A04048, Rev 1 to Fuel Handling Accident During Reconstitution

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Rev 1 to Fuel Handling Accident During Reconstitution
ML20212D544
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/10/1999
From: Gryczkowski G, Mihalcik J, Sommerville I
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20212D542 List:
References
CA04048, CA04048-R01, NUDOCS 9909230163
Download: ML20212D544 (37)
v • d • e


Text

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, L. _ c Engineering Service Process Overview EN-1-100 Revision i1

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ATTACIIMENT 19, CALCULATION COVER SIIEET INITIATION (Control Doc Type - DCALC) Page 1 of 37 DCALC No.: CA04048 Revision No. I Vendor Calculation (Check one): 0 Yes 5 No ESP: ES199701640 Supp No.: 0 Rev.No.: 0 Responsible Group: NEU Responsible Engineer: Gerard E. Gryczkowski CALCULATION ENGINEERING [ Civil DISCIPLINE: Electrical

[ Instr & Controls Mechanical 8 Nuc Engrg Diesel Gen Project

[ Life Cycle Mngmt [ ReliabilityEngrg [ NucFuelMngmt Other

Title:

Fuel Handling Accident during Reconstitution i Unit UNIT 1 UNIT 2 COMMON ,

)

Proprietary or Safeguards Calculation: YES NO Comments: NA Vendor Calc No.: NA REVISION NO.: NA i

Vendor Name: NA Safety Class (Check One): SR O AQ NSR There are assumptions that require Verification during walkdown: AIT #: NA This calculation SUPERSEDES: CA04048 Rev.0 REVIEW AND APPROVAL Responsible Engineer: Gerard E. Gryczkowski , Date: 09/10/99 Independent Reviewer: Ian M. Sommervill Date: 9-N 47 Responsible Engineer: Joseph A. Mihalcik 41 h - Date: Jo La193 f

9909230163 990920 PDR ADOCK 05000317 p PDR j

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4 CA04048 Rev.1 Page 2

2. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES /

Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Rev Rev Rev Rev Rev 001. 1 002 1 003 1 004 1 005 1 006 1 007 1 008 1 009 1 010 1 011 1 012 1 313 1 014 1 015 1 016 1 017 1 018 1 019 1 020 1 021 0 022 0 023 0 024 0 025 0 j 026 0 027 0 028 0 029 0 030 0 ]

031 0 032 0 033 0 034 0 035 0 1

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3. REVIEWER COMMEN,TS bl w Ni MA% +Q M M Yu b M % N

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  • l CA04048 Rev.1 Page 4 l i 1

.4. TABLE OF CONTENTS l i

-01.COVERSHEET..................................................................................................................I

02. L I ST OF E FFECTIV E PAG ES .. . . ... .. . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. ... . . . ... . . . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . 2
03. REVI EWER C OM M ENTS .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . . . . .. . ..... . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . .. .. . . . .. . . .. . ... .. .. . ... .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
04. TAB L E OF CONTENTS . .... . .... .. ... .. . .. . . . . . . ... ... . ... . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 4 ,

a 0 5 . INTRO D U CTI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ,

1 1

06.INPUTDATA.....................................................................................................................7  !

0 7. TEC HNICAL A S S UMPTI ON S . .... .. . .. . . .. . . . . . .. .. . .. . . .. ... . . . . .. . . .. . . .... . . . . . .. . . . .. .. .... . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 9 0 8 . RE F E REN C E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

09. M ETHO D S O F AN ALY S I S . . . . . . .. . . . . .... . .. . .. .. ... . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . ... . . . . .. ... . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 0. C A L C U L ATI ON S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES................................................... ........... I 8 12.RESULTS..........................................................................................................................19 1 3 . C ON C LU S I ON S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0
14. ATTA C HM ENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 ATTACHMENT A: EXCEL SPREADSHEET FHA ACTIVITI ES . . . . .. . . . . . .. . ... . . .. . . . .. ... ... .. . . .. . . . ...... .... .. .. .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 ATTACHMENT B: EXCEL SPREADSHEET FHA ACTIVITIES DURING RECOMBINATION......................... 23 ATI'ACHM ENT C: S FP DI AG RAM .. ........... .............. ....... ............ .. ...... .. ........... .. .. . .. .. . . 2 5 ATTACHMENT D: IODINE DF CALCULATION FOR 23' WATER.... ..... .................. 27 ATTACHMENT E: IODINE DF CALCULATION FOR 20.4' WATER.......................... 29 ATTACHMENT F: FUEL ROD PIN PRESSURE AT 100 HOURS................................. 31 ATTACHMENT G: FUEL ROD PIN PRESSURE AT 100 HOURS NON C ON S E RVATI V E).. .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 l L AST PAGE O F RE PO RT. .. . . . . . ... .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. ... .. . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7
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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 5

5. INTRODUCTION Chapter 14.18 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) presents the licensing basis ,

. evaluation of the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA), which is assumed to occur in the spent fuel  ;

pool (SFP) handling area or in the containment by dropping a fuel assembly during fuel i movement operations. All 176 rods from the highest power fuel assembly are damaged in the FHA.

An analysis of the FHA to support fuel movement in the containment with both doors of the ,

personnel air lock (PAL) in the open position per Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.9.4 was 1 performed in Ref.l. Similarly, an analysis of the FHA to support fuel movement in the SFP with the SFP filtration system in operation per TS 3/4.9.12 was performed in Ref.2. These calculations constitute the current licensing basis for the analysis of the FHA in the containment i and in the SFP. Based on Refs.1-2, the most limiting FHA would occur in the refueling pool area I of containment with the PAL doors open.

The NRC requested additional information regarding the control room doses that would result from fuel movement in containment with the PAL doors open. Ref.3 documented the FHA control room analysis, which calculated a 30-day control room thyroid dose of 47.94 Rem, which j exceeds the regulatory limits of 30 Rem thyroid xr 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC19. However, Ref.3 also determined that the operators wou d have approximately 3.89 hours0.00103 days <br />0.0247 hours <br />1.471561e-4 weeks <br />3.38645e-5 months <br /> to initiate protective measures to remain within regulatory dose limits. This was reported to the NRC in Ref.4. Subsequently, the NRC issued approval of CCNPP's FHA analysis in Ref.5 and interim approval of CCNPP's control room habitability analysis in Ref.6.

Ref.7 analyzed the offsite and control room doses from a FHA assuming high burnup fuel isotopics, ICRP 30 dose conversion factors (DCFs), ARCON96 generated atmospheric dispersion coefficients (X/Qs) to the control room inlet damper, and a 730 cfm control room inleakage.

l Ref.8 re-analyzed control room habitability for the containment and SFP fuel handling accidents

based on high burnup fuel isotopics, ICRP 30 DCFs, ARCON96 generated atmospheric l

dispersion coefficients to the west road inlet plenum assuming that the auxiliary building roof above the control room and room A512 are sealed, and a 2000 cfm control room mleakage. Note that for all cases the control room doses are less than the 10 CFR 50 App.A GDC 19 thyroid and whole body dose limits of 30 and 5 rem, respectively and that the site boundary and low population zone doses are less than the 10 CFR 100 thyroid and whole body dose limits of 300 and 25 rem, respectively. Note that the consequences of a FHA in the SFP are bounded by those of a FHA in containment.

The current work re-analyzes control room habitability for a SFP fuel handling accident during l spent fuel reconstitution. The Nuclear Fuel Management Unit seeks changes to their fuel l handling procedures, which would permit the reconstitution of one or more fuel assemblies to

' proceed simultaneously with fuel movement in the SFP. Reconstitution of assemblies would take place in individual SFP storage racks with spent fuel assemblies placed on rack spacers and with their upper end fittings removed. In such a configuration, the structural integrity of the fuel j assembly is reduced. Fuel pins may be damaged if a fuel assembly in the spent fuel handling machine (SFHM) is dropped on top of an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed.

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,t e CA04048 Rev.1 Page 6 l

) The probability for this accident is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations l placed on fuel handling operations.

(1) The SFHM will clear the top of any assembly placed on a rack spacer without striking it.

(2) Similarly, if the SFHM is carrying a raised assembly, the raised assembly will not strike assemblies placed on rack spacers per administrative controls in FH-340 and OI-25A. l (3) Fuel damage could occur if a raised fuel assembly or a heavy object is dropped on top of an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed. However, administrative controls will limit movement of any objects in the reconstitution area only via the single-failure-proof crane, if assemblies are seated on rack spacers with their upper end fittings removed.

l The worst case FHA is the dropping of a heavy object on a fuel assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed. Refs.1-6 assume a total iodine decontamination factor of 100 based on a minimum water depth of 23' per Ref.9. In the refueling pool this assumption is preserved by Technical Specification 3/4.9.10, which requires 23' of water above fuel assemblies seated in the reactor core. In the SFP, Technical Specification 3/4.9.11 only requires 21.5' of water above fuel assemblies seated in the SFP storage racks. This Technical Specification was deemed sufficient to preserve the required 23' of water because a FHA was assumed to occur as a fuel assembly strikes the bottom of the SFP. An energy impact analysis documented in the UFSAR showed that a fuel assembly striking another assembly within the rack end-to-end would not damage any_ fuel pins. When assemblies are placed on rack spacers and their upper end fittings are removed, a FHA from a dropped heavy object would violate the 23' of water assumption.

This analysis calculates a revised decontamination factor of 64 for a FHA during reconstitution with 20.4' of water between the top of the pin and the surface of the water and computes a new decay time for the revised offsite and control room doses to be bounded by the results of Refs.1, 2, and 8. The minimum time for reconstitution to occur is 10 days after shutdown.

Ref.9 also requires a pin pressure less than 1200 psig for a decontamination factor consistent  ;

with the methodology of Ref.9. 'Ihis is verified in this work via the calculations of Attaclunent F, which yield a peak pm pressure at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown ofless than 1000 psia.

7 CA04048 Rev.1

! Page 7

6. INPUT DATA The input data to determine the control room dose from a Fuel Handling Accident are the following:

(01) Initial thermal power is 2754 MWt (UFSAR 3.2.1/Ref.10).

(02) The power peaking factor is 1.65 (Ref.9).

(03) Fuel movement does not occur until 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown per TS 3/4.9.3.

(04) The containment volume is assumed to be 1.989E+06 ft' per UFSAR Table 14.20-3 and Ref.11. 72.73% of this volume comprises the sprayed region per Ref.12.

(05) The isotopic source terms (CI/MWT) were extracted from Ref.13 and are consistent with TID-14844 methodology (Ref.14). The isotopic decay constants (1/sec) were also extracted from Ref.13.

SOURCE : DECAY Isotope CI/MWT 1/SEC I-131 2.508E+04 9.976E-07 I-132 3.806E+04 8.425E-05 I-133 5.622E+04 9.211E-06 I-134 6.575E+04 2.200E-04 I-135 5.103E+04 2.912E-05 XE-131M 2.595E+02 6.815E-07 XE-133M 1.384E+03 3.663E-06 XE-133 5.622E+04 ' l.528E-06 XE-135M 1.557E+04 7.380E-04 XE-135 5.363E+04 2.115E-05 XE-137 5.103E+04 3.024E-03 XE-138 4.775E+04 8.151E-04 KR-83M 4.152E+03 1.052E-04 KR-85M 1.297E+04 4.297E-05 KR-85 4.102E+02 2.054E-09 KR-87 2.335E+04 1.514E-04 KR-88 3.200E+04 6.731E-05 KR-89 3.979E+04 3.632E-03 (06) Per Refs.1,2,15, and 16, damaged fuel rods are assumed to release their gas gap activities consisting of the following isotopes:

12 % I-131 10% other iodines 30% Kr-85 10% other noble gases (07) Per Ref.9 for 23' of water and 1200 psig pin pressure, the iodine gap activity is composed of i 99.75% inorganic species and 0.25% organic species ofiodine. The pool decontamination factors

!L are 133 for the inorganic iodine and I for the organic iodine, yielding an overall effective decontamination factor of 100. This difference in decontamination factor for inorganic and organic iodine species results in the iodine above the fuel pool being composed of 75% inorganic and 25% organic species.

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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 8

' (08) The decontamination factor of noble gases in the pool is unity per Ref.9.

(09) Bottom of fuel assembly in SFHM at normal up limit: 46' O.625" (Ref.17)

.(10) Length of fuel assembly: 157.241"(Ref.18)

' (11) Distance from top of fuel assembly to top of fuel rod: 7.266" (Ref.18)

(12) Distance from SFP floor to top of SFP racks: 1815/8" (Ref.19)

(13) Distance from SFP floor to bottom of assembly in storage: 12 5/8" (Ref.19)

(14) Elevation of SFP floor: 30' (Ref.20)

(15) Height of reconstitution rack spacers: 20.5" (Ref.21)

(16) Additional inputs and references are defined in the Attachments and are not repeated here.

CA04048 Rev.1 Page 9 j 7. TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS The following technical assumptions were utilized in this work:

(01) All 176 rods from only one fuel assembly will be damaged in the FHA. Administrative l

controls ensure that the assumption of 176 niptured fuel pins bounds any credible FHA. The 176 '

damaged rods are conservatively assumed to all be from the maximum power assembly in the core.

(02) No credit is taken for deposition of the plume on the ground or decay ofisotopes in transit.

(03) Buildup of daughter nuclides is not taken into account as source term nuclides decay per Ref.9.

(04) No credit is taken for plateout.

(05) The reaction ofiodine with the zircalloy cladding is conservatively neglected.

(06) The vapor pressure limitation on the gas phase concentration is conservatively neglected.

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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 10

8. REFERENCES j (01)" Revaluation of Fuel Handling Accident Supporting Both Personnel Air Lock Doors Open During Fuel Movement - Open Door Policy",000-DA-9302 Rev.1,10/13/93.

1 (02)"Offsite Doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary Associated with a Fuel Handling Accident in the Spent Fuel Pool Area", NC-94-030 Rev.1,12/22/94.

(03)" Control Room Doses from a Fuel Handling Accident", NS-94-009,3/2/94.

(04)" Supplement to License Amendment Request: Personnel Air Lock Open During Core Alterations", NRC-94-018,3/94.

(05)" Safety Evaluation by the Office of NRR Related to Amendment Numbers 194 and 171",

Correspondence NRC to BGE,8/31/94.

(06)" Control Room Habitability Interim Analysis for Thyroid Dose", Correspondence NRC to l BGE,6/22/95.

(07) "Offsite and Control Room Doses from a FHA in Containment and in the Spent Fuel Pool",

CA03960,11/17/97.

(08) "Offsite and Control Room Doses from a Fuel Handling Accident in Containment and in the Spent Fuel Pool with 2000 CFM Inleakage", CA04047,12/23/97.

(09)" Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a FHA in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for BWRs and PWRs", Safety Guide 25,3/23/72. l (10) " Power Levels of Nuclear Power Plants", Regulatory Guide 1.49 Rev.1,12/73.

(11) Bechtel letter from A.J. Arnold to C.H.Poindexter,4/4/75, CDCC#63854.

(12)"Offsite and Control Room Doses Following a LOCA", Bechtel Calculation M-89-33 Rev.3, 7/9/91.

(13) LOCADOSE NE319 Rev.3.

(14)" Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites", TID-14844,3/23/62.

(15)" Approval for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Fuel Pin Burnup Limit of 60 MWD /KG", NRC l

to G.C. Creel, Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318,7/6/92.

(16)" Generic Approval of CE Topical Report CEN-386-P", NRC to A.E.Scherer (CE),6/22/92.

(17)" Installation Spent Fuel Handling Machine", BGE DWG 15534-0001 Sh.3, Rev.7.

(18)" Fuel Bundle Assembly", BGE DWG 12131-0250, Rev.1 (19)"10X10 Fuel Storage Rack", BGE DWG 13939-37, Rev.4.

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- CA04048 Rev.1 Page11 (20)"SFP Floor Shim Plate Arrangement for High Density Speny Fuel Rack Plan and Details",

BGE DWG 63-876, Rev.l. .

(21)" Storage Rack Spacers (BG&E)", BGE DWG E-FIST-501-099 Sh.1, Rev.l.

(22) " Nuclear Reactor Analysis", J.J.Duderstadt and L.J. Hamilton, John Wiley & Sons Inc,1976.

(23)"Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Fuel Performance with RCS Flow Reduction", CA03512, 1/16/97.

(24) " Handbook of Chemistry and Physics - 61st Edition", CRC Press, 1980-1981.

(25) "Worksheet Calculations for WSES-3", File: 311-05,5/82.

(26)" Dry Storage Cladding Temperature Limits for the 24P NUHOMS System Using CSFSM Model Presented in PNL-6189", Nutech Calculation BGE001.0403,2/14/89. ,

(27)" Evaluation of Fission Product Release and Transport for a Fuel Handling Accident",

G. Burley,10/5/71.

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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 12

9. METHODS OF ANALYSIS The current work re-analyzes control room habitability for a SFP fuel handling accident during spent fuel reconstitution. The Nuclear Fuel Management Unit seeks changes to their fuel handling procedures, which would permit the reconstitution of one or more fuel assemblies to proceed simultaneously with fuel movement in the SFP. Reconstitution of assemblies would take place in individual SFP storage racks with spent fuel assemblies placed on rack spacers and with their upper end fittings removed. In such a configuration, the structural integrity of the fuel assembly is reduced. Fuel pins may be damaged if a fuel assembly in the spent fuel handling machine (SFHM) is dropped on top of an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed.

The probability for this accident is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations placed on fuel handling operations.

(1) The SFHM will clear the top of any assembly placed on a rack spacer without striking it.

(2) Similarly, if the SFHM is carrying a raised assembly, the raised assembly will not strike i assemblies placed on rack spacers per administrative controls in FH-340 and OI-25A. 1 (3) Fuel damage could occur if a raised fuel assembly or a heavy object is dropped on top of an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed. However, administrative controls will limit movement of any objects in the reconstitution area only via the single-failure-proof crane, if assemblies are seated on rack spacers with their upper end fittings removed.

The worst case FHA is the dropping of a heavy object on a fuel assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed. Refs.1-6 assume a total iodine decontamination factor of 100 based on a minimum water depth of 23' per Ref.9. In the refueling pool this assumption is preserved by Technical Specification 3/4.9.10, which requires 23' of water above fuel assemblies seated in the reactor core. In the SFP, Technical Specification 3/4.9.11 only requires 21.5' of water above fuel assemblies seated in the SFP storage racks. This Technical Specification was deemed sufficient to preserve the required 23' of water because a FHA was assumed to occur as a fuel assembly strikes the bottom of the SFP. An energy impact analysis documented in the UFSAR showed that a fuel assembly striking another assembly within the rack end-to-end would not damage any fuel pins. When assemblies are placed on rack spacers and their upper end fittings are removed, a FHA from a dropped heavy object would violate the 23' of water assumption.

This analysis calculates a revised decontamination factor of 64 for a FHA during reconstitution with 20.4' of water between the top of the pin and the surface of the water and computes a new decay time for the revised offsite and control room doses to be bounded by the results of Refs.1, 2, and 8. The minimum time for reconstitution to occur is 10 days after shutdown.

L Ref.9 also requires a pin pressure less than 1200 psig for a decontamination factor consistent with the methodology of Ref.9. This is verified in this work via the calculations of Attachment F, which yield a peak pm pressure at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown ofless than 1000 psia.

l l- This was accomplished via the following:

(1) Attachment C depicts a cross-sectional view of the SFHM with an assembly at the normal l

l' up limit in relation to a normal assembly in the SFP racks and elevated assemblies with and without upper end fittings. The SFHM and its assembly will always clear the assemblies seated in the racks.

(2) EXCEL spreadsheets were developed in Attachments D and E to calculate the DF for 23' of water and 20.4' of water. The DF decreases from 100 to 64 with the decreased coverage.

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I . CA04048 Rev.1 Page 13 (3) EXCEL spreadsheets were developed in Attachments A and B to calculate the decay time required to compensate for the decreased DF. Increasing the decay time from 100 to 240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br /> will compensate for a decrease in DF from 100 to 64.

(4) An EXCEL spreadsheet was developed in Attachment F to calculate the peak pin pressure at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown.

(2) EXCEL SPREADSHEET METHODOLOGY TO CALCULATE DF The methodology of Ref.27 was utilized to calculate DF in Attachments D and E, which present the methodology in detail.

DF=l/(IFO/DFO+IFI/DFI)

DFI=exp(6*K,,*H/da/v3,3)

K,g=11(1/(K,+K,)+1./(K,*P))

K i =1.13*(Do*v 3,3/da)i/2 K,=3.75E-:

  • v3,3 K,=1.646*Do/d 3,3 v 3,3=29.86*V 3,3 '" Bubble velocity where IFO=0.0025 Organic iodine fraction Ref.27 IFI=0.9975 Inorganic iodine fraction Ref.27 DFO=1.0000 Organic DF - Ref.27 deia=0.97536 -cm CladID UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 P=10 Instantaneous partition factor Ref.27 Do=0.278 cm/sec 12 diffusivity in He .Ref.27 Do=1.27E-05 cm/secI2 diffusivity in water Ref.27 V 3,3=6.9261 cm3 Bubble volume d3,3=2.3650 cm Bubble diameter Assumed

. Attachment D is the base case, which results in an overall DF of 100 for a water depth of 23', an instantaneous partition factor of 10, and a bubble diameter of 2.365 cm. Note that the bubble diameter was picked to yield the correct DF. Attachment E is the same case except with a water depth of 20.4', which can be calculated via l

H = 21.5' - 20.5"/12 + 7.266"/12 = 20.40' l

- where 21.5' is the minimum water depth for assemblies seated in the SFP racks per Tech Spec 3/4.9.11,- 20.5". is the spacer height per Ref.21, and 7.266" is the distance from the top of a fuel assembly to the top of a fuel rod per Ref.18.

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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 14

) . (3) EXCEL SPREADSHEET METHODOLOGY TO CALCULATE FHA ACTIVITY:

The initial isotopic activity in Curies released to the containment for isotope 'i' is based on the following algorithm based on TID-14844 (Ref.13):

Ago = ATID,

  • P
  • PPF
  • RFi / NASSM / DF,
  • exp(-b
  • to
  • 3600.)

where ATID, = Isotopic activity per unit power (Ci/MWT)

P = Core power (MWT)  ;

PPF = Power peaking factor RF, = Isotopic gas gap release fraction DF, = Isotopic decontamination factor 4 = Isotopic decay constant (1/sec) to = Time from power shutdown to FHA (hr)

NASSM = Number of assemblies in core = 217 2

The correspondig isotopm activity density in Ci/m released to the containment for isotope 'i' is Pcio = 6 / V, where -

V, = Containment volume (m )

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(4) EXCEL SPREADSHEET TO CALCULATE PEAK PIN PRESSURE Attachment F calculates the equilibrium fuel temperatures in the fuel, gas gap, and clad for the following cases:

(i) A pin at 100% full power and 1.0 peaking factor (ii) A pin at 1% full power and 1.0 peaking factor (iii) A pin at 1% full power and 1,7 peaking factor via the methodology of Ref.22.

q'= Power *PPF/(217* 176*L)= Linear power density (W/cm) dtrs =q'/(4*n*Kr)=Temperatur- drop across the fuel dT,,,=q'/(2*n*R/H,)" Temperature drop across the gas gap dToa=q'*Tc/(2*n*R/K,)= Temperature drop across the clad dT,,i=q'/(2*n*H,*(R +T,))=

r Temperature drop from clad to coolant dT=q'/(2*n)*[l/(2*Kr) + 1/(R,*H,) + T/(R,*K,) + 1/H/(Rr+T,)]= Total temperature drop

]

1 Tog,,a,=Ta+dT,i j Tog,,,,,=Toa.i,+dToa T,,, i,=To,4 .,

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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 15 T,,, =T,,, i,+dT,,,

Tr i i.=T,,,,,,

Troi. =Tr i i +dTr ,,

T,ia=(T,ia.;,+T,ia .)/2 i T,,,=(T,,, i,+T,,r..)/2 4

Tr i=(Troi.i.+Tr i..)/2 where K i=0.024 W/cm-K Ref.22 Ri=0.4782 cm UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 R,=0.4877 cm UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 H =1.1 W/cm2-K Ref.22 T,,=0.07112 cm UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 K,=0.22 W/cm-K Ref.24 H,=4.5 W/cm2-K Ref.22 Powet=2.754E+09 W @ 100% Full Power UFSAR 3.2.1 - Ref.10 PPF= Power Peaking Factor =1.7 or 1.0 L-fuel 347.2180 cm Ref.18 L- in 373.9617 cm Ref.18 al ha-Zr4 5.84E-66./K Ref.25 al a-UO2 1.07E-05./K Ref.25 Tcool=548 'F for Case (i) UFSAR Fig.4.9

=70 'F for Case (ii) Ref.23

=140 *F for Case (iii) Tech Specs Table 1.1 Note that from Ref.23 J

P = 2162.5 psia @ 603 "F Case (i)

P,,,,,

, = 850.7 psia @ 70 'F Case (ii)

Note that from Ref.26 ,

P,,, = 2140. psia @ 619 'F Case (i)

Using the following algorithm (Ideal Gas Law) for pressure  !

Ps .p2 = P,,,i * (Tg e+459.67)/(T,,,i+459.67)*V,,,i/V .p2 s

where -

V,ia(T) = x

  • R 2* L,i, * (1+ alpha-Zr4*(T-70)*5/9)'

Vr.i(T) = x

  • R,3
  • Lr,i _*(1+ alpha-UO2*(T-70)*5/9)5 V,,, = V,ia - Vr i the following gap pressure-temperature values can be ascertained:

CA04048 Rev.1 Page 16

' ~

- P,, = 872.2 ph @ 71 'F Case (ii)

P,, = 993.4 psia @ 142 *F ;' Case (iii),

The calculated Case (ii) results are close to the Ref.23 values, thus verifying the methodology.

The CaLe (iii) results indicate a maximum 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> pin pressure less than 1000 psia.

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4 CA04048 Rev.1 Page 17

10. CALCULATIONS The following calculations were performed in this calculational package

(1) EXCEL spreadsheets were developed in Attachments A and B to calculate the decay time required to compensate for the decreased DF.

(2) Attachment C depicts a cross-sectional view of the SFHM with an assembly at the normal up limit in relation to a normal assembly in the SFP racks and elevated assemblies with and without upper end fittings. The SFHM and its assembly will always clear the assemblies seated in the racks.

(3) EXCEL spreadsheets were developed in Attachments D and E to calculate the DF for 23' of water and 20.4' of water.

(4) An EXCEL spreadsheet was developed in Attachment F to calculate the peak pin pressure 3

at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown.

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! CA04048 Rev.1 Page 18

11. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES

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All calculations were developed on an EXCEL spreadsheet.

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i CA04048 Rev.1 Page 19.

12. RESULTS;

- The results of this calculation are as follows:

(1) Attachment C depicts a cross-sectional view of the SFHM with an assembly at the normal up limit in relation to a normal assembly in the SFP racks and elevated assemblies with and without upper end fittings. The SFHM and its assembly will always clear the assemblies seated in the racks.

(2) EXCEL spreadsheets were developed in Attachments D and E to calculate the DF for 23' of water and 20.4' of water. The DF decreases from 100 to 64 with the decreased coverage.

(3) EXCEL spreadsheets were developed in Attachments A and B to calculate the decay time i rec uired to compensate for the decreased DF. Increasing the decay time from 100 to 240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br /> wi .1 compensate for a decrease in DF from 100 to 64.

- (4) An EXCEL spreadsheet was developed in Attachment F to calculate the peak pin pressure at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown. The maximum pin pressure at 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown is less than 1000 psia.

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CA04048 Rev.1 Page 20

13. CONCLUSIONS The worst case accident that can occur in the SFP with assemblies seated on rack spacers with their upper end fittings removed is for an object to fall on one such assembly breaking all 176

. exposed pins. This is very conservative, because an assembly in the SFHM will not interfere with assemblies seated on rack spacers and because administrative controls and the single-failure proof crane will preclude heavy objects falling on an exposed assembly.

For an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end fitting removed, the water covering over the exposed pins will be 20.4', decreasing the decontamination factor from 100 for 23' of water covering to 64 for 20.4' of water covering. To remain bounded by current analyses for 1 control room and offsite dose, assemblies should not be put on the rack spacers and have their l upper end fittings removed until at least 10 days post-shutdown. 4 l

Regulatory Guide 1.25 also requires that the pin pressure be less than 1200 psig for the DF methodology to remain valid. At 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> post shutdown, the peak pin pressure will be below 1000 psia, thus validating the current methodology. -

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CA04048 Rev.0 Page 21 *

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'4. ATTACIIMENTS -

i ATTACHMENT A EXCEL SPREADSHEET l FHA ACTIVITIES l

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FHA-ACT 0)o&W non g

A l B l C D E l F G I 1

FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT ACTIVnY 2

3 POWER 2754 MWT

  • 4 PPF 1.65 5 TIME-OFF 100 HRS 6 VOLC 1.9890E+06 CF 56322.2079 M3 0.02831685 7

8 TID-14844 REL DF CTMT CTMT DECAY 9 Cl/MWT FRAC ACTIVITY ACTIVITY CONSTANT 10 Cl Cl/M3 1/SEC 11 1-131 2.508E+04 0.120 100 4.401E+02 7.814E-03 9.976E-07 12 1-132 3.806E+04 0.100 100 5.362E-11 9.520E-16 8.425E-05 13 1-133 5.622E+04 0.100 100 4.273E+01 7.587E-04 9.211E-06 14 l-134 6.575E+04 0.100 100 5.530E-32 9.819E-37 2.200E-04 15 l-135 5.103E+04 0.100 100 2.992E-02 5.313E-07 2.912E-05

  • 16 XE-131M 2.595E+02 0.100
  • 1 4.252Et02 7.549E-03 6.815E-07 17 XE-133M 1.384E+03 0.100 1 7.752E+02 1.376E-02 3.6E3E-06 18 XE-133 5.622E+04 0.100 6.792E+04 1 1.206E+00 1.528E-06 19 XE-135M 1.557E+04 0.100 1 1.349E-111 2.395E-116 7.380E-04 20 XE-135 5.363E+04 0.100 5.542E+01 1 9.840E-04 2.115E-05 21 XE-138 4.775E+04 0.100 3.650E-123 1 6.481E-128 8.151E-04 22 KR-83M 4.152E+03 0.100 3.102E-13 1 5.508E-18 1.052E-04 23 KR-85M 1.297E+04 0.100 5.197E-03 1 9.227E-08 4.297E-05 24 KR-85 4.102E+02 0.300 2.575E+03 1 4.572E-02 2.054E-09 25 KR-87 2.335E+04 0.100 1.043E-19 1 1.853E-24 1.514E-04 26 KR-88 3.200E+04 0.100 2.007E-06 1 3.563E-11 6.731 E-05 i

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CA04048 Rev.0 Page 23 ATTACHMENT B .

FHA ACTIVITIES DURING RECOMBINATION 4

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r,,..

Choywr stem FHA-ACT-REC f7 M i

i A l B l C l D E F G l 1 FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT ACTIVITY {

( 2 j 3 POWER 2754 MWT t 4 PPF 1.65 5 TIME-OFF 240 HRS 6 VOLC 1.9890E+06 CF 56322.2079 M3 0.02831685 7

8 TID-14844 REL DF CTMT CTMT DECAY 9 Cl/MWT FRAC ACTIVITY ACTIVITY CONSTANT 10 Cl C1/M3 1/SEC 11 1-131 2.508E+04 0.120 64 4.159E+02 7.384E-03 9.976E-07 12 1-132 3.806E+04 0.100 64 3.035E-29 5.388E-34 8.425E-05 13 1-133 5.622E+04 0.100 64 6.434E-01 1.142E-05 9.211 E-06 ,

14 l-134 6.575E+04 0.100 64 6.054E-80 1.075E-84 2.200E-04 16 l-135 5.103E+04 0.100 64 1.977E-08 3.509E-13 2.912E-05 '

. 16 XE-131M 2.595E+02 0.100 1 3.016E+02 5.355E-03 6.815E-07 17 XE-133M 1.384E+03 0.100 1 1.224E+02 2.173E-03 3.663E-06 18 XE-133 5.622E+04 0.100 1 3.144E+04 5.583E-01 1.528E-06 19 XE-135M - 1.557E+04 0.100 1 3.919E-273 6.959E-278 7.380E-04 20 XE-135 5.363E+C4 0.100 1 1.301 E-03 2.310E-08 2.115E-05 21 XE-138 4.775E+04 0.100 1 1.411E-301 2.506E-306 8.151 E-04 22 KR-83M 4.152E+03 0.100 1 2.917E-36 5.180E-41 1.052E-04 23 KR-85M 1.297E+04 0.100 1 2.043E-12 3.627E-17 4.297E-05 24 KR-85 4.102E+02 0.300 1 2.572E+03 4.567E-02 2.054E-09 25 KR-87 2.335E+04 0.100 1 7.575E-53 1.345E-57 1.514E-04 26 KR-88 3.200E+04 0.100 1 3.710E-21 6.587E-26 6.731 E-05 1

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CA04048 Rev.0 l Page 25 ATTACHMENT C -

SFP DIAGRAM l l

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CA04048 Rev.0 Page 27 -

ATTACHMENT D -

IODINE DF CALCULATION FOR 23' WATER 4

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  • hy.'D DF' &

lodine decontamination Factor Calculation l l '

l The decontamination factor (DF) is defined as the ratio of the initial iodine concentration to the final I iodine concentration. Gas transfer frem a bubble into the surrounding liquid occurs by successivi processes of gas phase diffusion, transfer across the bubble interface, and solution in the liquid phase.

The most important parameters in the evaluation of mass transfer characterics include the bubble dimenplons, contact time, and the partition factor. The following calculations are conservative in that '

the reaction of iodine with zircaloy and the vapor pressure limitation on the gas phase concentration are neglected.

IFO 0.0025 Organic iodine fraction Ref.27 .

IFl 0.9975 Inorganic iodine fraction Ref.27 DFO 1.0000 Organic DF Ref.27 )

d-clad 0.97536 cm Clad ID UFSAR Tab 3.31 ^

P 10 Instantaneous partition factor Ref.27 l DG 0.278 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in He Ref.27

  • DL 1.27E-05 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in water Ref.27 V-bub 6.9261 cm3 Bubble volume ,

d-bub - 2.3650 cm Bubble diameter Assumed I

v-bub =29.86*V-bub ^(1/6) Bubble velocity - -

v-bub 41.2261 cm/sec Ref.27 Ko=1.646*DG/d-bub Ref.27 Ko 0.1935 cm/sec Kc=3.75E-3*v-bub . For turbulent flow Ref.27 Ko 0.1546 cm/sec -

Kl=1.13*(DL*v-bub /d-bub)^(1/2) . Ref.27 K! 0.0168 cm/sec Keff=11(1./(Ko+Kc)+1./(Kl*P)) Ref.27 Keff 0.1134 H 23.0000 ft 701.0400 cm '

DFl=exp(6*Keff*H/d-bub /v-bub) Ref.27 DFl 133 l

DF=1/(IFO/DFO+1FI/DFI) Ref.27 I DF l 100  !

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I CA04048 Rev.0 Page 29 -

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ATTACHMENT E '

IODINE DF CALCULATION FOR 20.4' WATER

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L.. -

DF ChMr ko g,)Q lodine decontamination Factor Calculation I- I I

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lodine concentration. Gas transfer from a bubble int nal ve

/

The most important parameters in the evaluation of me dimensions, contact time, and the partition factor. T%e following a calculations the reaction neglected. of lodine with zircaloy and the vapor pressure limitation on are on the gas p IFO 0.0025 Organiciodine fraction IFl 0.9975 Ref.27 DFO Inorganic lod;ne fraction I 1.0000 Ref.27 I Organic DF d-clad . _ 0.97536 cm Pe?.,27 P

Clad ID j 10 Instantaneous partition factor UFSAR Tab 3.3_-1 . '

DG 0.278 cm2/sec Ref.27 12 diffusivity in He DL 1.27E-05 Ref.27 cm2/sec' 12 diffusivity in water 4 V-bub 6.9261 cm3 Ref.27 d-bub Bubble volume 2.3650 cm Bubble diameter Assumed l j v-bub =29.86*V-bub ^(1/6)  :

Bubble velocity  !

v-bub 41.2261 cm/sec Ref.27 Ko=1.646*DG/d-bub Ko Ref.27 0.1935 cm/sec Kc=3.75E-3*v-bub ~

Kc For turbulent flow Ref.27 0.1546 cm/sec ~

Kl=1.13*(DL*v-bub /d-bub)^(1/2) .

Ki 0.0168 cm/sec Ref.27 Keff=1./(11(Ko+Kc)+11(Kl*P)) l Keff -0.1134 Ref.27 k

H 20.4000 ft 621.7920 cm DFl=exp(6*Keff*H/d-bub /v-bub)

DFI 77 Ref.27 _.

DF=1/(IFO/DFO+1FI/DFI)

DF l 64 Ref.27 I

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CA0404! Rev.0 Page 31

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ATTACHMENT F .

FUEL ROD PIN PRESSURE AT 100 HOURS S

4 9

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Fg, d. .

i hkaf MO GAPPRES.

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A l B C  !

l l D E F 1 G H l FUEL ROD PIN PRESSURE AT 100 HOURS 2

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! 3 q'= Power *1.7/(217*176*L) l

4 -

dTfuel=q'/(4*pl*Kf) ,

6 dTgap=q'/(2"pl*Rf*Hg) Ref.22 l 6 dTclad=q'*Tc/(2*pi'Rf*Kc) Ref.22 i

7 dTcool=q'/(2*pl*Hs*(Rf+Tc)) Ref.22 8 R,ef.22 dT=q'/(2*pl)*[1/(2*Kf) + 1/(Rf*Hg) + Tc/(Rf*Kc) + 1/Hs/(Rf+Tc)]Ref.22 9 where 10 Kf 0.024 W/cm-K Ref.22 i 11 Rf 0.4782 cm 12 Rc UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 0.4877 cm l 13 Hg UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 '

1.1 W/cm2-K 14 Tc Ref.22 l l 0.07112 cm

  • 16 Kc UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 0.22 W/cm-K Ref.24 16 Hs 4.5 W/cm2-K 17 Ref.22
  • Power 2.754E+09 W 18 L-fuel UFSAR 3.2.1 - Ref.10 347.2180 cm 19 Ref.18

! L-pin 373.9617 ctn 20 alpha-Zr4 Ref.18 5.04E-06 ./K  ;

Ref.25

~

21 alpha-UO2 1.07E-05 ./K  !

22 Ref.25 23 At time t=0 100% FP 1.0 PF l

24 q' 207.6774 W/cm l 25 Tcool 548.0000 UFSAR F.4-9 Tcool 548.0000 A i 26 Tclad-min 572.0682 F Tclad 592.1782 F t 27 Tclad-max 612.2882 F Tgap 668.8405 F l 28 Tgap-min 612.2882 F Tfuel 1345.1350 F 29 Tgap-max 725.3928 F

Pgap 2162.5 psia 30 Tfuel-min 725.3928 F Ref.23 31 Tfuel-max 1964.8772 F .

32 dT 1416.8772 F 33 dt 1416.8772 F ^

34

! 35 At time t=0 1% FP 1.0 PF l 36 q' 2.0768 W/cm 37 Tcool 70.0000 Ref.23 Tcool 70.0000 F

{ 38 Tclad-min 70.2407 F. Tclad 70.4418 F 39 Tclad-max 70.6429 F. '

Tgap 40 Tgap min 71.2084 F 70.6429 F Tfuel 41 Tgap-max 77.9713 F 71.7739 F Vclad-cold 279.4141 cc 42 Tfuel-min 71.7739 F Vfuel-cold 249.4783 cc 43 Tfuel-max 84.1688 F Vgap-cold  ;

44 dT 29.9358 cc 14.1688 F Vclad-hot l 45 dt 280.8354 cc 14.1688 F Vfuel-hot {

46 255.1689 cc i Vgap-hot 25.6665 cc '

47 Pgap 872.2103 psia 48 i

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  • l GAppagg NM g,f, o l .Se 5 A B 49 At time t=0 C D E F 1% FP 1.7 PF G. H SO q'

.3.5305 W/cg1 61 Tcool S2 Tclad-min 140.0000 TS Tab.1.1 Tcool T 140.4092 F 140.0000 F 53 Tclad-max Tclad 140.7510 F 141.0929 F 64 Tgap-min Tgap 141.0920 F 142.0543 F 55 Tgap-max Tfuel 143.0157 F 153.5_513 F 56 Tfuel-min Vclad-cold 279.6054 cc 143.0157 F 57 Tfuel-max Vfuel-cold 249.8153 cc 164.0869 F 58 dT Vgap-cold 29.7901 cc 24.0869 F 59 dt 24.0869 F

' Vclad-hot 280.8354 cc 60 Vfuel-hot 255.1689 cc 61 Vgap-hot 25.6665 cc Pgap 993.4443 psia .

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DECAY HEAT GENERATION FOLLOWING SHLITDOWN *

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  • TIME

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PERCENT POWER gv7r O

7.00 in 5 MIN -

'7' ' l G '  !

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CA04048 Rev.0 Page 35 ATTACHMENT G .

FUEL ROD PIN PRESSURE AT 100 HOURS NONCONSERVATIVE 4

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WOYNWO W GAPPRES 6-1 A l_ B l C l D E F G H 1

FUEL ROD PIN PRESSURE AT 100 HOURS 2 l /

3 q'= Power *1.7/(217*176*L)

  • 4 dTfuel=q'/(4*pi'Kf) j Ref.22 5 dTgap=q'/(2*pi'Rf*Hg) Ref.22 6 dTclad=q'*Tc/(2*pi*Rf*Kc) Ref.22 7 dTcool=q'/(2*pi'Hs*(Rf+Tc)) Ref.22 8 dT=q'/(2*pi)*[1/(2*Kf) + 1/(Rf*Hg) + Tc/(Rf*Kc) + 1/Hs/(Rf+Tc)] Ref.22 9 where 10 Kf 0.024 W/cm-K Ref.22 11 Rf 0.4782 cm UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 l 12 Rc 0.4877 cm UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 13 Hg 0.5 W/cm2-K Ref.22 l 14 Tc 0.07112 cm *

)

UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 l 15 Kc 0.107 W/cm-K Ref.24 .

16 Hs 4.5 W/cm2-K Ref.22 4 I 17 Power 2.754E+09 W UFSAR 3.2.1 - Ref.10 18 L-fuel 347.2180 cm Ref.18 19 L-pin 373.9617 cm Ref.18 _

20 alpha-Zr4 5.84E-06 ./K -

Ref.25 '

21 alpha-UO2 1.07E-05 ./K Ref.25 22 23 At time t=0 100% FP 1.0 PF 24 q' 207.6774 W/cm 25 Tcool 548.0000 UFSAR F.4-9 Tcool 548.0000 F 26 Tclad-min 572.0682 F Tclad 613.4159 F 27 Tclad-max 654.7635 F Tgap 779.1785 F 28 Tgap-min 654.7635 F Tfuel 1523.3357 F 29 Tgap-max 903.5935 F Pgap 2162.5 psia Ref.23 30 Tfuel-mlii 903.5935 F f

31 Tfuel-max 2143.0779 F 32 dT 1595.0779 F 33 dt 1595.0779 F -

34 35 At time t=0 1% FP 1.0 PF 36 q' 2.0768 W/cm 37 Tcool 70.0000 Ref.23 Tcool 70.0000 F 38 Tclad-min 70.2407 F Tclad 70.6542 F 39 Tclad-max 71.0676 F Tgap 72.3118 F 40 Tgap-min 71.0676 F Tfuel 79.7534 F 41 Tgap-max 73.5559 F Vclad-cold 279.4147 cc 42 Tfuel-min 73.5559 F Vfuel-cold 249.4862 cc 43 Tfuel-max 85.9508 F Vgap-cold 29.9285 cc 44 dT 15.9508 F Vclad-hot 280.8934 cc 45 dt 15.9508 F Vfuel-hot 255.9761 cc 46 Vgap-hot 24.9173 cc 47 Pgap 773.1286 ptia 48 1

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$Y hy,b GAPPRES 8pe. 37 A ,,,1 R C D E F G 49 At time t=0 1% FP H 1.7 PF 50 q' / 2.5305 W/cm 51 Tcool 140.0000 TS Tab.1.1 Tcool 140.0000 F

  • 52 Tclad-min 140.4092 F Tclad 141.1121 F 53 Tclad-max 141.8150 F Tgap 143.9300 F-54 Tgap-min 141.8150 F Tfuel 156.5807 F 55 Tg'ap-max 146.0451 F Vclad-cold 279.6064 cc 66 Tfuel-min 146.0451 F Vfuel-cold 249.8288 cc 57 Tfuel-max 167.1163 F Vgap-cold 29.7775 cc 58 dT 27.1163 F Vclad-hot 280.8934 cc 59 dt 27.1163 F Vfuel-hot 255.9761 cc 60 Vgap-hot 24.9173 cc 61 Pgap 881.6575 psia O

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