05000461/FIN-2013003-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Procedures Resulted in the Unplanned Intake of Radioactive Material by Five Workers |
| Description | A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for the failure to follow procedures associated with the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) on March 28, 2013. The issue resulted in the unplanned intake of radioactive material by five workers. RWP 10014553, 2013 RW HRA/LHRA, Revision 0, established the requirement for the usage of high efficiency particulate air vacuums during the cleanup of a legacy radioactive resin spill. The licensee replaced this cleanup method with manual resin removal during the cleanup contrary to the conditions set in the RWP. This is a performance deficiency, which was within the licensees ability to foresee and should have been prevented. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request 01494203. The licensee completed actions to ensure worker compliance with radiation protection program procedures. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor safety significance in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that, the workers received additional and unplanned dose from the intake of radioactive materials. The significance was determined in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined the finding has very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve: (1) As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) planning or work controls involving excessive occupational collective dose, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) compromised ability to assess dose. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of human performance with the component of decision making. The licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and failed to adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed. |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2013003 Section 2RS1 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil B Kemker R Walton S Mischke D Lords C Lipa J Draper B Winter V Myers S Bell |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Clinton) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||