOOS represents the feedwater temperatures shown in Figure 2.2 of Reference 22. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in Item 6.6.1 of Reference 22.
Limiting results for TBVIS are compiled from all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those including TBVOOS.
Limiting results for TBVOOS are compiled from all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 including those with TBVOOS.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-23 Table 5.11 ATRIUM 10XM LHGRFACp Transient Results Power
(% rated)
Nominal Operation and FHOOS*
Startup FHOOS 1*
Startup FHOOS 2*
TBVIS TBVOOS TBVIS TBVOOS TBVIS TBVOOS 100.0 0.99 0.97 90.0 0.95 0.95 77.6 0.97 0.90 65.0 0.87 0.81 60.0 0.85 0.78 55.0 0.82 0.76 50.0 0.80 0.73 0.71 0.64 0.71 0.64 40.0 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.58 0.64 0.58 26.0 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.49 26.0 at > 50 % F below Pbypass 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.32 23.0 at > 50 % F below Pbypass 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.37 0.29 26.0 at 50 % F below Pbypass 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.44 0.39 23.0 at 50 % F below Pbypass 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.34 0.41 0.34 Nominal operation and FHOOS represents the feedwater temperatures shown in Figure 2.2 of Reference 22. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in Item 6.6.1 of Reference 22.
Limiting results for TBVIS are compiled from all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those including TBVOOS.
Limiting results for TBVOOS are compiled from all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 including those with TBVOOS.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-24 Table 5.12 Licensing Basis Core Average Axial Power Profile State Conditions for Power Shape Evaluation Power, MWt 3,952.0 Core pressure, psia 1,050.0 Inlet subcooling, Btu/lbm 25.5 Flow, Mlb/hr 107.6 Control state All rods out (ARO)
Core average exposure (EOCLB), MWd/MTU 33,270.1 Licensing Axial Power Profile (Normalized)
Node Power Top 25 0.303 24 0.779 23 0.988 22 1.117 21 1.238 20 1.307 19 1.323 18 1.325 17 1.298 16 1.255 15 1.248 14 1.213 13 1.265 12 1.268 11 1.266 10 1.270 9
1.232 8
1.139 7
1.015 6
0.869 5
0.714 4
0.581 3
0.490 2
0.386 Bottom 1
0.113 Sum of Bottom 7 Nodes = 4.168
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-25 Figure 5.1 LRNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-26 Figure 5.2 LRNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-27 Figure 5.3 LRNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-28 Figure 5.4 TTNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-29 Figure 5.5 TTNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-30 Figure 5.6 TTNB at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-31 Figure 5.7 FWCF at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-32 Figure 5.8 FWCF at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-33 Figure 5.9 FWCF at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-34 Figure 5.10 IHPS at 100P / 105F - TSSS Key Parameters
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-35 Figure 5.11 IHPS at 100P / 105F - TSSS Sensed Water Level
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 5-36 Figure 5.12 IHPS at 100P / 105F - TSSS Vessel Pressures
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 6-1 POSTULATED ACCIDENTS Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA)
The results of the ATRIUM 10XM LOCA analysis are presented in References 24 and 25 as supplemented by Reference 26. The ATRIUM 10XM peak cladding temperature (PCT) is 2,052 F. The peak local metal water reaction is 2.06% and the maximum core wide metal-water reaction (for hydrogen generation) for a full ATRIUM 10XM core is < 1.0 %.
The results of the ATRIUM 11 LOCA analysis are presented in Reference 27, as supplemented by Reference 28. The ATRIUM 11 PCT is 1,898 F. The peak local metal water reaction is 8.27% and the maximum core wide metal-water reaction (for hydrogen generation) for a full ATRIUM 11 core is < 0.73%.
Analyses and results support the EOD and EOOS conditions listed in Table 1.1. Note TBVOOS, EOC-RPT-OOS, PLUOOS, and TIPOOS/LPRM out-of-service have no direct influence on the LOCA events.
Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA)
Plant startup utilizes a bank position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) including rod worth minimization strategies. The CRDA evaluation was performed for both A and B sequence startups consistent with the withdrawal sequences specified by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The approved Framatome AURORA-B CRDA methodology is used (Reference 29). The applicability of this methodology for the Browns Ferry plants is demonstrated in Reference 30.
The analysis utilized the RG 1.236 criteria (Reference 31) consistent with the approach previously demonstrated in Reference 30. The CRDA analysis results demonstrate that the core coolability is maintained with total fuel enthalpy remaining below 230 cal/g and no fuel melting.
The radiological consequences are shown to be bounded by the Browns Ferry CRDA alternate source term (AST) analysis. The number of effective rod failures (adjusted for revised release fractions) were confirmed to be less than the Browns Ferry licensing limit of 850 which is based upon the current AST dose analysis.
The following table identifies the limiting rod drop with the actual number of rod failures and the number of rod failures scaled up to account for revised release fractions of DG-1327 (Reference 32).
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 6-2 ATRIUM 10XM ATRIUM 11 Sequence Max Prompt Enthalpy Increase (cal / g)
Max Total Enthalpy (cal / g)
Fuel Melt Bundles with Failures Actual Rod Failures FSAR Dose-Equivalent Failures Actual Rod Failures FSAR Dose-Equivalent Failures Fraction of Allowed Rod Failures EOC_B3412 EOC_A3412 81.0 109.6 no 0
0 0
0 0
0 Fuel and Equipment Handling Accident The fuel handling accident radiological analysis implementing the AST as approved in Reference 33 was performed with consideration of ATRIUM-10 core source terms. The ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 source terms have been dispositioned relative to those in the AST analysis of record and found to support the same conclusions. Fuel assembly and reactor core isotopic inventories used as input to design basis radiological accident analyses are applicable to all three units (Reference 33). The number of failed fuel rods for the ATRIUM-10 fuel as previously provided to TVA in Reference 34 for use in the AST analysis is unchanged.
The number of failed fuel rods for the ATRIUM 10XM fuel is 163 which remains bounded by the analysis of record. Framatome has also performed an analysis to demonstrate the number of failed rods due to a fuel handling accident involving ATRIUM 11 fuel does not exceed 194 (Reference 35). These results are consistent with the number of failed rods supported by the current Browns Ferry AST analysis. No other aspect of utilizing the ATRIUM 10XM and ATRIUM 11 fuel affects the current analysis; therefore, the AST fuel handling accident analysis remains applicable.
Fuel Loading Error (Infrequent Event)
There are two types of fuel loading errors possible in a BWR - the mislocation of a fuel assembly in a core position prescribed to be loaded with another fuel assembly and the misorientation of a fuel assembly with respect to the control blade. As described in Reference 36, the fuel loading error is characterized as an infrequent event. The acceptance criterion is the offsite dose consequences due to the event shall not exceed a small fraction of the 10 CFR 50.67 limits.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 6-3 Mislocated Fuel Bundle Framatome has performed a fuel mislocation error analysis for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22.
The analysis considered the impact of a mislocated assembly against potential fuel rod failure mechanisms due to increased LHGR and reduced CPR. Based on the analyses the offsite dose criteria (a small fraction of 10 CFR 50.67) is conservatively satisfied. A dose consequence evaluation is not necessary since no rod approaches the fuel centerline melt or 1 % strain limits and less than 0.1 % of the fuel rods are expected to experience boiling transition.
Misoriented Fuel Bundle Framatome has performed a fuel assembly misorientation analysis for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 (monitored with the ACE critical power correlation). The analysis was performed assuming the limiting assembly was loaded in the worst orientation (rotated 180 ) and depleted through the cycle without operator interaction. The analysis demonstrates the small fraction of 10 CFR 50.67 offsite dose criteria is conservatively satisfied. A dose consequence evaluation is not necessary since no rod approaches the fuel centerline melt or 1 % strain limits and less than 0.1 % of the fuel rods are expected to experience boiling transition.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-1 SPECIAL ANALYSES ASME Overpressurization Analysis This section describes the maximum overpressurization analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The analysis shows the safety / relief valves have sufficient capacity and performance to prevent the reactor vessel pressure from reaching the safety limit of 110 % of the design pressure.
Main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure, TSV closure, and TCV closure (without bypass) analyses were performed with the AURORA-B methodology (Reference 5) for 102 % power and both 85 % and 105 % flow at the highest cycle exposure. The MSIV closure event is similar to the other steam line valve closure events in that the valve closure results in a rapid pressurization of the core. The increase in pressure causes a decrease in voids which in turn causes a rapid increase in power. The turbine bypass valves do not impact the system response and are not modeled in the analysis. The potentially limiting ASME overpressurization events were performed consistent with the approved process defined in Reference 5. The following assumptions were made in the analysis.
The most critical active component (direct scram on valve position or motion) was assumed to fail. However, scram on high neutron flux and high dome pressure is available.
The safety relief valve (SRV) opening setpoints used in the analysis are set to the Technical Specification values increased by 3%, plus an additional 5 psi. To support operation with 1 MSRVOOS, the plant configuration analyzed assumed one of the lowest setpoint MSRV was inoperable.
TSSS insertion times were used.
The initial dome pressure was set at the maximum allowed by the Technical Specifications plus an additional 5 psi bias, 1,070 psia (1,055 psig).
A fast MSIV closure time of 3.0 seconds was used.
The analytical limit anticipated transient without scram - recirculation pump trip (ATWS-RPT) setpoint and function were assumed.
Results of the limiting valve closure, MSIV closure overpressurization analyses are presented in Table 7.1. Various reactor plant parameters during the limiting MSIV closure event are presented in Figure 7.1 - Figure 7.4. The maximum pressure of 1355 psig occurs in the lower plenum. The maximum dome pressure for the same event is 1320 psig. The results
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-2 demonstrate the maximum vessel pressure limit of 1,375 psig and dome pressure limit of 1,325 psig are not exceeded for any analyses.
ATWS Event Evaluation ATWS Overpressurization Analysis This section describes analyses performed to demonstrate the peak vessel pressure for the limiting anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event is less than the ASME Service Level C limit of 120 % of the design pressure (1,500 psig). Overpressurization analyses were performed at 100 % power at both 85 % and 105 % flow over the cycle exposure range for both the MSIV closure event and the pressure regulator failure open (PRFO) event. The PRFO event assumes a step increase in pressure demand such that the pressure control system opens the TCV and TBV. Steam flow demand is assumed to increase to 125 % demand (equivalent to 131.3 % of rated steam flow) allowing a maximum TCV flow of 105 % and a maximum bypass system flow of 21.3 %. The system pressure decreases until the low pressure setpoint is reached resulting in the closure of the MSIV. The subsequent pressurization wave collapses core voids, thereby increasing core power.
The potentially limiting ATWS overpressurization events were performed consistent with the approved process defined in Reference 5.
The following assumptions were made in the analyses.
The analytical limit ATWS-RPT setpoint and function were assumed.
The SRV opening setpoints used in the analysis are set to the Technical Specification values increased by 3%, plus an additional 5 psi. To support operation with 1 MSRVOOS, the plant configuration analyzed assumed one of the lowest setpoint MSRV was inoperable.
All scram functions were disabled.
The initial dome pressure was set to the nominal pressure of 1,050 psia.
A nominal MSIV closure time of 4.0 seconds was used for both events.
Analyses results are presented in Table 7.2. The response of various reactor plant parameters during the limiting MSIV closure event are shown in Figure 7.5 - Figure 7.8. The maximum lower plenum pressure is 1498 psig and the maximum dome pressure is 1480 psig. The results demonstrate the ATWS maximum vessel pressure limit of 1,500 psig is not exceeded.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-3 Long-Term Evaluation Fuel design differences may impact the power and pressure excursion experienced during the ATWS event. This in turn may impact the amount of steam discharged to the suppression pool and containment.
An evaluation for ATRIUM 11 fuel was presented in Section 7.3 of Reference 37. This evaluation concluded the introduction of the ATRIUM 11 fuel design does not significantly impact the long term ATWS response (suppression pool temperature and containment pressure) and the current analysis remains applicable. This conclusion is applicable for the Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 core design.
ATWS with Core Instability The ATWS with core instability (ATWS-I) event for the ATRIUM 10XM fuel design acceptability in MELLLA+ has been assessed as satisfactory in Reference 38, Section 3.9.3.3. For Browns Ferry ATRIUM 11 fuel, the results given in Reference 39 demonstrate the acceptance criteria are met.
Standby Liquid Control System In the event the control rod scram function becomes incapable of rendering the core in a shutdown state, the standby liquid control (SLC) system is required to be capable of bringing the reactor from full power to a cold shutdown condition at any time in the core life. The Browns Ferry Unit 3 SLC system is required to be able to inject 720 ppm natural boron equivalent at 70 F into the reactor coolant. Framatome has performed an analysis demonstrating the SLC system meets the required shutdown capability for the cycle. The analysis was performed at a coolant temperature of 366 F with a boron concentration equivalent to 720 ppm at 68 F*. The temperature of 366 F corresponds to the low pressure permissive for the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction valves and represents the maximum reactivity condition with soluble boron in the coolant. The analysis shows the core to be subcritical throughout the cycle by at least 2.58 % k/k based on the short Cycle 21 EOC.
TVA Browns Ferry SLC licensing basis documents indicate a minimum of 720 ppm boron at a temperature of 70 F. The Framatome cold analysis basis of 68 F represents a negligible difference and the results are adequate to protect the 70 F licensing basis for the plant.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-4 Fuel Criticality The spent fuel pool criticality analysis for ATRIUM 11 fuel is presented in Reference 40. The ATRIUM 11 fuel assemblies identified for the cycle meet the spent fuel storage requirements.
ATRIUM 11 fuel assemblies will not be stored in the new fuel storage vault.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-5 Table 7.1 ASME Overpressurization Analysis Results Event Maximum Vessel Pressure Lower-Plenum (psig)
Maximum Dome Pressure (psig)
MSIV closure (102P / 105F) 1,355 1,320 Pressure Limit 1,375 1,325
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-6 Table 7.2 ATWS Overpressurization Analysis Results Event Maximum Vessel Pressure Lower-Plenum (psig)
Maximum Dome Pressure (psig)
MSIV closure (100P / 85F) 1,498 1,480 Pressure Limit 1,500 1,500
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-7 Figure 7.1 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Key Parameters
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-8 Figure 7.2 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Sensed Water Level
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-9 Figure 7.3 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Vessel Pressures
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-10 Figure 7.4 ASME-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 102P / 105F - Safety / Relief Valve Flow Rates
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-11 Figure 7.5 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Key Parameters
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-12 Figure 7.6 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Sensed Water Level
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-13 Figure 7.7 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Vessel Pressures
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 7-14 Figure 7.8 ATWS-MSIV Overpressurization Event at 100P / 85F - Safety / Relief Valve Flow Rates
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-1 OPERATING LIMITS AND COLR INPUT MCPR Limits Determination of MCPR limits are based on analyses of the limiting AOTs. To determine the limiting MCPR value for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22, the transient analyses are performed in accordance with the process defined in Reference 5 for the scope of cases described in Section 2.2 of Reference 3, consistent with the requirements in Limitations and Conditions 3 and 8 of Reference 5. The analyses also comply with the requirements of Limitations and Conditions 9 and 19.
MCPR operating limits are established such that less than 0.1 % of the fuel rods in the core are expected to experience boiling transition during an AOT initiated from rated or off-rated conditions and are based on a TLO SLMCPR of 1.08 and SLO SLMCPR of 1.09. Exposure-dependent MCPR limits were established to support operation from BOC to NEOC, NEOC to EOCLB, and EOCLB to end of combined FFTR / Coastdown (Coast). MCPR limits are established to support base case operation and the EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1.
MCPRp limits above the bypass power level implement a flow dependency as a MCPR margin improvement when operating at lower core flows associated with the MELLLA+ operating domain. At a given power level, MCPRp limits are defined for specific ranges of core flow.
TLO MCPRp limits are presented for base case operation and the EOOS conditions in Table 8.1 - Table 8.9. Limits are presented for OSS, NSS, and TSSS insertion times for the exposure ranges considered. Tables 8.1 through 8.3 present the MCPRp limits for the BOC to NEOC exposure range. Tables 8.4 through 8.6 present the MCPRp limits for the NEOC to EOCLB exposure range. Tables 8.7 through 8.9 present the MCPRp limits for the EOCLB to End of Coast exposure range. To develop MCPRp limits for SLO, thermal limits are a combination of the corresponding TLO limit set and a 0.01 adder, which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR.
MCPRf limits protect against fuel failures during a postulated slow flow excursion. The MCPRf limits presented in Table 8.10 are applicable for all cycle exposures and EOOS conditions identified in Table 1.1.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-2 LHGR Limits The steady-state LHGR limits are presented in Table 8.11. Power-and flow-dependent multipliers (LHGRFACp and LHGRFACf) are applied directly to the LHGR limits to protect against fuel melting and overstraining of the cladding during an AOT.
The LHGRFACp multipliers are determined using the RODEX4 thermal-mechanical methodology (Reference 41) using the AURORA-B transient simulations. To determine the applicable LHGRFACp multipliers for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22, the analytical analysis approach complies with Limitation and Condition 18 of the Reference 5 topical report. Input is developed in support of Limitation and Condition 18 such that the centerline fuel temperature and cladding strain results are reasonably bounded from the licensing calculations.
LHGRFACp multipliers were established to support operation at all cycle exposures for all scram insertion times and for the EOOS conditions identified in Table 1.1 with and without TBVOOS.
LHGRFACp limits are presented in Table 8.12.
LHGRFACf multipliers are established to provide protection against fuel centerline melt and overstraining of the cladding during a postulated slow flow excursion. LHGRFACf limits are presented in Table 8.13. LHGRFACf multipliers are applicable for all cycle exposures and EOOS conditions identified in Table 1.1.
MAPLHGR Limits The ATRIUM 10XM TLO MAPLHGR limits are discussed in Table 8.14. For SLO, a multiplier of 0.85 must be applied to the TLO MAPLHGR limits. Power-and flow-dependent maximum average planar multipliers (MAPFAC) set-downs are not required; therefore, MAPFAC = 1.0.
The ATRIUM 11 TLO MAPLHGR limits are discussed in Table 8.14. For SLO, a multiplier of 0.85 must be applied to the TLO MAPLHGR limits. Power-and flow-dependent MAPFAC set-downs are not required; therefore, MAPFAC = 1.0.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-3 Table 8.1 TLO MCPRp Limits for OSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation 100.0 1.58 1.51 90.0 1.61 1.63 77.6 1.74 1.79 65.0 1.83 1.84 50.0 1.93 1.95 26.0 2.50 2.58
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 FHOOS 100.0 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.69 1.72 77.6 1.81 1.87 65.0 1.94 1.99 50.0 2.00 2.08 26.0 2.58 2.71
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
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ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-4 Table 8.2 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation 100.0 1.58 1.55 90.0 1.61 1.64 77.6 1.79 1.79 65.0 1.97 1.91 50.0 2.07 2.07 26.0 2.50 2.65
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 TBVOOS 100.0 1.83 1.81 90.0 2.05 1.93 77.6 2.08 2.14 65.0 2.08 2.19 50.0 2.10 2.21 26.0 2.55 2.68
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS 100.0 1.69 1.67 90.0 1.69 1.72 77.6 1.89 1.87 65.0 1.98 1.99 50.0 2.08 2.19 26.0 2.58 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 PLUOOS 100.0 1.58 1.55 90.0 1.61 1.64 77.6 1.79 1.79 65.0 1.97 1.91 50.0 2.07 2.07 26.0 2.50 2.65
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-5 Table 8.2 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp TBVOOS and FHOOS 100.0 2.11 1.86 90.0 2.46 2.01 77.6 2.46 2.23 65.0 2.46 2.23 50.0 2.48 2.27 26.0 2.62 2.82
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 TBVOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 1.83 1.81 90.0 2.05 1.93 77.6 2.08 2.14 65.0 2.08 2.19 50.0 2.10 2.21 26.0 2.55 2.68
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 1.69 1.67 90.0 1.69 1.72 77.6 1.89 1.87 65.0 1.98 1.99 50.0 2.08 2.19 26.0 2.58 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70
- TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS 100.0 2.11 1.86 90.0 2.46 2.01 77.6 2.46 2.23 65.0 2.46 2.23 50.0 2.48 2.27 26.0 2.62 2.82
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-6 Table 8.2 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Startup FHOOS 1 TBVIS 100.0 2.23 2.21 50.0 2.23 2.21 26.0 2.84 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 1 TBVOOS 100.0 2.48 2.44 50.0 2.48 2.44 26.0 2.84 3.03
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVIS 100.0 2.23 2.21 50.0 2.23 2.21 26.0 2.84 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVOOS 100.0 2.48 2.44 50.0 2.48 2.44 26.0 2.84 3.03
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Turbine bypass valves in-service (TBVIS) limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those that include TBVOOS. TBVOOS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Note feedwater heaters out-of-service conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-7 Table 8.3 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation 100.0 1.65 1.61 90.0 1.75 1.71 77.6 1.94 1.86 65.0 2.12 2.00 50.0 2.24 2.22 26.0 2.60 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 TBVOOS 100.0 2.60 2.55 90.0 2.62 2.55 77.6 2.62 2.55 65.0 2.62 2.55 50.0 2.64 2.57 26.0 2.66 2.86
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS 100.0 1.84 1.78 90.0 1.87 1.89 77.6 2.04 1.97 65.0 2.12 2.10 50.0 2.24 2.25 26.0 2.69 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 PLUOOS 100.0 1.65 1.61 90.0 1.75 1.71 77.6 1.94 1.86 65.0 2.12 2.00 50.0 2.24 2.22 26.0 2.60 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-8 Table 8.3 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp TBVOOS and FHOOS 100.0 2.82 2.60 90.0 2.82 2.77 77.6 2.82 2.77 65.0 2.82 2.77 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.86 2.99
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 TBVOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 2.60 2.55 90.0 2.62 2.55 77.6 2.62 2.55 65.0 2.62 2.55 50.0 2.64 2.57 26.0 2.66 2.86
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 1.84 1.78 90.0 1.87 1.89 77.6 2.04 1.97 65.0 2.12 2.10 50.0 2.24 2.25 26.0 2.69 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70
- TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS 100.0 2.82 2.60 90.0 2.82 2.77 77.6 2.82 2.77 65.0 2.82 2.77 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.86 2.99
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-9 Table 8.3 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times BOC to NEOC* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Startup FHOOS 1 TBVIS 100.0 2.38 2.36 50.0 2.38 2.36 26.0 2.94 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 1 TBVOOS 100.0 2.84 2.79 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.96 3.22
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVIS 100.0 2.38 2.36 50.0 2.38 2.36 26.0 2.94 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVOOS 100.0 2.84 2.79 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.96 3.22
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
TBVIS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those that include TBVOOS. TBVOOS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Note feedwater heaters out-of-service conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-10 Table 8.4 TLO MCPRp Limits for OSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation 100.0 1.58 1.48 90.0 1.61 1.63 77.6 1.74 1.73 65.0 1.83 1.84 50.0 1.93 1.95 26.0 2.50 2.31
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 FHOOS 100.0 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.69 1.63 77.6 1.81 1.73 65.0 1.94 1.84 50.0 2.00 2.08 26.0 2.58 2.41
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-11 Table 8.5 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation
> 90%F 90%F
> 90%F 90%F 100.0 1.58 1.58 1.50 1.48 90.0 1.61 1.61 1.64 1.63 77.6 1.79 1.79 1.78 1.78 65.0 1.97 1.97 1.91 1.79 50.0 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 26.0 2.50 2.50 2.31 2.31
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 TBVOOS 100.0 1.83 1.81 90.0 2.05 1.93 77.6 2.08 2.14 65.0 2.08 2.19 50.0 2.10 2.21 26.0 2.55 2.68
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS
> 90%F 90%F
> 90%F 90%F 100.0 1.69 1.69 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.69 1.69 1.71 1.63 77.6 1.89 1.89 1.78 1.78 65.0 1.98 1.98 1.99 1.79 50.0 2.08 2.08 2.19 2.19 26.0 2.58 2.58 2.41 2.41
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 PLUOOS 100.0 1.58 1.50 90.0 1.61 1.64 77.6 1.79 1.78 65.0 1.97 1.91 50.0 2.07 2.07 26.0 2.50 2.31
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-12 Table 8.5 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp TBVOOS and FHOOS 100.0 2.11 1.86 90.0 2.46 2.01 77.6 2.46 2.23 65.0 2.46 2.23 50.0 2.48 2.27 26.0 2.62 2.82
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 TBVOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 1.83 1.81 90.0 2.05 1.93 77.6 2.08 2.14 65.0 2.08 2.19 50.0 2.10 2.21 26.0 2.55 2.68
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 1.69 1.62 90.0 1.69 1.71 77.6 1.89 1.78 65.0 1.98 1.99 50.0 2.08 2.19 26.0 2.58 2.41
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70
- TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS 100.0 2.11 1.86 90.0 2.46 2.01 77.6 2.46 2.23 65.0 2.46 2.23 50.0 2.48 2.27 26.0 2.62 2.82
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-13 Table 8.5 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Startup FHOOS 1 TBVIS 100.0 2.23 2.21 50.0 2.23 2.21 26.0 2.84 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 1 TBVOOS 100.0 2.48 2.44 50.0 2.48 2.44 26.0 2.84 3.03
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVIS 100.0 2.23 2.21 50.0 2.23 2.21 26.0 2.84 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVOOS 100.0 2.48 2.44 50.0 2.48 2.44 26.0 2.84 3.03
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
TBVIS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those that include TBVOOS. TBVOOS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Note feedwater heaters out-of-service conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-14 Table 8.6 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation
> 90%F 90%F
> 90%F 90%F 100.0 1.65 1.65 1.57 1.55 90.0 1.75 1.75 1.71 1.68 77.6 1.94 1.94 1.80 1.79 65.0 2.12 2.12 2.00 1.82 50.0 2.24 2.24 2.22 2.22 26.0 2.60 2.60 2.31 2.31
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 TBVOOS 100.0 2.60 2.55 90.0 2.62 2.55 77.6 2.62 2.55 65.0 2.62 2.55 50.0 2.64 2.57 26.0 2.66 2.86
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS
> 90%F 90%F
> 90%F 90%F 100.0 1.84 1.84 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.87 1.87 1.76 1.68 77.6 2.04 2.04 1.80 1.79 65.0 2.12 2.12 2.10 1.82 50.0 2.24 2.24 2.25 2.25 26.0 2.69 2.69 2.42 2.42
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 PLUOOS 100.0 1.65 1.57 90.0 1.75 1.71 77.6 1.94 1.80 65.0 2.12 2.00 50.0 2.24 2.22 26.0 2.60 2.31
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.72 2.53 2.83 2.57 23.0 2.85 2.72 2.94 2.60 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-15 Table 8.6 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp TBVOOS and FHOOS 100.0 2.82 2.60 90.0 2.82 2.77 77.6 2.82 2.77 65.0 2.82 2.77 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.86 2.99
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 TBVOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 2.60 2.55 90.0 2.62 2.55 77.6 2.62 2.55 65.0 2.62 2.55 50.0 2.64 2.57 26.0 2.66 2.86
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.98 2.77 2.95 2.78 23.0 3.24 2.91 3.27 2.90 FHOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 1.84 1.62 90.0 1.87 1.76 77.6 2.04 1.80 65.0 2.12 2.10 50.0 2.24 2.25 26.0 2.69 2.42
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70
- TBVOOS, FHOOS, and PLUOOS 100.0 2.82 2.60 90.0 2.82 2.77 77.6 2.82 2.77 65.0 2.82 2.77 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.86 2.99
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
Note feedwater heaters out-of-service / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-16 Table 8.6 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times NEOC to EOCLB* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Startup FHOOS 1 TBVIS 100.0 2.38 2.36 50.0 2.38 2.36 26.0 2.94 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 1 TBVOOS 100.0 2.84 2.79 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.96 3.22
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVIS 100.0 2.38 2.36 50.0 2.38 2.36 26.0 2.94 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVOOS 100.0 2.84 2.79 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.96 3.22
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
TBVIS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those that include TBVOOS. TBVOOS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Note feedwater heaters out-of-service conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-17 Table 8.7 TLO MCPRp Limits for OSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation 100.0 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.69 1.63 77.6 1.81 1.73 65.0 1.94 1.84 50.0 2.00 2.08 26.0 2.58 2.41
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
EOCLB to End of Coast limits also support operation with FFTR / FHOOS which bounds operation with feedwater heaters in-service. FHOOS / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-18 Table 8.8 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation
> 90%F 90%F
> 90%F 90%F 100.0 1.69 1.69 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.69 1.69 1.71 1.63 77.6 1.89 1.89 1.78 1.78 65.0 1.98 1.98 1.99 1.79 50.0 2.08 2.08 2.19 2.19 26.0 2.58 2.58 2.41 2.41
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 TBVOOS 100.0 2.11 1.86 90.0 2.46 2.01 77.6 2.46 2.23 65.0 2.46 2.23 50.0 2.48 2.27 26.0 2.62 2.82
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 PLUOOS 100.0 1.69 1.62 90.0 1.69 1.71 77.6 1.89 1.78 65.0 1.98 1.99 50.0 2.08 2.19 26.0 2.58 2.41
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 TBVOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 2.11 1.86 90.0 2.46 2.01 77.6 2.46 2.23 65.0 2.46 2.23 50.0 2.48 2.27 26.0 2.62 2.82
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
EOCLB to End of Coast limits also support operation with FFTR / FHOOS which bounds operation with feedwater heaters in-service. FHOOS / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-19 Table 8.8 TLO MCPRp Limits for NSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Startup FHOOS 1 TBVIS 100.0 2.23 2.21 50.0 2.23 2.21 26.0 2.84 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 1 TBVOOS 100.0 2.48 2.44 50.0 2.48 2.44 26.0 2.84 3.03
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVIS 100.0 2.23 2.21 50.0 2.23 2.21 26.0 2.84 2.77
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVOOS 100.0 2.48 2.44 50.0 2.48 2.44 26.0 2.84 3.03
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
TBVIS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those that include TBVOOS. TBVOOS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Note feedwater heaters out-of-service conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-20 Table 8.9 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast*
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Base case operation
> 90%F 90%F
> 90%F 90%F 100.0 1.84 1.84 1.62 1.60 90.0 1.87 1.87 1.76 1.68 77.6 2.04 2.04 1.80 1.79 65.0 2.12 2.12 2.10 1.82 50.0 2.24 2.24 2.25 2.25 26.0 2.69 2.69 2.42 2.42
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 TBVOOS 100.0 2.82 2.60 90.0 2.82 2.77 77.6 2.82 2.77 65.0 2.82 2.77 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.86 2.99
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 PLUOOS 100.0 1.84 1.62 90.0 1.87 1.76 77.6 2.04 1.80 65.0 2.12 2.10 50.0 2.24 2.25 26.0 2.69 2.42
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.79 2.68 2.90 2.66 23.0 2.95 2.81 3.05 2.70 TBVOOS and PLUOOS 100.0 2.82 2.60 90.0 2.82 2.77 77.6 2.82 2.77 65.0 2.82 2.77 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.86 2.99
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.17 2.88 3.16 2.86 23.0 3.30 3.00 3.40 2.96 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
EOCLB to End of Coast limits also support operation with FFTR / FHOOS which bounds operation with feedwater heaters in-service. FHOOS / FFTR and single-loop operation conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-21 Table 8.9 TLO MCPRp Limits for TSSS Insertion Times EOCLB to End of Coast* (Continued)
Operating Condition Power
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRp ATRIUM 11 MCPRp Startup FHOOS 1 TBVIS 100.0 2.38 2.36 50.0 2.38 2.36 26.0 2.94 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 1 TBVOOS 100.0 2.84 2.79 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.96 3.22
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVIS 100.0 2.38 2.36 50.0 2.38 2.36 26.0 2.94 2.90
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 2.99 2.68 3.08 2.66 23.0 2.99 2.81 3.19 2.70 Startup FHOOS 2 TBVOOS 100.0 2.84 2.79 50.0 2.84 2.79 26.0 2.96 3.22
> 50%F 50%F
> 50%F 50%F 26.0 3.48 3.17 3.39 3.03 23.0 3.62 3.17 3.63 3.03 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. For single-loop operation, MCPRp limits will be 0.01 higher which accounts for the difference in TLO and SLO SLMCPR. Note that operation in SLO is only supported up to 43.75% core power, 50% core flow, and an active recirculation drive flow of 17.73 Mlb/hr.
TBVIS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those that include TBVOOS. TBVOOS limits are applicable for all EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in item 6.6.1 of Reference 22. Note feedwater heaters out-of-service conditions are not allowed when operating in the MELLLA+ operating domain.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-22 Table 8.10 MCPRf Limits Core Flow
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM MCPRf Limit ATRIUM 11 MCPRf Limit 30.0 1.64 1.70 84.0 1.40 1.45 107.0 1.40 1.45 Table 8.11 Steady-State LHGR Limits Peak Pellet Exposure (GWd/MTU)
ATRIUM 10XM Steady-State LHGR Limit (kW/ft)
ATRIUM 11 Steady-State LHGR Limit (kW/ft) 0.0 14.1 13.6 18.9 14.1 21.0 13.6 53.0 10.2 74.4 7.4 80.0 3.5
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-23 Table 8.12 LHGRFACp Multipliers*
EOOS Condition Power
(% rated)
Base case operation (TBVIS)
LHGRFACp TBVOOS LHGRFACp ATRIUM 11 ATRIUM 10XM ATRIUM 11 ATRIUM 10XM Nominal operation and FHOOS§ 100.0 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.97 26.0 0.54 0.59 0.45 0.56 26.0 at > 50 % F 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.38 23.0 at > 50 % F 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.34 26.0 at 50 % F 0.41 0.45 0.38 0.43 23.0 at 50 % F 0.39 0.44 0.35 0.39 Startup FHOOS 1§ 100.0 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.97 26.0 0.45 0.53 0.37 0.48 26.0 at > 50 % F 0.35 0.39 0.28 0.32 23.0 at > 50 % F 0.33 0.37 0.26 0.29 26.0 at 50 % F 0.39 0.44 0.35 0.39 23.0 at 50 % F 0.38 0.41 0.30 0.34 Startup FHOOS 2§ 100.0 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.97 26.0 0.45 0.53 0.37 0.48 26.0 at > 50 % F 0.35 0.39 0.28 0.32 23.0 at > 50 % F 0.33 0.37 0.26 0.29 26.0 at 50 % F 0.39 0.44 0.35 0.39 23.0 at 50 % F 0.38 0.41 0.30 0.34 Limits support operation with or without EOC-RPT-OOS and any combination of 1 MSRVOOS, up to 18 TIP channels OOS, and up to 50 % of the LPRM out-of-service. Base case supports single-loop operation.
Limits are applicable for all the EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 except those including TBVOOS.
Limits are applicable for all the EOOS scenarios presented in Table 1.1 including those with TBVOOS.
§ Nominal operation and FHOOS represents the feedwater temperatures shown in Figure 2.2 of Reference 22. Startup FHOOS 1 and Startup FHOOS 2 temperatures are presented as FW Set 1 and FW Set 2, respectively, in Item 6.6.1 of Reference 22.
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 8-24 Table 8.13 LHGRFACf Multipliers Core Flow
(% of rated)
ATRIUM 10XM LHGRFACf Multiplier ATRIUM 11 LHGRFACf Multiplier 0.0 0.62 0.62 30.0 0.62 0.62 77.9 1.00 78.3 1.00 107.0 1.00 1.00 Table 8.14 MAPLHGR Limits Average Planar Exposure (GWd/MTU)
ATRIUM 10XM MAPLHGR Limit (kW/ft)
ATRIUM 11 MAPLHGR Limit (kW/ft) 0.0 13.0 11.5 15.0 13.0 20.0 11.5 60.0 9.0 67.0 7.6 69.0 7.2
Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 9-1 REFERENCES 1.
Letter, NRC to TVA, L44 230113 006, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 -
Issuance of Amendment Nos. 325, 348, and 308 Regarding Application of Advanced Framatome Methodologies, and Adoption of TSTF-564-A, Revision 2, Safety Limit MCPR, in Support of ATRIUM 11 Fuel Use (EPID L-2021-LLA-0132), dated January 13, 2023 (ML22348A068).
2.
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3.
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4.
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6.
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7.
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8.
ANP-4061P Revision 0, ATRIUM 11 Fuel Rod Thermal-Mechanical Evaluation for Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22, Framatome Inc., September 2023.
9.
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11.
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13.
ANP-10298P-A Revision 1, ACE/ATRIUM 10XM Critical Power Correlation, AREVA Inc., March 2014.
14.
ANP-10335P-A Revision 0, ACE/ATRIUM 11 Critical Power Correlation, Framatome Inc., May 2018.
Framatome Inc.
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NEDO-33075-A Revision 8, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, GE Hitachi Boiling Water Reactor, Detect and Suppress Solution - Confirmation Density, November 2013.
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004N5430 Revision 2, Browns Ferry Nuclear Units 1, 2 and 3 - Backup Stability Protection Region Endpoint Determination Procedure and ABSP Setpoints Confirmation, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, April 2018 (FS1-0038489 Revision 1.0).
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NEDO-33006-A Revision 3, General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus, General Electric Hitachi Nuclear Energy America, LLC, June 2009. (ADAMS Accession Number ML091800530) 20.
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Technical Specification Requirements for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3, Tennessee Valley Authority, as amended.
22.
ANP-4047P Revision 0, Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Plant Parameters Document, Framatome Inc., May 2023.
23.
ANF-1358(P)(A) Revision 3, The Loss of Feedwater Heating Transient in Boiling Water Reactors, Framatome ANP, Inc., September 2005.
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ANP-3546P Revision 0, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 LOCA Break Spectrum Analysis for ATRIUM 10XM Fuel (EPU MELLLA+), AREVA Inc., March 2017.
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ANP-3547P Revision 2, Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 LOCA-ECCS Analysis MAPLHGR Limits for ATRIUM 10XM Fuel (EPU MELLLA+), Framatome Inc.,
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FS1-0044279 Revision 5.0, 10 CFR 50.46 PCT Error Report for Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 with EPU/MELLLA+ Conditions, Framatome Inc., October 2023.
27.
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Framatome Inc.
ANP-4067 Revision 0 Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Page 9-3 30.
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(TS-405), September 27, 2004.
34.
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35.
ANP-3307P Revision 1, AREVA Support of TVAs ECP for Implementation of ATRIUM 11 Into Browns Ferry, AREVA Inc., November 2014.
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ANP-3908P Revision 4, Applicability of Framatome BWR Methods to Browns Ferry with ATRIUM 11 Fuel, Framatome Inc., June 2022.
38.
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39.
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40.
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