05000498/FIN-2016002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Control Steam Generator Water Levels at Low Power |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealed, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Procedures, for failure to implement procedures for power operation as described in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 2.g, dated February 1978. Specifically, the procedure the licensee used for low power operation failed to include adequate instructions for the control of steam generator water levels, which resulted in a plant cooldown, a letdown isolation, a pressurizer power-operated relief valve lift, and unplanned entry into two technical specification action statements. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2015-26657. The inspectors determined that the failure to control steam generator water levels due to an inadequate procedure during lower power operations was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the failure to control steam generator water levels resulted in a plant cooldown, a reactor coolant system letdown isolation, a pressurizer power-operated relief valve to lift, and unplanned entry into two technical specification action statements. The inspectors screened this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green per Section B. of Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss-of-coolant accident, did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident resulting in a total loss of their function, and did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. Inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of training in the human performance area because the organization failed to provide training and ensure knowledge was transferred to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, because the licensee provided start-up training and simulator based training, skill of the craft vice detailed procedures was thought to be adequate for controlling steam generator water levels at low power [H.9]. |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2016002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez N Hernandez N Taylor |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (South Texas) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
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