BECO-88-120, Application for Amend to License DPR-35,revisng Section 3.F to Include Ref to Sser Prepared in Support of Amend

Application for Amend to License DPR-35,revisng Section 3.F to Include Ref to Sser Prepared in Support of Amend

ML20151S511
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	08/06/1988
From:	Bird R BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
BECO-88-120, NUDOCS 8808150247
Download: ML20151S511 (9)

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, . aosnwcason Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 BECo 88-120 Ralph G. Bird 5emor Vice President - Nuclear Proposed Change 88 16 AuFust 6, 1988

.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555 License DPR-35 Docket 50-293 LICENSE AMENDHENT REOUEST Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Boston Edison Company proposes the attached amendment to License Condition 3.F of Facility Operating License DPR-35.

The 10CFR170.12(c) required ' application fee of $150.00 will be electronically mailed to the NRC.

R. G. Bird d

I Attachment j JDK/amm/22:0 [

Commonwealth of Massachusetts)  :

County of Plymouth )

~f Then personally appeared before ~me, Ralph G. Bird, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Senior Vice President - Nuclear of Boston Edison Company and that he is duly authorized to execute and file the submittal contained herein ,

in'the name and on behalf of Boston Edison Company and that the statements in  !

said submittal are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

My commission expires: O/MI /f8 W -

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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY' c' . ..

U.'S... Nuclear Regulatory Commissioa Page 2

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cc: Mr. D. Mcdonald,' Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station Pl-137 Hashington DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road

-King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior NRC Resident Inspector Pilgrirs Nuclear Power Station Mr.. Robert M. Hallisey, Director Radiation Control Program Massachusetts Department of Public Health 150 Tremont Street, 2nd Floor Boston, HA 02111 w

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Attachment to BECo Letter Nc, 88- 120 Proposed Chance

'That Section 3.F of License No. DPR-35 be amended to include a reference to a supplementary NRC safety evaluation report prepared in support of this change.

Reason for Chance The NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) accompanying Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Technical Specification Amendment No. 35 documented PNPS compilance to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1. The SER is referenced in License Section 3.F. Section 4.13 of the SER identified fire barriers as providing 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> separation between redundant safety related systems or separation of areas with significant fire hazards.

During our current refueling outage (RF0 No. 7), a review was conducted of fire barriers including fire doors, fire dampers, and penetration seals. This review determined that existing documentation would not support verification 3 of a three hour rating for some of the barriers referenced in the SER. As a result, Fire Protection Engineering Evaluations (FPEE) were performed to determine the adequacy of the fire barriers.

Use of FPEE's for fire carrier ratings of less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> requires NRC approval because of the SER reference in the License Section 3.F.

Justification for Chance He have developed a process for conducting FPEE's which provides a formal and consistent methodology for verifying and documenting the adequacy of a specific fire protection system or feature. FPEE's have been used to document the acceptability of fire barriers with a fire rating of less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

FPEE's are composed of the following elements:

• Area configuration and occupancy.

• Combustible loading (in terms of equi /alent fire severity), extent and nature of combustibles, and continuity of combustibles.

• Safe Shutdown Systems.

e Other considerations. (Other topics are included, as appropriate, such as, fire protection features including detection and -

suppression, purpose of barrier, other factors that limit fire spread and reason for evaluation). {

i e Consequences of fire in an area. (This section includes the fire l hazards analysis, means of fire propagation, consequences, and i potential impact on safe shutdown capability). l

= Review and approval by a Fire Protection Engineer.

Enclosure 1 provides a listing of the fire barriers involved in this amendment request. This listing includes a description of the fire barriers, category, function, fire zones, safe shutdown trains in the zone, associated fire hazards, fire protection features, and the basis for acceptability. He have confirmed the adequacy of each fire barrier with respect to the fire hazards in the associated areas or that automatic suppression is present to prevent /

propagation.

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Evaluation and Determinatiol pf No Sian1'icant Hazards Considerations The Code of Federal Reaulations,10CFR50.91 requires that at the time a licensee requests an amendment, it must provide to the Commission its analysis, using the standards in 10CFR50.92, about the issue of no significant hazards consideration. Therefore, in accordance with 10CFR50.91 and 10CFR50.92 the following analysis has been performed.

1. Operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The level of defense a fire barrier must provide is directly tied to the equipment it protects, the function of the protected equipment, the fire hazards it protects against, and the ability to detect and suppress the fire.

FPEE's document actual fire barrier configuration, fire hazards associated -

with the areas separated by the barrier, pertinent fire protection features, and the consequences of a design basis fire. The FPEE is, by work instruction, reviewed and approved by a fire protection engineer.

An FPEE establishes that a fire barrier provides protection consistent with its ultimate design objective of preventing fire propagation or documents why a lesser rating is acceptable. By establishing that the barrier continues to meet its design function, it is also established that there is not a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified.

Hence, the proposed change to Licensing Condition 3.F by sanctioning the conclusions' established by the FPEE's, will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified.

2. Operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

As discussed in the above response, the FPEE process is a formal process used to establish that a fire barrier can perform its design function.

Since accident evaluations assume that selected equipment will perform in a predetermined way (design functions); the establishment of a fire barrier's ability to perform its design function of protecting areas and equiF9nt associated with accident evaluations includes it within the category of "accidents previously evaluated." Therefore operating Pilgrim Station according to the proposed change will not create the possibility of a new cr different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Failure of fire barriers poses a challenge to a margin of safety if the barriers cannot perform their design function; that is, they fail to protect equipment from the debilitating effects of fire. If barriers can be demonstrated capable of performing their design function using an acceptable and consistent methodology, the margin of safety is not reduced.

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FPEE's have demonstrated that the barriers impacted by the proposed

' License Condition change are capable of performing their design function.

Therefore, operating Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed

. ' change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This change has been reviewed and recommended by the Operations Review Committee,-and reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee.

Schedule of Change This change will be effective following-BECo's receipt of its approval by the Commission.

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Fire Hazard fEaulvalent Fire Detection /

Descriptiots Cateaorv Function Fire Zone Safe S/D Train Severity) Sunoression Basis for Accentability East Walt Battery "A" Separates Bettery Room ? Both Train B 2.4 less than 1.5 hrs; Detection both Wall rating exceeds hazards -

Room ~B- B ery Room - 2. 2.1 less than 1 hr. zones

, g ,g W-2.1 Switchgear Room *B' Switchgear Room Tr "A" Separates Switchgear Room Both Train W 2.1 less than 1 hr: 2.1 detection; Wall rating exceeds hazards -

West & South Walls Switchgear se,than 1 N. 2.6 autornats H r. Seal O3 suppress'on Room from Area - 2.6 Hydrogen SealOil Area Bstiery Room *B- A- Separates Battery Room - Both Train W 2.4 less than 1.5 hr; 2.4 detection; Wall rating exceeds hazards '

Battery Room 4 6 kss tMn 1 br. 2.6 auomath South Wall dr. Seal Oil from suppression Area - 2.6 Hydrogen SealOil Area A* Separates Stairway #10 - Bc.a Train T 2.6 tess than 1 hr.; 2.6 automatic Wail rating exceeds hazards Stairway #10 Walls at Stairway #10 3.10 less than I hr suppression; El. 23' dr. Seal OB from 3.10 None Area - 2.6 Hydrogen SealOil Aru .

l Aux. Boiler Room 1.26 Train 'Bk 126 less than 0.5 hr; 1.26 auto Wall rating exceeds hazards Aux. Boiler Room  :"A" Separates Aux. Boiler. -126 Corridor - None Corridor normally suppression in the South Wall Room from

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fuellines; Bldg. Corridor Corridor - None Page1 Enclosure 1 July 18,1988

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Fire Hazard (Eaulvalent Fire Detection /

MiloJ1 D Cateaorv Function Fire Zone Safe S/D Tra:n Severitv1 Sunoression - Basis for Accentability

- Control Room South "A and Separates Centrol Room - 3.1 Train'A'& F; 3.1 less than 0.5 hr ' 3.1 detecten in WaB rating exceeds hazards WaB T Control Room 3.1 2.16 Train 'A' 2.16 less than 0.5 hr required panels; Stairway #8-2.16 116- h from Stairway 28 Stairway s12 Wa!!s at A*and Separates Stairway #12 - 1.27 Train 'At tv less than 0.5 hr none- Wall rating exceeds hazards T Stairway #12 1.27 1.23 Train 'B' 1.23 Nss than 1 l'.r El 51* Fan Room #1 -

from Fer; 1.23 Room #1 "A" Separates Storage - 2.5 All(3) Train F 2.5 greater than 3 hr 2.5 & 2.7 - Suppression in Zones 2.5 &

Turbine Lube Od Resevoir Wall Lube Oil Res. Reservoir - 2.7 2.7 greater than 3 hr automatic 2.7; Wall rating exceeca "den 1 2.8 lera than 0.5 hr suppression hazards in Zone 2.8.

ervoir area & n _ 8 Storage Tank 2.8 None Room from Condensate Pump Area

'A and Separates Control Room - 3.1 Train *A* & F; 3.1 less than 0.5 hr 3.1 detection in Wall rating exceeds hazard:

Control Room Wall H- 1.23 Train "B' 1.23 less than 1 hr. required panels; Control Room Fire Area 3.1 Stairway 26 - Fire 1.23 - None (Kitchen Zone 1.23 Area) from Stairway #6 of Fire Zone 1.23 Train 'A' Pumps - Trains A". T and "X" 5.1 less than 0.5 hr none Wall rating exceeds hazards Salt Servce Water "A"and Separates T redundant Fire, A,rea 5.1; 5.2 less than 0.5 h-Pump Room Wa!!s P salt service 5.3 less than 0.5 hr krbrea5 water pumps Train T Pumps -

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(Eaulvalent Fire Detection pescription Cattoory Functiors Fire Zone Safe S/D Train Severity) Suporession Basis for Accentobility Computer Room East A- Separates Computer Room - 3.3 - None: 3.3 less than 0.5 hr 3.3 - detodion and Wall rating exceeds hazards Wall Computer 3.3; 3.9 Train "A- 3.9 less than 0.5 hr automatic Corridor #137 -

Room from 3.9 swession

% 3.9 - None Corridor #137 Vital MG Set Roo .. A- Separates Vital MG Set BothTrain A- 3.5 less than 1 hr 3.5 - detection; Wall rating exceeds hazards Vital MG Set Room - 3.5 2.16 less than 0.5 hr 2.16 - r.one South Wall Stairway #8 - 2.16 Room from Stairway #8 b &

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July 18,1988