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Category:Inservice/Preservice Inspection and Test Report
MONTHYEAR2CAN082301, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Twenty-Ninth Refueling Outage (2R29)2023-08-10010 August 2023 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Twenty-Ninth Refueling Outage (2R29) 1CAN032302, Inspection Summary Report for the Thirtieth Refueling Outage (1R30)2023-03-20020 March 2023 Inspection Summary Report for the Thirtieth Refueling Outage (1R30) 2CAN052202, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Eighth Refueling Outage (2R28) - Revision 12022-05-31031 May 2022 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Eighth Refueling Outage (2R28) - Revision 1 ML22126A0332022-05-10010 May 2022 Review of the Spring 2021 Steam Generator Tube Inspections During Refueling Outage 1R29 2CAN022201, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Eighth Refueling Outage (2R28)2022-02-0808 February 2022 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Eighth Refueling Outage (2R28) ML22034A8992022-02-0303 February 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports in Support of TSTF-577 1CAN102104, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R292021-10-22022 October 2021 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R29 2CAN082103, Unit 2 - Fifth 10-Year Interval Snubber Program Plan2021-08-31031 August 2021 Unit 2 - Fifth 10-Year Interval Snubber Program Plan 1CAN072102, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Ninth Refueling Outage (1R29)2021-07-19019 July 2021 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Ninth Refueling Outage (1R29) 2CAN122001, Submittal of 40-Year Containment Building Tendon Surveillance and Concrete Inspection2020-12-0404 December 2020 Submittal of 40-Year Containment Building Tendon Surveillance and Concrete Inspection 2CAN112005, Unit 2 - Inservice Testing Plan for the Fifth 10-Year Interval2020-11-24024 November 2020 Unit 2 - Inservice Testing Plan for the Fifth 10-Year Interval 2CAN072001, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Seventh Refueling Outage (2R27)2020-07-0808 July 2020 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Seventh Refueling Outage (2R27) 1CAN012004, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Eighth Refueling Outage2020-01-28028 January 2020 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Eighth Refueling Outage 2CAN091901, Entergy Operations, Inc. - Request for Alternatives Subject to the Fifth 10-Year Interval of the Inservice Testing Program2019-09-0303 September 2019 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Request for Alternatives Subject to the Fifth 10-Year Interval of the Inservice Testing Program 2CAN021906, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2019-02-28028 February 2019 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report 2CAN011903, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Sixth Refueling Outage2019-01-23023 January 2019 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Sixth Refueling Outage 1CAN101802, Submittal of 45th-Year Reactor Building Inspection Report2018-10-10010 October 2018 Submittal of 45th-Year Reactor Building Inspection Report 1CAN091802, Snubber Testing Program for Fifth Inservice Test Interval2018-09-24024 September 2018 Snubber Testing Program for Fifth Inservice Test Interval 1CAN081808, Inservice Testing Plan for the Fifth 10-Year Interval2018-08-27027 August 2018 Inservice Testing Plan for the Fifth 10-Year Interval 1CAN071802, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Seventh Refueling Outage (1R27)2018-07-25025 July 2018 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Seventh Refueling Outage (1R27) 2CAN101701, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage (2R25)2017-10-0606 October 2017 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage (2R25) 1CAN091703, Inservice Inspection, Pressure Test and Containment Inservice Inspection Program Plans for the Fifth 10-Year Interval2017-09-21021 September 2017 Inservice Inspection, Pressure Test and Containment Inservice Inspection Program Plans for the Fifth 10-Year Interval 1CAN031703, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R262017-03-22022 March 2017 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R26 1CAN031702, Reactor Building Inspection Summary Report - 1R262017-03-14014 March 2017 Reactor Building Inspection Summary Report - 1R26 1CAN031705, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Sixth Refueling Outage (1R26)2017-03-14014 March 2017 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Sixth Refueling Outage (1R26) 1CAN111602, Fifth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program, Relief Request VRR-ANO1-2017-12016-11-16016 November 2016 Fifth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program, Relief Request VRR-ANO1-2017-1 1CAN011602, Amended Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage (1R25)2016-01-18018 January 2016 Amended Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage (1R25) 1CAN051502, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage (1R25)2015-05-28028 May 2015 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage (1R25) 2CAN011503, Year Containment Building Tendon Surveillance and Concrete Inspection2015-01-16016 January 2015 Year Containment Building Tendon Surveillance and Concrete Inspection 2CAN081406, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Third Refueling Outage (2R23)2014-08-21021 August 2014 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Third Refueling Outage (2R23) 2CAN081404, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 2R232014-08-18018 August 2014 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 2R23 1CAN111301, Revised Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fourth Refueling Outage (1R24)2013-11-0505 November 2013 Revised Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fourth Refueling Outage (1R24) 1CAN101306, Unit 1, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R242013-10-23023 October 2013 Unit 1, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R24 1CAN101304, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fourth Refueling Outage (1R24)2013-10-21021 October 2013 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Fourth Refueling Outage (1R24) 1CAN101301, Request for Relief from Volumetric Examination Frequency Requirements, Request for Relief ANO1-ISI-0232013-10-0808 October 2013 Request for Relief from Volumetric Examination Frequency Requirements, Request for Relief ANO1-ISI-023 1CAN041305, Unit 1, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Fall 2011 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspections2013-04-30030 April 2013 Unit 1, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Fall 2011 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspections 2CAN121204, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Second Refueling Outage (2R22)2012-12-13013 December 2012 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Second Refueling Outage (2R22) 1CAN031203, Unit 1, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R232012-03-22022 March 2012 Unit 1, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R23 2CAN051102, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-First Refueling Outage2011-05-25025 May 2011 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-First Refueling Outage 2CAN011105, Program Section SEP-ISI-105 for ASME Section XI, Division 1, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Inservice Inspection Program2011-01-25025 January 2011 Program Section SEP-ISI-105 for ASME Section XI, Division 1, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Inservice Inspection Program ML1036305792010-12-29029 December 2010 Notification of Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 050-368/2011002) and Request for Information ML1022504182010-07-29029 July 2010 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R22 1CAN061004, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Second Refueling Outage (1R22)2010-06-29029 June 2010 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-Second Refueling Outage (1R22) 2CAN031006, Inservice Testing Plan for the Fourth 10-Year Interval2010-03-25025 March 2010 Inservice Testing Plan for the Fourth 10-Year Interval 1CAN021002, Response to Second Set of Requests for Additional Information on the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Requests2010-02-0909 February 2010 Response to Second Set of Requests for Additional Information on the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Requests 2CAN120901, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twentieth Refueling Outage (2R20)2009-12-0707 December 2009 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twentieth Refueling Outage (2R20) 1CAN030907, Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R212009-03-30030 March 2009 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1R21 1CAN030902, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-First Refueling Outage (1R21)2009-03-0404 March 2009 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Twenty-First Refueling Outage (1R21) CNRO-2009-00002, Relief Request CEP-ISI-011 for Third 120 Month Inservice Inspection Interval2009-03-0404 March 2009 Relief Request CEP-ISI-011 for Third 120 Month Inservice Inspection Interval 2CAN070802, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Nineteenth Refueling Outage (2R19)2008-07-0101 July 2008 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Nineteenth Refueling Outage (2R19) 2023-08-10
[Table view] Category:Letter type:
MONTHYEAR2CAN012401, U.S. Additional Protocol2024-01-17017 January 2024 U.S. Additional Protocol 2CAN012403, Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 42024-01-11011 January 2024 Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 0CAN012401, Registration of Cask Use2024-01-10010 January 2024 Registration of Cask Use 1CAN122301, Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval (ANO1-ISl-037)2023-12-14014 December 2023 Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval (ANO1-ISl-037) 2CAN112302, Submittal of Amendment 31 to Safety Analysis Report2023-11-16016 November 2023 Submittal of Amendment 31 to Safety Analysis Report 0CAN102303, Registration of Cask Use2023-10-24024 October 2023 Registration of Cask Use 0CAN102302, (ANO) Emergency Plan Revision 49 and Emergency Plan On-Shift Staffing Analysis Revision 32023-10-11011 October 2023 (ANO) Emergency Plan Revision 49 and Emergency Plan On-Shift Staffing Analysis Revision 3 0CAN102301, Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Study2023-10-0404 October 2023 Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Study 1CAN092301, Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 42023-09-21021 September 2023 Supplemental Information - Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 0CAN092302, Supplement to Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (ANO-CISI-002)2023-09-14014 September 2023 Supplement to Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (ANO-CISI-002) 2CAN092301, Reply to a Notice of Violation2023-09-0808 September 2023 Reply to a Notice of Violation 0CAN092301, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision2023-09-0505 September 2023 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision 0CAN082301, Units 1 and 2 - Changes to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Form for Radioactive Material Package No. 03412023-08-17017 August 2023 Units 1 and 2 - Changes to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Form for Radioactive Material Package No. 0341 2CAN082301, Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Twenty-Ninth Refueling Outage (2R29)2023-08-10010 August 2023 Inservice Inspection Summary Report for the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, Twenty-Ninth Refueling Outage (2R29) 0CAN072301, Registration of Cask Use2023-07-18018 July 2023 Registration of Cask Use 1CAN062304, Supplement Related to License Amendment Request to Remove Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation2023-06-29029 June 2023 Supplement Related to License Amendment Request to Remove Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation 0CAN062301, Status of Actions to Return to Compliance2023-06-26026 June 2023 Status of Actions to Return to Compliance 0CAN062302, Submittal of Revision 22 of the ANO Fire Hazards Analysis2023-06-20020 June 2023 Submittal of Revision 22 of the ANO Fire Hazards Analysis 1CAN062301, Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval (ANO1-ISI-037)2023-06-0808 June 2023 Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval (ANO1-ISI-037) 0CAN052303, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report for Calendar Year 20222023-05-24024 May 2023 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report for Calendar Year 2022 0CAN052302, Emergency Plan Rev. 482023-05-11011 May 2023 Emergency Plan Rev. 48 0CAN052301, Units 1 and 2 - Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 20222023-05-0909 May 2023 Units 1 and 2 - Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for 2022 2CAN052301, Cycle 30 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)2023-05-0303 May 2023 Cycle 30 Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) 0CAN042302, Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for 20222023-04-27027 April 2023 Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for 2022 0CAN042301, Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 20222023-04-14014 April 2023 Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2022 2CAN042301, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 42023-04-0505 April 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 1CAN032301, License Amendment Request to Modify the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Turbine Trip Function on Low Control Oil Pressure2023-03-30030 March 2023 License Amendment Request to Modify the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Turbine Trip Function on Low Control Oil Pressure 2CAN032303, Responses to Request for Additional Information Concerning the Request for Alternative Regarding the Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 462023-03-29029 March 2023 Responses to Request for Additional Information Concerning the Request for Alternative Regarding the Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 46 2CAN032304, Supplement to the Request for Alternative Regarding the Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 462023-03-29029 March 2023 Supplement to the Request for Alternative Regarding the Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 46 2CAN032305, 03 Post Examination Analysis2023-03-23023 March 2023 03 Post Examination Analysis 1CAN032302, Inspection Summary Report for the Thirtieth Refueling Outage (1R30)2023-03-20020 March 2023 Inspection Summary Report for the Thirtieth Refueling Outage (1R30) 1CAN012301, Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Relief ANO1-ISI-0352023-01-30030 January 2023 Responses to Request for Additional Information for Request for Relief ANO1-ISI-035 2CAN012303, U.S. Additional Protocol2023-01-23023 January 2023 U.S. Additional Protocol 2CAN012302, Relief Request ANO2-RR-23-001, Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 462023-01-20020 January 2023 Relief Request ANO2-RR-23-001, Half-Nozzle Repair of Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration 46 1CAN122201, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 42022-12-22022 December 2022 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 0CAN122202, Registration of Cask Use2022-12-21021 December 2022 Registration of Cask Use 0CAN122201, Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-22-0992022-12-0808 December 2022 Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-22-099 0CAN112201, Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (ANO-CISI-002)2022-11-10010 November 2022 Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (ANO-CISI-002) 1CAN102202, Application to Remove Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation2022-10-31031 October 2022 Application to Remove Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation 1CAN102203, Cycle 31 Core Operating Limits Report2022-10-24024 October 2022 Cycle 31 Core Operating Limits Report 1CAN102201, Supplement to Proposed Technical Specifications 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 Revised Dose Calculations2022-10-13013 October 2022 Supplement to Proposed Technical Specifications 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 Revised Dose Calculations 0CAN092201, Supplement to License Amendment Request for Approval of Changes to the Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements2022-09-29029 September 2022 Supplement to License Amendment Request for Approval of Changes to the Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements 1CAN092201, Supplement to Request for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fifth 10-Year Interval, First Period2022-09-0808 September 2022 Supplement to Request for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fifth 10-Year Interval, First Period 0CAN082201, License Amendment Request for Approval of Changes to the Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements2022-08-30030 August 2022 License Amendment Request for Approval of Changes to the Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements 1CAN082201, Request for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fifth 10-Year Interval, First Period2022-08-24024 August 2022 Request for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fifth 10-Year Interval, First Period 2CAN072201, Response to Request for Additional Information Requests for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second and Third Periods2022-07-20020 July 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Requests for Relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers Section XI Volumetric Examination Requirements - Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second and Third Periods 0CAN072201, Registration of Cask Use2022-07-14014 July 2022 Registration of Cask Use 0CAN062202, Registration of Cask Use2022-06-0909 June 2022 Registration of Cask Use 1CAN062201, Response to the Request for Additional Information Proposed Technical Specifications 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 Revised Dose Calculations2022-06-0202 June 2022 Response to the Request for Additional Information Proposed Technical Specifications 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 Revised Dose Calculations 1CAN052201, Request for Relief Related to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-729-6 Augmented Examination Requirements ANO1-ISI-0352022-05-31031 May 2022 Request for Relief Related to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case N-729-6 Augmented Examination Requirements ANO1-ISI-035 2024-01-17
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Text
Entergy Operations, Inc.
%Entergy 1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Tel 479-858-4704 Stephenie L. Pyle Manager, Licensing Arkansas Nuclear One 1 CAN041305 April 30, 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Fall 2011 Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspections Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51
References:
- 1. Entergy letter dated March 22, 2012, "Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report - 1 R23" (1 CAN031203) (ML12086A294)
- 2. NRC email dated March 11, 2013, "Request for Additional Information - TAC No. ME8279" (ML13070A289)
Dear Sir or Madam:
Entergy Operations, Inc. submitted information summarizing the results of the Fall 2011 steam generator tube inspections performed at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (Reference 1).
On reviewing the submittal, the NRC staff requested additional information to continue the review and issued Reference 2. The response to the Reference 2 request is attached.
This submittal contains no regulatory commitments.
Should you have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely, SLP/rwc
Attachment:
Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Fall 2011 Refueling Outage
1 CAN041305 Page 2 of 2 cc: Mr. Arthur T. Howell Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P. 0. Box 310 London, AR 72847 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Kaly Kalyanam MS 0-8 B1 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852
Attachment To 1CAN041305 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Fall 2011 Refueling Outage
Attachment to 1 CAN041305 Page 1 of 6 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSERVICE INSPECTIONS FOR THE FALL 2011 REFUELING OUTAGE TAC NO. ME8279 DOCKET No. 50-313 By letter dated March, 22, 2012, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems Accession Number [ADAMS] ML12086A294), Entergy Operations, Inc., the licensee, submitted information summarizing the results of the fall 2011 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The licensee discussed the progress and initial findings of the outage with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff in a teleconference summarized in a memorandum dated October 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Number ML12276A301). The licensee participated in a category 1 public meeting on January 26, 2012 to discuss tube-to-tube wear indications observed during the outage. The meeting summary can be found in ADAMS under Accession Number ML120270400.
In order for the staff to complete its review of the fall 2011 SG tube inspections, please provide the following:
- 1. For the last several inspection outages, please provide the effective full power years that the SGs had operated at the time of the inspection.
Actual SG Actual SG Actual SG End of Operating Operating Operating Year Cycle Cycl e Cycle Comment Outage Length Length Designation (EFPM) (EFPM) (EFPY) 2005 1R19 0 0 0 Baseline 2007 1R20 15.74 15.74 1.31 11lSI 2008 1R21 16.83 32.56 1.40 2 nd ISI 2010 1R22 14.80 47.36 1.23 3 rd IS[
2011 1R23 17.15 64.51 1.43 4 th ISI 2013 1R24 15.87 80.38 1.32 5th ISI
- 2. The tube in row 43, column 8 could not be stabilized. Please discuss the reason that the tube could not be stabilized. If it was because of bowing, please discuss if it would be expected that the tube could not be stabilized given the measured extent of bowing (given the size/stiffness of the stabilizing cable).
Attachment to 1 CAN041305 Page 2 of 6 The most likely reason for inability to stabilize the tube in R43 C8 was the combination of bowing and the uniquely designed stabilizer for the 1 R23 outage.
The qualified stabilizer for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) is a heat treated cable with segments of rigid sleeves. During 1 R23, two attempts were made to install a segmented stabilizer at the location R43 C8. After the first attempt, a review of the condition was made and based on judgment it was assumed that the stabilizer could have kinked during installation. During the second attempt the second stabilizer was inserted to the same depth. With the same resulting relative insertion indicating the stabilizer was binding at the same location. Entergy expected to be able to install the qualified stabilizer in this tube; however, based on the extent of bowing of the tube during cold conditions and the length of the rigid sleeve, the stabilizer could not pass. The non-insertion condition was entered into Entergy's Corrective Action Program as CR-ANO 2011-02146.
- 3. The bowing in the upper spans of SG B appears to be larger than for SG A. In SG B, one tube was plugged for bowing in the upper portion of the SG (upon initial discovery of this phenomenon).
- a. Please discuss if this experience is similar to what has been observed in SG A. If the experience is different, please discuss any insights on the nature of the difference.
This is similar to what is observed in SG A. The bowing is a function of which tube support plates (TSP) hang on the inner shroud and which side of the support plate are affected also. For example if the top TSP hangs on the "z" side of the generator and the TSP below it hangs in a slightly different spot, the effect on the upper spans results in an "S"shape bow due to the plates moving in slightly different directions.
Additionally the extent of the bowing is also affected by when the TSP actually hangs on the inner shroud during the cool down. The extent of the bowing in the upper span is therefore a function of which TSPs lock, where and when.
- b. Please discuss any insights on why the tie rod bowing in SG B manifested itself after several cycles of operation (i.e., what changed in the steam generator that would cause the tube supports to "lock up" after several cycles of operation).
Because SG B possessed no detectable bowing after the first three operating cycles (1 R20, 1R21, 1 R22) but did after the fourth operating cycle (1 R23), it is postulated that the change in the condition of the surfaces increased the effective friction coefficient and resulted in some previously 'partially bound' locations (1 R20, 1 R21, 1R22) on certain TSPs to become 'fully bound' (or at least significantly more bound; 1R23). This increased binding results in larger vertical pull-down forces during plant cool down and the consequent increased tie rod bowing.
Based on the many similarities shared by SG A and SG B, the same basic mechanism (frictional binding) that is occurring in SG A is now detectably active in
Attachment to 1 CAN041305 Page 3 of 6 SG B. The presence of a common active mechanism producing tie rod bowing in SG A and SG B is somewhat anticipated. This is because the mechanism involves several effects occurring during fabrication and both steam generators were fabricated using the same materials, tools, techniques, procedures and processes.
The regions experiencing frictional binding have interferences that are a result of fabrication tolerance stack-up. Potentially, the difference between 'binding' and 'no binding' could be only a few mils of interference or clearance. It is postulated that the local regions of tolerance stack-up result in more interference for SG A as compared to SG B. Hence, for SG B the cumulative surface corrosion and/or small particulate accumulation over a longer time (3 refuel cycles) was required to offset the initial clearance (or increase initial low level binding) and produce sufficient binding to create tie rod bowing.
- 4. In Section 3.7 of your report, you indicate that there were five new tube-to-tube proximity indications. In Table 3.7.1, there appears to only be three new tube-to-tube proximity indications (outermost ring in 1 4 th (row 128) and 1 5 th (row 12) span; third outermost ring in 1 st span (row 85)). Similarly, for SG B, it was indicated that there were seven locations of tie-rod-to-tube contact, but the table only appears to list six locations (also, for SG A, 11 locations in text and 9 locations in Table for I R20). Please clarify.
Table 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 were an attempt to present the extent of bowing for a given location. This is broken down by span and ring and row for a particular tie rod. For example the row 12 listed in the 15th span also has a row 13 in the 1 5 th span that is associated with the same tie rod. Therefore the reference to five new proximity indications is related to the number of tubes not locations. There are 92 tubes with some form of proximity currently in SG A for 1 R23. That can be a tie rod to a tube, a tube to a tube or both.
For SG A - Five new tube-to-tie rod proximity indications were detected, one in the first span, two in the fourteenth span, and two in the fifteenth span.
Row Tube Span 13 18 15 24 10 15 110 8 14 128 10 14 85 36 1 Tie rods change slightly from outage to outage but historically have bowed in the same general direction. The magnitude of bowing can also change in either direction. For example it can increase but can also stay the same or decrease if the load is directed towards the inner rings more than the outer ring.
The number for SG B that was referenced in the report was seven tubes that were in contact with tie rods in the first span and not tie rod locations.
Attachment to 1 CAN041305 Page 4 of 6 Any tube coming in contact with a tie rod at power will be removed from service by plugging. This will account for a projected residual bow.
- 5. Please discuss any insights on the nature of the new pattern of "appreciable" wear at tube support plate 6 in SG A.
- a. Is there any correlation of this wear with the tie rod bowing issue (even in light of the fact that the bowing occurs during shutdown periods)?
No - the TSP wear appears to be a function of the tube pre-load which is under investigation as part of the tube to tube wear (TTW) root cause. The tubes around the tie rods do not have consistent wear at the TSPs.
- b. Has anything occurred operationally (e.g., power uprate, significant change in SG operating parameters (e.g., feedwater temperature)) that would explain the significant increase in the number of new wear indications at the tube support plates?
No - all operating parameters have remained the same since the steam generators were replaced in 2005.
- c. Has the number of new wear indications increased or decreased (per outage) since SG replacement?
Even the original steam generators would periodically see changes in the number of new indications. This would appear to be consistent.
Outage SG A Wear SG A New SG B Wear SG B New Calls Wear Calls Calls Wear Calls 1R20 690 690 512 512 1R21 %990 524 %1029 685 1 R22 * * *
- 1R23 1492 # 501/2 = 251 1414 # 396/2 = 198 Only Tie Rods Were Inspected
- This value is for 2 fuel cycles so it is divided by 2
% During the first inservice inspection (ISI) (1 R20), only a sample of the total wear population was re-inspected (using X-Probe) for confirmation. During 1 R21 however, every wear indication was re-inspected. The 1R21 re-inspection resulted in approximately one-third of the 1 R20 wear calls being re-classified as
Attachment to 1CAN041305 Page 5 of 6 "NDF" (no defect found). Even though these indications have been re-classified, the "TWD" (through-wall degradation) call stored in the Data Management System for the 1 R20 outage still remains as the official 1R20 call. The update to "NDF" is reflected in the 1R21 data.
SG-A: 690 (1 R20 TWDs) - 466 (1 R21 repeats) = 224 (1 R21 NDFs)
SG-B: 512 (1R20 TWDs)- 344 (1R21 repeats) = 168 (1R21 NDFs)
- d. Has the growth rate of the wear indications increased or decreased with time?
The repeat and new growth rates have continued to decrease with time. The once-through design results in different parts of the generator having different wear rates.
For example in the 9th span where the aspirating ports are, the cross flow becomes more turbulent which results in higher rates than the lower part of the bundle.
Outage SG A Repeat SG A New SG B Repeat SG B Repeat Growth Rate Growth Rate Growth Rate Growth Rate
(%/EFPY) (%IEFPY) (%IEFPY) (%IEFPY) 1R20 1stISI 9.3 1st 11.4 1R21 3.57 8.56 5.71 9.99 1 R22 * * *
- Only Tie Rods Were Inspected
- 6. One tube had three indications of wear attributed to tube-to-tube contact. In order for this to occur, the tubes involved would have to move in different directions to affect the tube in the middle.
The 1 R23 Condition Monitoring Operational Assessment (CMOA) (AREVA document 51-9173653-002) identified two locations with three wear scars, both in SG B (21-47 and 25-72). Note that this identification was made after re-analysis was performed on prior inspection data from 1 R20 and 1 R21 as well 1 R23 based on limited number of tubes with Array or +Point data.
The initial planned 1 R24 SG B eddy current inspections are complete. Inspections using qualified array techniques have identified one tube with TTW indications. The tube SG B R25 T72 has 3 wear scars and is shown below. The 1 R24 inspections were performed for tie rod bowing phenomena. These inspections included tubes with previous TTW indications but not adjacent tubing. Adjacent tubing to R25 T72 could have TTW and currently would remain uninspected.
Attachment to 1 CAN041305 Page 6 of 6 Additional testing is planned for 1 R24 to support diagnostic testing of tubing preload.
This testing is referred to as Frequency Response Testing. It includes pre- and post-test eddy current.
Testing of adjacent tubing to R25 T72 will be performed with the Array Probe.
24 24 2422 6 (68 1 GROUP 3 wear 2502wear 7Wwear SG B Location of Tube with 3 Wear Scars
- a. Is this information being considered in your root cause assessment?
For the TTW Root Cause Analysis (RCA), the fact that a tube can be in contact with one or more tubes and experiencing wear is not an unlikely event. In this case, tube R25-T72 may not be active in the bowing, but rather affected by its neighbors bowing towards it. The additional inspection mentioned above will help in this determination.
The Tie Rod Bowing RCA does not consider TTW as a possible cause for tie rod bowing.
- b. Has the extent of movement of the tubes been considered in evaluating the inspection findings (assume that the affected tube moved in one direction then a neighboring tube would have to move considerably more to come into contact with the "affected" tube - is there any concern with the extent of movement on tube integrity)?
Extent of movement is not necessary in evaluating of the inspection findings when considering tie rod bowing, as bowing is due to compressive load caused by controlled movement of the tube sheets. Moreover, the measurements for tubes bowings during inspection only found one or two tubes with bowing, which suggest that tubes restored their "straight" condition after the loads were released.
In regards to evaluation of the TTW itself, the extent of movement is not a contributing factor for determining structural integrity for evaluation of CMOA.