05000461/FIN-2013005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Requirements of Station Scaffold Installation Procedure |
| Description | Inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings for the failure to follow station procedure MA-AA-796-024, Scaffold Installation, Inspection, and Removal, Revision 8, to obtain engineering approval for seismic scaffolds not complying with specific requirements of approved station procedures during the C1R14 outage. Specifically, seismic scaffolds identified during walkdowns by the inspectors did not meet procedural requirements for required clearances from or tie off to safety-related components and did not have the required engineering evaluation and approval for acceptability. The licensee documented this issue in the corrective action program (CAP) as Issue Report (IR) 01574003 and completed the required engineering review and approval. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to follow the station procedure for scaffold installation, inspection, and removal was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems (MS) cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4 Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix G Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, the finding was screened against Attachment 1, Checklist 8 and found to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not: 1) increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory, 2) degrade the licensees ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory when needed, 3) significantly degrade the licensees ability to recover decay heat removal once it is lost, 4) result in one or less safety relief valves being available to establish a heat removal path to the suppression pool with the vessel head on. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the resources component, in that the licensee ensures that personnel, equipment, procedures and other resources are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the scaffold coordinator and superintendents had the required training to assure nuclear safety while erecting seismic scaffolds. |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2013005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Boland D Jones D Lords J Laughlin R Walton S Bell S Mischke W Schaup |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| Finding closed by | |
| IR 05000461/2013005 (11 February 2014) | |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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