05000528/FIN-2006012-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement the Operability Determination Process |
| Description | The team identified two examples of a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to perform operabilty determinations. In both examples, the licensee failed to perform an operability determination following identification of a degraded condition that had the potential to adversely affect the safety function of all emergency diesel generators. Specifically, an operability determination was not performed after identifying the failure of the Unit 3 Train A emergency diesel generator on July 25, 2006, was potentially the result of plastic debris affecting proper auxiliary contact operation of a K-1 relay. The licensee determined the debris most likely originated from a modification performed on all emergency diesel generator K-1 relays during initial plant startup. Following another failure of the Unit 3 Train A emergency diesel generator on September 22, 2006, an operability determination was not performed after identifying the failure was the result of the K-1 relay actuating arm not providing adequate compression of the auxiliary contacts. The licensee determined this degraded condition most likely originated during implementation a modification done to all emergency diesel generator K-1 relays during initial plant startup. This finding is greater than minor because the failure to follow the operability determination process, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern in that degraded or nonconforming conditions would not be properly evaluated. Using the Phase 1 worksheet in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because unreliable K-1 relay operation resulted in no actual loss of safety function of the other five emergency diesel generators prior to corrective actions being implemented, and the finding did not represent a potential risk significant condition because of a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event. This issue is documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report/Disposition Requests 2928389 and 2940558. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting element of problem identification and resolution in that engineering personnel failed to properly evaluate and perform operability determinations for identified degraded conditions affecting the emergency diesel generators (Section 4.0). |
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000528/2006012 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2006 (2006Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Howell M Bloodgood M Hay M Runyan S Rutenkroger |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Palo Verde - IR 05000528/2006012 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Palo Verde) @ 2006Q4
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||